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Abstract
Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine have been particularly substantive 
and multidimensional, involving high levels of interaction and encompassing a 
wide range of salient issues in the political, military, economic and societal 
spheres. In the second half of the 1990s, their institutional framework was 
developed to reflect the different processes of bilateral integration between 
Russia and Belarus, on the one hand, and of a less far-reaching cooperation 
between Russia and Ukraine, on the other.
This work analyses and compares Russo-Belarusian and Russo-Ukrainian 
relations since the mid-1990s, examining their role in domestic politics and 
placing them in the wider international context. It is concerned with the 
formulation of objectives and strategies guiding Russia’s policies towards Belarus 
and Ukraine, surveying the perspectives of different elite groups and public 
opinion. It investigates linkages between issues in bilateral relations along with 
Russia’s use of various policy instruments. Relative gains In Russia’s economic 
relations with Belarus and Ukraine respectively are considered in order to assess 
the effectiveness of economic levers in each case.
The evolution of the Russia-Belarus Union forms a major part of the study, 
looking beyond its institutional development into the progress actually made in 
attaining declared objectives, particularly economic convergence and unity in 
terms of foreign and defence policy. Likewise, the contractual basis of relations 
between Russia and Ukraine is examined and contrasted with actual tendencies 
in bilateral social and economic interaction as well as with the development of 
political and military cooperation. The material and conceptual factors shaping 
the external orientations of Belarus and Ukraine are explored with a view to 
understanding their diverging positions towards Russia.
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Introduction
Russia, like the rest of the states that resulted from the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, is still a relatively new actor in international affairs. Having inher­
ited the diplomatic apparatus and certain attributes of a global power (such as 
membership of the United Nations Security Council) from the Soviet Union, 
Russia initially gave secondary attention to its immediate neighbourhood. As 
Russian foreign policy has had to rationalise its objectives, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and Russia's European environment have been 
increasingly clearly identified as the primary foci of Russian concern. Forming 
integral part of both these international environments, Belarus and Ukraine 
have risen in prominence among Russia’s external priorities. Sometimes over­
shadowed by international headline-making issues such as relations with 
NATO, the upgrading of relations with Belarus and Ukraine has been one of 
the principal endeavours of Russian foreign policy since the mid-1990s. Rus­
sia has since embarked on a bilateral process of political, economic and mili­
tary integration with Belarus and has taken steps in the direction of reaching 
political understanding and forging close economic and military cooperation 
with Ukraine.
Belarus and Ukraine are Russia’s closest neighbours, but not in a geo­
graphical sense alone. They are in many ways of special significance to Rus­
sia, not least due to their largely shared East Slavic and Orthodox cultural heri­
tage and dense inter-societal relations, blurring the line separating the domes­
tic from the international sphere. They are among Russia’s most important 
trading partners, still linked to their larger neighbour by a multitude of eco­
nomic relations, many of which vital to the prosperity of all three countries’ 
most promising economic sectors. Their bilateral relations with Russia are of 
pivotal importance, not only to their own positioning in the international envi­
ronment, but equally to Russia’s efforts to promote centripetal tendencies 
within the CIS and advance a less NATO-centric European security system. 
Belarus is, thus, valued as Russia’s ciosest reliable aliy, while, as a leading 
Russian foreign policy expert has noted, “a Ukraine that is allied to Russia is
probably the sweetest dream of the Russian elite”.^  From a European perspec­
tive, the evolution of Russia’s reiations with Belarus and Ukraine is bound to 
form a crucial determinant of whether the dynamics prevailing on the eastern 
boundary of the enlarged Euro-Atlantic community (following the expansions of 
NATO and the European Union into Central Europe) will be primarily those of 
stability and cooperation or tension and confrontation.
Research objectives
This work will be concerned with the sources, the instruments and the results 
of Russia’s policies towards Belarus and Ukraine, focusing on the second Yel­
tsin administration and the first year and a half of the Putin presidency.^ It is a 
period in which the open-ended debates about Russia’s future and role in the 
world, which characterised the early post-Soviet years, lost much of their sali­
ence in the face of the need to find concrete solutions to a range of imminent 
problems in Russia’s relations with its neighbours. Relatively narrow economic 
(e.g. division of Soviet assets and liabilities; new trading arrangements; debt 
settlement mechanisms; revival of industrial cooperation), political (e.g. border 
recognition) and military issues (e.g. Russia’s use of military installations out­
side its territory) have constituted a very substantial agenda. At the same time, 
Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine have been shaped by longer-term 
economic interests and broader political ends. These relate to the multi­
faceted process of Russo-Belarusian integration and to the search for a viable 
partnership with Ukraine, despite their leaderships’ divergent visions concern­
ing European security arrangements and the future of the CIS. Examining the 
linkages within this wide array of issues would offer a promising way of gaining 
insights into the complex dynamics of Russia’s interaction with two of its most 
important neighbours.
Moreover, Belarus and Ukraine appear especially suitable as comparative 
cases, as they share a number of features affecting their relations with Russia:
 ^Alexei Bogaturov, “An inside outsider’’, in Tom Casier and Katlijn Malfliet (eds.), Is Russia a 
European Power? The Position of Russia in a New Europe. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
1998, p. 87
 ^The first Yeltsin presidency (as well as that of Leonid Kravchuk in Ukraine and the Kebich 
leadership in Belarus) will be looked at primarily as background to later political decisions.
continued salience of a mixed Sovlet/Orthodox/East Slavic cultural heritage 
linking them to Russia; high (albeit different) degrees of economic dependence 
on their Eastern neighbour; and a current position as ‘outsiders’ in the ongoing 
process of European integration.^ A juxtaposition of Russian considerations 
applying to each of these two countries is intended to illustrate the relative 
weight of different factors and concerns in Russian foreign policy formulation. 
The examination of diverging strategies (or lack thereof) and policy outcomes 
in Russia’s relations with Belarus, on the one hand, and those with Ukraine, on 
the other, may serve to identify effective policy instruments as well as con­
straints in connection to Russian policy objectives in this region. A comparative 
analysis of the foreign policy orientations of the Lukashenko and Kuchma ad­
ministrations (the respective leaderships of Belarus and Ukraine since 1994) 
will aim to pinpoint the domestic and external factors underlying their diverging 
approaches to relations with Russia.
The emphasis on Russia’s policies does not assume that all initiatives origi­
nate exclusively from Russia and that the role of Belarus and Ukraine is limited 
to merely responding to Russian incentives or pressures. This has clearly not 
been the case of the integration process with Belarus, in which initiative have 
come predominantly from the Beiarusian leadership, while Russian policy­
makers have taken a more cautious approach. However, due to its overwhelm­
ing political, economic and strategic weight and -  at least theoretically -  supe­
rior bargaining power, Russia remains by far the most influential actor in this 
region. It is on this basis that closer scrutiny Is devoted to the emergence and 
pursuit of Russian policy preferences. Likewise, relations between Belarus and 
Ukraine will be beyond the scope of this study, as they have been far less ex­
tensive and substantive than those between each of the two countries and 
Russia. More broadly, the relations of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus with third 
states and organisations will not be a subject of investigation in their own right, 
but will be considered only in so far as they function as inputs in Russo-
 ^This term has been borrowed from the classification employed by M. Light, J. Lôwenhardt 
and S. White in the research project The Outsiders: Russia. Ukraine. Belarus. Moldova, and 
the New Europe (part of the Economic and Social Research Council’s “One Europe or Sev­
eral?” programme). It denotes European states which are neither members of NATO and/or 
the EU (Insiders’) or in the process of accession to these structures (‘pre-ins’).
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Belarusian and Russo-Ukrainian relations. Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian 
domestic politics or the three leaderships’ domestic policy agendas (e.g. gov­
ernment reshuffles; economic reform strategies) will also be referred to the ex­
tent that they underlie particular developments in relations between Russia, on 
the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine, on the other. The complex issues of 
Crimean separatism and of the ethnic Russian and Russophone populations in 
Ukraine will not be examined in detail, but from the narrower perspective of 
their impact on inter-state relations between Russia and Ukraine.
This is not to suggest a rigidly limited definition of the foreign policy realm 
(as opposed to domestic politics and policy) or restrict the scope of research to 
interaction between foreign ministries. Given the very substantial economic 
element to Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine, attention needs to be 
paid to the positions and activities of state economic agencies (e.g. trade and 
finance ministries; customs committees), regional administrations and enter­
prises engaging in major transactions with political implications (e.g. energy 
exports). These may not always be consistent with the declared objectives ex­
pressed by the institutions competent to formulate and express official policy in 
the field of external relations. This may also be the case with other governmen­
tal agencies (e.g. defence ministries), regional authorities and national legisla­
tures. In the present study, official policy will be identified with the positions 
taken by the executive branch (also to be referred to as a given country’s po­
litical leadership) and more specifically of the presidency (assisted by the Se­
curity Council) and the foreign ministry, which are in charge of foreign relations 
in all three countries under consideration. For the purposes of simplicity, the 
names of the three countries or those of their capitals will at times be used to 
denote the executive authorities (e.g. “ Is Russia blackmailing Ukraine?’’). This 
usage is not meant to convey the assumptions that the states in question be­
have as unitary actors'* or that inter-societal interaction (the ‘human aspect’ of 
international relations) is not relevant to this study. The main focus will remain 
on the national (state) level of policy formulation, which, in this particular re-
No such assumption underlies the use of the collective term ‘the West’ to refer to NATO, the 
European Union and their member-states. It is not intended merely as a convenient shorthand, 
but also to denote common positions (e.g. with regard to the Lukashenko regime) or to take 
account of political discourse (in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) reflecting perceptions of the 
West as a whole.
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gional context, maintains its function as a mediator between sub-national ac­
tors (e.g. regional authorities) and the wider international environment.
Sources and Methods
Secondary Literature
Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been the 
object of extensive research. The role of ideas (i.e. conceptions of national 
identity drawn from different interpretations of history and resulting in different 
notions of Russia’s appropriate role in the international environment) in the 
evolution of Russian foreign policy has been explored (among others) by Iver 
Neumann, Ilya Prizel, and David Kerr.^ Kugler and Kozintseva have analysed 
the interaction between external factors (especially Western powers’ foreign 
policies) and the formulation of Russian foreign policy preferences. They pre­
sent credible forecasts of Russia’s future international behaviour based on a 
rigorous examination of stated preferences and projected capabilities.® The re­
lationship between developments in Russia’s domestic politics and foreign pol­
icy change has been thoroughly investigated in a study by Malcolm, Pravda, 
Allison, and Light.^ Mark Webber, and the volumes edited by Dawisha and 
Parrott have integrated the above aspects in the examination of Russia’s rela­
tions with the states of the ‘near abroad’.® Richard Latter's study as well as two 
highly informative and analytically rich volumes edited by Baranovsky, and Al-
® Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. London: Routledge, 1996; Ilya Prizel, Na­
tional Identity and Foreign Policy. Cambridge, CUP, 1998; David Kerr, T h e  New Eurasianism: 
The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia’s Foreign Policy", Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 47, No. 6, 1995, 
pp. 977-988
® Richard L. Kugler and Marianna V. Kozintseva, Eniaraino NATO: The Russia Factor. Santa 
Monica, California: RAND, 1996
 ^ Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal Factors in Russian For­
eign Policy. Oxford: OUP/Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996 
® Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States. Manchester: 
MUP, 1996; Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994; K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.), The Making of For­
eign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995; 
K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds.). The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions 
in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997
lison and Bluth respectively have been concerned with the security dimension 
of these relations.® Moreover, there exist several edited volumes surveying 
post-Soviet Russia's policies towards various regions of the world, all of which 
contain chapters on Russia’s relations to either the other post-Soviet states 
taken as a whole, or to the Western newly independent states in particular.^® In 
his thorough analysis of the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement, J.L. Black 
devotes extensive attention to Ukraine’s interaction with the Alliance and the 
consequences for Russo-Ukrainian military-political relations.*^ A major re­
search project by White, Light and Lowenhardt has explored foreign policy 
preferences among the elites and mass publics in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova, with these countries’ relations with NATO and the EU forming 
the primary focus of the analysis.*^
Relations between Russia and Ukraine have been one of the issues covered 
by books related to either Ukraine’s role in the international field or to the 
country’s overall development.*® An edited volume by the Zürich Center for Se­
curity Studies and Conflict research deserves particular mention. Its papers 
represent in-depth, authoritative examinations of the considerations underlying 
Ukrainian foreign policy (domestic politics; elite and mass public conceptions
 ^Richard Latter, Russia, its Neighbours and the Future of European Security. Wilton Park Pa­
per 94, London: HMSO, 1994; Viadimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging 
Security Agenda. New York: SiPRi/ Oxford University Press, 1997; Roy Aliison and Christo­
pher Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia. London: RIIA, 1998
Biackwill, Robert D. and Karaganov, Sergei A. (eds.), Damage Limitation or Crisis?. Wash­
ington: Brassey’s Inc., 1994; Leon Aron and Kenneth M. Jensen (eds ), The Emergence of 
Russian Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1994; Peter Shear­
man (ed.), Russian Foreign Poiicv since 1990. Boulder CO: West view Press, 1995 
** J.L. Black, Russia faces NATO expansion: bearing gifts or bearing arms?. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, pp. 175-202
The project The Outsiders: Russia. Ukraine. Belarus. Moldova and the New Europe has 
been conducted within the "One Europe or Several?” Research Programme of the UK Eco­
nomic and Social Research Council. Outputs have included: M. Light, S. White, and J. Lowen­
hardt, “A wider Europe: the view from Moscow and Kyiv", International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 1, 
2000, pp. 77-88; M. Light, J. Lowenhardt, and S. White, Russia and the Dual Expansion of 
Europe. Policy Paper 02/00, Brighton: Economic and Social Research Council, University of 
Brighton, 2000
Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Poiicv. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers/The Center for 
Strategic and international Studies, 1995; and Ukraine under Kuchma. London: Macmil­
lan/Centre for Russian and East European Studies (University of Birmingham), 1997
of national identity and interests; security considerations) as well as of particu­
lar directions of Ukrainian diplomatic activity (Russia; NATO; the EU; Central 
Europe; the Black Sea region).*"* A comparable range of topics is covered by 
two volumes on Ukraine’s external relations published by the Ukrainian Re­
search Institute of Harvard University.*® The monographs by Sherman Garnett 
and Tor Bukkvoll focus on Ukraine’s position in the international security envi­
ronment, also surveying domestic sources of potential instability and relations 
with Russia. Both works do not extend beyond the early years of the Kuchma 
presidency.*® The studies by Anatol Lieven and Andrew Wilson, which are 
based on extensive primary research on the ethnic, linguistic and regional 
cleavages within Ukraine, provide valuable insights into the complexities of 
Ukraine’s choice of external orientation, but do not examine relations with Rus­
sia as such.*^ Paul D’ Anieri’s study focuses specifically on bilateral economic 
relations, which it examines through the prism of the competing international 
relations theories. However, it is primarily concerned with the period 1992- 
1996 and makes little use of primary sources.*® A more comprehensive and up- 
to-date study exists in the Russian language, which covers economic and po­
litical developments, but not security aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian relation­
ship.*® The book-length study by Roman Solchanyk is also comprehensive, but 
appeared after most of the research for the present work had been com-
Spillman, Kurt R., Wenger Andreas, and Müiler, Derek (eds.), Between Russia and the 
West: Foreign and Security Poiicv of Independent Ukraine. Bern: Peter Lang AG, 1999 
Lubomyr A. Hajda (ed.), Ukraine in the World. Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, 
Harvard University, 1996 and (same editor, title and publisher) 1998 
Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment
of Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace/ Brookings institution Press, 1997; Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security. Chat­
ham House Papers, London: RIIA, 1997 
Anatol Lieven, Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry. Washington DC: United States insti­
tute of Peace Press, 1999; Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority 
Faith. Cambridge: CUP, 1997.See also Andrew Wilon, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000 
Paul J. D' Anieri, Economic Interdependence in Ukrainlan-Russian Relations. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999 
Robert Yezverov, Ukraina: s Rossiei Vmeste ill Vroz’?. Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2000
pleted.^® A journal article by economists Krasnov and Brada deserves particu­
lar mention, since it represents the only systematic attempt at calculating the 
overall balance of Russo-Ukrainian economic transactions (including division 
of Soviet assets and liabilities, trade and debt repayments).^* James Sherr’s 
papers offer insightful analyses of strategic and political factors in Ukraine's 
relations with Russia, concentrating on particular events (division of the Black 
Sea Fleet, dismissal of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk.
The issue of Russo-Belarusian integration has been briefly covered in the 
work of David Marples on contemporary Belarusian politics and society.^® A 
monograph (in Russian) by Nadezhda Pastukhova surveys the history of 
Russo-Belarusian relations from the formation of the Soviet Union to the pre­
sent, summarily covering various aspects of the current integration process. 
There is another book of similar content by Yu. Godin, which, however, ap­
peared after the research for this work had already been completed.^'* Other 
Russian-language book-length publications on Russo-Ukrainian and Russo- 
Belarusian relations have been principally in the form of collections of articles 
by experts in specific aspects of bilateral relations (e.g. historical background; 
mass public attitudes; economic relations; the role of regional factors).^® Such
Roman Solchanyk, Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2000
Krasnov, Gregory V. and Brada, Josef C., “Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy 
Trade", Eurooe-Asia Studies. Vol. 49, No. 5, 1997, pp. 825-823
Sherr, James, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?: The Baltic Sea Fleet Accords”, Survival. 
Vol. 39, No. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 33-50; Sherr, J., The Dismissal of Borvs Tarasvuk. Occa­
sional Brief no. 79, Camberley, Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre/ Royal Military 
Academy Sandhurst, October 2000
David R. Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Press, 
1999
Nadezhda Pastukhova, Sovuz Rossii i Belorussii: Istoriva. Nastovashchee. Persoektivv. 
Moscow: Kniga i Biznes, 2000; Yu. F. Godin, Rossiva i Belorussiva na outv k vedinenivu. Mos­
cow: Mezhdunarodnve Otnosheniva. 2001
Dmitry E. Furman, Ukraina i Rossiva: Obshchestva i Gosudarstva. First edition, Moscow: 
“Mir, Progress, Prava Cheioveka"/ Publications of the Andrei Sakharov Museum and Public 
Centre, 1997; and Belorussiva i Rossiva: Obshchestva i Gosudarstva. Second edition, Mos­
cow: "Mir, Progress, Prava Cheioveka"/ Publications of the Andrei Sakharov Museum and 
Public Centre, 1998; A. Zverev, B. Koppiters, D.Trenin (eds.), Etnlcheskive i Realonal’nve 
Konfiiktv v Yevrazii: Rossiva. Ukraina. Belorussiva. Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 1997; Leonid Zaiko
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articles have not been uncommon in Russian-language academic journals, but 
Western scholars have paid scant attention to the Russo-Belarusian integra­
tion process. A small body of secondary literature concerns the development of 
the CIS and of sub-regional groupings within the organisation. A book-length 
study has been published in the Russian language, analysing all aspects of 
the evolution of the CIS itself (including the emergence of sub-groupings) as 
well as -  in more general terms -  bilateral relations between Russia, on the 
one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine, on the other.^® A number of Russian au­
thors have looked at these issues primarily from a geopolitical perspective, 
combining historical, strategic and civilisational elements, resulting in largely 
scenario-based analyses.^^
In the Western literature, a relative lack of attention to efforts at re­
integration among post-Soviet states seems to be related to the prevalence of 
a pessimistic view of the CIS. Agreements aimed at re-integration between 
Russia and Belarus or the ‘Eurasian Economic Community’ of Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have typically been met with equally 
sceptical assessments.®® Sakwa and Webber consider the CIS as a rather 
amorphous organisation with poor prospects of becoming more cohesive, a 
view also shared by certain Russian authors.®® Member-states’ divergent stra­
tegic priorities and most CIS leaders mistrust of Russian intentions are identi­
fied as serious impediments to the evolution of the CIS into a well-functioning 
organisation, lying at the basis of current ‘symptoms’ of malfunctioning such as 
the high rate of unimplemented agreements and not infrequent cancellations of
(ed.). Natsionarno-gosudarstvennve Interesv Respubliki Belarus’. Minsk: Analytichesky Tsentr 
‘Strategiya’, 1999
A.D. Shutov, Postsovvetskove prostranstvo. Moscow: “Nauchnaya kniga”, 1999 
Examples include Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovv Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskove Budushcheve 
Rossii. Moscow: Aktogeia, 1997; and Dmitry Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border 
Between Geopolitics and Globalization. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna­
tional Peace, 2001
See for example Ustina Markus, “Russia and Belarus: Elusive Integration", Problems of 
Post-Communism. Vol. 44, No. 5, September/October 1997, pp. 55-61 
Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, “The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: 
Stagnation and Survival”, Eurooe-Asia Studies. Vol. 51, No. 3,1999, pp. 379-415. See also 
Shutov, Postsovvetskove prostranstvo
summits.®® The analyses by J. Adams, A. Becker, K. Malfliet, and Welsh and 
Willerton, on the other hand, discern integrative tendencies (for the most part 
driven by economic considerations) existing alongside centrifugal ones and 
identify instances of successful - if partial - attainment of stated goals.®* The 
comparative examination of the CIS and the European Community/ European 
Union, with reference to regional integration theories developed with the West 
European context in mind, is used to reveal the relative strengths and weak­
nesses of the CIS and to suggest fruitful paths for its future development -  in­
cluding in the form of sub-regional groupings.®®
Published primary sources
News media
Research for this work has been heavily based on primary materials.®® 
Newspapers from Russia and - to a lesser extent - from Ukraine and Belarus 
(publications from the Ukraine and Belarus tend to be less ready available), in 
printed or - occasionally - electronic format, have been the main source of fac­
tual information, including statements by political leaders. Wherever possible, 
care has been taken to cross-reference potentially disputable information, e.g. 
content of Russo-Ukrainian negotiations on highly sensitive economic issues 
(fuel debt; sales of enterprises). Newspapers and other news publications 
(weekly or bimonthly journals) have also been used as a source of political
Sakwa and Webber, “The Commonwealth of Independent States", p. 369 
®* Jan S. Adams, “The Dynamics of Integration: Russia and the Near Abroad”, Demokratizat- 
siva. Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 50-64; Abraham S. Becker, “Russia and Economic Inte­
gration in the CIS”, Survival. Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996-97, pp. 117-36; Katlijn Malfliet, “The 
Commonwealth of independent States: Russian Ambitions In a European (Eurasian) Project?”, 
in Tom Casier and Katlijn Malfliet (eds.), Is Russia a European Power? The Position of Russia 
in a New Europe. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998, pp. 91-129; Helga A. Welsh and 
John P. Willerton, “Regional Cooperation and the CIS: West European Lessons and Post- 
Soviet Experience”, International Politics. Vol. 34, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 31-66 
The theoretical contributions of these studies will be examined in a later section of this chap­
ter.
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leaders’ statements. In some cases, where the author had no access to rele­
vant primary information, newspaper articles have been used as a source of 
analytical insights with due caution to identify them as interpretations of 
events. An effort has been made to use a variety of news publications corre­
sponding to different parts of the political spectrum in each of the three coun­
tries in order to compensate for potential biases in the coverage of politically 
charged issues. For example, newspapers sympathetic to liberal, market- 
oriented political forces (e.g. Segodnva and Izvestiva in Russia, Belarusskava 
Delovava Gazeta in Belarus) have given wider publicity to problematic aspects 
of Russo-Belarusian integration, while governmental papers (Rossiiskava Ga­
zeta in Russia; Sovetskava Belorussiva in Belarus) have tended to focus on 
the more successful elements of the process. Nevertheless, the use of diverse 
sources of factual information has been constrained by the limited availability 
of certain sources (e.g. the author has had no regular access to many Ukrain­
ian and Belarusian news publications) and by the uneven coverage of relevant 
issues in different publications. The Russian newspaper Nezavisimava Gazeta 
stands out among news publications in terms of the frequency with which It is 
cited in this study. This is because, unlike other newspapers, it contains a 
regular section devoted to events in the CIS, extensively reporting on issues 
pertinent to Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine and frequently 
publishing interviews with prominent members of the three countries’ foreign 
policy communities. In addition to press interviews, the views of the latter have 
also been acquired from articles they have published (e.g. in the Russian offi­
cial journal International Affairs or the Belarusian one Belarus v Mire) as well 
as from interviews conducted by the author (see following section).
Other sources of factual information have included Russian news agencies’ 
reports, particularly the specialised publications Diplomatic Panorama and CIS 
Daily News Brief by the authoritative agency ‘Interfax’, which have been avail­
able to the author in electronic format on a subscription basis. Supplementary 
sources have included reputable electronic news publications such as the 
weekly Russia Journal and regular news and analytical reports by research
In most cases, these are cited in footnotes, but not listed in the bibliography. Only volumes 
with a bibliographical reference number (e.g. publications by the Russian State Statistics 
Committee) are included in the bibliography.
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institutes with considerable expertise in relevant issues (e.g. East West Insti­
tute, Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research). Wherever possible, 
the author has sought to trace the information contained in the latter publica­
tions to the original sources (official documents; Russian or Ukrainian press). 
Detailed information related to specific sectors of particular significance to 
Russo-Belarusian and Russo-Ukrainian economic or military relations (e.g. 
joint production projects; Russian investment in the Belarusian and Ukrainian 
energy sectors; joint military exercises) have, in many cases, been drawn from 
specialised publications (e.g. Russian Ministry of Defence newspaper Kras- 
nava Zvezda: Rossiskava Gazeta annex Economic Union) and databases such 
as www.rusoil.ru for the energy sector.
Official publications and statistical data
Official documents, such as texts of international treaties and agreements 
between Russia, on the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine on the other, as 
well as decrees issued by the Presidents or parliamentary resolutions relating 
to foreign policy issues, have been extensively studied and compared. Most of 
these texts are published in full in either of the two official monthly publications 
of the Russian Foreign Ministry (Diolomaticheskv Vestnik and Bvulleten’ 
Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov). Collections of international agreements and 
other official foreign policy documents have also been consulted.^"*
Economic and social Indicators (e.g. trade volumes, economic growth rates, 
migration flows), which are used to assess the impact of purported governmen­
tal efforts to strengthen bilateral economic and societal links, are drawn both 
from the official publications of national and supranational statistical services 
(e.g. Goskomstat of Russia, Statistics Committee of the Russia-Belarus Union) 
and also from regional and country reports by international financial institutions 
(IMF, World Bank, EBRD). Data has in some cases not been consistently col-
These have included the Russian Foreign Ministry series Vneshnvava Politika Rossii: 
Sbornik Dokumentov and occasional publications such as a volume on Russo-Ukrainian rela­
tions (also published by the Russian MFA and the Moscow State Institute of International Rela­
tions), Rossiisko-Ukrainskve Otnosheniva 1990-1997 gg.: Sbornik Dokumentov. Moscow, 1998
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lected and published, thereby not allowing for reliable comparisons over time/^ 
Moreover, Western experts, along with many of their colleagues from Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus, have serious reservations regarding the accuracy of offi­
cial statistics published in these countries. The continuing use of barter trans­
actions and the existence of particularly large 'grey' sectors, estimated to rep­
resent as much as half of economic activity in these countries, represent al­
most insurmountable methodological difficulties for the production of reliable 
statistical information. It is, therefore, barely surprising that Russian data on 
trade with Ukraine differ from those published by the Ukrainian authorities. 
Where data from different sources presents significant divergences, figures 
from both sources will be given. However, the primary purpose of quoting this 
data is not to gauge the exact levels of transactions, but to identify broad 
trends and relate them to developments in political relations. Analytical reports 
by international financial institutions and evaluations by Russian, Ukrainian 
and Belarusian experts offer credible estimates of macro-economic processes, 
helping to put official statistics into perspective.
Survey evidence
There is a very considerable body of survey research of public and -  to a 
lesser extent -  elite opinion in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, whose analysis 
presents methodological problems similar to those of official statistics. The 
Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian press as well as many academic studies in 
these countries very often cite survey results without publishing information as 
to the methodology employed. For the purposes of this study, however, only 
surveys accompanied by methodological Information (time and location of sur­
vey; size and composition of sample; polling organisation) are used. In addi­
tion, preference is given to reputable institutes, known for the professionalism 
of their researchers and the high methodological standards employed in their 
surveys. These include the ‘Public Opinion Foundation’ (FOM), the ‘All- 
Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion’ (VTslOM) and the company
For example, annual trade statistics until 1994 were given in roubles without reference to 
rates of Inflation or the exchange rate between the rouble and the dollar, which showed very 
dramatic fluctuations during that period.
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‘Russian Public Opinion and Market Research' (ROMIR) in Russia; the ‘Novak’ 
institute and the ‘Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Stud­
ies’ in Belarus; the ‘Kiev Centre for Political Research’, the ‘Kiev International 
institute of Sociology’ and the ‘Ukrainian Institute for Social Research' in 
Ukraine. Surveys commissioned by foreign organisations such as the US State 
Department and carried out by reliable local organisations (including the 
above) have also been employed. The survey series ‘New Russia Barometer’ 
organised by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strath­
clyde, has provided a wealth of reliable data regarding Russian public opinion. 
In this context, special reference needs to be made to the project The Outsid­
ers: Russia. Ukraine. Belarus. Moldova, and the New Europe by Margot Light, 
Stephen White, and John Lowenhardt, whose authors kindly allowed the au­
thor of the present study access to their survey results prior to their publica­
tion.^®
In most cases, questions concerning foreign policy or other aspects of inter­
state and inter-societal relations are not the subject of surveys on a regular 
basis, but are usually examined as they become topical as a result of political 
events. Moreover, comparisons over time are complicated by the fact that 
questions relating to the same issue are posed in different ways (e.g. “Do you 
support integration with Belarus?”; “How would you vote in a referendum on a 
Union-state with Belarus?”), with potentially considerable ramifications for re­
spondents’ answers. The possibility that respondents may have felt inclined to 
give a reply in line with their state’s official policy due to uncertainty about the 
impartiality and the status of the interviewers must also be considered. These 
problems may be partly overcome through the juxtaposition of findings on the 
same or very similar questions from different survey organisations. It is, thus 
possible, to discern consistent patterns in the policy preferences of different 
constituencies (differentiated in terms of age; political ideology; ethnicity; local­
ity of residence; religious and linguistic affiliation) among political elites and 
mass publics. Comparisons of findings, in conjunction with specific questions 
investigating particular components of broader questions (e.g. questions offer­
ing respondents choice over alternative forms of inter-state relations or over 
different considerations in favour of closer relations with a neighbouring state).
More details about the ‘Outsiders’ project are given in note 12.
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offer insights into the dynamics affecting relevant policy preferences among 
the mass electorates and elite constituencies in the three countries.
Public opinion analysis is relevant to this study, as a combination of geo­
graphical, identity-related and economic factors place relations among Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus at the top of the key foreign policy issues of interest to the 
three countries' electorates. Due to Ukraine’s particular structure of political 
cleavages, characterised by acute ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional di­
visions, foreign policy questions (and in particular relations with Russia and 
with NATO) have been among the most salient issues affecting electoral out­
comes and polarising Ukrainian society.®’' As far as Russia and Belarus are 
concerned, the prominence given to bilateral relations (as well as to Russo- 
Ukrainian relations) in political leaders’ discourse and also in the media sug­
gests that the issue’s appeal to the electorate is estimated to be significant 
enough to form part of policy-makers’ considerations. The latter have been in­
vestigated in greater depth by means of interviews with members of the three 
countries’ foreign policy communities®® and foreign officials with relevant exper­
tise.
Elite interviews
The author conducted 67 semi-structured interviews. Two interviews with 
diplomats from the countries concerned were conducted in Britain in December
1998. A further 24 interviews took place in Moscow between 15 and 30 June
1999, and between 23 November and 17 December 1999; two in Yaroslavl’ (15 
December 1999); 19 in Kiev between 26 October and 5 November 1999; and 
20 in Minsk between 9 and 20 November 1999. About three quarters of the in­
terviews were conducted in Russian. The findings from these interviews have 
been followed up and supplemented by numerous conversations the author 
has subsequently conducted with some of the interviewees and with other
The role of social cleavages in the Ukrainian public’s foreign policy preferences and voting 
behaviour is examined in detail in Chapter Four.
Foreign policy communities or elites are understood to include individuals, who by virtue of 
their political influence or professional expertise are in a position to participate in the formula­
tion of their country’s foreign policy to a higher degree than most members of the electorate.
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members of the three countries’ foreign policy communities in the context of 
international conferences and similar occasions.
English was used only in cases where the interviewees were entirely confi­
dent in their ability to express themselves fluently. Many interviewees (espe­
cially government officials and advisers) preferred to maintain confidentiality. 
Some declined to be quoted even by position or institutional affiliation and 
were strongly averse to having the conversation recorded on tape, while some 
objected to written notes being taken as well. In order to maximise interview­
ees’ inclination to speak candidly, their statements were not recorded in any 
way during the conversation, but were transcribed as fully as possible by the 
author immediately afterwards. Though few interviewees were prepared to give 
the author permission to quote them by name, this option has not been taken 
for the purpose of uniformity in the use of interview materials in this study. An 
appendix listing interviewees (with the exception of those who did not wish 
their details to be disclosed) is provided at the end of the study. A conidential 
list of interviews (including names of officials not listed in the appendix) has 
been entrusted to the Head of the Department of Politics, University of Glas­
gow, and may be made available - upon written request - only to bona fide re­
searchers.
Interviewees were drawn from the following elite sections: academic experts 
on foreign policy and external economic relations; government and parliamen­
tary committee advisers; members of parliament and leaders of political par­
ties; foreign ministry and other government officials; military officers; business 
leaders and representatives of regional authorities (in Russia); researchers 
from official and non-governmental think-tanks, e.g. Russian Institute for Stra­
tegic Studies, Institute of Europe (Russian Academy of Sciences), Centre for 
Current International Problems (Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry), Carnegie Centre (Moscow), East-West Institute (Kiev), National Insti­
tute of Russian-Ukrainian Relations (part of Ukraine’s Council for National Se­
curity and Defence), National Institute of Strategic Studies (Kiev); journalists; 
and Western European diplomats.
The content of the interviews varied depending on each interlocutor’s area of 
activity and expertise in order to maximise opportunities for obtaining informa­
tion and insights unavailable (or hardly available) in published sources. A set 
of common questions were put to all interviewees from each country in an ef-
fort to estimate the relative prominence of competing viewpoints and explore 
differences of opinion among different sections of national elites (e.g. on the 
economic expediency of integration for Russia and for Belarus; on the pros­
pects for Ukraine’s integration with the European Union or with Russia and 
Belarus). In each country, a balance between respondents belonging to circles 
supporting the current administration and those sympathetic to different sec­
tions of the opposition was sought. Still, the small size of the sample and the 
practical difficulties involved in selecting a random sample do not allow us to 
claim that the views expressed by the interviewees accurately represented 
those of their country’s elite as a whole. Indeed, it is not possible to consider 
the views of a group of interviewees belonging to a particular section of the 
elite (e.g. government advisers) as representative of those of that elite section. 
However, interviewees were asked to contrast their personal opinions with 
what they perceived as the views of their peers. In most cases, they were quite 
open in identifying differences of opinion among their colleagues (e.g. mem­
bers of the same political party, officials in the same government agency).
Despite the above-mentioned methodological shortcomings, elite interview­
ing has been indispensable to this study. It has furnished factual information 
unavailable from other sources at the time of the research (e.g. on the pro­
gress achieved in the implementation of agreements). It has enabled the au­
thor to gather a considerable variety of perspectives on the relevant issues, 
some of which contradicted preliminary hypotheses (e.g. the admission by 
some Ukrainian interviewees from government circles that economic pressure 
on the part of Russia has been greatly exaggerated to gain concessions from 
Western governments and institutions). Finally, interviews were most enlight­
ening in revealing shifts in elite opinion. The author’s conscious search for 
market-minded Russian politicians warning against integration with Belarus on 
the grounds of economic cost, a position widely expressed in 1997, proved 
fruitless two years later.
Theoretical perspectives
The dominance of Realism
Interstate relations in the post-Soviet context have been the object of rather 
scant attention from international relations theorists, while policy-centred 
analyses have only in few cases sought to assess the applicability of different 
theoretical propositions (drawn from the principal international relations theo­
ries) to this region.®® Most of the relevant analytical studies and especially 
those of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian scholars have been informed by 
the Realist school of thought, which views struggle for power among states as 
the immutable essence of international relations. Realist theory represents a 
very long-standing tradition, encompassing a great number of authors from dif­
ferent generations and parts of the world with diverse views on many important 
aspects of international relations, e.g. on the role of ethics; on the relevance of 
domestic politics to the making of foreign policy; or even on which aspects of 
public policy fall within the remit of foreign policy. The neo-Realist school, in­
spired by the work of Kenneth Waltz, differs from so-called classical Realism in 
explaining foreign policy actions with reference to systemic and structural fac­
tors (international anarchy in the sense of absence of a global authority with 
legitimacy and powers of enforcement over those of state authorities; balance 
of power and the distribution of capabilities among states within the global or a 
regional system), downplaying the role of domestic politics, identity-related and 
other psychological factors.^®
Most Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian authors assign high importance to 
geographical factors, economic and military capabilities as determinants of 
foreign policy objectives. The relative military capabilities of Russia and the 
enlarged NATO are given particular prominence in accounting for Russia's in-
See for example Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor 
States. Manchester: MUP, 1996; Paul J. D’ Anleri, Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian- 
Russian Reiations. Albany; State University of New York Press, 1999 
A classic text In this school is by Kenneth M. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading 
MA: Addlson-Wesley, 1979
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terest in closer relations and/or integration with Belarus and Ukraine/^ How­
ever, these analyses cannot be placed within the neo-Realist framework, as 
they take explicit account of domestic, cultural-historical and psychological fac­
tors (notably the shared sense of identity uniting Russians, Belarusians and 
many Ukrainians). They are discernibly influenced by nineteenth-century geo­
political theories and can be said to reflect a broader Realist perspective in the 
sense that they conceive of the international environment as essentially com­
petitive, with a strong emphasis on strategic considerations. It is worth noting, 
however, that, in the aforementioned accounts, competitive elements prevail in 
the analysis of Russia’s relations with non-CIS countries (especially with the 
membership of NATO), whereas Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine 
are viewed primarily in the context of an identitive community characterised by 
predominantly cooperative and integrative dynamics.
Most of the Western literature as well as accounts by Russia-sceptic Ukrain­
ian authors look at Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine from a Realist 
perspective and regard power accumulation (in its various forms, including in­
ternational prestige) and projection as the driving force of Russian policy."*  ^
Psychological factors in the form of an alleged ‘neo-imperialist’ mentality are 
often recognised as a reinforcing fa c to r .T h e  strengthening of state sover­
eignty (ostensibly served by the pursuit of close ties with NATO, the United 
States and the EU and by resistance to Russian initiatives) is identified as 
Ukraine’s ‘vital interest’. From this perspective, Belarusian foreign policy ap­
pears as an anomaly, as that of a state that is not aware of its own best inter-
Examples Include A.D. Shutov, Postsovvetskove prostranstvo: N. Pastukhova, Sovuz Rossii 
I Belorussii: and D. Trenin, The End of Eurasia 
For a classical Realist definition of fundamental state Interests and analysis of a policy of 
diplomatic prestige as an alternative to the exercise of power (ability to control policy out­
comes against other actors’ objectives) requiring expenditure of material resources, see Hans 
J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. Fifth edition, New York, NY: Knopf, 1978, especially 
pp. 77-78
See for example John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin ”, 
Foreign Affairs. May/June 1996, pp. 52-62; Yaroslav Bilinsky, “Russia, Ukraine and the West: 
An Insecure Security Triangie”, Problems of Post-Communism. January/February 1997, pp. 
27-33; O. Belov et al. (eds.), Ukraine 2000 and Beyond: Geopolitical Priorities and Scenarios 
of Development. Kyiv: The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, National Insti­
tute for Strategic Studies, 1999; and D’Anleri, Dilemmas of Interdependence.
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est. In line with the Realist tradition, security (in the narrow sense of preserva­
tion of territorial integrity and state sovereignty) and the consolidation of state 
power with regard to external and sub-national actors are presented as the 
primary interests informing decision-makers. Economic aspects of foreign pol­
icy are treated in an instrumental fashion, as means of political influence (in 
the case of Russia) and as necessary conditions for the consolidation of state 
sovereignty (in the case of Ukraine and Belarus).
Realism, like other theoretical perspectives on international relations, offers 
a set of analytical categories (e.g. power; state sovereignty; national interest) 
and assumptions (e.g. primacy of security considerations; competitive nature 
of international politics), which have rather limited explanatory power in their 
own right. Although it may not be possible to cast off antecedent theoretical 
assumptions prior to proceeding with analysis, this study will strive to identify 
foreign policy actors' own assumptions about the international environment 
and -  to the extent possible -  adhere to their usage of theoretically ambiguous 
concepts. Thus, there will be no attempt to define the three countries’ respec­
tive national interests apart from the conceptions of their leaderships and the 
different sections of their foreign policy communities. Despite the dominance of 
Realist theoretical perspectives in Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian thinking 
about international affairs, several other perspectives have been reflected in 
political leaders’ discourse about foreign policy and are concerned with factors 
salient in this particular international context.
Interdependence theory
Interdependence is a term often used in Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian 
officials’ arguments regarding economic relations among their countries. This 
refers to high levels of bilateral transactions (between Russia and Ukraine and 
between Russia and Belarus), some of which are essential to the functioning of 
their economies and may not be substituted within a sufficiently short time- 
scale and/or at sufficiently low cost to allow them to shift in line with changes In
For a Realist theoretical examination of the role of economic factors in international rela­
tions, see Charles P. Kindleberger, Power and Monev: The Politics of International Economics 
and the Economics and the Economics of International Politics. New York, NY: Basic Books, 
1970
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political priorities. Trade within certain industrial sectors, energy supplies from 
Russia and transport routes to the European market through Belarus and 
Ukraine are examples of such long-standing economic transactions with sub­
stantial implications on foreign policy options. Some theorists belonging to the 
Realist school recognise economic interdependence as a factor mitigating the 
salience of considerations related to military security and state sovereignty and 
enabling cooperative patterns to prevail in certain aspects of a given state's 
external relations."*® In the latter case, non-coercive instruments (exercise of 
influence rather than power) become more relevant."*®
The theory of complex interdependence, however, as developed by Keo- 
hane and Nye, represents a departure from the Realist tradition. Complex in­
terdependence is as a meso-theory formulated to account for relations in spe­
cific regional contexts (as opposed to macro-theories referring to the world 
system as a whole). It highlights the input of inter-societal and trans-national 
links (e.g. informal elite networks; civil society groups; trans-national economic 
conglomerates) existing along side inter-state relations between governments. 
It also argues that inter-state relations comprise a wide array of issues, some 
of which equally feature in the domestic policy agenda or affect particular do­
mestic constituencies (e.g. external trade regimes; multi-lateral approaches to 
economic stabilisation), without any rigid or clear hierarchy favouring military 
security concerns. In such contexts, the role of military force loses its rele­
vance as a policy instrument, not only as a result of cost-benefit calculations, 
but primarily due to critically reduced mutual threat perceptions."*’' These fac­
tors shape the negotiating patterns pursued by foreign policy actors (e.g. link­
age strategies; agenda formation) and the resulting policy outcomes."*® Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine represent a regional context, in which most of the defining 
elements of complex interdependence are present (with the exception of a 
prominent role played by international organisations). Complex interdepend-
For example, Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 153-165; Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The 
Political Economy of International Relations. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1975, pp. 3-4 
Knorr, The Power of Nations, p. 4
Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. Second edition, Lon­
don: Harper-Collins, 1989, pp. 23-29 
"*® Ibid.. pp. 29-35
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ence could, therefore, provide a useful framework in considering the multi­
faceted complex of relations (e.g. indebtedness; cross-border investment ac­
tivities; military cooperation arrangements; discord over strategic or economic 
priorities) between Russia, on the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine, on the 
other.
Identity theory
This regional context presents additional features, most notably the legacy of 
a shared (albeit not identical) cultural-historical background, lying at the basis 
of high mutual relevance and identity-informed mutual perceptions. These fac­
tors may have a direct (decision-makers' own perceptions) or indirect (through 
the Intervening factors of public opinion and domestic politics) contribution to 
the definition of external priorities, threat assessments and even the selection 
of policy instruments. National identity has been studied as a psychological 
phenomenon, whereby a mass of people identify themselves and are prepared 
to act as a collective entity (a nation) with reference to a common set of na­
tional symbols."*® In recent foreign policy literature, conceptions of national 
identity have been recognised as a major factor affecting states’ definitions of 
their values (e.g. the relative importance attached to state sovereignty and wel­
fare maximisation) and, consequently, their foreign policy priorities.®® As Prizel 
has noted, the conduct of foreign policy by appeal to a legitimising mythology 
corresponding to the prevalent conception of national identity “provides the po­
litical elite with a ready tool for mass mobilisation and political cohesion”. This 
function acquires increased salience “in countries where the political elite feels 
particularly vulnerable" and “legal institutions play a relatively marginal role in 
the process of nation-building”.®* The search for a post-Soviet Russian identity 
could be advanced by a foreign policy seeking continuity with positively per­
ceived aspects of the Soviet state such as great power status and unity (in
William Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: 
CUP, 1990, p. 52
^  See for example Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed.), Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: For­
eign Policies in Transition. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997; Ilya 
Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy 
I. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, pp. 19-20
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some form) with the other successor countries. Given Ukraine’s divisions along 
regional and ethno-linguistic lines, foreign policy could be expected to serve 
the function of a nation-building tool at the same time as competing concep­
tions of national identity would be likely to influence the formulation of foreign 
policy.
Theories o f regional integration
Integration represents the officially declared foremost objective of Russo- 
Belarusian relations and - more arguably - that of the CIS as a whole, albeit in 
a looser sense. The objective has substantial political support also in Ukraine
-  both on the mass and elite levels. Russian, Belarusian and -  to a lesser ex­
tent -  Ukrainian political leaders and officials tend to use the term integration -  
more or less -  interchangeably with others such as ‘unification’ or even ‘coop­
eration’ without defining their content. More important perhaps are these terms’ 
normative connotations, which are highly context-dependent. In Belarus, where 
the majority of the population appears to attach little intrinsic value to inde­
pendent statehood and maintains overall positive images of the Soviet Union 
and Russia, a politician could expect the terms ‘unification’ and ‘union’ to gen­
erate favourable responses among the electorate. By contrast, in Western 
Ukraine, where most of the population is very sensitive about national sover­
eignty and distrustful of Russia, speaking of ‘pragmatic co-operation’ may be 
more acceptable. The term ‘integration’ will be retained in this study by virtue 
of its common usage in both Western European post-Soviet political discourse
- including official documents - as a special form of co-operation involving 
common decision-making and a higher element of enforcement. It is intended 
to be continuous, long-lasting and conducive to community-building - usually 
through the establishment of some supranational institutions, but not to the 
point of a formal merger of states.®^
Approximately half of the present study concerns the integration process be­
tween Russia and Belarus, which has drawn inspiration from other such proc­
esses in other parts of the world (primarily Western Europe). These have 
formed the object of a substantial body of case studies and comparative analy-
52 Welsh and Willerton, “Regional Co-operation and the CIS", p. 37
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ses, which have sought to identify factors observed in most instances of suc­
cessful implementation of integrationist projects. All studies support the con­
clusion that integration processes are initiated only among states character­
ised by considerable economic interdependence and cross-border social inter­
action, such as that linking Russia, Ukraine and Belarus even after the dissolu­
tion of the Soviet Union. In addition to placing the Russo-Belarusian integra­
tion process into a comparative perspective, theories of regional integration 
could help uncover dynamics particular to regional contexts with high levels of 
economic and inter-societal interaction (or regional subsystems®®), which might 
be observed also in Russo-Ukrainian relations. They may also shed light to the 
operation of factors differentiating Ukraine from Belarus with regard to their 
approaches to Russia.
High levels of transactions (i.e. communications, trade, mobility of persons) 
and/or cultural homogeneity have been linked to the emergence of a regional 
identity (‘we feeling'), providing a favourable societal climate for a process of 
integration.®"* Neo-functionalist theory, which has been formulated with refer­
ence to West European integration, denies that cultural homogeneity must be 
antecedent to the initiation of an integration process. A common sense of iden­
tity is supposed to follow the gradual empowerment of a new supranational 
centre through the accumulation of functional competences.®® Similarly, Nye 
has suggested that the level of transactions prior to the initiation of an integra­
tion process is less relevant than elite expectations of a growth in mutually 
beneficial transactions once the process is under way.®® A shared culture, in-
The notion of regional subsystems does not refer to integration processes, but to highly in­
ter-connected (in terms of ‘similarity or complementarity" and degree of interaction) regional 
contexts. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A 
Comparative Approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 7-20 
Karl W. Deutsch, “Communication Theory and Political Integration", in Philip E. Jacob and 
James V. Toscano (eds.). The Integration of Political Communities. Philadelphia and New 
York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964, pp. 51-54; Etzloni makes the point that most cultural 
values are politically irrelevant - with the exception of shared political symbols and rituals. 
Amitai Etzloni, Political Unification: A Comparative Studv of Leaders and Forces. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 3;
Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 16 
J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1971, p. 77
24
creased transactions, and a sense of common identity may be necessary as 
‘solidifiers’, especially as the process comes to encompass politically sensitive 
functions.®’' Convergence in national elites’ attitudes and policy preferences is 
another factor deemed causally relevant to the initiation and evolution of re­
gional integration processes. Neo-functionalist theory expects a shared sense 
of identity among national elites to result from the process of integration - by 
means of elite engrenage (socialisation). The launching of the process, how­
ever, is hypothesised to depend upon national elites’ perception of common 
interests, such as the perception of a common external threat. Similarity be­
tween domestic political systems and policies favoured at the national level is 
considered necessary to the success of an integration process.®®
Internally cohesive, democratic states with a pluralistic distribution of interests 
have been viewed as optimally suited to a process of regional integration.®®
In the case of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, extensive survey research 
points to predominantly positive memories of Soviet-era political unity and 
socio-economic integration (high levels of inter-republican transactions), along 
with an antecedent perception of cultural similarity (Western Ukraine being a 
striking exception).®® These factors might compensate for the weakness of plu­
ralistic interest-group structures, to which neo-functionalist theory ascribes the 
function of transforming elite engrenage into mass support for the integration 
process. In so far as elites in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus still display consid­
erable continuity with the personnel of the Soviet party-state apparatus, they 
could be said to have already undergone a process of engrenage. All three 
countries have presidential political systems, comprising ideologically similar 
political forces and characterised by a rather weak rule of law. The compatibil­
ity of national policies has been rather problematic due to the diverse courses
A. Etzloni, Political Unification, pp. 36-37
Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process”, Interna­
tional Organization, Vol. XV, No. 4, Autumn 1961, reprinted In International Political Communi­
ties: An Anthology. Garden City, N.Y.: Double and Company, 1966, pp. 120, 123 
Ibid., p. 126
See for example L.A. Sedov, “SSSR i SNG v obshchestvennom mnenii Rossii”, VTSIOM: 
Monitoring Obshchestvennovo Mnenlva. Vol. 27, No. 1, January-February 1997, p. 14; M.l. 
Beletsky and A.K. Tolpygo (Kiev Centre of Political Research and Conflict Studies), 
“Natsional’no-kul’turniye i ideologicheskiye orientatsii naseleniya Ukralny”, Polis. Vol. 46, No. 
4,1998, p. 86
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of economic reform and the divergent views of NATO held by the leaderships 
of Russia and Belarus, on the one hand, and that of Ukraine, on the other.
Economic incentives, according to which an integration process is seen as a 
means of promoting growth by creating economies of scale, underpin the em­
pirical observation that most integration processes have arisen among states 
with similar levels of socio-economic development. This refers to the fact that 
participating states tend to fall within the same general category of wealth 
without precluding considerable disparities among them.®* Some integration 
theorists such as Nye regard symmetry in economic size as an additional 
structural condition assisting regional integration.®^ Others consider that the 
prospects of an integration process may be enhanced by the presence of “a 
powerful core area providing a centripetal force”.®® Comparative analyses of 
the CIS and the European Community in its formative stages suggest strong 
asymmetries in economic development and Russia’s overwhelming size as 
systemic weaknesses in the CIS context.®"* Russia, Belarus and Ukraine pre­
sent less heterogeneity than the CIS as a whole, not only in terms of GDP per 
capita, but also in terms of economic structure. Russia’s disproportionate eco­
nomic and military size may hinder integration by fostering fears of Russian 
hegemony among Ukrainian and Belarusian elites. At the same time, it - at 
least theoretically - enables Russia to assume the role of political leadership, 
which would entail devoting a comparatively higher proportion of its assets as 
rewards to make integration attractive to other states.®®
Outline of structure
The considerations contributing to the formulation of Russian objectives with 
regard to Belarus and Ukraine will be examined in Chapter One. The interplay 
of external developments (such as the expansion of NATO) and Russia’s do­
61
62
A. Etzloni, Political Unification, pp. 21-22 
J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts, pp. 80-81
Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System. Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1967, p. 21. See also Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations. Third Edition, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall International, 1968, pp. 243-245 
®'* Welsh and Willerton, “Regional Co-operation and the CIS", pp. 45-46 
A. Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 45
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mestic political processes will be explored, with a particular focus on the impli­
cations for the Russian leadership’s definition of the country’s strategic inter­
ests in the former Soviet region. The shifts in the Russian elite’s perceptions of 
the wider international environment and the resulting rethinking of Russian for­
eign policy, which occurred in the mid-1990s, will be revisited with a view to 
understanding the positions of Belarus and Ukraine in Russia’s broader foreign 
policy agenda. The role of the East-Slavic/Orthodox nexus in the formation of a 
post-Soviet Russian national identity will be looked at from the perspective of 
its contribution to the search for particular types of relations (integration; close 
partnership) with Belarus and Ukraine. The views and policy inputs of different 
political forces and elite sections (such as the military leadership and certain 
influential economic constituencies) as well as those of public opinion will be 
surveyed, drawing on primary sources. The array of outcomes favoured by 
these constituencies will be located in terms of priority in official policy (some 
may not feature in the official policy agenda at all), distinguishing between bot­
tom-line and maximum objectives.
Chapter Two will compare the policy instruments used to further Russian ob­
jectives with regard to Belarus and Ukraine respectively. Discrepancies be­
tween stated Russian objectives and actual outcomes will be investigated to 
identify constraints (whether structural, e.g. economic interdependence, or of a 
more reversible nature, e.g. poor negotiating strategies) on Russia’s ability to 
translate its superior resources into bargaining power vis-à-vis the Ukrainian 
and Belarusian authorities. A section of this chapter will look into the condi­
tions linked to Russian economic support to Belarus and contrast them with the 
record of Russo-Ukrainian economic relations (focusing especially on the divi­
sion of Soviet assets and on energy supplies). It will thus seek to assess the 
accuracy of the common suggestion that Russia has used economic coercion 
(or blackmail) to force Ukraine into political concessions. Divergences in the 
approaches of different political forces, sections of the Russian executive and 
relevant business interests as to the optimal use of economic instruments with 
regard to Belarus and Ukraine will be related to inconstancies in Russian pol­
icy. Divisions between the positions of the executive, the Duma and leftist- 
nationalist political forces with respect to issues with the potential to undermine 
Ukraine’s cohesion as a state (most notably, the status of Crimea and that of
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the Russian language) will be examined to evaluate the potential for Russia’s 
employing intervention in these issues as a policy instrument.
Chapter Three will be concerned with the results of these policies. It will 
analyse and compare the contractual framework of Russia’s relations with Bel­
arus (Friendship treaty; Customs Union agreement; treaty on the formation of a 
Community; treaty on a Belarus-Russia Union; treaty on equal rights of citi­
zens; treaty on the formation of a Union-state) and with Ukraine (Black Sea 
Fleet Accords; Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation treaty; treaty on Eco­
nomic Cooperation for the years 1998-2007). The evolution in the institutional 
structure of the Russia-Belarus Union and in the scope of its activities will be 
placed in comparative perspective in the light of theory developed with refer­
ence to integration processes in other parts of the world. Another section will 
consider how cohesive the Union has been in terms of foreign policy coordina­
tion and military cooperation. The distance between Russian and Ukrainian 
positions in these fields will equally be examined. Trends in bilateral economic 
and social transactions will be surveyed and outcomes in key sectors (e.g. cus­
toms and monetary union between Russia and Belarus; industrial cooperation 
and cross-border investment between Russia and Ukraine) will be measured 
against treaty provisions. The main aim will be to pinpoint the factors that have 
hindered the implementation of agreements and the attainment of declared ob­
jectives in some sectors as well as those that have enabled progress in others.
The foreign policy orientations of the Ukrainian and Belarusian leaderships 
will be considered in Chapter Four, going back to the Kravchuk presidency 
(Ukraine) and to the Kebich leadership (Belarus) in order to understand the 
rationale of the policy adjustments made by the Kuchma and Lukashenko ad­
ministrations. In analysing the two leaderships’ choice between a Russia- 
centred course and one focused on the EU and/or NATO, the relative weight of 
economic concerns, public opinion and other considerations underlying elite 
policy preferences (e.g. sectional interests, domestic policy agendas) will be 
assessed. The perspectives of the principal political forces and elite sections 
within each country will be presented (as drawn from the writings, public state­
ments and interviews of their representatives) to estimate the extent to which 
changes in the relative influence of these constituencies may reflect on official 
policy towards Russia. Factors such as dependence on the Russian economy, 
notions of national identity and international standing will be probed in order to
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in order to account for the Belarusian and Ukrainian leaderships’ different de­
grees of responsiveness to actual and putative incentives and/or pressures 
presented by Russia, the EU or other external actors (e.g. NATO).
A concluding chapter will outline the most noteworthy findings, considering 
them from the perspective of different theories of international relations. It will 
also place them in the wider European context, seeking to make some projec­
tions into the medium-term future on the basis of the principal trends observed 
in the period studied in this work.
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Chapter O ne
The rationale of Russia’s pro-lntegrationist policy towards Bela­
rus and Ukraine
This chapter will seek to account for the ascendancy of Belarus and Ukraine 
in Russia’s foreign policy agenda since the mid-1990s. To this end, it will out­
line the factors which led to the general reorientation of Russian foreign policy 
away from the Atlanticist focus of the early post-Soviet period. It will also con­
sider the impact of the search for a post-Soviet Russian identity on Russian 
foreign policy objectives and on relations with Belarus and Ukraine in particu­
lar. Considerations related to security and economic interests will be looked at 
from the perspectives of different political forces, sections of the Russian ad­
ministration, other elite constituencies and public opinion. These will be related 
to preferences regarding Russia’s type of relations with Belarus and Ukraine, 
as reflected in official policy.
The broader context of Russia’s foreign policy
The reintegration of the former Soviet space and the advancement of rela­
tions with Belarus and Ukraine to a qualitatively new level have progressively 
moved up in the list of Russia’s external priorities as part of a gradual revision 
of the foreign policy course that was pursued in the first year and a half of in­
dependent statehood.* The alleged neglect of the ‘near abroad’ due to a bias 
in favour of the West and the United States in particular formed the most po­
tent and broadly supported criticism levelled at the early foreign policy of the
* This Is reflected In the prioritisation of official diplomatic visits to Belarus and Ukraine, which 
is observable since Andrei Kozyrev’s departure from the Foreign Ministry. Minsk and Kiev 
were the first foreign capitals to be visited by his successor, Yevgeny Primakov, after he be­
came Foreign Minister in January 1996 and again after he was appointed Prime Minister in 
September 1998. These were equally the first foreign destinations of Vladimir Putin following 
his election to the Presidency in March 2000 -  albeit a visit to London separated those to 
Minsk and Kiev.
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first Yeltsin administration.^ The Russian leadership was charged with ignoring 
the country’s interests by not actively seeking to halt and reverse tendencies of 
disintegration prevalent throughout the former Soviet Union. Intra-CIS trade 
showed a steady decline and most member-states were striving to increase 
their independence from Moscow by searching for new economic and strategic 
partners. The Ukrainian leadership’s explicitly stated aspiration of dissociating 
the country from Russia in order to make it part of Central Europe and the 
West was particularly disconcerting to the critics of Yeltsin’s early diplomatic 
course.
In turn, the approach and objectives with respect to the former Soviet Union 
were the first elements of Russian foreign policy to be amended. The “Concept 
of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation”, an official document approved 
by the President in April 1993, identified integration processes in the CIS as 
one of Russia’s vital security interests.® Two years later, another official docu­
ment entitled “Strategic course of the Russian Federation towards CIS states” 
clarified the policy implications of the above-stated national interest: Russia 
would seek to assume a leading role in promotirig such processes."*
The active pursuit of reintegration constituted a major departure from Rus­
sia’s initial stance on relations with the other successor states. In the early 
1990s, Russia's objective had been limited to the establishment of normal, co­
operative relations with the independent former Soviet republics on the basis 
of equality and respect for national sovereignty enshrined in international law. 
No special attention or treatment, either negative (e.g. diplomatic pressure) or 
positive (e.g. exports at subsidised prices), was to be directed at other states 
of the former Soviet Union with the objective of rendering them receptive to 
Russia’s views and interests. Russia’s relations to them would be governed by 
the same principles as those to countries of the ‘far abroad’ (i.e. states outside 
the former Soviet Union). To some extent, the reasons behind the revision of
 ^Since 1996, the term ‘near-abroad’ has been abandoned in Russian official parlance in favour 
of the more neutral ‘post-Soviet space’, which is thought to convey Russia’s respect for the 
sovereignty of its neighbours.
 ^ “Kontseptslya vneshnei politlki Rossilsskoi Federatsil’’, Diolomaticheskv Vestnik. special Is­
sue, January 1993
“Strateglchesky kurs Rossii s gosudarstvami Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv”, Dio­
lomaticheskv Vestnik. October 1995, p. 3
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this line could be considered as separate from the factors underlying the wider 
changes in Russia’s foreign policy. Reintegration, at least of the form envis­
aged in the agreements that dissolved the Soviet Union and created the CIS 
(i.e. a common economic space and unified armed forces managed by inter­
state institutions), had not been deemed undesirable or unimportant by the 
makers of Russia’s early foreign policy. Rather, it was thought that a policy of 
openly sponsoring reintegration would risk provoking mistrust of Russia’s in­
tentions among the leaders of other CIS states and, would, therefore, be coun­
terproductive. In addition, assistance to unreformed economies would over­
strain Russia’s resources during a period crucial to its own economic recovery. 
It was expected that, once other CIS countries had consolidated their state in­
stitutions and reformed their economies according to market principles, they 
would seek reintegration with Russia on a mutually advantageous - as op­
posed to a donor-recipient - basis. Appreciating Russia’s respect for their in­
dependence, they would voluntarily recognise their larger neighbour as their 
leader by virtue of its superior economic resources, military capabilities, and 
influence in world affairs.®
While it may be contended that the laissez-faire strategy towards the CIS 
was not allowed sufficient time to produce the outcome anticipated by its au­
thors, it is clear that they had grossly underestimated the value leaders of 
other CIS states attached to national sovereignty. With the exception of Bela­
rus, there was no sign of CIS leaders perceiving the potential economic gains 
of market-based integration as attractive enough to set their suspicions of 
Russia aside. It became clear that reintegration would not take off the ground 
unless the Russian leadership developed an active policy towards the 
achievement of this objective. The inadequacy of the laissez-faire strategy 
alone would probably have prompted Russia to formulate some sort of pro­
integration policy even in the absence of significant changes in its domestic 
politics or its external environment beyond the CIS.
However, since the second half of 1992, the authors of Russia’s early for­
eign policy have gradually lost popular support, posts in the government and
 ^Yevgeny P. Bazhanov, Rossiva kak velikava derzhava. Moscow; “Nauchnaya kniga’V institute 
of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation), 1999, p. 27
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the Presidential administration, and, consequently, influence over official pol­
icy. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and CIS Minister Shelov-Kovedyaev saw their 
authority wane in line with that of the whole Gaidar team of radical reformers. 
As the socio-economic policies of the latter angered large sections of the elec­
torate and fell far short of the predicted spectacular economic recovery, visions 
of Russia’s future based on the wholesale adoption of Western economic and 
political models declined in appeal. Foreign policy in its own right became the 
object of a major national debate - probably as fierce as the one on economic 
reform. During the run-up to the Duma election of December 1993, denuncia­
tions of Yeltsin’s foreign policy as overly pro-Western or even treasonable 
were very prominent - especially in the electoral campaigns of the ‘red-browns’ 
(i.e. the Communist Party, Zhirinovsky’s nationalist LDPR, and a number of 
smaller parties expressing similar views). The victory at that election of parties 
using nationalist anti-Western rhetoric came as a shock to many observers in 
the Western press, leading them to the conclusion that the Russian public was 
suffering from a version of the Weimar syndrome.® Likewise, they interpreted 
the increasingly nationalist tone of Russia’s foreign policy line as Yeltsin’s re­
sponse to the change in the public’s mood.
Yeltsin indeed sought to reduce friction with the Parliament and draw allies 
from within the 'power structures’ (i.e. the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Af­
fairs, and Defence; the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence 
Service), the Armed Forces, and the military-industrial complex. The results of 
the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections certainly strengthened the position 
of the above sections of the Russian elite, whose members - by and large - 
had been sceptical of or outright hostile to the idea of ‘partnership and integra­
tion with the West’.’' Attributing foreign policy change primarily to the electoral
® The term Weimar syndrome (based on the example of Inter-war Germany) refers to the 
mindset of a nation, which, as a result of having simultaneously suffered a dramatic deteriora­
tion in material well-being and national prestige, becomes inclined to support political leaders 
advocating discrimination against ethnic minorities at home and/or confrontation with enemies 
abroad whom they blame for their country’s ills. See Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. 
Kopostein, “The Weimar/Russia Comparison’’, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 13, no. 3, 1997, pp. 
252-283
 ^Yevgeny Bazhavov, The Changing Foreign Policy of Russia. Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga and 
Diplomatic Academy/ Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Ministry of Foreign Af­
fairs of the Russian Federation, 1999, pp. 3, 6-7
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success of the ‘red-browns’ is unwarranted. As Margot Light demonstrates in a 
thorough examination of the evolution of elite views on foreign policy, by mid- 
1993, a basic consensus had begun to emerge as a result of a growing num­
ber of defections from the ranks of ‘liberal Westernisers’ to those of ‘pragmatic 
nationalists’.® There exist several classifications of participants in the foreign 
policy debate.® Light offers the neatest model discerning three politically rele­
vant groups: ‘liberal Westernisers’, who designed post-Soviet Russia’s early 
diplomatic course, aspiring to enlist the support of economically advanced 
Western democracies for Russia’s process of transformation; ‘pragmatic na­
tionalists’, who favour selective co-operation with the West within the frame­
work of a foreign policy balanced between East and West, and furthering Rus­
sia’s great power status; and 'fundamentalist nationalists’, who reject Western- 
inspired socio-economic models and see the West as a malevolent force seek­
ing to undermine Russia,*®
As of 1994, the consensus, which was centred around ‘pragmatic national­
ist’ positions, came to be reflected in the official foreign policy line. Russia’s 
foreign policy began to emphasise national interests, economic and strategic, 
rather than ‘universal values’ of human rights and democracy. It grew reluctant 
to forsake opportunities to earn much-needed hard currency through arms or 
nuclear technology exports to states with dictatorial regimes or poor human
The views analysed are those of politicians, diplomats, academic experts, and journalists. 
Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking", in Malcolm, Pravda, Allison, and Light, Internal Fac­
tors in Russian Foreign Policy. Oxford: OUP/ Royal Institute of international Affairs, 1996, pp. 
35, 51,71-72.
® For example, Brzezinski and Sullivan divide them into four groups: ‘neo-democrats’ (Gaidar, 
Kozyrev), ‘national-patriots’ (Rutskoi, Khasbulatov, Ambartsumov), ‘pragmatic nationaiists’ 
(Yavlinsky, Primakov, Lukin, A. Arbatov), and ‘right- and left-wing extremists’ (Zyuganov, Zhir­
inovsky). Dawisha and Parrott’s schools of thought correspond to the above categories with the 
addition of a politically marginal group of Slavophile Intellectuals focusing on the need for 
Russia to rediscover its spiritual traditions (Solzhenitsyn , Rasputin, Shafarevich). See Z. 
Brzezinski and P. Sullivan (eds.), Russia and the CIS. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, pp. 
60-64; and K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Cambridge: 
CUP, 1994, pp. 199-202.
Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking”, op. cit., p. 34. Neumann’s categories of ‘liberals’, ‘Eurasian- 
ists’, and ‘romantic nationalists’ mirror the three groups identified by Light - with the exception 
that Neumann is more concerned with intellectuals than politicians. See Iver B. Neumann, 
Russia and the Idea of Europe. London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 200-201, 205
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rights records. More importantly, solidarity with the community of ‘civilised de­
mocratic states’ would not necessarily lead Russian diplomacy to endorse the 
positions of the United States or West European powers on international is­
sues (e.g. armed conflicts between or within third states). On the contrary, it 
would not hesitate to enter into confrontation with its Western partners in de­
fence of its perceived vital interests. In December 1994, Yeltsin warned of a 
‘cold peace’ in the event that NATO went ahead with its plans of Eastward 
enlargement.**
The appointment of Yevgeny Primakov as head of the Foreign Ministry did 
not introduce a radical break with Kozyrev’s revised stance, but brought in cer­
tain tangible innovations in foreign policy doctrine. The recognition of Russia’s 
great power status was declared as its uppermost national interest and the 
guiding principle of all its activities in the international sphere.*^ In accordance 
with this principle, Russian diplomacy would strive for the diversification of the 
country’s ties with its external environment. Non-Western powers such as India 
or China would be regarded not only as valuable export markets for Russia’s 
military-industrial complex, but also as potential strategic partners. Opposition 
to the United States’ global hegemony and the need to strengthen the trend 
towards the formation of a multi-polar world became common themes of Rus­
sian diplomatic discourse.*® The ultimate task of foreign policy would be to ac­
celerate and consolidate the process of Russia’s emergence as one of the 
leading powers in the new multi-polar system.*"*
Though debates and criticisms over particular decisions continued (e.g. 
whether Russia should have signed the Founding Act with NATO in May 
1997), Primakov was able to plausibly claim that the fundamentals of foreign 
policy were no longer subject to contention, but were founded on genuine 
agreement among the country’s major political and societal forces.*® Instead of
See Yeltsin’s address to the CSCE summit In Budapest (5 December 1994), Diolo- 
maticheskv Vestnik. January 1995, p. 5
Yevgeny Primakov, Press Conference, Diolomaticheskv Vestnik. February 1996, p. 3 
See, for example,
December 1997, p. 1 
Igor’ Ivanov (First 
maticheskv Vestnik. January 1997, p. 32 
Yevgeny Pr 
ary 1998, p. 3
 Primakov’s interview with Aleksei Pushkov, Nezavisiamava Gazeta. 30 
*"* Deputy Foreign Minister), Press conference, 23 December 1996, Diolo-
i
imakov, Press conference, 23 December 1997, Dioiomaticheskv Vestnik. Janu-
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alienating the liberal wing of the political spectrum, the premises of the Prima­
kov doctrine gained the acceptance of its chief representatives, i.e. Yabloko 
leader Grigory Yavlinsky and the ‘young reformers’ who occupied government 
posts during Yeltsin’s second term (Chubais, Nemtsov, Kiriyenko).*® Indeed, 
Yabloko’s party programme for the parliamentary elections of December 1999 
closely reflected the Foreign Ministry line in stating that Russia should “strive 
for the formation of an organised and civilised multipolar world” and resist the 
“claims of the USA and NATO to unipolarity and to a monopoly in the eco­
nomic, military and political spheres of international affairs”.*’' Part of the ex­
planation consists in that Russian foreign policy did actually become balanced, 
for it did not replace the former pro-Western tilt with an anti-Western bias. The 
Russian leadership maintained its efforts for admission into the World Trade 
Organisation and for fuli participation in the G7/8. It took pains to offer com­
promise so as not to allow even the most significant instances of discord 
(NATO’s expansion into Central Europe, and its bombing campaigns against 
Iraq in 1998 and Yugoslavia in 1999) to irreparably damage its prospects of 
advantageous co-operation with Western Europe and the United States.*® 
Pragmatism, a celebrated feature of the revised Russian foreign policy, dic­
tates that sustained confrontation with the West is neither commensurate with 
Russia’s material resources nor conducive to its security.*®
Indeed, the main components of Primakov’s line have continued to define 
Russia’s foreign policy after his departure from the government in May 1999 
and after Putin’s election to the Presidency in March 2000. The new ‘Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, which was approved by President 
Putin in July 2000 reaffirms Russia’s self-identification as a great power, its 
opposition to a worid order economically and militarily dominated by the United
*® Vladimir Shlapentokh, “The Changing Russian View of the West”, in T. Casier and K. 
Malfliet (eds.), Is Russia a European Power?. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998, pp. TO­
YS
*’ Bezooasnost’. doverive. budushchee: Predvvbornava programma ‘Yabloka’ na vvborakn 
deoutatov Gosudarstvennov Dumv 1999 goda. Moscow: Smysl, 1999, pp. 44-46 
There was, however, talk of the Russo-American relations having passed the point of irre­
versible -  at least for the medium term - deterioration. See, for example, Novve Izvestlva. 5 
November 1998, p. 2; Seoodnva. 20 June 1998, p. 3; Kommersant’-Dailv 21 January 1999, p. 
1
Bazhanov, The Changing Foreign Policy of Russia, p. 17
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States, and the priority granted to relations with CIS countries.^® Putin has also 
continued working towards the diversification of Russia’s foreign partners by 
means of high-profile visits to China, India and former client states of the So­
viet Union like Cuba and North Korea/^ As he said, Russia cannot lean “either 
towards the West or the East. The reality is that a power with such a geopoliti­
cal position as Russia has national interests everywhere”. A t  the same time, 
the Putin administration has placed growing emphasis on closer ties with the 
European Union.
Already by the time of Primakov's appointment as Foreign Minister, the en­
tire spectrum of opinion had moved closer to nationalist positions. What had 
united Russia’s bitterly divided foreign policy elites? Rather than a shift in 
mass attitudes having caused an adaptation of elite perspectives, it appears 
that the latter as well as the official line expressed by the Foreign Ministry were 
primarily due to the conclusion that the early approach had been driven by illu­
sory expectations and failed to pay satisfactory dividends. Russia’s external 
environment has changed considerably since the beginning of the 1990s - in a 
different direction from the one anticipated by liberal Westernisers. Despite 
their efforts, they failed to convince the outside world to accept Russia as a 
‘normal’ European country.^^ The dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the disso­
lution of the Soviet Union did not give rise to a Euro-Atlantic community (a 
‘common European home’ in Gorbachev’s rhetoric or a ‘greater Europe without 
dividing lines’ in Yeltsinite parlance), free from rivalries over influence and 
strategic gains, in which Russia would be recognised as one of the dominant 
actors. The critics of Yeltsin’s early foreign policy stressed that Russia had suf­
fered real losses in political influence, prestige, strategic assets, and even 
revenue as a result of its - willing or reluctant - retreat from East/Central
"Kontseptslya vneshnyei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii", Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. August 
2000, pp. 3-11
In an interview to Russian television channels ORT and RTR, Putin reiterated the impor­
tance of de-ideologised relations with these countries. Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 26 De­
cember 2000
^  Putin’s address to top Foreign Ministry officials as reported by Interfax News Agency, Diplo­
matic Panorama. 26 January 2001 
Putin’s annual speech to the Duma, Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 2001, p. 10 
Iver B. Neumann, Use of the other: "the East" in European identity formation. Manchester: 
MUP, 1999, p. 169
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Europe and the former Soviet Union - to the advantage of Western states and 
organisations. Economic gains in the form of foreign investment or financial 
and technical assistance proved far too limited to compensate for these losses 
by helping Russia become one of the world's economically most developed 
states - a trade-off that would have been acceptable to a significant part of the 
Russian foreign policy elite.^^
Gorbachev’s rapprochement with the West and Yeltsin’s pursuit of cordial 
relations with Western powers produced substantial benefits in the field of se­
curity in the narrow sense of freedom from the threat of military aggression. 
Russians were and felt more secure than ever before. Public opinion polls re­
peatedly indicated that the majority of the population perceived no external 
threat to Russia’s security.^® The military doctrine adopted in November 1993 
was premised on the assessment that the danger of armed conflict with the 
West had ceased to exist. Instead, countries on Russia’s southern periphery 
were regarded as the most likely sources of security risks.^^ This set of exter­
nal circumstances would allow Russia to embark on the arduous process of 
modernising its armed forces and to reduce expenditure on defence - espe­
cially on procurement of nuclear and costly conventional weapons to rival 
NATO arsenals - without jeopardising its security.
NATO’s decision to extend membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic did not alarm the Russian public.^® It did, nevertheless, provoke 
negative reactions from almost all Russian political leaders, thus broadening
In a survey of elites involved in foreign policy conducted in early 1994 by the reputable All- 
Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTslOiVI), half of the respondents said that 
they would prefer Russia to be “one of the world’s 10-15 most developed countries" rather than 
“one of five great powers". Nikolai Popov, “Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: Analiz politikov i 
ekspertov”, Mirovava ekonomika I mezhdunarodnive otnosheniva. 1994, no. 3, p. 59 
Richard Rose, "Do Russians want to fight?", in 0 . Haerpfer, C. Wallace, and R. Rose, Public 
Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-Communist Europe. Studies In Public Policy no. 
293, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997, p. 21 
Pavel Grachev (Defence Minister) in Nezavlsimaya Gazeta. 9 June 1994, p. 10 
In a VTslOM survey conducted in December 1995 only 0.5% of respondents expressed con­
cern about NATO enlargement. See Institute of World Economics and International Relations 
(IMEMO), Obshchestvennoye mneniye i rashireniye NATO. Moscow: Russian Academy of Sci­
ences, 1998, p. 33
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and strengthening the emergent consensus on foreign policy.^® NATO 
enlargement was perceived as a breach of trust on the part of the West, sub­
verting the spirit of the Two plus Four agreements on German re-unification 
and the Paris Charter, which had marked the end of the Cold War.®° It meant 
that the security architecture of Europe would be irreversibly NATO-centric and 
that Russian proposals for a Europe-wide collective security system based on 
the OSCE would be shelved. Russian foreign policy elites feared that they 
would be excluded from decision-making processes on important issues, to 
whose resolution Russia should be in a position to make an independent con­
tribution. Even after the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech republic 
to NATO, the Russian leadership has continued to express its concern over 
NATO enlargement. As President Putin said in autumn 2000, “we are against 
NATO expansion. None of the reasons that gave birth to NATO exist. Still, 
NATO itself, not only exists, but is expanding, and expanding towards our bor­
ders".®  ^ Or, in the words of Russian Defence Minister Igor’ Sergeyev, “the dan­
ger (to European security) comes from the South, but NATO is moving to the 
East. This is what Russia does not understand and is alarmed over”.®^ Though 
Putin caused a sensation by declaring that Russia was ready to become a 
NATO member, he has made it clear that the existing membership of the Alli­
ance would not accept Russia as a full member, which would transform NATO 
into an organisation with a role similar to Russia’s vision of the OSCE.®® In 
view of the West’s apparent unwillingness to heed Russia’s views and inter­
ests, Russian officials and political leaders have perceived a pressing need to 
reinforce the country’s status as a great power and, thereby, its weight in inter­
national negotiations.
The extent of the consensus has been exaggerated by the Foreign Ministry; while it encom­
passes basic components of Russian foreign policy (e.g. opposition to NATO expansion; desir­
ability of some form of Integration with Belarus), there are hardly any broadly supported ap­
proaches to their optimal achievement. Author’s Interview with Russian academic expert, Mos­
cow 22 June 1999.
See article by Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Af­
fairs, in Izvestiva. 12 May 1995, p. 3 
Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 26 October 2000 
Nezavlsimaya Gazeta. 20 January 2001, p. 5 
Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 14 December 2000
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The position of Belarus and Ukraine in Russia’s role conception
“Russians do not simply want to gain a place under the sun; they would like to re­
store a special place under the sun.”®'*
A state’s foreign policy objectives are formulated and ordered according to 
the interplay between national decision-makers’ conception of their country’s 
appropriate role in the world and the status vested in that state by the outside 
world.®® In the case of post-Soviet Russia, national foreign policy elites’ image 
of their own country (i.e. role conception), based on their sense of national 
identity, appears to be at odds with the role that the outside world -  especially 
Western powers and organisations as well as many CIS countries -  are pre­
pared to recognise as warranted. National identity has been defined as the 
“condition in which a mass of people have made the same identification with 
national symbols -  have internalised the symbols of the nation -  so that they 
may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility 
of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity”.®® These symbols in­
clude not only a state’s flag and anthem, but -  most importantly -  prevalent in­
terpretations of its history, perceptions of its external environment, and a cor­
responding notion of the state’s rightful place in the world.
Russia in its present form might be a very young state, but it is heir to the 
long history of the Soviet Union and the Czarist Empire. It has been repeatedly 
noted that, as the collapse of communism and the -  albeit partial -  renewal of 
the Russian elite led to a yet uncompleted reappraisal of this history, Russian 
national identity is still in flux.®  ^ Indeed, the symbols of national identity must
Bazhanov, “The Changing Foreign Policy of Russia", op.clt., p. 15
Jean-Franrjois Thibault and Jacques Livesque, “The Soviet Union/Russia; Which Past for 
which Future?”, in Philippe G. Le Prestre (ed.). Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: For­
eign Policies in Transition. Montreal & Kingston: McGIII-Queen’s University Press, 1997, p. 38 
William Bloom, Personal identity. National Identity, and International Relations. Cambridge: 
CUP, 1990, p. 52
See, for example, Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 181-182;
Marie Medras, “Towards a post-imperial identity”. In Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and 
Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. New York: SIPRI/ Oxford University Press, 1997, p.
90
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be subject to adaptation in response to profound changes in domestic and ex­
ternal circumstances, if they are to continue to perform the functions of provid­
ing the citizenry with a sense of pride and psychological security, forging soli­
darity based on the notion of a common purpose shared by the mass of the 
population and their ruling elite, and endowing the state's leadership with 
popular legitimacy.®® Adaptation became essential, since core symbols of So­
viet identity, such as the role of the state as the guarantor of all citizens’ wel­
fare and as the leader of international socialism, could no longer be evoked to 
inspire loyalty on the part of the Russian public or gain international prestige in 
the post-Soviet period.®® A radically new sense of national identity linked to a 
role conception of Russia as integral part of a Western community of economi­
cally advanced liberal democracies remained far removed from reality and, 
therefore, became untenable.
Russian leaders still lay claim to one of the source of pride Soviet citizens 
felt through identification with the state: the status of ‘a great state’ or a ‘great 
power’."*® To be sure, post-Soviet Russia lacks key attributes of the Soviet Un­
ion’s great power status. It is obvious both to its own citizens and to the out­
side world that Russia -  itself in search of political and socio-economic models 
-  cannot derive international status from pretensions to ideological orthodoxy. 
Its chronic condition of socio-economic crisis, which the leadership publicly ac­
knowledges, does not allow it to project the image of a world leader in science 
and technology. Equally well-publicised social problems plaguing the Russian 
armed forces and their poor performance in the Chechnyan conflict have 
eroded military might as a source of international prestige. Unlike its prede­
cessor, Russia is neither the leader of an alliance controlling Central and 
Eastern Europe nor supported by a network of client regimes In the Third
Ibid., pp. 58-59, 79,116
Identification with the nation-state on the part of the mass citizenry needs to be based either 
on economic and social welfare associated with state policies or on the perception of a com­
petitive, hostile external environment against which the state provides material and/or emo­
tional protection. Ibid., pp. 80,146-147.
'*® For present-day Russians, the Soviet state and victory in WWII are the two sources of pride 
in their history that are connected to the state. Similarly, over a quarter of respondents gave 
‘pride in our great and powerful country’ and ‘world leadership’ as losses as a result of the dis­
solution of the Soviet Union. VTslOM, Ekonomicheskive I sotsial’nve oeremenv: Monitoring 
obshchestvennoao mneniva. vol. 25, no, 5, September/October 1996, pp. 80, 84-85.
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World. Still, Russia inherited the Soviet permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council, which serves as a vestige of former greatness and the cornerstone of 
efforts for its restoration. Russian foreign policy makers admit that the United 
States will remain the world’s only superpower for a long time. Russia, how­
ever, is asserted as one of the ‘great powers’ alongside China, Japan, Ger­
many or the European Union."*  ^ This status Is justified in terms of the size of 
Russia’s territory and population, its economic potential based on its wealth in 
natural and human resources, its special responsibility for global security due 
to its possession of a nuclear deterrent capability, its historical and current dip­
lomatic pre-eminence.
The achievements of pre-revolutionary Foreign Minister Aleksandr Gorcha­
kov, whose active foreign policy returned Russia to the concert of European 
powers in the wake of its humiliating defeat in the Crimean war, have been 
praised and presented as the model for Russian diplomacy today."*  ^For its cru­
cial task is seen to be comparable: to make the most of Russia’s residual au­
thority as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and of its diplo­
mats' own skill in order to project influence beyond what the country’s material 
capabilities can presently sustain. During this period of supposedly temporary 
weakness, Russia needs to maintain a high profile in international affairs or 
risk marginalisation. If Russia turned inward to devote maximal effort and re­
sources to the success of domestic reform, leaving the resolution of any inter­
national issues not immediately affecting its own survival to other powers, as­
suming a major international role, when domestic circumstances improved, 
would be much harder.
This expectation is most pertinent to the question of Europe’s institutional 
architecture and that of NATO’s consolidation as the central decision-making 
and enforcement structure on the continent, a development the Russian elite 
deemed politically adverse -  over and above any potential security implica­
tions. Kugler interprets Russia’s negative stance on NATO expansion as re-
Igor' Ivanov (Deputy Foreign Minister), Press Conference, 23 December 1996, Diolo- 
maticheskv Vestnik. January 1997, p. 32 
Yevgeny Primakov, "Russia in world politics: a lecture in honour of Chancellor Gorchakov”. 
International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 44, no. 3,1998, pp. 7-12; Igor’ Ivanov, speech at the first 
International Studies Association Convention, Moscow 2001, Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 
2001, p. 13
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fleeting geopolitical imperatives more than concern over the prospect of mili­
tary aggression on the part of the Alliance/® NATO enlargement affected Rus­
sian foreign policy in an indirect but highly potent manner by altering the per­
spective from which Russian elites perceive Western intentions and the inter­
national environment in general. As Robert Jervis concludes in his classic Per­
ception and Misperception in International Politics, “it is often impossible to ex­
plain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ 
beliefs about the world and their images of others.”"*"* As it will be subsequently 
contended, Russian objectives and policies with regard to Belarus and Ukraine 
cannot be satisfactorily explained without taking into account the major shift in 
Russian policy-makers’ beliefs about the nature of international politics, which 
was inextricably linked to the re-emergence of a suspicious or even hostile im­
age of the West and NATO in particular.
NATO enlargement prompted a change of paradigm in Russian foreign pol­
icy circles, for it was seen as fundamentally inconsistent with ‘new thinking’, a 
theoretical perspective on international politics that Gorbachev had elevated to 
an official doctrine and foundation of his foreign policy. Even though the term 
‘new thinking’ was eliminated from official parlance after Gorbachev’s ouster 
from power, its core principles continued to guide the external orientation of 
post-Soviet Russia at least until the middle of 1993. ‘New thinking’, which re­
sembled the Western liberal internationalist or Idealist tradition in stressing in­
ternational co-operation based on ‘universal human values’, served as the jus­
tification for Soviet and, subsequently, Russian efforts to eliminate antagonism 
with the West and become integrated in the ‘community of democratic states 
and correspondingly the highly developed world economy’."*® The acceptance 
of ‘new thinking’ by most of the Russian foreign policy elite had been at best 
tentative or merely superficial and had rested - to a large extent - upon their 
perception of the West’s behaviour as benevolent to Russia and beneficial to 
its role conception. Once NATO expansion dealt a fatal blow to any such per­
"*® Richard L. Kugler with Marianna V. Kozintseva, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 1996, p. 19 
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Prince­
ton University Press, 1976, p. 28
*^® Andrei Kozyrev, “Preobrazheniye ill Kafkianskaya Metamorfoza: Demokraticheskaya 
Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii I eyo Prioritety", Nezavislmava Gazeta. 20 August 1992, pp. 1, 4
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ceptions, Russian foreign policy was redesigned according to theoretical prin­
ciples that were considered to have proved more reliable than those of ‘new 
thinking’/®
Apart from the Marxist-Leninist tenets placing the systemic dynamics of 
capitalism at the root of inter-state conflict, Soviet theory about international 
relations shared assumptions similar to those of the Realist paradigm that had 
prevailed in academic and policy-making circles in most Western countries af­
ter the end of WWII. The concept of ‘correlation of forces’, closely analogous 
to the Realist ‘balance of power’, formed the principal analytical tool in the ex­
amination of the competition between states for the accumulation of power, 
the currency of the international system -  convertible into increased security, 
economic gain, political influence, or prestige."*® The Soviet/Russian variant, 
influenced by 19^ century European theorists of geopolitics such as Mackin­
der, assigned particular importance to a country’s geographical position, the 
size of territory and population under its control as determinants of its status in 
the international system."*®
In the post-Soviet period, as Marxist theoretical principles were abandoned 
even by Communist analysts,®® the above paradigm found new ideological
underpinnings- in a- mixture of Western Realism, nationalism, pan-Slavism and 
At this point, it is important to bear in mind that, as it was noted in the previous sections, the
principies of ‘new thinking’ had started losing ground in Russia’s foreign policy debate before 
the issue of NATO expansion came to the fore. Indeed, it will be argued that the fact that more 
traditional perspectives had already been on the ascendancy greatly contributed to the preva­
lent perception of NATO enlargement as a development threatening Russia's Interests and 
identity. Thus, NATO enlargement did not produce, but decisively reinforced an existing 
movement away from ‘new thinking' tenets as the foundation of Russia’s foreign policy.
The major difference between the Realist ‘balance of power’ and the Soviet ‘correlation of 
forces’ consisted in that the latter concept was mainly applied to blocs of states rather than 
individual powers, for Soviet analysts were primarily concerned with comparing the capabilities 
of the capitalist and socialist blocs of states.
'*® For a discussion of the concepts of power, influence, prestige, etc. see Karl W. Deutsch, The 
Analysis of international Relations. Third Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Interna­
tional, 1968, especially pp. 47-48
Hence the Russian designation of the academic discipline of international politics as ‘geo­
politics’ (geopolitika). See K.S. Gadzhiev, Vvedenive v aeoDolitiku. Moscow: Logos, 1998, pp. 
3, 12
For example, Viktor Ilyukhin (Communist Party deputy and Chairman of the State Duma 
Committee on Security), in his book Natslva. gosudarstvo. bezooasnost’ (Moscow: “Tsentr 
kniga”, 1999), makes no reference to Marxist concepts.
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derpinnings in a mixture of Western Realism, nationalism, pan-Slavism and 
‘Eurasianism’.®^ The latter component, developed by Russian émigré thinkers 
of the 1920s, focused on the notion of Russia as a distinct civilisation, inti­
mately linked to both Europe and Asia, but part of neither. The role of a do­
mestically and internationally strong state as the guarantor of this unique civili­
sation was a core element of Eurasianist theory. The Russian state, thus, had 
a claim to the status of a leading power in the international arena and to being 
the primary locus of identification of Russia’s ethnically and religiously diverse 
population. In its original conception, Eurasianism had represented a compro­
mise between the ideas of nineteenth-century Slavophiles, advocating isola­
tionism in order to protect the purity of Russian culture from the harmful Influ­
ence of the West, and those of Westernisers, wishing their country to adopt 
Western European models of political organisation and be closely involved in 
European affairs.®^ In the post-Soviet period, prominent Russian historians and 
political scientists such as L. Gumilev, A. Dugin and K. Gadzhiev revisited the 
theories of Trubetskoy, Savitsky and other Eurasianist thinkers to provide ap­
propriate frameworks for conceptualizing Russia’s role in today’s international 
environment.®®
In the debate on Russia’s foreign policy, the Eurasianist notions of distinct­
iveness from both Europe and Asia and necessity of great power status pro­
vided the ideological basis of the foreign policy consensus between liberals 
and ‘red-browns’ as the justification for the assertive diplomatic course geared 
towards the attainment of international recognition of Russia as a great
Hannes Adomeit, “Russia as a ‘great power’ in world affairs; images and reality”, Interna­
tional Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1, 1995, p. 45
Prince Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, Nasledive Chinoiskhana. Moscow: Agraf, 1999; Savitsky, 
Pyotr, Kontinent Yevraziva. Moscow: Agraf, 1997 
Unlike other present-day Eurasianists, Dugin, despite his emphasis on Russia’s unique 
geopolitical and civilisational role as a Eurasian power, diverges from early Eurasian thinkers 
in rejecting the notion of Russia as a culturally diverse, multi-ethnic state. Instead, he 
advances the Slavophile idea of the Slavic-Orthodox Russian nation’s messianic role as the 
bearer of the Eurasian civilisation, on which he bases the claim that the preservation of a 
multiethnic empire represents the only acceptable form of Russian statehood. Aleksandr 
Dugin, Osnovv Geopoiitiki: Geopoliticheskove Budushcheve Rossii. Moscow: Aktogeia, 1997, 
pp. 188-190; Gadzhiev, Vvedenive v Geopolitiku
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power.®"* They were resurrected by certain ‘pragmatic nationalist’ experts, such 
as Yevgeny Ambartsumov (Chairman of the Russian Parliament’s Joint Com­
mittee on Foreign Affairs until 1995), Vladimir Lukin (former Ambassador to the 
US and later Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee) Sergei Kara- 
ganov (director of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council), and then presiden­
tial advisers Sergei Stankevich and Andranik Migranyan to argue for an inde­
pendent diplomatic course geared towards maximising Russia’s political influ­
ence and safeguarding its strategic interests - especially in the former Soviet 
area.®® Eurasianist arguments formed the ideological foundation for a role con­
ception whose realisation requires the attainment of great power status based 
on leadership of post-Soviet states.®®
The policies proposed to advance this role conception coincided with pre­
scriptions derived from an interpretation of Russia’s external environment 
within the theoretical framework of ‘geopolitics’. In particular, the ‘need’ for 
some form of reintegration with the other newly independent states that made 
up the core of the Soviet Union (Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) was put for­
ward as a geopolitical precondition for Russia’s return to the status of a global 
power. This perceived need was deemed all the more imperative due to the 
assessment that the US had started to regard almost the whole world, Includ­
ing parts of the former Soviet Union, as its sphere of influence.®^ Russian pol­
icy-making circles’ apparent receptiveness to Eurasianist-geopolitical theories
Iver B. Neumann, "The Geopolitics of Delineating ‘Russia’ and ‘Europe’: The Creation of the 
‘Other’ in European and Russian Tradition”, in CarrGre d’Encausse et al., Is Russia a European 
Power? The Position of Russia in the New Europe. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998, 
pp. 18-19
®® See, for example, Andranik Migranyan’s article in Nezavlsimaya Gazeta. 12 January 1994, 
pp. 1,4, in which he advocates the proclamation of ‘the entire geopolitical space of the former 
Soviet Union’ as an exclusive sphere of Russia’s vital Interests. In defence of the compliance 
of such a move with international norms, he draws a parallel with the Monroe Doctrine, which 
had defined the whole of North and South America as a sphere of influence of exclusive US 
jurisdiction.
^  David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics In Russia's Foreign Policy ”, 
Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 47, No. 6, 1995, pp. 977-988; S. Neil Mac Farlane, “Russian Con­
ceptions of Europe”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3,1994, pp. 234-269 
A. Migranyan, “Geopolitika: Rossiya I blizhnoye zarubezh’e”, Nezavlsimaya Gazeta. 18 
January 1994, p. 5
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raised significant concern in Ukraine and other CIS countries.®® Some of the 
more radical but influential theories have presented former Soviet republics’ 
independent statehood as a ‘geopolitical anomaly’ and a fundamental threat to 
Russian security interests.®® However, the author’s interviews with Russian of­
ficials and experts suggest that such theories have had an uneven influence, 
their insights being called upon primarily to interpret the motives of the US and 
NATO rather than to directly inform Russian policy in the CIS.®®
Yeltsin described NATO enlargement as an attempt by certain Western 
forces to create new spheres of influence and isolate Russia.®  ^ Indeed, accord­
ing to Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and Zbigniew Brzezin- 
ski’s The Grand Chessboard, the two Western works on international relations 
most widely read both in academic and policy-making circles in Russia, this is 
exactly the course of action prescribed for the advancement of the West’s civi­
lisational and strategic interests. The two authors disagree about the optimal 
boundaries of Western expansion. Whereas Huntington argues that mainly Or­
thodox countries such as Ukraine and Belarus cannot be harmoniously incor­
porated in the Western (Catholic-Protestant) community of states and would be 
best left in Russia's sphere of influence, Brzezinski is adamant about the stra­
tegic necessity of Ukraine becoming firmly allied to the West and, thus, a bar­
rier to Russian ambitions.®^ Not surprisingly, the Russian experts who are most 
alarmed by NATO enlargement, which they view as the product of Western 
hostility towards Russia and US aspirations to absolute global hegemony, of­
ten interpret Western and especially US strategy in terms of Brzezinski’s con­
tainment theory. They expect the West to intensify its efforts to lure Ukraine
R. Ya. Yezverov, Ukralna s Rossiel: Vmeste ill Vroz’?. Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2000, p. 74 
Dugin’s theory, which is often cited by Russian officials and government advisers, contends 
that "Belarus should be regarded as a part of Russia" and that it “should be Integrated with 
Russia in the closest way possible", while “Ukraine must be an administrative unit within a 
Russian centralised state" (allowing for cultural and linguistic autonomy). Dugin, Osnovv Geo­
poiitiki. pp. 348-349, 376-377 
Moscow, June and November-December 1999
“Foreign policy priorities”. President’s message to the Federal Assembly (16 February 1995), 
Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. March 1995, p. 5
®^See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 
New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 167; Zbigniew BzezinskI, The Grand Chess­
board: American Primacy and its Geostrategic imperatives. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
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and possibly Belarus into its sphere of influence, depriving Russia of allies in 
Europe;
“If Russia had Ukraine’s support, it would be a great power. As Brzezinzki says, 
with Ukraine Russia is an empire. Without Ukraine, there is no empire. Therefore, 
the West does not want to see Russia and Ukraine united in the international 
arena.”®®
According to analyses attributed to Russian Intelligence Service sources, 
NATO has almost succeeded in eliminating Russian influence in Europe and is 
seeking to reduce Russia's leverage in the CIS.®"*
In this context, it is extremely important for Russian foreign policy that Bela­
rus and Ukraine unequivocally choose Russia and the CIS over the West as 
the principal long-term focus of their external orientation. Such a choice on the 
part of the Belarusian and Ukrainian leaderships would establish a limit to the 
expansion of the West’s influence at the expense of that of Russia. Even in the 
eyes of those members of the Russian political elite such as Yabloko leader 
Grigory Yavlinsky, whose generally positive image of the West does not pre­
dispose them to infer that NATO statesmen’s intentions coincide with those of 
Brzezinski, NATO’s territorial expansion appeared as politically damaging for 
Russia.®® It undermines the credibility of Russia’s claim to great power status, 
which underlies the political elite’s attempts to use foreign policy as a means of 
strengthening national identity. Moreover, it hinders the advancement of Rus­
sian foreign policy makers’ projects for a ‘common European home’ or ‘a 
Europe without dividing lines’, in which their conception of Russia as a leading 
power could materialise. These projects, however, were thwarted in large part 
because of Central European countries’ mistrust of Russia and their desire to 
irrevocably become part of the West by joining NATO and the European Un­
ion.
Belarus and Ukraine’s adoption of an external orientation centred on Russia 
would be crucial to the letter’s international image, for it would represent a
Author’s interview with an academic expert in the Diplomatic Academy and senior adviser to 
the Russian MFA, Moscow, 24 June 1999.
®'* Seaodnva. 10 April 1999, p. 3 
Grigory Yavlinsky, "The NATO Distraction”, Transition. 21 March 1997, p. 33
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counterweight to Central Europeans’ perception of Russia as potential threat to 
European security. It would also provide Russian diplomacy with a reliable 
source of support for its positions and initiatives, which would be invaluable in 
view of the tendency on the part of Central European states to adhere to the 
positions taken by the institutions they wish to join.®® The importance Russian 
foreign policy elites assign to actual Belarusian and potential Ukrainian diplo­
matic support cannot be overestimated, especially with respect to Russian di­
plomacy’s exertion to resist the monopolisation of decision-making on Euro­
pean affairs by a NATO-centric institutional architecture.®^ A leading Russian 
academic expert on Ukraine went so far as to assert that NATO enlargement 
into Central Europe would have never taken place, had the Ukrainian leader­
ship been unambiguously opposed to it.®® Conversely, Ukrainian or Belarusian 
dissent from Russia’s stance on various international issues would be highly 
embarrassing to Russian diplomacy. If Russia’s positions failed to be upheld 
by its immediate neighbours, ostensibly sharing in the same historical and cul­
tural tradition and whose security and welfare depend on Russia much more 
than those of any other European state, their credibility would suffer to the 
point of all but eliminating their chances of gaining broader acceptance. As an 
eminent Russian scholar and foreign policy advisor has put it, without Belaru­
sian and Ukrainian backing, “it will be much more difficult for Russia to attain
Pal Dunay, Tamos Kende and Tamos Szocs, ‘The Integration of Central and Eastern 
Europe Into the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Fifteen”, in Marc 
Maresceau (ed.), Enlarging the European Union. London: Longman, 1997, pp. 327-336 
On Russian diplomacy’s continuing efforts to place the OSCE at the centre of decision­
making on European security, even after NATO enlargement, see Foreign Minister Igor’ 
Ivanov’s statements in Seaodnva. 9 April 1999, p. 2 
Author’s interview, Moscow, 21 June 1999. Ukraine’s official position on NATO enlargement 
simultaneously emphasised both Central European states’ right to freely choose their external 
orientation and apprehensions that Ukraine might be reduced to a ‘buffer’ between East and 
West. See the interview with Boris Tarasyuk (Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister at the time). 
Transition. 28 July 1995, p. 19. The Ukrainian leadership’s eagerness to forge cordial relations 
with the Alliance, however, created the impression - both in Russia and the West - that it actu­
ally welcomed NATO’s move to the East, a position carefully omitted from official statements 
to avoid aggravating Russia.
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positive results in European and world politics, to play the traditional role of an 
influential power in the international arena”.®®
Given the failure of the CIS to develop anything remotely resembling a com­
mon foreign policy, many Russian foreign policy makers seem to regard 
integration with Belarus and some form of close partnership with Ukraine as 
essential building blocs in a medium-term project to transform the CIS from a 
rather incoherent arrangement into a distinct community of states parallelling 
that made up by existing and aspiring NATO and EU member-states. The Un­
ion with Belarus in particular is seen as the nucleus of the CIS and its success 
is hoped to increase the attractiveness of integration with Russia in the eyes of 
other CIS countries, thus promoting centripetal tendencies.^® This rationale 
was expressed in President Putin’s annual address to the Duma in April 2001, 
in which Belarus was the only state mentioned among Russia’s policy priori­
ties.^^ Putin also described the ostensible qualitative improvement in relations 
with Ukraine as one of Russian diplomacy’s principal achievements during the 
first year of his presidency, reiterating the priority given to the post-Soviet re­
gion and relations with Ukraine in particular.^^
Security considerations
In addition to political objectives, most sections of the Russian elite deem in­
tegration with Belarus and a special partnership with Ukraine vital for reasons 
related to military planning.^® According to many Western and Russian ana-
Anatoly D. Shutov (Director of the CIS Centre, Institute for Contemporary International Stud­
ies, Diplomatic Academy), Ukralna: vremva strateaicheskikh reshenii. unpublished paper, 
spring 1999, p. 1
V. E. Kovalenko (Deputy Director of the 2nd CIS Affairs Department, Russian MFA), “O vne- 
shne politicheskom izmerenii soyuza Belarus! I Rossii”, in Diplomatic Academy (MFA of the 
Russian Federation) and Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the Russian Federation, Sovuz 
Belarus! i Rossii: vvbor sdelan. Minsk: Polymnya, 1998, p. 70
Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 2001, p. 10
Putin’s interview to the Ukrainian media, 6 February 2001. Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. March 
2001, p. 42
Author’s interviews in Moscow, June and December 1999. All respondents viewed strategic 
considerations as the most important or one of the most important reasons for reintegration 
with Belarus and Ukraine’s priority in Russian foreign policy, interviewees represented various
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lysts, the motivation of the Russian side in concluding the broad-ranging trea­
ties and agreements with Belarus is almost entirely reducible to interest in a 
permanent military alliance/"* Almost all Russian experts would agree that stra­
tegic considerations form one of the most important, if not the most important 
factor, affecting Russian policy towards Belarus and Ukraine/® As it will be ar­
gued in the sections to follow, it would nonetheless be inaccurate to suggest 
that integration with Belarus and close partnership with Ukraine serve a merely 
instrumental function in Russian foreign policy elites’ strategy for furthering 
their role conception of Russia as a great power and strengthening the coun­
try’s military position.
Following the creation of national armed forces on the part of several CIS 
countries - including Ukraine - and the abolition of the CIS High Command in 
1992, the Russian military leadership has been keen on preserving control of 
or access to military installations in other former Soviet republics - even out­
side the CIS (e.g. the Skrunda radar base in Latvia) - in a drive to salvage as 
high a degree of integrity in the former Soviet military capabilities as possi­
ble.^ ® This task was seriously complicated by the determination of four CIS 
states (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkmenistan) to minimise Russian 
influence on their defence policies and their refusal to sign the CIS Collective 
Security Treaty (Tashkent, 1992). The Foreign Policy Concept and the Military 
Doctrine document of 1993 declared that Russia had both a responsibility and 
a fundamental security interest to maintain order in the CIS.^^ The Russian 
military would continue to make substantial commitments beyond the borders 
of the Russian Federation, either in the form of peace-keeping forces in vari-
sectlons of the Russian elite, including academic experts (institute of Europe, Russian Acad­
emy of Sciences; Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry), government advisers 
(Analytical Centre of the Government of the Russian Federation; Russian Centre for Strategic 
Studies); Duma advisers; parliamentarians of left-wing and right-wing factions; business lead­
ers (Gazprom; League of Security Enterprises); members of the Armed Forces.
Steven J. Main, Russia-Belarus Union Treatv: Politics versus Economics?. Paper presented 
at the conference entitled “Moscow, the Regions, and Russia’s Foreign Policy”, Scottish Centre 
for International Security, University of Aberdeen, 8 May 1999
Author’s interviews with academic experts and policy advisers, Moscow, 15-30 June 1999.
Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States. Manchester: 
MUP, 1996, p. 176
The document was published in Rossiiskive Vestv. 18 November 1993, pp. 1-2
51
ous conflict regions (Dnestr region, Abkhazia, Tajikistan) or as forces assisting 
militarily weak CIS states with the defence of their borders against infiltration 
from Islamist militants. To this end, numerous bilateral agreements providing 
the Russian Armed Forces with basing or passage rights were negotiated and 
concluded with several CIS member-states in Central Asia and the Cauca­
sus/®
From the point of view of the primary justification of Russian military activity 
beyond Russia’s own borders (i.e. conflict prevention or containment), Belarus 
and Ukraine did not qualify as priority concerns - especially once agreement 
was reached with the Moldovan authorities on the withdrawal of the 14th Rus­
sian Army from the breakaway Dnestr region.^® By the end of 1994, Belarus 
and Ukraine had ratified the START 1 Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty, which meant that all nuclear weapons on their territories would be 
transferred to Russia or destroyed, thus removing another source of Russian 
anxiety. Instead of waning, Russian military interest in Belarus and Ukraine in­
tensified at that time, as the conclusion of bilateral agreements, which will be 
examined in the next two chapters, indicates. The military leadership in 
particular expressed grave apprehensions regarding the prospect of admission 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into NATO and stressed the re­
newed strategic importance of Belarus and Ukraine.®®
In March 1995, Russia signed an agreement with Georgia providing for the establishment of 
four military bases on the territory of the latter and Russian patrols of its border with Turkey. A 
treaty with Armenia, which was conciuded in the same month, allowed Russia to use the 
Gyumri base for the next 25 years. Russia also has basing agreements with Kazakhstan, and 
border protection agreements with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. See Roy Allison 
and Christopher Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia. London: The Royal 
Institute of international Affairs, 1998, pp. 18-21. During the Instanbul OSCE summit of No­
vember 1999, Russia agreed to dismantle the Vaziani and Gudauta bases (Georgia) by mid- 
2001. Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 18 July 2000 
Russia has confirmed its intention to withdraw its troops from Moldova by the end of 2002, 
as it was agreed during the OSCE summit of November 1999, which took place in Istanbul. 
Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 26 July 2000.
Defence Minister Igor’ Rodionov, in his speech at a conference on CIS integration, identified 
NATO expansion as a ‘potential source of a military threat to Russia’ and called for military 
reintegration among CIS members to counter this danger. Nezavlsimaya Gazeta. 26 Decem­
ber 1995, p. 1
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Initially, the evaluation of the new strategic situation took the form of estimat­
ing increases in NATO member-states’ combined capabilities with a view to 
negotiating adjustments in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. The 
treaty placed ceilings on the number of troops and weapons of various types 
that could be stationed on the territory of each state to the west of the Ural 
mountains with the intention of keeping an approximate balance between the 
forces of NATO and those of the former Warsaw Pact.®* Russian military lead­
ers argued that NATO enlargement would significantly alter this balance to 
Russia’s disadvantage, since NATO would have 54 divisions in Europe com­
pared to only three Russian ones.®  ^ Western experts doubted that, given its 
dramatically reduced defence budget, the Russian military’s resources would 
allow for a major reinforcement of European military districts in the short or 
medium term, even if the CFE was amended to that effect. At that stage, the 
calculations of the Russian military leadership were geared towards a hypo­
thetical situation of confrontation, for which it is the task of militaries to pre­
pare, even when the political context makes its occurrence seem rather re­
mote.®® The low priority given to defence in Russia’s budgetary politics sug­
gests that political decision-makers, including the then Communist-dominated 
Duma, did not perceive NATO as an actual threat to the country’s security nor 
saw the implementation of plans for the integration of Russia and Belarusian 
armed forces as urgent.®"*
Russian perceptions of a threat emanating from NATO have increasingly ac­
quired a security as opposed to a political character as a result of the Alli­
ance’s campaigns against Iraq in 1997 and 1998 and Yugoslavia in 1999, 
which, in contrast to previous NATO campaigns at the beginning of the dec­
ade, were launched without sanction from the UN Security Council and without
The original CFE treaty was signed in 1990. After the breakup of the USSR, national ceilings 
for the successor states were set by the CFE-1A Agreement of 1992.
See statement by Colonel- General Valery Manliov (First Deputy Head of the General Staff), 
in “Are Russian Generals Afraid of NATO?", The Russia Journal, electronic version at www. 
russiaiournal.eom/Ri08/10-nato.html. p. 1
Ibid.
Duma-endorsed budgetary allocations to defence in the period 1992-1995 amounted to 4.4 
to 5% of the country’s GDP, while actual expenditure has been estimated as significantly 
lower. See Christopher Bluth, “Russian military forces: ambitions, capabilities and constraints", 
in Allison and Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, op. cit., pp. 80-81
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prior consultation with Russia. Russian political and military leaders unani­
mously condemned NATO’s operations in Yugoslavia, which they saw as 'open 
aggression against a sovereign state’. The proclamation of a new strategic 
concept on the part of NATO, which provides for intervention in conflicts be­
yond the territory of member-states, with or without a UN mandate,®® exacer­
bated the anxiety of the Russian military and political elites.®® The possibility of 
a NATO military attack against Russian forces, either on the territory of an­
other state of the former Soviet Union or in the Russian Federation itself, be­
gan to be treated as a contingency for which Russia’s armed forces should ac­
tively prepare.
Before the above NATO operations, perceptions of NATO as a military threat 
had been largely confined to ‘red-browns’ in the Russian parliament and, 
probably, sections of the military leadership. In January 1997, a Communist 
initiative led to the formation of the characteristically named ‘anti-NATO group’ 
uniting 254 Duma deputies from several factions. Its purpose was to lobby in 
favour of ending any form of co-operation with the Alliance and a firmer stance 
against its plans for eastward enlargement, it very soon established close co­
operation with sister groups in the Belarusian and Ukrainian parliaments.®^ 
Duma Chairman Gennady Seleznyov of the Communist Party became the 
champion of a campaign to awaken the Presidency and the government to the 
perceived imminent threat represented by NATO, warning that Russia might 
find itself targeted by NATO’s nuclear weapons.®® The presence of Commu­
nists in the Primakov government had strengthened officials’ receptiveness to 
hard-line anti-NATO positions. Public opinion also provided fertile ground for 
alarmist rhetoric, with almost two-thirds seeing NATO’s campaign as ‘a direct 
threat to Russian security’, even though the vast majority disagreed with ‘red- 
brown’ Duma leaders who called for Russian weapons and troops to be sent to 
Yugoslavia.®® As NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia appeared to vindicate the fears
See paragraphs 31 and 48 in “The Alliance's Strategic Concept”, NATO Press Release NAC- 
S(99)65, 24 April 1999
®® Rossiiskava Gazeta. 27 April 1999, pp. 1, 7
RFE/RL Newsline. 9 July 1997, www.rferl.ora/newsline1997/08/3-CEE/cee-090797.htnril 
Izvestiva. 10 April 1999, p. 2
According to a Russia-wide public opinion poll conducted In April 1999 by the Public Opinion 
Foundation (Moscow), 70% of the Russian public identified NATO’s campaign as ‘a direct 
threat to Russia’s security’. The percentage was as 61% for the most pro-Western section of
54
expressed by the ‘red-browns’, the Foreign Ministry and the Presidential ad­
ministration came under growing pressure to reflect ‘red-brown’ views in official 
statements and policy/®
Still, it is highly unlikely that the official response, which seems to augur a 
substantive reconsideration of Russia’s defence policy involving a prepared­
ness to increase military expenditure®* and a willingness to take practical steps 
in the direction of military co-operation with Belarus and Ukraine, is the product 
of political considerations alone. In 1996, then Defence Minister Igor’ Rodionov 
had called for a new military doctrine taking into account Russia’s interest in 
military cooperation and integration with CIS countries, which was being un­
dermined by the West, and of the new military threats -  even hypothetical - 
created by NATO’s expansion into Central Europe.®^ In April 1999, Deputy 
Head of the Presidential administration Sergei Prikhodko agreed with Duma 
Defence Committee Chairman Roman Popkovich that Russia’s military doc­
trine would have to be revised.®® The new military doctrine, which was adopted 
by Presidential decree in April 2000, lists the build-up of military forces near 
the borders of the Russian Federation and those of its allies, and the deploy­
ment of troops on the territories of Russia, bordering and friendly states with­
out approval from the UN Security Council among the main external threats to 
Russia’s security.®"* Marshal Igor’ Sergeyev, Russia’s Minister of Defence at
the Russian electorate, I.e. Yavlinsky’s supporters. The results are available on the Founda­
tion’s website at: www.fom.ru. For an example of Duma calls for Russian military assistance to 
Yugoslavia, see statements by then Security Committee Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin in The Rus­
sia Journal, vol. 2, no. 9, 29 March - 4 April 1999, electronic version at www. russiaiour- 
nal.com/ri9/ri9/1-if.htm
Author’s interview with senior researcher at Moscow Diplomatic Academy and adviser to the 
Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 22 June 1999.
In January 2000, the government announced a 150% increase in spending on defence 
procurement. Nezavislmava Gazeta. 28 January 2000, p. 1.
See Rodionov’s article in Nezavisimove Voennove Obozrenive. 28 November 1996, pp. 1,4 
Sergei Prikhodko quoted in Izvestiva. 10 April 1999, p. 1. For the statements of Roman 
Popkovich as reported by Itar-Tass, 28 April 1999, see CPI Russia Weekly. 30 April 1999, 
www.cdi.orQ/russia/aor3099/html. p. 16
^  The draft military doctrine was published In Krasnava Zvezda. 9 October 1999, p. 3. See 
also the interview of First Deputy Chief of General Staff Valery Maniiov in the same newspa­
per on 8 October 1999, p. 1. The approved text was published in Nezavislmava Gazeta. 22 
April 2000, pp. 5-6
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the time, made the following statement: “What is happening in Yugoslavia now 
can happen in any country, not only in Europe, which seeks to carry out its 
own independent policy”/® A few days later, he announced plans to reverse 
planned reductions in the country’s armed forces due to the need to face up to 
NATO’s new strategic concept. “This alarms not only me as the Defence Minis­
ter, but also the President of Russia. The steps which NATO took against 
Yugoslavia increase our anxiety”.®® An increased reliance on a nuclear deter­
rent with a special emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterweight to 
NATO conventional forces’ overwhelming supremacy is reflected in the Janu­
ary 2000 version of Russia’s National Security Concept.®^ In the words of Rus­
sian Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, if there is a question of Russia 
being attacked by NATO, “everything in the armed forces’ disposal should be 
utilised”.®®
Even politicians and foreign policy experts from the liberal wing of the Rus­
sian political spectrum expressed grave concerns about NATO’s readiness to 
intervene militarily wherever Western leaders deemed fit and recognised the 
Union with Belarus as of utmost strategic importance.®® Russian military ex­
perts published estimates of NATO’s capability to inflict damage on Russia and 
allied Belarus in a campaign similar to those against Iraq and Yugoslavia: Be­
fore the admission of Central European states,
“NATO could use in such a campaign only 550 out of its 5300 combat aircraft. It 
could reach just the boundary of Smolensk-Bryansk-Kursk, but the whole of Bela­
rus falls within its operations zone. With the admission of Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and other East European countries, the Alliance’s military infra­
structure will have the possibility to advance to the East by 650-750 km. Its unified 
armed forces will be reinforced by 17% in their tactical aviation capabilities. NATO 
will have 290 air bases at its disposal, including some built by the Soviet Army. Up 
to 3500 combat aircraft could be concentrated on them. The use of these air
Igor’ Sergeyev, quoted by Itar-Tass, 31 March 1999, translated In GDI Russia Weekly. 2 
April 1999, www.cdl.ora/russla/apr0299/html. p. 16 
Igor’ Sergeyev quoted by Interfax, 7 April 11 
1999, www.cdl.ora/russla/apr0999/html. p. 10 
Sobranlve Zakonodatel'stva Rc 
Izvestiva. 31 March 1999, p. 2
)ecember 19Î
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999, translated in GDI Russia Weeklv. 9 April
3
ossiiskoi Federatsii. February 2000, pp. 691-704.
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Author’s interviews, Moscow, D 99.
bases will allow the whole of NATO’s tactical aviation forces to inflict missile and 
bomb strikes up to the Volga region.”*®®
A more pessimistic assessment comes from the analytical summaries of the 
General Staff:
“In Europe, the combat strength of NATO forces will increase by 15% in person­
nel, 20% in tanks, and 15% in combat aircraft. The zone of reach for NATO avia­
tion from Polish airfields in respect of Russian territory will extend to the Mur- 
mansk-Kotlas-Samara-Grozny boundary.”*®*
In the strategic environment created since NATO’s self-sanctioned intervention 
in Yugoslavia,
"Russia could not live without Belarus. The radar station at Vileika (Belarus), the 
joint air-defence alert system and other forms of very close and extensive military 
co-operation are immensely important to Russia’s security. With Belarus, Russia’s 
border with NATO is extended by 700 km. Without it, NATO would reach 
Smolensk oblast. Russia Is surrounded by 16 states - none of them except Bela­
rus can be relied upon as a friendly, allied state. Belarus is Russia’s only depend­
able ally.”*®^
Marshal Sergeyev visited Minsk soon after the beginning of NATO's opera­
tions in Yugoslavia to speed up the implementation of a number of measures 
designed to reinforce the two states’ joint defence as provided for in the trea­
ties signed by their Presidents.*®® The joint exercises entitled ‘Zapad (West) 
99’, which took place between 21 and 26 June 1999 and concentrated on anti­
aircraft defence, left no doubts as to the fundamental reason for the Russian 
military’s interest in an integrated defence system between Russia and Bela­
rus.*®"* NATO’s campaign occasioned similar interest in co-operation with
*®® V. I. Romanenko, General- Major, in "Rol" soyuza v reshenii problem voyennoi bezopas-
nostl dvukh stran”. In Sovuz Belarus! i Rossii: vvbor sdelan. op. cit., p. 76
*®* RIA-Novosti Daiiv Review. DR012599, 25 January 1999, p. 10
®^^ Author’s interview with senior adviser to the Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 24 June 1999.
*®® The Russia Journal, vol. 2, no. 9, 29 March - 4 April 1999, electronic version at 
www.russiaiournai.com/ri9/ri9/1-if.htm. p. 1
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®^‘* Krasnava Zvezda. 10 August 1999, p. 1
Ukraine, which was reportedly subjected to Russian pressure in order to allow 
the passage of Russian aircraft and, possibly, troops through its territory on 
their way to Yugoslavia. Western military experts expect that Russia might feel 
under pressure to act quickly and “use the levers at its disposal to shift 
Ukraine’s trajectory from ‘Euro-Atlantic’ integration to Slavic union”.*®® Already 
in 1997, following the conclusion of the Accords on the division of the Black 
Sea Fleet, Yeltsin’s Press Secretary Sergei Yastrzhemsbky had recognised 
that “Ukraine and NATO are very closely linked. The closer our relations with 
Ukraine, the less of a headache NATO will be.”*®® Marshal Sergeyev, during a 
visit to Kiev, stated that “Ukraine and Russia should have a common defence 
space.”*®^ Ukraine’s frequent hosting of and participation in military exercises 
within the framework of NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP) programme and 
NATO’s financial support for the Ukrainian military have alarmed Russian pol­
icy-makers.*®® In view of President Kuchma’s statements about integration into 
‘Euro-Atlantic structures’ and his cordial relations with Western leaders and 
NATO officials, Russian officials and analysts have interpreted these develop­
ments as indications that the Ukrainian leadership may be contemplating 
NATO membership.*®®
The expansion of NATO into Central Europe, the announcement of its new 
strategic concept, the intervention in the Kosovo crisis. Western criticism of 
Russia’s operations in Chechnya In 1999-2000, and the United States’ plans to 
effectively withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty form a chain of events which led 
to a cumulative increase in Russian perceptions of a security threat emanating 
from the West. While Russian policy-makers do not expect NATO to Intervene 
militarily in the post-Soviet space in the near future, they do not rule out such a
See the analysis by James Sherr, in Directorate General of Development and Doctrine 
(Royal Military Academy Sandhurst), Reaction to Events in Kosovo. Camberiey, Surrey: 
CSRC, July 1999, p. 15 
*®® Kommersanf-Daiiv 31 May 1997, p. 1
Seaodnva. 28 August 1997, p. 3
Russia and Belarus have also joined the PfP programme, which comprises different forms 
of co-operation in military matters between NATO members and members of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council. Unlike Ukraine, however, they have shown little enthusiasm for participa­
tion in PfP activities. Ukraine’s participation in the PfP will be examined in more detailed in 
Chapter Three.
Author’s interviews, Moscow, December 1999.
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possibility in the medium and long term, especially since Russia’s military pre­
paredness is likely to decline further.**® In the coming years, should Russia’s 
relations with NATO countries be free of new tensions resulting from crises 
such as the ones mentioned above, the salience of military-strategic calcula­
tions may subside as a factor in Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine.
The idea of a Slavic Union in Russian domestic politics
The integration process between Russia and Belarus is ostensibly based on 
“the firm foundation of a common destiny, common historical roots and tradi­
tional friendship of fraternal peoples, the indissoluble nature of their ties of kin­
ship, (their) spiritual and cultural closeness".*** Some of these terms of refer­
ence (e.g. ‘traditional friendship’, ‘fraternal peoples’) tend to be commonplace 
in agreements between Russia and other CIS states. The ethnic, spiritual and 
cultural elements linking Russia to Belarus differentiate the Union from other 
integration efforts like the Customs Union of the Five. Tellingly, the Treaty on 
the Formation of a Community of Russia and Belarus was signed only a few 
days after the agreement to create a Customs Union, which - apart from Rus­
sia and Belarus - also included Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (and later Tajiki­
stan).**^ President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan complained that, not only had 
his country not been invited to join the Community, but he had not even been 
informed that two of his integration partners were planning to proceed to a 
deeper level of integration so quickly. The presence of Patriarch of Moscow 
and all Rus Aleksy II in the ceremony launching the Russia-Belarus Commu­
nity indicated that what was at issue was more than wider and deeper integra­
tion (the treaty between Russia and Belarus crucially differed from the Cus­
toms Union treaty in containing clauses on military integration): It was an ex­
clusive ‘family’ club.
Ibid.
"Declaration on the further unification of Belarus and Russia” (25 December 1998), Diplo­
maticheskv Vestnik. January 1999, p. 44.
The Treaty on the Deepening of Integration’ was signed by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan on 29 March 1996. The Treaty on the Formation of a Community’ was con­
cluded by Russia and Belarus on 2 April 1996.
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Officially, the treaties concluded between Russia and Belarus are open to 
internationally recognised states that share the objectives and principles of the 
Community/Union.**® So far, Yugoslavia has expressed an interest in joining 
the Union and, indeed, its Parliament was granted observer status in the Un­
ion’s Parliamentary Assembly. Given the numerous problems in the implemen­
tation of economic agreements between Russia and Belarus, the accession of 
territorially incongruent states with low levels of pre-existing economic interde­
pendence would further complicate the current process. The founders of the 
Union would wish to see it widen in the future with the admission of other CIS 
states. Parliamentary groups campaigning for membership of the Russia- 
Belarus Union exist in Ukraine, Armenia and Kazakhstan.**"* Ukraine has been 
singled out by Russian politicians as the ideal third member of the Union. 
Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov, in an address to the Verkhovna Rada, in­
vited Ukraine to join the Union of Russia and Belarus.**® Russia’s Communists 
along with other left-wing parliamentary factions have been particularly vocal in 
calling for the re-unification of the Soviet Union’s Slavic core**® and have been 
the main organisers of an unofficial assembly, which brings together like- 
minded Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian parliamentarians campaigning for 
this cause.
Belarus and Ukraine have been favoured as Russia’s partners of choice for 
a variety of reasons, including their strategic and/or economic significance to 
Russia. Their ethnic and/or cultural affinity to the population of Russia was in­
terpreted as conducive to positive popular attitudes towards Russia and as a 
distinct reason to re-integrate. Already before the dissolution of the Soviet Un-
**® Article 18, Treaty on the Formation of a Community; articie 7, Treaty on the Union of Bela­
rus and Russia, op.cit.
**"* The Ukrainian Parliament’s inter-faction bioc "For cooperation among sovereign Slavic peo­
ples" and the “Armenian popular initiative Russia-Belarus-Armenia" have also been granted 
observer status in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Russia-Belarus Union. Press service of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia, Sovuz Belarusi I Rossii: 100 
voprosov i otvetov. Moscow: Klub “Realisty”, 1999, pp. 29-30.
*^ ® Kommersant’-Dailv 30 September 1998, p. 4
**® In its campaign for the Duma election of December 1999, the CPRF proposed the unifica­
tion of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine into a single ‘union state’ as the primary objective of Rus­
sian foreign policy alongside the restoration of the country’s military might. 15 shaoov k Po- 
bedel. 12 November 1999 (election campaign flyer)
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ion, author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn had argued that the Soviet state should be 
dismembered and that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Northern Kazakhstan 
should unite in a single ‘Russian’ sta te .*Accord ing to the census of 1989, 
ethnic Russians formed 13.2% of the population of Belarus, with the titular na­
tionality representing 77.9%. In Ukraine the respective rates were 22.1% and 
72.7%, and in Kazakhstan 37.8% and 39.7%.**® Among titular nationalities of 
Soviet republics, Belarusians had the lowest level of adherence to their native 
language (80%), followed by Ukrainians with 88%. Belarusians also had the 
highest rate of knowledge of Russian as a second language (60%), with 
Ukrainians close behind at 59%.**® Belarusians and Ukrainians had the highest 
rates of ethnically mixed marriages (mostly with Russians), whereas inter­
marriages among Russians and Kazakhs were rather uncommon.*^® In Soviet 
times, it was quite common for Russians to temporarily move to other repub­
lics, especially Belarus and Ukraine, to study, serve in the armed forces, or 
work.
Though no significant political force subscribes to Solzhnitsyn’s ideas as 
such, many members of the Russian elite perceive a need to preserve and 
strengthen the historic, cultural and social bonds (e.g. ethnically mixed fami­
lies; mobility across republics) uniting the peoples of Russia, Belarus, and 
Ukraine and treat them as a major consideration In favour of integration in their 
own right. As a left-wing politician put it, "Russians, Ukrainians and Belaru­
sians are one people, descendants of the Kievan Rus. They were artificially 
broken up and now they wish to unite.’’*^ * Or as a liberal Duma deputy put it,
Literaturnava gazeta. 18 September 1990, p. 1.
**® According to the estimates of Kazakh population experts, the emigration of ethnic Russians 
has combined with the higher birth rates of Kazakhs to bring the population of ethnic Kazakhs 
up to 44.3% and that of Russians down to 35.8% as of 1994. See Ingvar S van berg, “Kazakh­
stan and the Kazakhs” in Graham Smith (ed.). The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet 
States. London: Longman, Second edition, 1996, p. 323
**® The data refers to ethnic Belarusians and ethnic Ukrainians, who (according to the census 
of 1989) represented 78 and 73% in the Belarusian and Ukrainians SSRs respectively. State 
Statistics Committee of the USSR, Natsional'nv Sostav Naseleniva SSSR. Moscow: 'Finansy i 
Statistika’, 1989, pp. 78, 88.
*^ ® Smith, The Nationalities Question, pp. 216, 323
*^ * Author’s interview with Georgy Tikhonov. Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS 
Affairs and leader of the All-Russia Sociopolitical Movement ‘Soyuz’. Moscow, 29 June, 1999.
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“Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian people have always been very close, like 
one n a t i o n . T h e  historical accuracy of such statements is highly contested, 
especially by non-Russian a cco un ts .W ha t  concerns us is that similar views 
appear to be widely held by the Russian elite - even among the liberal wing of 
the political spectrum (i.e. members and supporters of ‘Yabloko’ and the ‘Union 
of Rightist Forces’), whose representatives have refrained from employing the 
rhetoric of Orthodox-Slavic solidarity either during the conflict in Yugoslavia or 
with regard to the Union with Belarus.
At the same time, politicians are fully aware of the Russian public’s nostalgia 
for Soviet-era u n i t y ,w h ic h  is particularly pertinent to Slavic peoples, whose 
separation from Russia dealt the hardest blow to post-Soviet Russian identity. 
A survey of the Russian elite conducted by ROMIR (Moscow), found that 
59.9% of respondents disagreed with the statement that “Russia and Ukraine 
should be absolutely independent countries”, while 53% thought that the Rus­
sian mass public would also disagree with that statement. The percentage dis­
agreeing with the same statement referring to Belarus was 64.1. More than 
three quarters (77%) of the elite respondents believed that most Russian citi­
zens would not support Russia and Belarus being completely separate from 
each o th e r .E v id e n c e  from public opinion surveys indeed indicates that
Author’s interview with Vyacheslav igrunov, Deputy Chairman of Yabloko and of the Duma 
Committee on CiS Affairs, Moscow, 8 December 1999.
For a summary of Ukrainian historiography as weii as on the debates surrounding the defini­
tion of ‘Rus’ and their origins, see Paui Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine. Toronto: Univer­
sity of Toronto Press, 1996, pp. 18-21, 52-54, 67-68; and Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian National­
ism in the 1990s. Cambridge: CUP, 1997, pp. 3-4. For alternative interpretations of Belaru­
sians’ descent, see Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus: At a Crossroads in History. Boulder, CO: West- 
view Press, 1993, pp. 6-9; and U.M. ignatouski, Karotki narvs oistorii Belarus!. Minsk: “Bela­
rus”, 1992, pp. 31-34.
According to a survey by the US Information Agency. 71% of the Russian citizens regret the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. USiA, Opinion Analysis. M-240-960, 23 December 1996. A 
survey by the Public Opinion Foundation (sample of 1500) asked the same question (whether 
they regretted the breakup of the USSR) in January 1999 and received 85% positive answers. 
Detailed results can be obtained electronically from www.fom.ru/reports/72/o901001 html
At the same time, 44.3% of respondents estimated that most of the Ukrainian public would 
favour complete independence from Russia, whereas only 9.2% thought that such a position 
would be supported by Belarusian public opinion. The survey took place in September 2000 
and was based on a sample of 500 (business leaders, government officials, parliamentarians,
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closer ties with Belarus and Ukraine are favoured to a higher extent than with 
Kazakhstan (68.7% as opposed to 54.9%), Armenia (47.3%) and other post- 
Soviet s ta te s .T h is  diversification of attitudes towards post-Soviet states ac­
cording to the presence of a Slavic and/or Rossophone population is corrobo­
rated by another study, which suggested that more than three quarters of the 
Russian public wanted close ties to Ukraine and Belarus, more than half with 
Moldova and Central Asian states, while less than half saw such ties to the 
states of the Caucasus or the Baltics as d e s i ra b le . In  a VTslOM survey con­
ducted in May 1997, 35% of respondents named Ukraine as Russia's main 
partner in the CIS, followed by Belarus with 33%, while 34% wished to see no 
differentiation between CIS countr ies.Perce ived ethno-cultural similarity, 
experience of intermarriages and harmonious mixed communities, positive 
memories of former political unity and common statehood, all seem to contrib­
ute to the Russian public’s order of preferences.
The salience of ethnic and cultural factors in generating support for reinte­
gration has been discerned only by one survey known to the author, in which 
79% of respondents in Russia (the survey covered both Russia and Belarus) 
endorsed the following answer to the question about the reasons for uniting 
Russia and Belarus in a single state: “Russians and Belarusians are histori­
cally one people, they are spiritually close, and have similar languages, cul­
tures, and traditions.” 76% agreed that “it is necessary to restore the political, 
economic, cultural, and family ties that were disrupted as a result of the 
breakup of the USSR”. The only consideration that drew more support (82.9%)
journalists, scientists) drawn from 10 Russian cities. Respondents were not offered a choice of 
institutional arrangements other than ‘absolute independence’. The results are posted at www. 
romir.ru/ s o c d o I it/socio/10-2000/cis.htm
Survey conducted by VTslOM in January-February 2000 based on a sample of 1940 re­
spondents as part of the ongoing project The Outsiders: Russia. Ukraine. Belarus. Moldova, 
and the New Europe by Stephen White et al. within the ESRC "One Europe or Several?” re­
search programme.
R. Rose, “Do Russians want to fight?", op.cit., p. 23. The low rates of support for closer ties 
to the Baltic states despite the presence of sizeable Slavic minorities appears to be the result 
of the perception of these states as ‘anti-Russian’ due to grievances -  especially in the cases 
of Estonia and Latvia - arising from their treatment of the Russophone populations.
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referred to an expected increase in the two countries’ defence capabilities, 
which would enable them to counter a potential military threat on the part of 
NATO.^^® Popular support for the Russia-Belarus Union tends to fluctuate, not 
below the level of a comfortable absolute majority. A survey conducted in May 
1999 indicated that 30% of Russian citizens would like the integration process 
to be accelerated, 38% wanted it to keep to its current schedule, while only 
16% favoured slowing it down.^^° In January 1999, the Public Opinion Founda­
tion (FOM, Moscow) repeated a survey conducted in April 1997, asking re­
spondents how they intended to vote in a referendum on the unification with 
Belarus, and found that support levels had increased from 62% to 77%.^^  ^
Other polls indicate that the Russian public tends to view the Union with Bela­
rus chiefly as a worthy national cause - regardless of calculations involving 
material costs and benefits, and would like to see Ukraine join as well.^^^ 
According to a US Information Agency survey, 76% of Russian citizens wished 
Russia and Ukraine to unite.
With regard to the creation of a ‘Union state’ (a concept somewhat more 
controversial than ‘integration’), the opinion of 42.4% of respondents was ‘quite 
positive’, with another 23.8% describing their attitude as ‘very positive’, 19.1% 
expressing indifference and only 10.4% viewing such a development nega-
Results cited by Yevgeny Golovakha and Natal’ya Panina, “Rossiisko-ukrainskie otnosh- 
eniya v obshchestvennom mnenli Ukrainy i Rossii", in D. E. Furman (ed.), Ukraina i Rossiva: 
Obshchestva i Gosudarstva. Moscow, “Prava Cheloveka”, 1997, p. 260
Unpublished survey conducted in May-June 1999 using a sample of 1062 respondents by 
the Centre of Sociological Studies, Foundation for National and International Security (Mos­
cow).
USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, Russia/NIS Opinion Alert. L-30-99,14 May 
1999, p. 1. These are the results of a telephone survey conducted by USIA in Moscow and St 
Petersburg between 10 and 12 May 1999 using a sample of 700.
Support was highest (88%) among Zyuganov’s electorate and lowest (70%) among Yav­
linsky’s voters. The survey sampled 1500 respondents from 56 towns in 29 oblasts. Detailed 
results can be obtained electronically from www.fom.ru/reDorts/72/o9Q1001 .html
Ekho Moskvy, 2 December 1999.
USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, Opinion Analysis. M-12-97, 24 January 
1997, p. 4. The survey (commissioned by USIA) was conducted by ROMIR between 16 and 31 
October 1999 using a sample of 1800.
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tivelyJ^"^ A later survey by the Centre of Sociological Studies (Foundation for 
National and International Security, Moscow) indicated that 67% of Russian 
citizens were prepared to vote in favour of a Union state in a referendum. 
The vagueness surrounding the notion of a ‘Union state’ appears to have cre­
ated a considerable degree of confusion as to its compatibility with the preser­
vation of national institutions of government. In surveys, where respondents 
were given a choice of alternative forms of integration, support for full political 
unification was much lower than the rates of those intending to vote in favour 
of a ‘Union state’. Most of the Russian public appears to believe that Russia 
and Belarus should remain independent states with close ties in the economic, 
military and political s p h e re s . I n  the aforementioned FOM survey of January 
1999, 37% of respondents said they would like Russia and Belarus to unite in 
a single state, while 36% expressed preference for close economic and politi­
cal relations between separate states. Another survey conducted by the same 
foundation two months later found only 17% of Russian public opinion suppor­
tive of a single state. Almost two thirds (73%) said that Russia and Belarus 
should retain independent s ta te h o o d .T h e  survey by the Centre of Socio­
logical Studies offered respondents a choice among a confederation, a federa­
tion and a unitary state, which gathered 23%, 45% and 12% of preferences re­
spectively.
In this context, as the aforementioned liberal deputy explained, “to speak 
against the Union with Belarus would equate to electoral suicide” for any seri­
ous politician or political party. During the campaign for the 1999 Duma elec­
tion, all main parties with the exception of the ‘Union of Rightist Forces’, whose 
programme devoted minimal attention to foreign policy issues, recognised the 
Union with Belarus as of cardinal importance to Russia, while several pro­
pounded the accession of other states of the former Soviet Union -  particularly
The survey was conducted between 20 and 21 November 1999 by ROMIR (Moscow) using 
a sample of 1500 from 40 Russian regions. The results can be obtained from the ROMIR web­
site at www.romir.ru/socpolit/vvps/december/belarus.htm. A possible drawback of this survey 
might be the rather general wording of the question (“How are you disposed towards the crea­
tion of a Union with Belarus?”; possible answers “very negatively”, "rather negatively", “quite 
positively", “very positively", “do not know/ do not wish to answer”).
See note 129.
Chapter Four will present the preferences of the Belarusian public, which are quite similar.
See www.fom.ru/reports/df/t904116.html
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Ukraine and Kazakhstan.Support  for the Union has corne to be regarded as 
a “test of patriotism” .^ ®^ Not coincidentally, Presidents Shaimiev of Tatarstan, 
Rakhimov of Bashkortostan, and Aushev of Ingushetia, federal units with Mus­
lim, non-Slavic titular nationalities, have been among the boldest critics of the 
Union with Belarus. As Aushev has pointed out, Russia's minority ethnic 
groups have not been consulted in this p rocess .L ibe ra l  and centrist politi­
cians, especially the ones from the self-styled pragmatic parties of power (‘Our 
Home is Russia’ and, since late 1999, ’Unity’) have been more careful than 
others to downplay - but not deny - notions of Slavic-Orthodox unity as part of 
the rationale underlying the Russia-Belarus Union. The contradiction between 
the espousal of ethno-cultural principles in official policy and Eurasianist ideas, 
which portray Russia’s ethnic and religious diversity as a source of strength 
and which lie at the basis of Russia’s foreign and nationalities policies, has 
been glossed over.”"^  ^ Indeed, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, in his 
book “Invincible Russia”, presents - not all that convincingly - Slavic-Orthodox 
unity and Eurasianist vastness and diversity as complementary, if not mutually 
reinforcing foundations for the rebirth of Russia as a strong state.
The only politicians campaigning for the votes of the Russian electorate as a 
whole to express outright opposition to integration with Belarus have been Va- 
leriya Novodvorskaya and Konstantin Borovoy, leaders of the marginal - in the 
sense of lacking parliamentary representation or ties to the ruling elite - 
‘Democratic Union’ and ‘Party of Economic Freedom' respect ive ly .A l l  other
‘Yabloko’, 19 Dekabrva -  vse na vvborvl. election campaign flyer no. 6 ,10  December 1999; 
Programma Obshcherossiiskoi politicheskoi oraanizatsli ‘Otechestvo’. Moscow; ‘Otechestvo’, 
1999, pp. 112-120; CPRF, 15 shaaov k Pobede!. 12 November 1999 (campaign flyer); Pro­
gramma LDPR. Moscow: LDPR, 1998, pp. 26-27
Dmitry Trenin, “Belorussko-rossiiskaya Integratsiya; Na puti k soyuzu nezavisimykh gosu- 
darstv", Brifino Moskovskooo Tsentra Karnegi. vol. 1, no. 1, January 1999, p. 1 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 9 December 1999, p. 9
On the influence of Eurasianist thinking on Russia’s nationalities policy see R. Abdulatipov 
et al., Natsionai’nava Politika Rossiisskoi Federatsii. Moscow: “Slavyansky Dialog”, 1997, pp. 
4-5, and the “Concept of the State Nationalities' Policy of the Russian Federation”, Ibid., p. 11. 
According to the 1989 Soviet census, which is the most recent, ethnic Russians formed 81.5% 
of the population In the Russian Federation, with the rest divided among some 180 linguisti­
cally and culturally diverse ethnic groups.
G .A. Zyuganov, Rossiva Neodolimava. Moscow: ITRK, 1999, pp. 24-25
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mocratic Union’ and ‘Party of Economic Freedom’ respectively/'^^ All other 
criticisms of the process currently under way have been directed either at Lu­
kashenko and his regime or at particular flaws in the provisions of bilateral 
agreements, but have not disputed the desirability of integration in itself. This 
is the case even for Grigory Yavlinsky and Yegor Gaidar, who are typically 
identified as opponents of integration. '^*'^ Yavlinsky, in an interview in which he 
favoured economic integration and opposed the creation of common govern­
mental institutions on the grounds that this would advance only the personal 
interests of Yeltsin and Lukashenko, stated that: “We are fraternal peoples, we 
are linked by the blood of the Great Patriotic War (WWII). It is not up to Luka­
shenko and Yeltsin to unite our peoples, we are united by our entire history.” '^*® 
Gaidar, addressing a conference on the problems of integration between Rus­
sia and Belarus (Moscow, 18 March 1999), questioned the legitimacy of the 
integration process due to the lack of democratic institutions in Belarus and 
suggested that Russia and Belarus “solve the questions of our Slavic brother­
hood, commonality (of culture), etc.” ideally in a united Europe or alternatively 
within the Russian Federation. He also proposed Belarus becoming part of the 
Russian Federation as the only viable form of integration. '^*®
While it is safe to assert that all mainstream political forces in Russia sup­
port some form of integration with Belarus, any form of merger of the two states 
is highly controversial. Gaidar’s proposal is, of course, absolutely unaccept­
able to the Belarusian side. The idea of a Russo-Belarusian federation of 
equals is favoured by some sections of the Communist party as a partial resto­
ration of the Soviet Union. It is, however, staunchly opposed by the leaders of 
Russia’s so-called ‘ethnic republics’, who have expressed their determination 
not to allow Belarus superior status in a new federal or confederal structure.*'*^
On Novodvorskaya’s rejection of ethnic ties as a basis for integration, see her Interview in 
Belarusskava De I ova va Gazeta. 10 December 1999, electronic version available at 
www.bda.Dress.net.bv/1999/12/1999 12 10.687/index.htm
See for example S.V. Astakhanova, "Soyuz Belarusi i Rossii v zerkale politlcheskykh 
mnenii”, in Sovuz Belarusi i Rossii: vvborsdelan. op. cit., p. 90.
Obshchava Gazeta. 12-19 May 1999, reprinted in Bvulleten’ Belarus Seoodnva (Moscow), 
Special Issue “Union of Belarus and Russia”, May 1999, p. 6 
Bvulleten’ Belarus Seoodnva. May 1999, pp. 8-9. The Dur 
countries or part thereof to become federal units of Russia in June 2001.
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ma adopted a law allowing foreign 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 9 December 1999, p
As neither of these scenarios seems realistic, the dominant perspective among 
Russia’s political elite suggests emulating the experience of EU integration, 
but with a stronger military element and prospects of advancing to a higher 
level. This proposed end-state of the integration process tends to be described 
by the ambiguous concept of a confederation. It would involve the preservation 
of national government institutions, but reserve policy-making in a set of key 
areas (defence and foreign policy, monetary policy) to intergovernmental insti­
tutions.*"® Such a form of integration would indeed exceed the level of centrali­
sation characterising common policy-making in the EU.
It is not possible to establish the exact proportion of Russian politicians and 
officials who consider integration as desirable by virtue of its promoting a 
sense of unity between East Slavic populations - rather than as merely Instru­
mental to calculations regarding electoral advantage, defence or influence in 
the international arena. All that can be said is that many members of the Rus­
sian elite (among whom one can find academics, business people, military offi­
cers, as well as politicians and state officials) genuinely see little distinction 
between Russian and post-Soviet Orthodox-Slavic cultural identity as attrib­
uted to the mass of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians alike. Moreover, in 
line with Huntington’s theory, many regard this cultural identity to be under 
threat of erosion - with such fears being closely intertwined with perceptions of 
security threats emanating from NATO expansion and activism. Such a mind- 
frame is reflected in the views of the leader of a Russian business association:
“We (his business colleagues) have been brought up to believe that a strong state 
is a good thing. This is especially important now with events in Yugoslavia. NATO 
is advancing the interests of Catholic and Protestant states against Slavic- 
Orthodox countries. Ideally, we would like re-unification with all former Soviet re­
publics starting with Belarus. Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians have one 
face, one culture, one history. We have always supported the Union (with Belarus) 
because it strengthens our state and its security, even though from the point of 
view of our business interests we are very cautious.”*'*®
Author’s interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999. 
Author’s interview, Moscow, 1 December 1999.
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There appears to be remarkable convergence between elite and mass atti­
tudes on the desirability of integration with Belarus (and, if possible, Ukraine), 
which sharply differentiates the Russo-Belarusian Union from the European 
Community/Union, whose example it is supposed to be following. In the West 
European context, the strategy of ‘integration by stealth' was devised to by­
pass the objections of national-minded politicians and preserve the ‘permissive 
consensus' of mass publics concerned with the protection of national sover­
eignty and cultural distinctiveness. Hence the competences of the European 
Community (and those of its predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Com­
munity) were initially restricted to technical and economic questions within the 
realm of ‘low politics' as opposed to the ‘high politics’ of security and foreign 
policy, which are closely associated with state sovereignty and national sensi­
tivities. Neo-functionalist theory hypothesised that integration in the field of 
‘high politics’ would be possible once elite socialisation and the transfer of 
popular loyalties from national to supranational institutions had eroded preoc­
cupation with national sovereignty. In the case of Russia, however, as a result 
of residual nostalgia for Soviet ‘greatness’ and identification with a ‘broader 
Russian nation’ exceeding the boundaries of the state (to include Belarus and 
Ukraine), high-profile moves towards integration with Belarus, far from arous­
ing public opposition, are likely to increase the approval rates of office-holders.
Apart from giving the Russian public an increased sense of security from ex­
ternal attack, military integration between Russia and Belarus has a symbolic 
appeal by creating an impression of a ‘stronger’ state, of a partial return to the 
might of the Soviet Union. It is possible that, in some cases, Russian politi­
cians may have sought to exacerbate mass perceptions of external and inter­
nal threats as a means of compensating for state institutions’ inability to func­
tion as providers of public welfare and draw popular legitimacy from this 
source.*®® The establishment of common governmental structures*®* and of
For a sceptical view of the Russian leadership’s manipulation of the public’s threat percep­
tions see Andrey Pyontkovsky, “Putinism, Part II”, The Russia Journal, issue 48, 14 February 
2000, electronic version available at
www.russiaiourani.com/start/coiumns/article 48 2281.htm. For a theoretical analysis of the 
sources of popular identification with the state see Bloom, Personal identity. National Identity, 
and international Relations, op. cit., p. 151.
The institutions of the Russia-Belarus Union will be examined in Chapter Three.
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equal rights for Russian and Belarusian citizens (freedom of movement; ac­
cess to education, health care, social security benefits, and employment) ap­
peal to much of the Russian public wishing to see the negative consequences 
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union minimised or redressed. The ideological 
appeal of a Union tends to be stronger among the older generations who grew 
up and spent most of their adult lives as citizens of the Soviet Union, an argu­
ment used by President Lukashenko when he urged the Russian leadership to 
speed up efforts to bring the benefits of integration to ordinary people.*®^ Inte­
gration for the people's welfare has been used as a slogan to generate positive 
publicity, but remains one of the less immediate priorities in the Russian lead­
ership's interest in the venture. Reversing the West European model, integra­
tion in ‘high politics’ domains (defence, foreign policy, common political institu­
tions) has taken precedence over welfare maximisation through the formation 
of a common economic and legal space. This has occurred because imple­
mentation in policy areas related to ‘high politics’ tends to be less complex, 
while, in this case, national identity functions not as a barrier to but as a motive 
- albeit auxiliary - for integration.
The economic rationale of integration
Economic arguments in favour of reintegration with Belarus and/or Ukraine 
tend to be more controversial than political, security or identity-related consid­
erations. No one has put forward a detailed balance-sheet of projected losses 
and gains, and the limited experience of the imperfectly implemented economic 
agreements with Belarus does not offer adequate grounds for the evaluation of 
competing views on the issue. Part of the Russian elite encompassing ‘red- 
browns’ and a section of the political centre - including many government offi­
cials - consider reintegration as unconditionally beneficial to Russia’s econ­
omy. This perspective stems from a positive evaluation of the Soviet economic 
system - at least of the closely integrated inter-republican division of labour, if 
not necessarily of central planning. The dramatic decline in economic transac­
tions between Russia and other former Soviet republics, which ensued from
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 16 October 1999, p. 5
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the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the rouble zone in 1993, 
is seen as one of the principal causes of the continuing economic crisis - both 
in Russia and in other post-Soviet states. Therefore, exiting the crisis requires 
the restoration of the USSR-wide transaction network to as full an extent as 
possible. Belarus and Ukraine are rated as more valuable integration partners 
compared to other CIS countries because of their higher levels of economic 
development and closer interdependence with Russia. The general population 
appears to share this assessment. According to a survey conducted by 
VTslOM, 47.4% of respondents said that closer economic ties to Belarus would 
bring ‘a lot' or ‘some’ benefit to Russia, while 45.6% thought so with respect to 
Ukraine. The rates for Baltic and Central European states, whose per capita 
GDP is higher than that of Belarus or Ukraine, were strikingly lower - an aver­
age of 24.3% for the three Baltic states and 25.8% for Central European coun­
tries.*®® Another survey by the Public Opinion Foundation indicated that 54% of 
Russians expected the Union with Belarus to raise the standard of living in 
both countries, while 40% thought that it would take a few years for Belarus to 
catch up with standards of living in Russia.*®" Whereas more Russians (33%) 
believed that standards of living were higher in Russia than in Belarus (26%), 
they also estimated that the economic crisis was more acute in Russia (46%) 
than in Belarus (18%).*®®
The aforementioned section of elite opinion tends to assign particular value 
to economic self-sufficiency, especially reducing dependency on Western 
loans and imports. Russia is far from self-sufficient in food production, whereas 
Ukraine is a net exporter of foodstuffs and Belarus is one of the main sources 
of food imports to Russia.*®® Since the financial crisis of August 1998, the cost 
of Western imports has increased sharply, thereby boosting the attractiveness 
of more affordable alternatives from Belarus, Ukraine and other CIS countries.
Survey conducted as part of the ongoing project The Outsiders by White et al., op. cit.
The survey sampled 1500 respondents from 56 towns in 29 oblasts in January 1999. De­
tailed results can be obtained electronically from www.fom.ru/reDorts/72/o901001 .html 
Survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in March 1999. Detailed results are 
available at www.fom.ru/reDorts/9e/t904118.html and www.fom.ru/reports/74/t904120.html 
Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, External Economic Activities of CIS Countries. 
Moscow, 1999, pp. 279, 393; Ministry of Statistics of Belarus and State Committee for Statis­
tics of Russia, Belarus i Rossiva: Statisticheskv sbornik. Moscow, 1999, p. 122
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which usually offer the advantage of barter as opposed to hard currency pay­
ments. Many members of the political elite from Communist, nationalist, and 
governmental circles see many other advantages to creating a more autarkic 
economic area through integration with Belarus and ideally Ukraine as well. 
They praise the Belarusian machine-building and consumer-goods industries, 
whose capacity had been designed to cover USSR-wide requirements and 
therefore far exceeds the needs of the country's population,*®^ for their low- 
priced products whose quality is supposed to rival those of western imports. 
They also tend to have an overall positive view of the Belarusian economy, of­
ten endorsing the Belarusian approach to economic reform as preferable to the 
more radical policies pursued in Russia or Ukraine. State ownership of major 
enterprises and state financing of key industries, as practised in Belarus, are 
popular with much of the Russian centre-left.*®® Such arguments are supported 
by citing positive indicators of socio-economic conditions in Belarus - most no­
tably its relatively low external debt; among the highest growth rates in the CIS 
since 1996;*®® the highest ranking among CIS countries in the UN human de­
velopment index; low unemployment; and relatively regular payment of salaries 
and pensions.*®®
Members of the more liberal sections of the Russian elite tend to be more 
sceptical both about the fundamental health of the Belarusian economy and 
about the quality of its industrial output. Many of them deem economic union 
with Belarus and Ukraine as potentially beneficial in creating economies of 
scale, recognising that Russia itself remains too weak to compete in the global
In 1990, Belarus exported 96% of tractors, 91.5% of motor vehicles, 85% of refrigerators, 
84% of industrial machinery, 77% of television sets it produced. I.V. Prokofev, “Promyshlenny 
kompleks", in E.M. Kozhokin (ed.), Belorussiva: Put’ k Novvm Gorizontam. Moscow: Russian 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 62
In a speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Russia-Belarus Community, State Duma 
Chairman Gennady Seleznyov (CPRF) praised the Belarusian economic model. Kommersant- 
Dailv 12 March 1997, p. 4
The GDP of Belarus showed positive growth for the first time in 1996 (2.8% as opposed to 
decline of 3.5% in Russia and of 10% in Ukraine), 10.4% in 1997, 8.3% in 1998 and 1.5% in 
1999. EBRD, Transition Report 1999. p. 73
Author’s interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999. Belarus is in 68th place 
(as opposed to Russia’s 72nd and Ukraine’s 102nd) in the index calculated by the UN Devel­
opment Programme, available at www.undp.ora/hdro/98hdi2.htm
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market - at least in the short and medium term. As one interviewee said, “we 
[Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine] have very similar socio-economic conditions, 
e.g. equally cheap labour, and the same low standards of production, which 
means that we can sell most of our products only to one another.”*®* Most Rus­
sian economic actors (enterprise directors, regional administrations, officials 
from the economic ministries) see reintegration in this light. Due to the struc­
ture of economic interdependence within the Soviet Union, there is relatively 
little duplication between commodities produced in Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine.*®^ Instead of fearing competition. In most cases - with the notable ex­
ception of alcoholic beverages - Russian producers associate reintegration 
with the restoration of production lines broken up after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union. This option for generating growth and employment was increas­
ingly favoured, as it became clear that foreign investment would probably re­
main far too limited to bring about a revival of Russian industry in the foresee­
able future. So long as trade barriers and/or superior standards continue to 
make Western markets virtually impenetrable for most Russian producers, re­
covering Soviet-era customers represents an effective means of expanding 
trade.
Since the August 1998 crisis, self-sufficiency as an economic objective has 
been gaining ground among Russian government circles - not as an alternative 
to integration in the world economy, but as a mechanism for reducing the vul­
nerability of Russia's economy to the whims of the global market and the lev­
erage of foreign governments. Russia’s most lucrative industries, fuel and raw 
materials exporters and the military industry, support reintegration as a 
mechanism for maximising control over their operating environment. The ability 
of Russian industry to deliver finished products is limited by its reliance on 
components and - less often - raw materials from other post-Soviet states. This 
reliance is particularly pronounced in Russia’s strategic industries, fuel produc­
tion and machine-building, especially weapons manufacturing.*®® Belarus used
Author’s interview, Moscow, 8 December 1999.
This has begun to change in some sectors, where Russia and Ukraine have been driven to 
establish self-sufficient production lines. These cases will be discussed in Chapter Three.
Altough Russia retained about 80% of Soviet MIC enterprises, finished commodities can be 
produced without the need of components from other CIS countries only in 20% of cases. Ana­
toly D. Shutov, Postsovvetskove orostranstvo. Moscow: “Nauchnaya kniga", 1999, p. 49
7 3
to be known as ‘the assembly shop’ of the Soviet Union. It has a very high 
concentration of enterprises belonging to the former Soviet military-industrial 
complex (MIC), most of which were founded after WWII and employed the 
most sophisticated technology available in the Soviet Union. The production 
lines of many of Russia’s most advanced weapons systems such as the S-300 
air-defence missiles or the ‘Topol” tactical missiles include Belarusian enter­
prises.*®" Interdependence between Russian and Ukrainian MIC enterprises is 
particularly significant in the aviation and aerospace industries.*®® The reliabil­
ity of component supplies is crucial to Russian exporters’ ability to deliver con­
tract obligations on time and maintain their credibility in competitive non-CIS 
markets. Because these industries are very investment-intensive, it is far more 
cost-effective to secure supplies through the creation of transnational financial- 
industrial groups (FIGs) rather than to build new component-producing installa­
tions in Russia. According to a Russia-Belarus Union official, “with Belarus, 
Russia’s defence industry is very strong, almost self-sufficient; if Ukraine 
joined the Union, it would be even stronger.”*®®
Russian energy exporters are also keen to bolster their credibility - espe­
cially in the West European export market, which depends on their ability to 
promptly transport the required quantities of fuel through the pipelines crossing 
the territories of Belarus and Ukraine.*®^ Theoretically, Russian ownership of 
the pipelines as well as fuel storage facilities connected to them should maxi­
mise the reliability of fuel transportation. In practice, the reluctance of the Bela­
rusian and Ukrainian authorities to cede control of such strategic assets means 
that Russian concerns are unlikely to acquire a stake large enough to allow 
their operations the desired level of autonomy. Moreover, legal ownership in 
itself would not automatically rid Russian energy companies from the pilfering
Vladimir Peftiev (Chairman of 'Beltekheksport’), “VPK Belarusi na poroge”, Vestnik Voz- 
dushnoao Flota. September-October 1999, p. 28
165 Q Q jjshenko, S.F. Belov, and 1.1. Gaidayenko, “Oboronny potentsial", in in E.M. Kozhokin 
(ed.), Ukraina: Vektor Peremen. Moscow: Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994, pp. 56- 
57
Author’s interview, Minsk, 19 November 1999.
Russian oil is transported to European markets through the ‘Druzhba’ pipeline, which has 
two sections - one crossing Ukraine and another crossing Belarus. There are two pipeline sys­
tems transporting gas through Ukraine (‘Soyuz’ and ‘Bratstvo’). The Belarusian section of the 
new Yamai-to-Europe gas pipeline was completed in autumn 1999.
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of fuel meant for export to Central and West European markets nor would it 
provide them with effective levers for ensuring that Belarusian and Ukrainian 
consumers pay their bills.*®® More than any other business sector, Russian en­
ergy exporters essentially rely on the cooperative behaviour of the Belarusian 
and Ukrainian authorities. The Russian oil and gas industries are actively in­
volved in economic Integration with Belarus, which they see as a framework for 
long-term arrangements guaranteeing their interests.*®® The aim of arrange­
ments falling under the rubric of ‘unified transport and energy systems’ is to 
approximate transportation and distribution conditions within the Russian do­
mestic market.
If successfully implemented, the harmonisation of economic legislation, tax 
standardisation and monetary union would greatly assist the expansion of Rus­
sian business activities in all sectors of the Belarusian economy, which has so 
far been discouraged by excessive state regulation, higher taxes, unfavourable 
banking laws, and multiple exchange rates. FIGs are an integration mechanism 
useful to many of Russia’s most profitable enterprises for gaining control over 
Belarusian and potentially Ukrainian plants in so-called strategic sectors 
excluded from privatisation.*^® Apart from the MIC, FIGs are attractive to 
Russian oil and metal-exporting companies interested in a number of chemical, 
oil-processing and metallurgical plants in Ukraine and Belarus. It is hoped that 
vertically integrated transnational FIGs may be more successful in drawing 
foreign investment than individual enterprises. In the case of Ukraine, where 
the authorities have not been as enthusiastic as those of Belarus in restoring 
economic ties to Russia, Russian enterprises have been seeking to acquire 
controlling blocks of shares - usually by setting up Ukrainian subsidiaries. The 
attempts of Russia’s gas monopoly ‘Gazprom’ to acquire equity in Ukrainian 
energy-complex assets in exchange for gas payments arrears will be examined 
in the following chapters.
As It will be shown in Chapter Two, gas exports have been particularly susceptible to this 
problem.
Author’s interview with ‘Gazprom’ executive, Moscow, 10 December 1999.
FIGs are established by intergovermnentai agreement and are mostly made up of state- or 
oblast-controlled enterprises.
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Conclusion: minimum and maximum objectives
Integration with Belarus represents an umbrella objective for the advance­
ment of several interests endorsed to different degrees by the various sections 
of the Russian elite. It has gathered almost universal support from the elite and 
the general public because it corresponds to Russia’s broader foreign policy 
aspirations and widely accepted definitions of its strategic and economic inter­
ests. Changes in the international environment, most notably the fragmentation 
of the CIS and the erosion of trust between Russia and Western powers - par­
ticularly as a result of NATO enlargement and its preparedness to take military 
action in defiance of Russia’s objections - contributed to the increased sali­
ence of considerations related to external security. These have combined with 
internal factors driving the centre of the Russian political spectrum away from 
liberal positions to place resistance to the erosion of Russia’s political, eco­
nomic and cultural influence to the advantage of 'the West' at the top of the 
foreign policy agenda. In this respect, Belarus’s long-term alignment with Rus­
sia is of paramount importance as a source of consistent diplomatic support, 
as a means of strengthening defence capabilities on Russia’s western flank, 
and as a de facto barrier to the expansion of Western Influence.
These objectives could be achieved through the establishment of a military 
alliance with mechanisms for consultation aimed at reaching a common ap­
proach to international issues - without the need for supranational structures or 
economic integration. Only some academic experts and politicians from the 
“Union of Rightist Forces” advocate such a limited arrangement. Reintegration 
with Belarus has a powerful symbolic-identitive appeal for many members of 
the Russian elite and for the majority of the Russian electorate, which favours 
the restoration of political, economic, cultural and social bonds to CIS coun­
tries - especially Slavic-Orthodox Belarus and Ukraine. For most of the Rus­
sian political elite, the popular legitimacy and political capital provided by the 
idea of integration embodied in the institutional apparatus of the Russia- 
Belarus Union and its largely non-military functions seem to be as vital as its 
strategic advantages. Russian policy-makers have been considering the de­
velopment of a confederal structure, but have tended to take a gradual ap­
proach due to the difficulties anticipated in delineating the competences of na­
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tional and Union institutions as well as determining the relative weight of the 
two states in common policy-making processes. They have been equally con­
cerned about the danger of triggering a renegotiation of Russia’s internal fed­
eral arrangements. Finally, they have been very cautious about lending plausi­
bility to arguments portraying Russia as a ‘neo-imperialist’ state eager to un­
dermine its neighbour's independent statehood.*^*
‘Virtual integration', i.e. the conclusion of seemingly far-reaching agreements 
with little practical content, is seen by some analysts as a low cost-high impact 
strategy for temporarily improving the rulers’ popularity rates. Russian policy­
makers realise that the success of economic integration with Belarus forms a 
precondition for the Union’s attractiveness to Ukraine. Besides, transport 
routes (by road, rail, air, sea, or pipelines) through Belarus and Ukraine are of 
supreme importance to almost every sector of the Russian economy and are, 
in the minds of many members of the foreign policy community, connected to 
the geopolitical calculations related to the zero-sum-game of Western expan­
sion and loss of Russian in f lu en ce .T he  Russian foreign policy makers are 
acutely concerned about the political and strategic implications of projects to 
extract oil from the Caspian Sea and transport it to Western markets without 
Russian participation and are determined not to allow this form of Western in­
fluence creep closer to Russia’s European borders.*^® Belarus as a transport 
route has the additional function of averting the economic and strategic isola­
tion of Kaliningrad oblast in view of the inclusion of Poland (and possibly the 
Baltic states in a second wave of enlargement) in NATO and the European Un­
ion.*^" Economic integration provides ample opportunities for package deals
Such arguments were put forward in a draft declaration on the future of Russo-Ukrainian 
relations proposed by a group of nationalist deputies in the Ukrainian Parliament. Nezavisi­
mava Gazeta. 14 September 2000, pp. 1,5
See the report on the Russo-Belarusian Union published by the Russian Institute of Strate­
gic Studies, the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy and the Politics Foundation in Nezav­
isimava Gazeta-Stsenarii. April 1997, pp. 1 ,2
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 25 March 2000, p. 5; Shutov, Postsovvetskove orostranstvo. op.cit., 
pp. 230-233, 240-242 . These projects are linked to the intention of Georgia and Azerbaijan to 
apply for admission to NATO. See G. Voitolovsky, “Kaspiisky vopros i interesy Rossii", 
Vneshnava Toraovlva. 1998, no. 7-9, p. 3
Vyacheslav Nikonov, “Belorussiya vo vneshei politike Rossii”, in Sherman Garnett and 
Robert Legvold (eds.), Belorussiva na oereput’e: v poiskakh mezhdunarodnoi identichnosti.
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furthering Russian political and strategic objectives as well as a series of eco­
nomic interests. These relate to a drive to revive trade and vertically integrated 
industrial production by resurrecting Soviet-era transaction networks and 
creating new ones - on an intergovernmental, inter-regional, or commercial 
basis. Thus, the distance separating what could be described as Russia's 
minimum objectives with respect to Belarus (long-term strategic alliance; 
reliable transportation routes; common institutions) from the maximum 
objective of a tightly integrated - in military, economic, and political terms - 
community appears rather insignificant. Still, the Russian elite attaches certain 
minimum conditions (e.g. that emission of a single currency would be 
controlled by Moscow) to the development of such an integrated community. 
These will be discussed in detail in the next two chapters.
In principle, all considerations in favour of integration with Belarus apply to 
Ukraine as well. In strategic as well as economic terms, Ukraine's importance 
to Russia is almost universally perceived to outweigh that of Belarus. Most 
Russian opinion as well as the elite would very much like to see Ukraine as the 
third member of the Union formed by Russia arid Belarus. Still, most members 
of Russia’s foreign policy community are fully aware that the political priorities 
of the Ukrainian leadership dictate a strategy of reducing Russia’s leverage 
and effectively rule out reintegration - at least until the end of President Ku­
chma’s second term of office in 2004. Even though maximum objectives with 
respect to Belarus and Ukraine are essentially the same, Russian foreign pol­
icy experts recognise that official policy needs to concentrate on more modest 
objectives, realistically attainable under current circumstances.*^® At a mini­
mum, Russia’s goal would be to discourage Ukraine from applying for admis­
sion to NATO and opposing Russian diplomatic positions, outcomes which 
would - at the very least - seriously undermine Russian claims to regional 
leadership. Strengthening Russian companies’ vis-à-vis their Western 
competitors in key sectors of the Ukrainian economy (notably banking, media, 
oil and gas, and defence industry) is also considered desirable and not entirely
Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 1998, p. 77. Latvia’s decision to seil the Mazhikyaisky oii-refining 
plant to an American company instead of Russia’s 'Lukoil' and turn to more expensive oil im­
ports from the Middie East was interpreted as the product of US pressure in connection with 
Latvia’s application for NATO membership. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 16 October 1999, p. 4 
Author’s interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999.
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unrealistic. The model of US-Canada (or US-Mexico) relations tends to be fa­
voured by the Russian foreign policy community for Russia's relations with 
Ukraine - at least for the near future. The successful attainment of these mini­
mum objectives would create a foundation for pursuing reintegration - within 
the Russia-Belarus Union or in a separate framework, if and when Ukraine’s 
domestic politics provide conditions more conducive to this end.
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Chapter Two
Levers of influence in Russia’s policies towards Belarus and 
Ukraine
In principle, Russian policy-makers’ considerations with respect to Belarus 
and Ukraine have been very similar, with the political (and identity-inspired), 
strategic and economic arguments that have underpinned the course of 
integration with Belarus being equally applicable to Ukraine. As we have seen 
in the previous chapter, however, Russian diplomacy has taken into account 
the Ukrainian leadership’s reluctance to follow the example of Belarus. It has, 
therefore, formulated more limited policy objectives pertaining to relations with 
Ukraine compared to those guiding Russian policy towards Belarus. This chap­
ter will seek to relate Russia’s use (or restraint from the use) of various policy 
instruments to its overall foreign policy goals and to the differentiated objectives 
towards its two neighbours.
Amitai Etzioni’s leadership theory of regional integration, which closely corre­
sponds to Russian aspirations in the post-Soviet region, and interdependence 
theory, which most accurately describes Russia’s policy resources in relation to 
Belarus and Ukraine, have been selected as the main analytical tools for exam­
ining Russia’s choice among possible policy instruments. A wide range of such 
instruments will be discussed in connection with Russia’s relations with both 
Belarus and Ukraine; communications (including public statements by politi­
cians not representing the Russian government); various forms of interference 
in domestic politics (e.g. in connection with the situation of Russophone popula­
tions); territorial claims; threats (or absence thereof) of military force; and an 
array of economic levers (e.g. various types of subsidies; trade concessions or 
restrictions; deliberate diversion of economic transactions). The effectiveness 
of Russia’s use of available policy instruments will be assessed, with 
consideration being given to a multitude of constraints (e.g. policy incoherence 
related to bureaucratic politics in the Russian administration; overt or implicit 
pressure from domestic public opinion or external actors).
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Russia as a leader?
Different theories of regional integration converge in treating the presence of 
a leading power as a necessary condition for the successful take-off of an inte­
gration process. The leading state (or core of leading states) is defined not 
merely in terms of size and resources, but - more importantly - in terms of be­
haviour. Russia is unambiguously the leader in terms of size and resources - 
not only vis-à-vis Belarus and Ukraine, but in the post-Soviet region as a whole. 
Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus involve high levels of economic 
transactions, which could be substituted only in the medium to long term at very 
considerable cost. In addition, major political events and -  under certain cir­
cumstances -  social upheaval (e.g. dramatic decline in living standards leading 
to mass protest or out-migration) in Ukraine and Belarus have the potential to 
affect decision-making in Russia - especially in the fields of defence and foreign 
policy. Likewise, political and economic changes in Russia (e.g. the financial 
crisis of August 1998) may have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine and 
Belarus. Hence, relations between the three countries are characterised by in­
terdependence.*
As will be shown in this chapter, in this case. Interdependence is asymmetri­
cal in the sense that that for Russia the cost of finding alternatives to its present 
transactions with Belarus or Ukraine is lower than the costs that would be in­
curred by either of the latter, should their interaction with Russia be reduced. 
Fuel imports from Russia cover up to 90% of energy requirements in the econ­
omy of Belarus and almost two thirds in the case of Ukraine.^ In turn, 70% of 
Russian exports to European markets are transported through the territory of 
Belarus and another 20% through Ukraine. Besides, Russian politicians have -  
at least putatively - significant opportunities to interfere in the domestic matters 
of Ukraine or Belarus, which could not be matched by the role of their Ukrainian 
or Belarusian counterparts in Russia’s internal affairs. In foreign policy, as 
Sherman Garnett has noted, “Ukraine’s ‘breathing space’ depends on Russian 
policy and actions more than any other external factor”, an observation with
 ^ This definition of interdependence as an analytical concept in International relations Is taken 
from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. Second edition, 
London: Harper-Coliins, 1989, pp. 8-11
 ^Ustina Markus, “Energy Crisis Spurs Ukraine and Belarus to Seek Help Abroad", Transition. 3 
May 1996, pp. 14-17
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equal validity as far as Belarus is concerned.® Against this background, Russia 
appears less vulnerable to changes caused by other actors affecting Its rela­
tions with Belarus and Ukraine. It could, therefore, threaten to initiate such 
changes, which would be particularly costly to Belarus or Ukraine (e.g. a redi­
rection of its fuel transit route from one of the two countries to the other), in or­
der to attain the objectives analysed in the previous chapter. Thus, Russia's 
superior resources constitute a potential source of power, the latter being de­
fined as control over outcomes. Resources are translated into power through 
political bargaining, in which the more dependent actors have the opportunity to 
distort the dominant actor’s ability to attain its desired outcomes to the degree 
that its superiority of resources would suggest." The question is to what extent 
Russia’s resources have been effectively converted into policy instruments to 
shape the Integration process with Belarus according to Russian preferences 
and to influence Ukrainian decision-makers in the direction of a Russia-centred 
foreign policy.
Neo-functionalism, the dominant theory pertaining to the development of in­
tegration in post-WWII Western Europe, explains the conclusion of integration 
treaties partly with reference to the role of leading states (France and Ger­
many) in offering economic concessions to smaller states, while setting limits to 
their political demands.® The theory known as ‘intergovernmentalism’, the main 
rival of neo-functionalism, is based on the principles of the Realist school of in­
ternational relations and highlights lowest-common-denominator bargains 
struck by top-level national leaders. Power relationships are crucial to the out­
comes of these negotiations, with larger resource-rich states acting as leaders 
by ‘buying off’ their smaller partners through ‘side-payments’ (rewards not di­
rectly flowing from formal integration arrangements).® According to Etzioni, the 
leading state “devotes a comparatively high proportion of its assets to guiding a 
process and leading other units (states) to support it”.^  Initiation of the process
 ^Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 
Central and Eastern Europe. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1997, p. 41
" Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 11-19, 53
 ^E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958, pp. 241-251 
® Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional integration. Cambridge: CUP, 1999, pp. 28-29 
 ^Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 45
82
is one of the defining characteristics of political leadership in this context.® The 
leading state exercises ‘integrative power’ (i.e. it makes other states follow its 
guidance), which may be 'identitive', ‘utilitarian’ or ‘coercive’ depending on the 
policy instruments used - rhetoric/propaganda, economic incentives or sanc­
tions, and military force or threats thereof respectively.® Transactionalism and 
network analysis offer an alternative, narrower definition of leadership by identi­
fying the unit (in this case, the state) with the highest density of transac­
tions/communications to other units in the system as the leader.*®
For the transactionalist and neo-functionalist theories, if a process of integra­
tion is to succeed, rewards need to be received before burdens (implementa­
tion costs) are incurred.** Etzioni, clearly differentiates between the motivation 
and strategy of the leading power and those of other units. In an asymmetric 
community, the leading state offers to other member-states more material as­
sets than it receives from them.*^ Moreover, it does not do so from an intention 
to obtain - at some point in the future - more economic assets than it has in­
vested. instead, it seeks to derive ‘symbolic (identitive) gratification’ such as 
prestige gained from the status of leadership.*® As it has been shown in the 
previous chapter, expectations of economic advantage are secondary to politi­
cal and strategic considerations in the overall motivation structure underpinning 
re-integration as a top priority of Russian foreign policy. In addition, the stress 
is on achieving certain key economic objectives (notably, maximisation of con­
trol over the external economic environment through stable transportation 
routes and vertically integrated production lines) rather than on relative gains or 
even a positive balance sheet in terms of revenue and expenses.
Apart from economic instruments, the leading state may employ ideologically 
charged appeals along with other conventional diplomatic methods of persua­
sion, resort to threats of violence or even use military force to coerce weaker 
states into participation in an integrated community. Etzioni, however, observes
® Ibid., p. 295 
® Ibid., pp. 37-39
David Knoke and James H. Kuklinski, Network Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982, pp. 
19, 24-25
Karl W. Deutsch et al.. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957, p. 71; Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1968 
Etzioni, Political Unification, op. cit., p. 77 
Ibid., p. 315
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that the use of military instruments undermines smaller states’ identification 
with the community, thereby impairing the long-term prospects of the commu­
nity’s survival. He concludes that heavy-handed attempts to accelerate a proc­
ess of integration occurring at a time when at least one of the prospective 
member-states has serious reservations are bound to fail. A temporary slow­
down awaiting favourable conditions may prove a more productive approach, 
as in the case of Norway’s hesitancy over joining a Nordic common market.*" 
Finally, effective communications, responsiveness on the part of the leading 
power to the needs of smaller states (e.g. practical demonstration of solidarity 
through prompt provision of assistance to a weaker state facing a crisis), and a 
fair representation of smaller states’ interests In decision-making on community 
matters are found to enhance a community’s chances of success. The following 
sections will examine Russian policy-makers’ choice of instruments and overall 
strategy with regard to managing the integration process with Belarus and 
overcoming the Ukrainian leadership’s negative stance on the issue.
Reassurance and identitive appeals as policy instruments
The Russian leadership, both under Yeltsin and Putin, has been rather cau­
tious in its statements and its use of the media for the purposes of promoting 
the cause of integration with Belarus and fostering Russia-friendly attitudes 
among the Ukrainian elites and mass public. Indeed, the initiative for integration 
with Belarus did not come from the Russian side, but from the Belarusian lead­
ership. Only after Prime Minister of Belarus Vyacheslav Kebich proposed an 
economic union with Russia in 1993 did a few Russian foreign policy experts 
such as Migranyan and Stankevich begin to advocate integration with Belarus, 
Ukraine and possibly Kazakhstan without waiting for CIS-wide consensus on 
the matter.*® The Communists and Zhirinovsky’s LDPR in particular started 
their careers in post-Soviet Russian politics by calling for the resurrection of the 
Soviet Union and, with this objective in mind, watched the signs of CIS disinte­
gration (the formation of national armed forces; the collapse of the rouble 
zone; and the sharp decline in trade among former Soviet republics) with espe-
Ibid., pp. 323-324
15 See for example the article by Sergey Stankevich In Delovov Mir. 20 July 1994, p. 1
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cial dismay.*® Once re-integration with Belarus was put forward, they welcomed 
it enthusiastically as a more realistic alternative to the reunification of all former 
Soviet republics in a single state or even as a first step in that direction. The 
most vocal support for the process of Russo-Belarusian integration has come 
from the leadership of the left-wing factions of the Russian parliament and na­
tionalist politicians such as Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov.*^ Duma Chairman 
Gennady Seleznyov and Chairman of the CIS Affairs Committee between 1995 
and 1999 Georgy Tikhonov, like Belarusian President Lukashenko, have re­
peatedly called on Ukraine to become the third member of the Union of Russia 
and Belarus.*® Their appeals employ Russia’s supposed leadership of the 
Slavic-Orthodox world as an ideological asset. Statements in this spirit have 
come also from Russia's military leadership. Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, 
Head of the International Cooperation Department in the Ministry of Defence, 
blamed NATO and the United States for "waging a struggle against Slavic 
unity” by seeking to undermine the Belarusian leadership and setting Ukraine 
against Russia. He concluded that Slavic peoples could survive “only by dem­
onstrating a high level of solidarity.”*®
The Russian Parliament’s weekly newspaper Rossiiskava Federatsiva and 
its fortnightly journal Rossiiskava Federatsiva Seoodnva regularly give positive 
coverage to matters relating to the Union. The Duma has sponsored various 
activities by civil society organisations aimed at promoting integration between 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, such as the Moscow congress of June 2001 enti­
tled “Three countries -  one people” .^ ® Seleznyov is also Chairman of the Par-
In March 1996, the Duma led by the ‘red browns’ passed a resolution (by 250 to 98 votes) 
denying the legality of the Belovezh agreements concluded in 1991 by the leaders of the Rus­
sian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian SSRs, which dissolved the Soviet Union and founded the CIS 
in its place. Seoodnva. 16 March 1996, p. 1 
See Luzhkov’s statement, calling for faster integration and denouncing the role of Chubais In 
slowing down the process, in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 29 April 1997, pp. 1, 3.
Seleznyov cited in Kommersant’-Dallv. 30 September 1998, p. 4 
Interfax News Agency, Diplomatic Panorama. 24 April 2000
The congress of East Slavic peoples discussed alternative integration models for a “Union of 
Three", along with cultural, historical and economic Issues. Most participants represented or­
ganisations from Russia. Belarus or Ukraine, while there were delegates from Yugoslavia, 
Transdniestria and Central Asian counties. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 5 June 2001, p. 5
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liamentary Assembly of the Russia-Belarus Union/* which has been a source 
of demands for faster and deeper integration and of criticism - directed primarily 
at the Russian executive - of failures to implement treaty provisions within the 
specified timescale. At the same time, the Assembly has also been advertising 
the advantages of integration and the positive achievements of the Union 
through a series of publications, which includes a quarterly information bulletin 
f informatsionnv Bvulleten’) issued since 1998 and the weekly Sovuz. Argu­
ments in favour of expanding the Union’s membership and Ukrainian member­
ship in particular often appear in these publications.^^ The Assembly in coop­
eration with the Russian Parliament has been leading the expansion of Union 
activities into the sphere of civil society. The Union Public Chamber, which held 
its first congress in Moscow in April 2000, was established as an association of 
Russian and Belarusian social organisations aiming to “promote integration 
processes between the two states in order to ensure the soonest establishment 
of a single union state.” Organisations from Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova 
and Yugoslavia have applied for membership in the Union Public Chamber.^® 
Some of them have been granted observer status in the Parliamentary Assem­
bly of the Union. In this respect, the Assembly’s role as a ‘locomotive of integra­
tion’ resembles the function envisaged by neo-functionalist theorists for the su­
pranational bodies of the European Community, the Commission and the Par­
liament.
Other organisations campaigning for integration with Belarus include the 
“Belarusian-Russian People’s Unity Movement”, chaired by Nikolai Gonchar 
and backed -  among others -  by Aleksandr Lebed and Boris Fyodorov, Georgy 
Tikhonov’s “All-Russia Movement ‘Soyuz’”, and the “Public Committee to Pro­
mote the Union of Russia and Belarus”, which is supported by Luzhkov, former 
Deputy Duma Chairman (1995-1999) Sergei Baburin and the association “Re­
al isty”. Their meetings are regularly attended by Russian parliamentarians -  
especially from left-wing factions -  and their Ukrainian counterparts.^" The ra­
tionale behind this activism is to increase public support for the Union, not just
The Parliamentary Assembly is made up of members of the two countries’ parliaments dele­
gated by their respective colleagues.
See for example, Press service of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and 
Russia, Sovuz Belarusi 1 Rossii: 100 voorosov I otvetov. Moscow: Klub “Realisty”, 1999, p. 20 
Itar-Tass, 25 April 2000; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 6 June 2001, p. 5 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 17 July 1997, p. 2
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in Russia and Belarus, but also in potential member-states, and to raise the 
profile of the issue as ‘a popular demand’, thereby bringing the weight of public 
opinion to bear upon the leaders of existing and potential members.^® In spring 
2001, on the initiative of the Committee for CIS Affairs, an inter-faction group 
“For the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia” was set up in the Duma with 
the purpose of undertaking initiatives promoting Ukraine’s accession to the 
Russia-Belarus Union.^®
Civilian members of the Russian government and the Presidential admini­
stration, however, have hardly employed appeals to a common identity as a 
means of increasing the legitimacy of the Union or increasing its attractiveness 
to potential member-states. They have been wary of statements that could dis­
credit the current integration process In the eyes of sceptics in Belarus and 
Ukraine by encouraging its association with any variant of Russian nationalist 
ideology. Rather than presenting the Union with Belarus as the embodiment of 
‘Slavic brotherhood’ or as an attempt to resurrect Soviet-era inter-republican 
relations, the stress has been on forging relations of a new type in the image of 
the European Union. The EU model Is used in an Implicit contrast with the So­
viet Union to portray the new Union as voluntary, non-hierarchical and com­
patible with state sovereignty.^^ Given that the Belarusian leadership is explic­
itly committed to maximum integration with Russia and has been actively advo­
cating its merits not only to the country’s population but to Russian constituen­
cies as well, there is little need for the Russian authorities to direct pro- 
integrationist rhetoric at Belarus.
Such rhetoric would antagonise the Ukrainian leadership, which has re­
jected -  at least for the short term - integration with Russia and Belarus in fa­
vour of the ‘European choice’ involving accession to the EU, whereas integra-
Georgy Tikhonov (Chairman of Duma CIS Affairs Committee, 1995-1999), for example, ac­
cused Ukrainian President Kuchma of deceiving his own people by promising integration with 
Russia and pursuing integration with NATO instead. Interview in Parlamentskava Gazeta. 24 
December 1998, p. 4
A group with the same name has already been operating in the Ukrainian Parliament for sev­
eral years. Belarusskava Delovava Gazeta. 3 April 2001, p. 3. The inter-parliamentary group 
(made up of Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian parliamentarians) with the same title held its 
founding conference in Grodno (Belarus) on 4 June 2001. Zerkalo Nedell. 9-15 June 2001, p. 4 
The equality of member-states and the retention of their sovereignty are enshrined in the 
treaties concluded by Russia and Belarus. These provisions have been criticised as incompati­
ble with plans for a common defence and monetary union.
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tion with Russia and Belarus is advocated by the Communists and other oppo­
nents of the Kuchma regime.^® Representatives of the Russian executive have 
deemed it expedient to maintain good relations with the Kuchma administration 
and have, therefore, refrained from inviting Ukraine to become the third mem­
ber of the Union. Instead, they have restricted their statements to the letter of 
treaty provisions, which merely mention the possibility of admitting new mem­
bers. In April 2000, Secretary of the Union Pavel Borodin was the first Russian 
official close to the executive branch to speak of a possible enlargement in 
three to five years’ time and to identify Ukraine and Kazakhstan as potential 
new members.Russian foreign policy-makers see rhetorical appeals as 
counter-productive, for they would be likely to prod Ukrainian foreign policy to 
become even more decidedly pro-Western. They have not commented on 
Ukraine’s declared aspiration to join the European Union (though they have re­
peatedly expressed categorical opposition to NATO membership for any post- 
Soviet state) from fear of prodding Ukrainian foreign policy to become even 
more decidedly pro-Western. The successful implementation of economic inte­
gration with Belarus, bringing tangible economic benefits, is considered as the 
most promising way of persuading a future Ukrainian administration to look to­
wards Russia rather than waiting indefinitely for admission to Western struc- 
tures.^°
Moreover, Russia’s executive has sought to clearly dissociate official foreign 
policy from a series of State Duma initiatives that alarmed the leaders of other 
CIS countries and Ukraine in particular. These include the resolution of March 
1996 denouncing the Belovezh agreements of 1991, which dissolved the Soviet 
Union, and the resolution forbidding the division of the Black Sea Fleet (Octo­
ber 1996) and providing for the financing of the city of Sevastopol from the
President Kuchma dismissed the idea of Ukraine's accession to the Russia-Belarus Union 
saying that it has not yet produced any tangible results. Seleznyov’s proposal that Ukraine 
should join the Union was applauded by the leftist fractions of the Ukrainian Parliament. Golos 
Ukrainv. 30 September 1998, p. 1 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 18 April 2000, p. 1. It should be noted that Borodin made this state­
ment in the capacity of a Union official, having ceased working - at least formally - for Russia’s 
Presidential administration three months earlier.
Author’s interview with senior official from the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 2 Decem­
ber 1999.
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Russian federal budget.^^ The resolution was passed unanimously, indicating 
that deputies from centrist and liberal factions had supported it.^  ^This led Brit­
ish analyst James Sherr to suspect that Russian policy towards Ukraine rested 
upon a covert division of labour between the executive branch and the Duma -  
at least during the run-up to the conclusion of the agreements on the Black Sea 
Fleet (May 1997).^^ By that time, Russian negotiators had accepted a reword­
ing of “Sevastopol will be the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet” to “the 
Russian BSF will be based in Sevastopol” to accommodate Ukrainian appre­
hensions of implicit territorial claims.^"  ^ If on that occasion Chernomyrdin’s gov­
ernment encouraged liberals and centrists in the Duma to side with the Yed- 
browns’ in order to demonstrate to the Ukrainian side the kind of policy options 
Russian diplomacy could resort to In the event its demands were not met, this 
has not been a consistent tactic. Overall, the Russian executive has been 
highly sensitive to accusations of ‘neo-imperialist’ intentions originating from the 
Ukrainian elite and has striven to avoid actions that might bolster their plausibil­
ity.
The unconditional recognition of Ukraine’s borders in the ‘Friendship, Part­
nership, and Cooperation Treaty’ of May 1997 gave rise to acute concern 
among ‘patriots’ in the Parliament who accused Russian negotiators of “open­
ing the way to Ukraine’s accession to NATO”.^  ^ Opponents of the treaty ob­
jected to its renunciation of claims to the Crimea and Sevastopol in particular. 
They feared that the elimination of territorial disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine would enable the latter to meet one of NATO’s criteria for aspiring
In 1992 and 9 July 1993, the Duma’s predecessor, the Russian Supreme Soviet, had passed 
two resolutions declaring the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 Illegal and claiming Sevas­
topol as a subject of the Russian Federation respectively.
The act was passed by 337 votes to 0 with five abstentions. Seaodnva. 17 October 1996, p.
1
James Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?\ The Black Sea Fleet Accords", Survival, 
vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 37 
This rewording was agreed during the Sochi negotiations of June 1995. The Duma’s resolu­
tion was disavowed by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 18 October 1996, 
pp. 1, 3
Statement by Deputy Duma Chairman Sergei Baburin, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 14 January 
1999, p. 3
89
members.^® Due to Luzhkov’s and Lebed’s dogged fight in the Council of the 
Federation to prevent the treaty from entering into force, the government had to 
engage in a prolonged struggle to convince both houses of Parliament to ratify 
the ‘Big Treaty’.^  ^ As Foreign Minister Ivanov argued, advancing territorial 
claims against Ukraine would be indefensible in the international community 
and could lead only to the deterioration of bilateral relations.^® The treaty’s re­
quirement that each of the parties will “refrain from actions directed against thé 
other and prevent the use of its territory to the detriment of the other” and the 
Black Sea Fleet agreements’ provision that Russian forces would be based in 
the Crimea -  including Sevastopol -  at least for 20 years were presented as 
safeguards against Ukrainian membership of NATO. It was expected that the 
recognition of Ukraine's territorial integrity by the Russian Parliament would re­
assure the Verkhovna Rada and prompt it to endorse Russia’s military pres­
ence in Crimea by ratifying the Black Sea Fleet a cco rds . In  the longer term, 
such steps are expected to contribute to the gradual erosion of perceptions of 
Russia as an “imperialist state”, which have been cultivated with significant 
success by prominent members of the Ukrainian foreign policy community.^^ 
They should also enhance Russia’s international image as a country respecting 
the sovereignty of its neighbours and weaken arguments like those of Brzezin-
^  Georgy Tikhonov (then Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs), interview 
with Parlamentskava Gazeta. 24 December 1998, p. 4. The treaty, however, did not resolve the 
question of the Azov Sea, whose division is supported by Ukraine, whereas Russia proposes 
its common use as a lake.
The Duma, thanks to the support of the CPRF leadership, ratified the treaty in December 
1998 (by 243 to 30 votes), almost a year after its ratification by the Ukrainian Parliament (by 
317 votes to 27) in January 1998. Having postponed the treaty’s ratification a month earlier, the 
Federation Council voted In favour (106 votes to 25, 17 abstentions) on 17 February 1999. 
Kommersant’-Daiiv. 18 February 1999, p. 3. On Luzhkov’s and Lebed’s opposition to ratifica­
tion, see Nezavisimava Gazeta. 28 January 1999, p. 1.
See Ivanov’s article in defence of the treaty in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 January 1999, p. 3 
Ibid. The Ukrainian Parliament indeed ratified the agreements in March 1999, just a month 
after the ratification of the ‘Big Treaty’ by Russia’s Federation Council.
Author’s interview with senior official from the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 2 Decem­
ber 1999. On the role of Ukrainian officials in propagating negative perceptions of Russia, see 
Arkady Moshes, “Konfliktny potentsiai v Rossiisko-Ukrainskikh otnosheniyakh’’, in A. Zverev et 
al. (eds.), Etnicheskive i reaionat’nve konfiiktv v Yevrazii: Rossiva. Ukraina. Belorussiva. Mos­
cow: Ves’ Mir, 1997, pp. 25-26.
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ski, which use Russia’s ostensibly imperialist intentions to gather international 
support for Ukraine’s admission to NATO."^ ^
A combination of neglect and reluctance to antagonise the Ukrainian leader­
ship by any kind of interference in the country’s domestic affairs led to con­
spicuous inaction on the part of the Russian government with regard to the de­
clared objective of supporting Russian language and culture in Ukraine. This 
question does not arise in the case of Belarus, where Lukashenko restored 
Russian to the status of second state language alongside Belarusian not long 
after he became President."^^ In autumn 1998, the Duma formally protested at 
the restriction of Russian-language broadcasting in the Crimea and the aboli­
tion of Russian as an official language of the Autonomous Republic."^ Despite 
well-documented, widespread resentment caused by the so-called ‘Ukrainisa- 
tion’ policies among Russian-speakers In Eastern and Southern Ukraine or 
even in Kiev,"^ the Russian executive had previously made no attempt to pre­
sent itself as the protector of Russian speakers’ interests in Ukraine. Not until 
February 2000, did the Russian Foreign Ministry issue a statement criticising 
the Ukrainian authorities’ policies aimed at expanding the use of the Ukrainian 
language in education, the workplace and the media."^ The Russian Ministry 
also asked OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel 
to investigate provisions for the use of the Russian language in Ukrainian edu-
For such an argument see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Ukraine, Russia, and the West”, Problems of 
Post-Communism. January/February 1997, pp. 32-33; Alexander Goncharenko, Ukrainlan- 
Russlan Relations: An Unequal Partnership. London: Royal United Services institute for De­
fence Studies, 1995, pp. 13-18, 26-27 
Russian remains the language employed by government authorities and state television in 
Belarus, while Russian television channels -  especially ORT - are received throughout the 
country.
Seaodnva. 24 October 1998, p. 2
Anatol Lleven presents such evidence from interviews with Russophone residents of Eastern 
Ukraine in his book Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalrv. Washington DC: US institute of 
Peace, 1999, pp. 55-58, 101. Focus-group research conducted by SOCiS-Gallup (Kiev) on be­
half of the US State Department in December 1999 corroborated Lieven’s findings with regard 
to Kiev, Kherson, Donetsk, and Simferopol. Thomas Klobucar, Ukraine and the World. Wash­
ington DC: Office of Research, US Department of State, April 2000, pp. 15-16 
The Foreign Ministry and Russia’s Human Rights Representative criticised the Ukrainian 
government’s draft resolution "On Additional measures to Widen the Functions of Ukrainian as 
the State Language" for “forcing out the Russian language”. Ukrainian Centre for Independent 
Political Research, Research Update. Vol. 6, No. 161, 21 February 2000.
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cation establishments."^ The authorities of the Russian Federation have re­
frained from any involvement in the dispute between Kiev and Khar’kov city 
council regarding the decision of the latter to use the Russian language in local 
administration. The Khar’kov council plans to conduct a referendum on this 
question (probably to coincide with the parliamentary and local elections of 
March 2002), with Ukrainian Russophone organisations campaigning for refer­
enda in other predominantly Russophone regions as well."^  ^Again, no support 
(moral or material) has been forthcoming from the Russian government.
No effort has been made to encourage Ukraine’s Russophone population to 
identify with Russia in order to increase or mobilise the considerable popular 
support for integration with Russia."^® Speaking at a conference of the ‘Russian 
Movement of Ukraine’ (RMU) and of the ‘International Forum of Ukraine’, RMU 
leader Aleksandr Svistunov stressed that the Russophone population of 
Ukraine could not count on financial or other assistance from Russia (e.g. for 
electoral campaigns of affiliated parties and candidates) and had to rely on its 
own forces."^ No financial or other support was given to civil-society organisa­
tions working for the preservation of Russian language and culture in Ukraine, 
nor did the Russian government establish any agencies of its own with such 
functions.®® The decision to open a branch of Moscow State University in Se­
vastopol was applauded by the Russian Foreign Ministry, but was primarily the 
product of Luzhkov’s initiative.®^ When transmission of the Russian state- 
controlled channel ORT was discontinued in 1995 on the grounds of its debts to 
the Ukrainian authorities, leading to mass protests in Eastern Ukraine, there
The High Commissioner found provisions overall satisfactory, but forwarded a list of recom­
mendations (mainiy regarding increased parental choice over the instruction of Russian lan­
guage in Ukrainian-language schools) to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoiy ZIenko. Communi­
cations (January-April 2001) between the High Commissioner, on the one hand, and the Rus­
sian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministers, on the other, are published in OSCE document 
HCNM.GAL/1/01 of 7 May 2001.
The council has also requested the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly’s co­
rapporteur on Ukraine, Hanne Severinsen) to look into the matter. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 8 
May 2001, p. 5
Detailed opinion poll data on this question is provided in Chapter Four.
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 February 2001, p. 5 
^  A. Lieven, Ukraine and Russia, pp. 72-74, 89-90
Luzhkov concluded the relevant agreement with the Crimean authorities during his visit in 
January 1997, Seaodnva. 18 January 1997, p.1
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was no reaction from the Russian government, which made no attempt to settle 
the debt question.®^
Several members of the Russian foreign policy community interviewed by the 
author suggested indifference on the part of the Yeltsin administration as the 
main explanation for the state of affairs described above. Still, two Russian 
television channels (ORT and NTV) and several radio stations continued to be 
received at least in certain parts of Ukraine.®® Following the inter-governmental 
agreement “On cooperation in television and radio broadcasting", which was 
signed during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko’s visit to Moscow in October 
2000, ORT, NTV and RTR are reportedly being broadcast more or less 
throughout Ukraine.®"* Besides, the main Ukrainian television networks are par­
tially owned by media tycoons controlling their Russian counterparts.®® These 
Ukrainian television channels have been overall loyal to Kuchma and could by 
no means be said to voice the line of the Russian leadership. On the particular 
issue of the Russia-Belarus Union, however, their coverage has been probably 
more extensive and positive than the Kuchma administration may have pre­
ferred it to be.®® The rather modest amount of 100 million roubles, most of 
which is likely to be spent on Russophone mass media, was allocated from the 
Russian federal budget of 2001 for the support of ‘compatriots’ in the Baltics 
and the CIS.®  ^ As Aman Tuleyev (governor of Kemerovo oblast’; former CIS 
Affairs Minister) remarked in this connection, over the years, lack of resources 
and political will have prevented Russia from behaving as a great power in ren­
dering substantial assistance to its diaspora in the former Soviet Union. In his
Lieven, Ukraine and Russia, pp. 73-74
ORT and NTV have been received in Kiev at all times. At the beginning of 1997, Ukrainian 
channels UT-2 and "Inter" replaced the Russian ORT and RTR In transmitters covering the 
86% Russophone Crimea. Seaodnva. 16 January 1997, p. 2
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 30 May 2001, p. 5. This Is also in iine with Ukraine’s accession to the 
“Convention on Transfrontier Television” of the Council of Europe as of July 1996.
Boris Berezovsky is reported to be one of the main shareholders of UT-1 (“Era"), UT-2 
(“1+1”), UT-3 (“Inter"), and satellite channels STB, REN TV, and TV6; Vladimir Gusinsky is a 
sharehoider of “Novy kanal” aiong with Mikhaii Fridman, who is also one of the owners of UT-4 
(“iSTV").
For example, on 27 October 1999, UT-2, not only showed substantial extracts of President 
Lukashenko’s speech to the Russian Duma as part of the main evening news broadcast, but 
complemented them with a viewers’ phone-in poll on the question of Ukraine’s accession to the 
Union.
Izvestlva. 24 October 2000, p. 1
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view, the strengthening of this diaspora had “huge potential to expand our 
(Russia’s) influence in these countries”.®® President Putin has admitted that “we 
[Russia] are clearly doing too little in terms of protecting our diaspora, culture 
and language”.®®
Economic levers
According to Etzioni’s theory, leadership of an integration process involves 
policies of rewarding its supporters and penalising those who resist it.®® More 
generally, as Realist accounts of foreign aid stress, it is common practice in in­
ternational politics for states aspiring to regional or global leadership to offer 
weaker states various forms of economic assistance in exchange for their po­
litical loyalty or participation in a military alliance.®* The effective design and 
implementation of such strategies requires a clear hierarchy of decision-making 
authority among relevant governmental structures and smooth co-ordination of 
their respective tasks. In many cases, outcomes depend on the cooperation of 
non-governmental actors such as major commercial enterprises operating in 
the target countries. Their responsiveness to government priorities is especially 
important to the successful manipulation of economic interdependence, when 
states -  or constituencies within them - resisting integration may be threatened 
with adverse changes to existing patterns of economic interaction.
Subsidising Belarus
Belarus began receiving side-payments for its loyalty at the time when the 
official launch of the bilateral integration process was in the pipeline. Two 
months prior to the conclusion of the treaty ‘On the Formation of the Commu­
nity of Belarus and Russia’ (April 1996), Russia wrote off debt of around $1,5 
billion. In return, Belarus accepted the ‘zero option’: it renounced claims to So-
Interview in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 3 November 2000, p. 8
Putin’s address to top Foreign Ministry officials as reported by Interfax, Diplomatic Pano­
rama. 26 January 2001 
Etzioni, Political Unification, p. 325
For a classic Realist account, see Hans Morgenthau,’’A Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 56, 1962, pp. 301-309
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viet assets and compensation for environmental damage caused by Russian 
forces deployed on its territory. Compensation for the nuclear warheads trans­
ferred to Russia would be paid in Russian state bonds. State securities were to 
cover the Belarusian debt owed to Gazprom, which had been accumulated be­
tween 1993 and 1996.®  ^Subsequently, the Belarusian economy has benefited 
from various forms of subsidisation from Russia, which do not appear in the 
texts of the integration treaties, but which constitute essential elements of the 
political arrangements underpinning the allied relationship. During the first CIS 
economic forum, which took place in St Petersburg in June 1997, Russia and 
Belarus concluded an agreement on the provision of 500 million roubles in 
credits from the Russian state budget to Belarusian enterprises to be spent on 
imports from the Russian Federation.®® In October 1998, a further 400 million 
roubles were granted (to be repaid between 2000 and 2006 with a provision for 
non-monetary payments) for the purchase of Russian machinery.®"*
Energy subsidies
According to a Russian foreign ministry official, following the establishment 
of the Russia-Belarus Community, the prices charged to Belarus for the import 
of Russian fuel were gradually reduced by approximately 40%. In 1997, Bela­
rus imported Russian gas at around $49 per 1000 cubic metres, at a time when 
the price for Ukraine was $78. In 1999, the price charged to Belarus was down 
to $30. The Belarusian side expects this price to drop to $12 or $15 after the 
conclusion of the Treaty on the Formation of a Union State’ (December 1999) 
in line with prices charged to consumers in Russian regions bordering Belarus. 
Although Gazprom has reduced the price charged to Belarus to $26 (as of 
January 2000), it is uncertain that an equalisation of prices for consumers in the 
two countries would meet the hopes of the Belarusian leadership, given that
Belarusian arrears for fuel deliveries during 1992 were included in the cancelled debt. The 
agreement ‘On the Resolution of Financial Claims’ was signed in February 1996, Bvulleten’ 
Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. October 1996, pp. 48-49 
See Irina Selivanova, “Ekonomicheskaya integratsiya Rossii i Belorussii”, in D.E. Furman 
(ed.), Belorussiva i Rossiva: obshchestva i aosudarstva. Second edition, Moscow: “Prava 
Cheloveka”, 1998, p. 323 
Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 1999, pp. 84-85
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Gazprom and the Russian government plan to gradually liberalise prices in the 
domestic market over a period of four or five years.®®
Despite the discount prices, Belarus has often lacked sufficient hard cur­
rency to pay for fuel imports. Until mid-1998, its energy debt had reached levels 
unacceptable to Russian exporters on a few occasions, with supplies being 
temporarily reduced as a consequence.®® In several instances, barter agree­
ments between the Belarusian state authorities and Russian fuel-exporting 
companies have been worked out with the intervention of the Russian govern­
ment and the Union bureaucracy. In the autumn of 1998, for example, such a 
deal allowed for the payment of $200 million of Belarus’s debt to Gazprom by 
the provision of foodstuffs for the Russian armed forces, which Russia could 
not afford to import from elsewhere due to the dramatic devaluation of the rou­
ble.®^  During 1997, barter constituted more than 80% (up to 92.5%, according 
to some sources) of Belarus’s payments to Gazprom. In 1998, payments were 
made 26% in cash and 74% by the provision of goods and services.®® In 1999, 
the percentage of monetary payments dropped to 8%, leading Gazprom to re­
quest cash payment for Belarus’s outstanding balance of $160 million.®® During 
the winter season of 2000-2001, Belarus bought Russian gas from ‘Itéra’ (an 
alleged Gazprom subsidiary) without any reduction in supplies.^® Itéra, whose 
chairman has announced plans for substantial investments ($ around 200 mil­
lion) in Belarusian infrastructure, is reported to have proposed to the country’s 
leadership a package agreement involving guaranteed gas supplies for 15-20 
years.^*
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 28 January 2000, p. 4
In the first quarter of 1998, Belarus’s debt to Gazprom stood at $470 million. Gazprom re­
duced gas deliveries to Belarus by 50% for three days in December 1996, by 30% in April and 
40% in June 1998, when debt exceeded $230 million and Beiarus faiied to make monthiy pay­
ments of $25 million, as had been agreed. Izvestlva. 17 June 1998, p. 1 
Belarus borrowed the money from a commercial bank. As soon as Gazprom received the 
funds, It transferred them to the Russian state towards payment of its tax arrears, which stood 
at around $1 bliilon at the time. In turn, the government used the money to purchase food from 
Belarus. Izvestlva. 17 October 1998, p. 1.
Selivanova, “Ekonomicheskaya integratsiya Rossii i Belorussii”, p. 324 
Interfax-AN I. 10 April 2000, via www.rusoll.ru/news/lndex.htm?date=2000-04-11 
Belarusskava Delovava Gazeta. 3 May 2001, p. 1 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 May 2001, p. 5
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Such arrangements clearly demonstrate the amenability of Russia’s energy 
companies to political pressures. In many respects, Russian energy companies 
- especially those like Gazprom, where the state is the major shareholder -  
continue to function more like Soviet-era ministries than like commercial or­
ganisations oriented towards the maximisation of profits -  at least as far as it 
concerns their operations in the domestic market. The directors of these enter­
prises are highly susceptible to government control though a variety of mecha­
nisms. These include state regulation of prices, which has continued to apply to 
the gas sector after the liberalisation of the oil market, the manipulation of ex­
port duties and corporate taxation, pressure for payment of tax arrears,and -  
in the case of partly state-owned companies -  interference in the appointments 
of top executives. Gas prices in the domestic market and -  to a lesser extent -  
those of the CIS have been necessarily maintained well below world-market 
levels, so that consumers are able to pay -  albeit irregularly - for their bills.^® In 
return, the Russian government has regularly acted on behalf of fuel exporters, 
usually in negotiations for favourable transit fees charged by foreign countries, 
for the payment of foreign parties’ arrears and for the acquisition of equity in 
major enterprises abroad.
Apart from low prices for gas, Belarus also receives oil from Russia on pref­
erential terms. Until 1996, intergovernmental agreements fixed quantities of 
guaranteed deliveries of a range of staple products including oil and gas and 
specified commodities to be supplied in Belarus as payment.^"* In line with the 
liberalisation of Russia’s domestic oil market, a 1996 agreement stated that 
Russian oil exporters would be free to negotiate prices with Belarusian import 
companies based on prices prevailing in the domestic market.^® In 1997, Bela-
Gazprom contributes approximately 30% of state budget revenues, while its tax arrears have 
typically exceeded $1 billion.
The average price charged for gas exports to CiS countries was $28 iower (per thousand 
cubic metres) than that paid by countries outside the CIS in 1995, $13 lower in 1996 and $18 
lower In 1997. Russian oil prices for CiS countries were -  on average - $34 lower In 1995, $41 
lower In 1996, and $16 lower in 1997, but in 1998 exceeded prices charged to other countries 
by an average of $3. The value of Russian gas exports to the CIS has, however, exceeded that 
of oil exports by up to 70%. Rossilskv Statlsticheskv Ezheaodnik. Moscow: Goskomstat, 1999, 
pp. 557-558, 573
See for example, the agreement “On the main principles of trade and economic cooperation 
for the year 1995", Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. June 1995, pp. 58-63
The same agreement “On pricing policy" provided that gas prices would continue to be fixed
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rus paid $94 per tonne of Russian crude oil. compared to a world market aver­
age of $119.^® As consumers within the Russian Federation began paying 
prices close to the world market average, so did Belarus/^ Oil imports are han­
dled by a large number of companies licensed by the Belarusian authorities, 
some of which have obtained exceptionally favourable deals. In autumn 1999, 
for example, the major state-owned Belarusian oil company imported Russian 
oil at $129 per ton -  more than $60 below the world market price.^® The main 
exporters of Russian oil to Belarus have been ‘Surguneftgaz’, 'Lukoil', 
‘YukosVTomskneft’, 'Rosneft', ‘Sibneft’, ‘Bashneft’, ‘Tatneft’ and ‘Slavneft’.The 
latter is itself -  to some degree - a product of the bilateral integration process 
with a special function to assist the integration of the two countries’ econo­
mies.^® ‘Slavneft’ as well as some others from the above companies have con­
cluded -  on the basis of intergovernmental agreements - contracts with the 
Belarusian authorities guaranteeing regular supplies to Belarusian oil- 
processing plants, which have been able to function at almost full capacity as a 
result.®® According to these agreements, most finished production is returned to 
Russia or exported further abroad.®*
It may appear curious, but Russia’s energy companies appear to deem the 
agreements reached with Belarus profitable.®^ They see them as integral part of 
a broader understanding that ensures the stable and trouble-free export of their
annually by intergovernmental agreement. Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. June 
1996, pp. 58-60
Rossiiskv Statist!cheskv Ezheaodnik. Moscow: Goskomstat, 1999, p. 557 
In 1998, the price normally charged to Belarusian importers of Russian oii rose to $105 per 
tonne, close to the world marker average.
Interview of S. Mishin, Vice-President of ‘Belneftekhim’ to Interfax-ANI. 7 December 1999, via 
WWW, rusoil. ru/news/i ndex. htm?date=1999-12-08 
See statement by Viadimir Putin (PM at the time), Interfax-ANI. 22 October 1999, via 
www.rusoil.ru. Slavneft’ is a Russo-Belarusian enterprise whose structure will be discussed In 
Chapter Three.
For example, the agreement guaranteeing 8 tonnes of Russian oil annually to the Mozyr oil- 
processing plant (allowing it to operate at full capacity) provided that 60% of its production 
would be returned to Russia. Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. April 1995, pp. 20-21 
Aleksandr Gordeichik, “Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Rossiei i Beiarus’yu”, in 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economic and Political Studies, Rossiisko- 
Belorusskive Otnosheniva: Problemv i Perspektivv. Proceedings of the round table held on 2-3 
February 1998, Moscow: ‘Epikon’, 1998, pp. 48-49 
Author’s interview with Gazprom executive, Moscow, 10 December 1999.
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products to the hard-currency markets of Central and Western Europe. The low 
fees charged by Belarus for the transit of Russian gas combined with the fact 
that no incidents of theft from the pipelines or storage facilities have ever been 
reported make Belarus the most reliable and cost-effective export route for 
Gazprom. This has encouraged the Russian monopoly to invest in the con­
struction of the Yamal-to-Europe pipeline crossing Belarusian territory. Belaru­
sian transit fees have been half of those demanded by Ukraine ($0.55 as op­
posed to $1.09 for 1000 cubic metres of gas per 100 km) and have been offset 
against the amounts Belarus owes to Gazprom.®® Since the favourable pay­
ment arrangements were introduced in late 1998, Belarus’s gas debt has been 
maintained within relatively modest boundaries -  between $160 and $250 mil­
lion.®"* Compared to the irregular payments and mounting debts of other post- 
Soviet states and many Russian regions, Belarus appears like a reasonably 
solvent customer. Gazprom has been promised a major share in 'Beltransgaz', 
the state-owned company controlling fuel pipelines and related facilities on the 
territory of Belarus,®® but the Belarusian government has not been reluctant to 
proceed with the privatisation of such enterprises. The ‘Programme of Actions’ 
attached to the Union-state treaty of December 1999 provides for the transfer 
of the Belarusian gas pipeline network to Gazprom by the end of 2000.®®
Economic relations with Belarus in Russian politics
Objections to Russia’s subsidisation of the Belarusian economy expressed 
by liberals in the Russian opposition, the media and the government itself have 
caused complications for the integration process. The supply of energy at dis­
counted prices and other credits have been far less of an issue than apprehen­
sions that economic unification with Belarus’s retention of mechanisms for in-
This level of transit fees was applicable In autumn 1999. Arkady Moshes, “Russian-Ukralnlan 
Relations after Ukraine’s Elections", Harvard Programme on New Approaches to Russian Se­
curity Memo Studies. Memo no. 82, October 1999, p. 1; electronic version at 
www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLiCY%20MEMOS/Moshes82.htmi 
A. Moshes, “Russian Policy towards Ukraine, Beiarus, and the Baltic States In the Putin Era", 
Memo no. 123, April 2000, p. 3; electronic version at 
www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLiCY%20MEMOS/Moshes123.htmi 
Izvestlva. 23 April 1998, p. 1
Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 2000, p. 79
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dependent economic policy-making would destabilise the Russian economy.®^ 
These arguments were strengthened by the experience of the largely dysfunc­
tional customs union, as a result of which the Russian budget was estimated to 
have been deprived of very substantial amounts of revenue.®® Discord over the 
cost of the integration process reached a peak during preparations for the 
Treaty on the Union of Russia and Belarus’. While the treaty was signed as 
scheduled on 2""* April 1997 to coincide with the anniversary since the conclu­
sion of the Treaty on the Formation of a Community’, the final text omitted 
many of the provisions on economic integration contained in the draft that had 
been approved by the Duma. The controversial clauses were removed as a re­
sult of a last-minute intervention by a group of market-minded members of the 
Russian government and the Presidential administration (Chubais, Nemtsov, 
Boiko, Kokh, Yumashev) who were concerned about the potential costs to the 
country’s economy.®® Two of the principal Russian participants in the drafting of 
the original document. Deputy PM Valery Serov and Presidential aide Dmitry 
Ryurikov, were promptly relieved of their duties, laying bare the deep divisions 
of opinion and the lack of co-ordination in policy-making within the Russian ex­
ecutive.
As a compromise with the Belarusian side and the irate Duma leadership,®® it 
was agreed that the provisions in question would be renegotiated and incorpo­
rated in the Charter of the Union, which was to be legally attached to the treaty. 
While the Charter was being discussed. Minister without portfolio at the time 
Yevgeny Yasin expressed support for the idea of unification, but estimated that 
it would bring no benefit to the Russia’s economy so long as Belarus did not 
adopt reforms to approximate Russian economic conditions.®* He contended 
that the mere addition of Belarusian production facilities to those of Russia and 
the restoration of Soviet-era transactions would hardly be advantageous in a 
market environment and dismissed President Lukashenko’s suggestion that 
Russia emulate Belarusian economic and social policies as devoid of support in
For example, see the article by Otto Latsis in Izvestlva. 29 March 1997, p. 2 
Estimates of Russia’s losses of income in custom duties vary from 5.5 trillion roubles be­
tween April 1997 and December 1996 to around $1 billion for 1996 alone. See Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. 16 December 1996, p. 3; Selivanova, “Ekonomicheskaya Integratsiya", p. 325 
Kommersant’-Dailv. 1 April 1997, p. 1
See Seleznyov’s statement in protest, Kommersant’-Dailv. 2 April 1997, p. 2 
See Yasin’s article in Kommersant’-Dailv. 24 April 1997, p. 5
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the Russian government. The Charter of the Union, which was signed on 23'^ '* 
May 1997, contained relatively minor changes to the earlier drafts. The most 
note-worthy changes were the following: a new article (Art. 13) committing the 
Union to the protection of civic and economic liberties; the substitution of refer­
ences to “uniform standards of social security" by “uniform approaches” in the 
calculation of benefits (Art. 10) and of those to a joint economic policy by “co­
ordination of decisions" (Art. 16); an added emphasis on standardisation of 
economic legislation and monetary-financial systems (Art. 16); omission of pro­
visions for Union citizenship and passports (Article 17 of the draft); and some 
weakening of supranational authorities' competences (Art. 16, 20).
Though the total cost of subsidising the essentially unreformed Belarusian 
economy has been calculated to exceed $2 billion annually, such figures are by 
no means widely accepted, not least because they - arguably -  overlook Rus­
sian savings resulting from the special relationship with Belarus. In the words of 
a Yabloko Duma member,
“The Union with Belarus saves Russia money, if Belarus were to distance itself 
from Russia like Ukraine has, Russia would have to build new military installations 
on its territory to replace those now used by the Russian armed forces in Belarus, 
and this would cost a lot. Also, we save from not having to demarcate the border 
and set up checkpoints.”®^
While the economic benefits of integration with Belarus are contested, cost in 
itself does not deter either liberals or pro-government circles from supporting 
the overall process. As an adviser to the Russian government said:
“There are many regions of the Russian Federation that absorb more resources 
than what they contribute to the federal budget. Sakhalin is an example. Does this 
mean we should give it to Japan?”®®
Compared to the Union treaty of 1997, the Treaty on the Formation of a Union 
State’ of December 1999 provoked little contention over economic matters.
Author’s interview, Moscow, 8 December 1999. Even though the party supported the Union 
with Belarus, it continued to argue for its own, ostensibly more realistic and mutually advanta­
geous programme of economic integration. Yabloko fraction declaration of 17 October 1999, 
available on www.vabloko.ru/Themes/Belarus/belarus-37.htm 
Author’s interview, Moscow, 30 November 1999.
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Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Union treaty had placed no sub­
stantial new burdens on the Russian economy. Appreciation of the strategic 
advantages derived from the Union (e.g. military bases and stable transport 
routes) appeared to have widened -  more or less proportionally to the re- 
evaluation of Western intentions in the wake of the massive withdrawal of in­
vestments, which accompanied the August 1998 financial crisis, and the 
events in Yugoslavia. Once the significance of Belarus’s loyalty has been 
taken into account, the price seems relatively small and worth paying even in 
the eyes of those who regard Russia’s financial and macroeconomic stability 
as the utmost priority.®"*
When liberal politicians raise cost as an issue, it is meant as a criticism of 
the Russian leadership for not assuming a tougher line towards Lukashenko. 
Whereas reducing current levels of support for the Belarusian economy would 
seriously endanger the cordiality of bilateral relations,®® Russian negotiators 
have been insisting that economic reforms in Belarus come before movement 
towards monetary union. So far, they have had rather limited success in con­
vincing the Belarusian leadership to proceed With privatisation, reduce state 
regulation of the economy and create a favourable operating environment for 
private business. In this respect, Russia’s position has been -  at times -  lack­
ing in consistency and credibility -  not least because the direction of Russian 
economic policy appeared uncertain due to the frequent government reshuf­
fles during the last two years of Yeltsin’s second term and Putin’s initially 
vague economic programme. At the same time, Russian reformists seem re­
assured by their success in averting economic unification on the German 
model. This would have allowed monetary union to precede the liberalisation 
and stabilisation of the Belarusian economy, thereby potentially jeopardising 
Russia’s own achievements in these fields. The August 1998 crisis cast doubt 
on the success of Russian economic policy and seems to have led to a more
The author’s conscious search for market-minded Russian politicians warning against inte­
gration with Belarus on the grounds of economic cost (a position widely expressed in 1997) 
proved fruitless in 1999. Tellingly, the Gaidar Institute had ceased to conduct research on the 
Union’s costs.
Dissatisfied with the pace of economic integration, President Lukashenko had warned that 
Belarus intended to redress the Imbalance in its Russia-focus foreign policy by developing 
closer ties to the West and, possibly, negotiating relations with NATO independently. These 
statements, however, failed to raise concern among Russian policy-makers. Kommersant’- 
Dailv. 6 March 1997, p. 3 and 25 September 1998, p. 2
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tolerant view of the Belarusian economic system. A survey by the Public Opin­
ion Foundation (FOM) conducted in 1997 and repeated in 1999 suggested 
that the Russian public, originally not too enthusiastic about economic aspects 
of integration with Belarus, became less wary of their consequences during 
that period.®® By 2000, economic support to Belarus was no longer a salient 
issue in Russian politics. Russia’s approval of a credit of over $200 in support 
of the Belarusian currency stabilisation in preparation for monetary union pro­
voked hardly any controversy.®^
Finally, many politicians from the liberal wing and the centre of the Russian 
political spectrum as well as some government officials have been critical of 
Lukashenko’s heavy-handedness towards the opposition and the media.®® 
‘Yabloko’ in particular has argued for progress in economic integration to be 
made conditional on the liberalisation of Belarusian domestic politics.®® At the 
same time, its leaders have admitted that Russia is not in a strong position to 
“give Belarus lessons in democracy” considering that more authoritarian re­
gimes than that of President Lukashenko have existed within the Russian 
Federation itself (e.g. in Tatarstan and Kalmykia) without any pressure from 
federal au thorities .W hereas the Russian government has attempted to fa­
cilitate negotiations between the Belarusian President and the underground 
opposition,*®* progress in integration negotiations has not been linked to the
The survey was first conducted in April 1997 and repeated in January 1999, using a sample 
of 1500 from 56 localities. It showed a 13-percentage-polnt decrease (from 40% to 26%) in the 
share of the Russian public perceiving standards of living in Belarus as lagging behind those in 
Russia - compared to a survey conducted in April 1997. In the same period, those optimistic 
that unification would lead to higher standards of living in both countries rose from 54% to 62%.
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 1 December 2000, p. 1
Boris Nemtsov in a debate on NTV’s “Glas n a rod a” stated that he supported the Union with 
Belarus - only without President Lukashenko, who - in the view of most Russian liberals - as of 
20 July 1999 does not hold office legitimately. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 4 December 1999, p. 5 
®® Deputy Chairman of Yabloko’s Duma faction, Sergei Ivanenko, justified the party’s refusal to 
vote in favour of the Union treaty on the grounds of Lukashenko’s establishment of an ‘illegiti­
mate parliament’, which did not allow for democratic scrutiny of the integration process in Bela­
rus. Kommersant’-Dailv. 6 June 1997, p. 2
Author’s interview with ‘Yabloko’ parliamentarian, Moscow, 8 December 1999 
In November 1996, PM Chernomyrdin and Chairmen of the two houses of the Russian Par­
liament Stroyev and Seleznyov visited Minsk to mediate a compromise between the Belarusian 
Parliament and President Lukashenko. The impasse resulted from the letter’s move to oust the
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improvement of the political situation in Belarus.*®^ In October 2000, even 
Duma deputies from ‘Yabloko’ and the ‘Union of Rightist Forces’, v/ho served 
as observers in the parliamentary election held in Belarus, spoke of “concrete 
advancements towards the creation of a democratic society” and signed the 
Duma statement recognising the elections as “conforming with international 
standards”.*®® This would suggest a substantial decline in the salience of the 
Belarusian domestic political situation as an objection to further integration on 
the part of Russia’s mainstream political forces.
Blackmailing Ukraine?
The financial implications o f the Black Sea Fleet agreements
Allegations of Russia employing ‘economic blackmail’ by linking issues such 
as continued energy supplies to Ukrainian political concessions -  particularly 
with respect to the question of basing rights for Russian armed forces in Cri­
mea and Ukraine’s attitude to NATO membership -  have been quite common 
both in the academic literature and in statements by members of the Ukrainian 
elite.*®"* Most members of the Russian foreign policy community, however, 
seem to share a negative assessment of achievements in relations with 
Ukraine. They identified Russia’s lack of stable negotiating positions and in­
adequate use of its economic trumps (debt, energy supplies, customs duties)
opposition from Parliament on the grounds of that month’s referendum on increasing Presiden­
tial powers. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 November 1996, p. 1
The only case when the Belarusian regime’s behaviour towards the media came close to 
interfering with the integration process was during the scandal caused by the Belarusian au­
thorities’ arrest of Russian journalist Pavel Sheremet in July 1997. Kommersant’-Dailv. 22 Au­
gust 1997, p. 3
Statements by ’Yabloko’ deputy Vyacheslav Igrunov in Belorusskava Delovava Gazeta. 16 
October 2000, p. 1, and G. Mirzoyev (Union of Rightist Forces) in Rossiiskava Gazeta. 24 Oc­
tober 2000, p. 1
See Paul D’ Anieri, "Dilemmas of Interdependence; Autonomy, Prosperity, and Sovereignty 
in Ukraine’s Russia Policy”, Problems of Post-Communism. January/February 1997, pp. 18-19; 
John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, “Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin”, Foreign Affairs. 
May/June 1996, p. 58. Such assessments were also given by three Ukrainian interviewees 
from non-governmental research institutes and organisations, Kiev, October-November 1999.
104
as the main failures.*®® In 1996, CiS Affairs Minister Aman Tuleyev had com­
plained that his ministry did not have sufficient control over economic levers 
(credits, debt rescheduling, customs legislation, investment decisions) to 
achieve its ends.*®® Trade and customs policy was decided separately from ne­
gotiations on the division and basing rights of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF).*®^
Responsibility for negotiations on the division of the BSF and on the use of 
related military installations was effectively taken away from the Foreign Minis­
try (the CIS Affairs Ministry had never been involved in them), when First Dep­
uty Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets replaced Deputy Foreign Minister Yury 
Dubinin as the head of Russian delegations visiting Ukraine as of 1995. 
According to a Russian foreign policy expert, the changes in the Russian 
delegation’s membership, which came to include individuals with very little 
diplomatic experience, and the lack of clear instructions and forward planning 
from the Presidential administration led to no less than six consecutive 
revisions of Russia’s negotiating position between 1993 and 1997. This was 
thought to have significantly eroded Russia’s potential to employ economic 
instruments to back up its demands.*®® Initially, proposals put forward by 
Russia during 1993-1994 had involved ‘buying-off’ the share of the Fleet that 
Ukraine claimed as its own (Ukraine’s original position was that the BSF should 
be divided in half) by writing-off a part of Ukraine’s debt. In March 1995, 
agreement was reached on $1.4 billion of Ukraine’s debt to Russia to be repaid 
by 2008 with payments starting in 1998.*°® Thus, the debt question was largely 
disentangled from the BSF negotiations, though Russia’s flexibility on this issue 
certainly contributed to Ukraine’s acceptance of compensation for bringing its 
share of the Fleet down to 18.3% from 50%. With the division of the Fleet, 
Ukraine’s compensation amounted to $526.5 million, which were deducted from 
its debt to Russia, an arrangement criticised by some Ukrainian experts as
Russian side.**® The two sides agreed on the 
Author’s Interviews with advisers to the Russian government, Moscow. June and November-
December 1999.
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 19 December 1996, p. 3
Author’s interview at the Russian institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, 30 November 
1999
Author’s interview, Moscow, 21 June 1999 
*^ ® Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 March 1995, p. 1 ; Agreement "On the Restructuring of Ukraine’s 
Debt in State Credits provided by the Russian Federation”, in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, Moscow State institute of International Relations, Rossiisko-Ukrainskive 
Otnosheniva 1990-1997 go.: Sbornik Dokumentov. Moscow, 1998, pp. 308-310
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to the Russian side.**® The two sides agreed on the amount of $3,074 billion 
as Ukraine’s debt to Russia at the time of the agreement (May 1997).*** During 
1995-1996, PM Chernomyrdin had reportedly threatened with reductions in gas 
supplies in case of a stalemate in negotiations regarding basing rights for the 
Russian BSF.**^ Given that gas cuts have been common even for Belarus, 
whenever payments arrears accumulated, the Russian negotiators would have 
been merely highlighting their resolve to produce an agreement by threatening 
with an effectively predetermined outcome. As will be argued subsequently, in 
view of Ukraine's failure to pay on time, it would have been difficult for the Rus­
sian government to avert the cuts, even if it had so wished.
Both before and after the rescheduling of Ukraine’s debt, numerous disputes 
arose regarding, not so much the value of the vessels themselves, as respon­
sibility for the cost of the Fleet’s upkeep. Russian negotiators contended that 
Ukraine’s claim to 50% of BSF assets, which was upheld until 1995, was un­
dermined by its failure to cover an equal proportion of the Fleet’s expenses.**® 
In turn, the Ukrainian side demanded that Russia pay the BSF’s taxes, which 
were estimated at $133 million a year.**"* As no compromise was reached, in 
January 1996 Russia withheld payments towards BSF costs until the conclu­
sion of the BSF Accords in May of the following year. This placed Ukraine’s lim­
ited resources under enormous strain and the Fleet faced cuts in electricity 
supplies due to arrears in utility bills.**® Even after the division of the BSF, 
many Russian analysts consider its presence on Ukraine’s territory as one of
The Ukrainian side agreed to this arrangement by the Sochi accord of 9 June 1995. Diolo- 
maticheskv Vestnik. Juiy 1995, p. 49. For a critical Ukrainian perspective, see Grigory Perepe- 
litsa, "Osnovnye voennye tendentsii v Chernomorskom regione: ukrainskaya perspektiva”, in I.
Kobrinskaya and S. Garnett (eds.), Ukraina: problemv bezooasnosti. Moscow: Moscow Carne­
gie Centre. 1996, p. 37
*** Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. October 1999, p. 81
Sherr, “Russia-Ukraine Rapprochement?", p. 43; author’s interviews, Kiev, October- 
November 1999
According to Colonel Aleksandr Zhukov, Head of the BSF’s Finance Department, Ukraine 
contributed 6.7% of the Fleet's income in 1993, while payments practically ceased as of 1994. 
Krasnava Zvezda. 18 May 1995, p. 1
This figure was given by A. Senchenko (Deputy PM of Crimea) cited in Seaodnva. 26 July 
1995, p. 1
**® According to Ukraine’s PM (at the time) Lazarenko, the BSF’s debt to Ukrainian utilities 
stood at around $170 million in August 1996. Seaodnva. 28 August 1996, p. 1
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the most important sources of Russia’s dependence on the goodwill of the 
Ukrainian authorities.
Debt negotiations since the BSF accords
In 1994, a Russian proposal similar to the one concerning Ukraine’s share of 
the BSF had been advanced with regard to military aircraft. It had been sug­
gested that Ukraine could sell most of the 19 TU-160 and the 23 TU-95IVIS stra­
tegic bombers, which had remained on its territory after the break-up of the So­
viet Union, for 200 billion roubles. The plan fell through at the time because 
Ukraine demanded at least 700 billion. Under START 1 treaty obligations, 
Ukraine would have to destroy the bombers, which were designed to carry 
cruise missiles. In November 1999, 11 of the aircraft began to be transferred to 
Russia in exchange for a $275 million reduction in Ukraine’s gas debt.**® Barter 
arrangements like those devised to assist Belarus in paying for fuel imports 
from Russia have also been used in the case of Ukraine, which has similarly 
found itself unable to settle its bills in full by rhonetary payments. Until 1997, 
part of Russian fuel supplies to Ukraine was included in the annual barter 
agreements concluded by the two countries’ governments.**^ 
in early 1998, agreement was reached regarding the payment of $1 billion for 
gas arrears by means of machinery and foodstuffs, which, however, failed to be 
delivered in full due to a poor harvest in Ukraine.**® Other arrangements for 
bringing down debt levels have included compensation for the nuclear weapons 
transferred to Russia as a result of Ukraine’s accession to the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear power and various barter schemes.**® 
Thanks to these arrangements, Ukraine received nuclear fuel from Russia 
without making any monetary payments or incurring debt until 1998.*^° Accord­
Reuters via Russia Today. 21 February 2000, electronic version at 
www.russlatodav.com/news.oh o3?id=136575
Agreements ‘On Trade-Economic Cooperation’ for 1994, 1995 and 1996 in Rossiisko- 
Ukrainskive Otnosheniva 1990-1997 go., pp. 266-272, 279-289, 314-329
R. Yevzerov, Ukraina: s Rossiei vmeste ili vroz’?. Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2000, Ukraina: s 
Rossiei vmeste ili vroz’?. Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2000, p. 35
*^  ^According to such an arrangement, Ukraine was to build housing for Russian servicemen 
returning from Central Europe and the Baltic states.
Ukraine imports ali fuei used by its nuclear power plants from Russia. These plants cover 
approximately 43% of the country’s electricity needs.
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ing to a Russian nuclear Industry executive, the barter arrangements repre­
sented a form of subsidy, as the goods supplied by Ukraine could have been 
obtained at lower prices in Russia.*^* Subsequently, Russian exporters de­
manded that a minimum of 35% of the exports' value be paid in cash. Ukraine’s 
inability to pay for more than a fifth of the fuel ordered resulted in further sup­
plies being withheld in 1998, but payment and supplies resumed in 1999.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Ukraine accumulated $2.7 billion of 
debt for fuel deliveries between 1991 and 1993, with an additional $1.4 billion 
owed to Gazprom for gas supplies in 1994. Under pressure from the IMF, the 
arrears for the period 1991-1993, which had been confirmed by the Intergov­
ernmental agreements of 25 May and 24 June 1993, were rescheduled for 12 
years with a two-year grace period ending in January 1998.*®  ^The $1.4 billion 
debt to Gazprom was converted into Ukrainian government bonds, which could 
be used to purchase shares in state enterprises to be privatised.*^® Economists 
Krasnov and Brada have estimated that these agreements represent a very 
substantial hidden subsidy to Ukraine, not only because fuel exports were 
priced well below world-market levels until the end of 1995,*^"* but also because 
the interest charged is significantly lower than rates attached to loans from al­
ternative sources. They have calculated the total of implicit subsidies from Rus­
sia for the period 1992-2008 to $12.6 billion, an amount likely to exceed the 
level of IMF credits to Ukraine.*^® Likewise, Ukrainian economist V. Dergachev 
puts the savings to the state budget derived from this restructuring arrange­
ment at the level of $500 million annually.*^®
interview given by Vitaly Konovalov, Chairman of the ‘TVEL’ nuclear fuel-producing enter­
prise (part of Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy) to Nezavisimava Gazeta. 11 November 1999, 
p. 6
i. Doronin. “Platezhno-raschetniye otnosheniya gosudarstv byvshego SSSR", Vneshvava 
Torgovlva. 1995, no. 12, pp. 16-17
The relevant agreement between the Ukrainian government and Gazprom appeared In Ros­
siisko-Ukrainskive Otnosheniva 1990-1997 gg.. pp. 354-360
In 1993, Ukraine paid $80-90 per tonne of crude oil Imported from Russia (around 70% of 
the average world market price), which rose to $96.5 in 1995 compared to a world market av­
erage of $100. No payment was made for $900 million worth of oil supplies received during 
1994. Yevzerov, Ukraina: s Rossiei. p. 38
Gregory Krasnov and Josef Brada, “Implicit Subsidies in Russlan-Ukrainian Energy Trade", 
Eurooe-Asia Studies, vo. 49, no. 5, 1997, pp. 827-829, 835-837
V. Dergachev, “Dolgaya doroga inostranykh Investltsii v ukrainskuyu ekonomiku", 
Vneshnvava Torgovlva. no. 1-3, 1998, p. 46
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As of 1996, the Ukrainian state has sought to shake off responsibility for gas 
imports, which were to be undertaken by commercial enterprises, namely 
‘United Energy Systems of Ukraine’, ‘Neftegaz Ukrainy’ and ‘Itéra’, allegedly a 
Gazprom subsidiary. At the same time, world-market prices were introduced by 
intergovernmental agreements both for gas imports and transit fees, which 
were set at $80 per 1000 cubic metres and $1.75 (for the passage of 1000 cu­
bic metres through 100km of pipeline) respectively.*^^ The $1.75 fee was ap­
plied in 1995, of which only $0.55 was paid in cash. The rest was covered by 
gas deliveries, whose price remained below world-market levels, hence ena­
bling Ukraine to incur no gas-related debt for that year. As of 1996, the full 
amount of the transit fee was to be paid in cash, but this has not happened in 
practice. Ukraine consumes 70-75 billion cubic metres of gas annually (of 
which it produces 18 billion), while Russia annually exports over 110 billion cu­
bic metres of gas to Central, Western, and Southern Europe through the 
‘Soyuz’ and ‘Druzhba’ pipelines crossing Ukraine. Therefore, the arrangements 
detailed above ought to leave Ukraine a surplus of around $800 million follow­
ing payment for its own gas consumption.*^® Substantially lower export prices 
and transit fees have since been negotiated with ‘Neftegaz Ukrainy’, which con­
trols the Ukrainian sections of the fuel pipelines, and with ‘United Energy Sys­
tems’.*^ ® The price of gas obtained in exchange for transit services has been 
around $35 (the same as the price paid by Western European consumers mi­
nus the transit costs), with higher prices applicable to imports payable in cash 
or commodities.*®®
Ukraine’s arrears for gas supplies Incurred since 1996 exceeded $2 billion by 
the beginning of 2000, of which $1.4 billion was recognised by the Ukrainian
During 1993 and 1994, the transit fee had been $0.65.
Krasnov and Brada, “Implicit Subsidies”, p. 828
According to Gazprom's agreement with ‘Neftegaz Ukrainy’, the export price for 1999-2000 
was set at $50 per 1000 cubic metres with a transit fee of $1.09 per 100km. Nezavisimava Ga­
zeta. 19 January 2000, p. 4. In the same period, ‘United Energy Systems’ purchased 30 billion 
cubic metres of gas for $40/1000 cubic metres. Den’ (Kiev), 25 January 2000, p. 1
This price has been calculated based on the supply of 34.7 billion cubic metres of gas in 
exchange for the transit of 119.9 billion (1999). Petra Opitz and Christian von HIrschhausen, 
Ukraine as the Gas Bridge to Europe?: Economic and Geopolitical Considerations. Working 
Paper no. 3, Kiev: Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, August 2000, p. 7
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government.*®* The exact amounts of gas debt have been very difficult to de­
termine due to disputes regarding the share of debt to be shouldered by the 
state as opposed to energy-importing companies. In mid-2001, the level of debt 
(also recognised by Ukraine) stood at $1.34 billion, though the government of 
Anatoly Kinakh refused to take responsibility for what it considered “corporate 
debt”.*^ 2 ^  similar situation had developed with regard to the comparably insig­
nificant debt of $123.5 million claimed by Russia’s ‘United Energy Systems’ for 
electricity supplies to Ukrainian companies. The Ukrainian government as­
sumed responsibility for only $7.45 million.*®® In 1999, Russian electricity sup­
plies to Ukraine were halted due to non-payment. They were resumed in 2001 
following the conclusion of an agreement on the unification of the two countries’ 
electricity grids.*®"*
Gas supplies as an issue in bilateral relations
Disagreements over the level of gas debt have been additionally complicated 
by the fact that Gazprom’s estimates have included charges for unauthorised 
removals of gas destined for export outside Ukraine. The problem of gas theft 
is as old as those of Ukrainian arrears and consequent reductions in supplies. 
By the beginning of 1999, the phenomenon had reached such dimensions that 
Gazprom Chairman Rem Vyakhirev sent a telegram to the Ukrainian PM re­
questing immediate action on the part of his government.*®® A year later, 
Ukraine’s Deputy PM Yuliya Timoshenko accused ‘Neftegaz Ukrainy’ of seizing 
about 130 million cubic metres of gas daily over and above the amounts pro­
vided by the contracts with Gazprom, causing Ukraine’s debt to increase by
*^ * The $1.4 figure was recognised by PM Viktor Yushchenko. Reuters via Russia Today. 23 
February 2000, electronic version at www.russiatodav.com/news.php3?id=137077. The $2.8 
billion figure put forward by the Russian side has been confirmed by Ukrainian Deputy Prime 
Minister Yuliya Timoshenko. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 13 January 2000, p. 5 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 10 July 2001, p. 5 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 5 March 1999, p. 5
Izvestlva. 7 September 2000, p. 6; Seaodnva. 13 February 2001, p. 5; Interfax, Diplomatic 
Panorama. 12 February 2001. The agreement was reached during the meeting of Presidents 
Putin and Kuchma in Dniepropetrovsk. It provides for the Russian electricity supplies to Ukraine 
as payment for the transit of Russian electricity exports to Moldova, Romania and Western 
Europe.
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 12 January 1999, p. 1
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$10 million a day.*®® It is not possible to ascertain the extent to which the 
Ukrainian authorities might be able to contain fuel theft from the pipelines. Ad­
visers to the Ukrainian government, in their discussions with the author, unre­
servedly admitted not only full awareness of the chronic and systematic nature 
of the phenomenon, but equally - at the very least - tolerance on the part of 
state authorities. As one of them said, “There is nothing Russia can do to stop 
it» 1®7 in  gas deliveries have barely constituted a credible sanction, since 
Gazprom cannot afford to interrupt supplies to its European customers. The 
Russian gas monopoly in itself has been unable to recover arrears, as illicit si­
phoning-off has peaked every time deliveries have been reduced due non­
payment. Russia has repeatedly reduced oil deliveries to end the interception 
of gas intended for export beyond Ukraine's borders.
Arrears have not been an issue in Ukraine's relations with Russian oil ex­
porters, as they have been able to make supplies strictly conditional on timely 
payment, which (for technical reasons) has not been an option available in the 
case of gas exports. Therefore, in order to compel the Ukrainian authorities to 
take measures against non-payment for gas supplies and illicit gas siphoning, 
in December 1999, the Russian government imposed a ban on oil supplies to 
Ukraine. By February 2000, the amount of gas siphoned off had been reduced 
to an estimated 30 million cubic metres a day, leading to the resumption of oil 
supplies from Russia.*®® Nevertheless, Gazprom once again reported theft of 
$700 million worth of gas from storage facilities connected to Ukraine's gas- 
exporting pipelines during the first five months of 2000.*®® For the remainder of 
that year, the Russian government reported that no illicit takings of gas from the 
export pipelines had occurred between May and December 2000.*"*° This con­
tributed to the conclusion of an agreement reached by the Russian and Ukrain­
ian Presidents in December 2000. Future gas imports would be paid for in cash 
by 50%, while the remainder would constitute Ukrainian state debt (including 
for gas taken above the amounts specified in the contracts).*"** The debt would
Golos Ukrainv. 13 January 2000, pp. 1, 3 
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 2 and 3 November 1999 
Kommersant’-Dailv. 8 February 2000, p. 2
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 15 June 2000, p. 5; Rossiiskava Gazeta/Biznes v Rossii. 25 October
2000, p. 1
Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. January 2001, p. 48 
Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. January 2001, p. 48
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be covered with state Eurobond issues maturing in 2012, thus providing low- 
cost credit for Ukraine, in return, the Russian side is given the option of con­
verting the bonds into equity during the forthcoming phase of Ukrainian privati- 
sation. "^^^
As of 2000, Gazprom reduced its exports to the CIS markets to supplies in 
payment of transit fees and ‘Itéra’ became the principal gas exporter to 
Ukraine. Still, the vicious circle of gas arrears, reduced supplies and illicit 
siphoning was not broken. In the first half of 2001, Ukraine once again faced 
cuts in gas supplies due to arrears to 'Itéra’. The company took legal action 
against three Ukrainian utilities (one of which, Tsentrenergo’, is state-owned), 
seeking payment of arrears totalling over $24 million. "^*® In reaction to the re­
duced supplies from Itéra, principal importer and supplier of the Ukrainian pub­
lic sector ‘Naftogaz Ukrainy’ announced that, in order to be able to supply its 
customers and store provisions for the winter season, “as of 7 July [2001], the 
company would be taking 10 million cubic metres of gas daily from the volumes 
transited by Gazprom to the countries of Europe”. The leadership of Neftegaz 
Ukrainy argued that the reduction in supplies effectively deprived it of choice. 
Moreover, as the agreements of December 2000 were not retroactive, in May 
2001 Gazprom resorted to legal action against the Ukrainian government in or­
der to obtain payment for $1.1 billion of debt, which the company claims was 
the value of gas taken during 2000 over-and-above contract provisions. 
Agreement regarding debt of $1.4 billion accumulated until June 2000 was 
reached in special intergovernmental negotiations of autumn 2001. again to be
So far, Gazprom has been offered shares in the Donetsk pipeline plant. Excerpts of the 
agreements “On Guarantees for the Transit of Russian Natural Gas through the Territory of 
Ukraine” and “On the Conditions of Reserve Supplies of and Payment for Russian Natural Gas” 
were published in Zerkalo Nedell. 3-9 February 2001, p. 1
For 2000 and 2001, Gazprom’s annual supplies to Ukraine amounted to 30 billion cubic me­
tres of gas as payment of transit fees. ’Itéra’ sells an equal amount of gas to Ukraine, mainly on 
behalf of Turkmenistan. Izvestlva. 13 November 2000, p. 2; Seaodnva. 14 November 2000, p. 2 
Izvestlva. 17 January 2001, p. 2 
Zerkalo Nedell. 31 March-7 April 2001, p. 3
Letter sent by ‘Neftogaz Ukrainy’ to Gazprom and Itéra, excerpted In Nezavislmava Gazeta. 
12 July 2001, p. 1. Neftegaz Ukrainy (for legal and/or technical reasons) found itself unable to 
cut off supplies to non-paying customers, particularly consumers In the state and municipal sec­
tors.
Nezavislmava Gazeta. 29 May 2001, p. 5
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covered with Eurobond issues with a twelve-year maturity period with a low in­
terest rate and a three-year grace (interest-free) period. The agreement may, 
however, have difficulty being ratified by the Ukrainian parliament, as it con­
tains a clause banning Ukraine from exporting gas, unless the amounts ex­
ported were in excess of Russian transit gas.^"^
Debt-for-equity arrangements
Until the agreement of December 2000, the Ukraine had quite successfully 
sought to rebuff debt-for-equity proposals advanced by Russia. The Russian 
government first put forward the idea of writing off part of Ukraine’s energy debt 
in exchange for shares in major enterprises in late 1993. Gazprom was particu­
larly keen on acquiring majority stakes in the companies controlling gas trans­
portation and storage facilities as well as a number of large metallurgical and 
chemical plants. Negotiations involving a list of 15 such firms selected by Gaz­
prom began in March 1995. It was also decided that all gas transportation in­
frastructure would be managed by a trans-national company to be named ‘Gaz- 
tranzit’. Gazprom’s stake in the firm was expected to provide a definitive solu­
tion to the interconnected problems of chronic arrears and gas th e f t .A l te rn a ­
tively, the option of Gazprom receiving shares of ‘Neftegaz Ukrainy’, which ac­
quired all blocks of shares previously owned by the state in Ukrainian oil and 
gas enterprises, was also d iscussed .Such  agreements have so far failed to 
materialise due to the divisiveness of the issue in the Verkhovna Rada, which 
in November 1995 passed legislation forbidding the sale of ‘strategic enter­
prises’. T h e  Gaztranzit plan was revived in autumn 1999 in a more modest 
version. Gazprom would hold 35% of shares and the new company would con­
trol only a new pipeline, whose construction it was to undertake. Russia has 
also proposed that the fuel pipelines be leased to Gazprom.
The remaining terms of the agreement (including the interest rate fixed at the LIBOR 
rate+1%) were very similar to that reached in December 2000. Zerkalo Nedeii. 6-12 October 
2001, p. 3
According to an intergovernmental agreement reached in spring 1994, Gazprom was to ac­
quire a 51% stake in Ukraine’s gas transport infrastructure and 50% in a set of energy plants. 
Seaodnva. 11 March 1994, p. 1
Kommersant’-Dailv. 28 February 1998, p. 2
Paul J. D’ Anieri, Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 82
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In spring 2000, the Ukrainian government prepared a list of 39 strategic en­
terprises, where share packages owned by the state are to be privatised, but 
not offered as payment for energy debtJ^^ In a meeting between Presidents 
Putin and Kuchma in October 2000, the Ukrainian side recognised all arrears in 
payments for Russian gas imports as state debt to be covered -  among other 
means of payment -  by the transfer of equity to be issued in the next stage of 
privatisat ion.Sti l l ,  the Ukrainian government estimated those arrears at $1.4 
billion as opposed to $3 billion claimed by Gazprom.However,  a draft law on 
the sale of a 49% stake in the pipeline system, which the government sent to 
the Rada for consideration in September 2000, appears unlikely to be passed 
rapidly, if at all.^ ®® Russian Deputy PM Viktor Khristenko warned the Ukrainian 
government that court action with regard to the outstanding debt claimed by 
Gazprom would continue until the company acquired the stock to be priva­
tised.''®® In June 2001, Ukrainian PM Anatoly Kinakh reiterated that equity 
transfers in exchange for debt cancellation would not be considered.”'®^
The scope for Russia’s use of economic levers ■
Barriers to bilateral trade may constitute a potent lever of influence in a rela­
tionship of asymmetric interdependence. Russian excise duties on fuel ex­
ported outside the Customs Union of the Five (as of 2001, Eurasian Economic 
Community) do not apply exclusively to Ukraine, but have added to the irritation 
of many members of the Ukrainian elite at what they see as a politically moti­
vated pricing policy. Gazprom’s -  albeit temporary - charging higher prices than 
those paid by Central European countries caused much resentment in 
Ukraine.”*®® Although Gazprom considered this a means of compensating for 
losses resulting from regular gas theft,^ ®® some Ukrainian analysts viewed it as 
retribution for Ukraine’s pro-Western foreign policy. They blamed the Russian
Nezavislmava Gazeta. 10 March 2000, p. 4 
Nezavislmava Gazeta. 17 October 2000, p. 1 
Seaodnva. 25 October 2000, p. 2 
izvestlva. 12 September 2000, p. 5 
Seaodnva. 14 November 2000, p. 2 
Zekaio Nedell. 16-22 June 2001, p. 3
Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, “Gas, Oil, and the Linkages between Domestic and For­
eign Policies: The Case of Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 2, 1998, p. 260 
Author's interview with Gazprom executive, Moscow, 10 December 1999
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side for the failure of bilateral and CIS-wide free trade negotiations, suggesting 
that Russian officials insisted on conditions they knew to be unacceptable to 
their negotiating partners (e.g. that VAT be paid in the country of origin of a 
commodity) as a means of nudging Ukraine and other CIS counties into joining 
the Customs U n io n .R u s s ia  continues to impose quantitative restrictions and 
high excise taxes on certain imports from Ukraine (most notably alcoholic bev­
erages and sugar), whose low prices would otherwise undercut domestic pro­
ducers.^®^
Many members of the Russian foreign policy community have opposed a 
free-trade arrangement with Ukraine, less from concern over the influx of 
cheaper Ukrainian goods, than from a disinclination to further encourage what 
they perceive as the free-rider attitude of the Ukrainian leadership. An eminent 
Russian academic expert described Ukraine’s relationship to Russia as para­
sitic.”*®^ Two other representatives of the Russian elite interviewed by the author 
likened Ukraine to the popular proverb's ‘loose calf that feeds from two cows’ - 
in this case Russia and the West.^®® In their view, which seems to be shared by 
many of their peers, the Ukrainian leadership is quite content to receive cheap 
credits and fuel from Russia (In the form of restructured debt and continuing 
fuel supplies despite non-payment for previous imports), while pursuing a pro- 
Western foreign policy rewarded with financial assistance from the IMF, the US 
government, and the EU. The Russian elite appears to favour ending all sorts 
of preferential treatment in economic relations with Ukraine, most notably by 
making further fuel supplies strictly conditional upon full and timely payment.
As has been explained above, this will not be a technically feasible option, 
until Russia upsets the relationship of interdependence by constructing new 
pipelines and other fuel-exporting facilities avoiding Ukraine’s territory. The 
Yamal to Europe gas pipeline crossing Belarus forms the first example of such 
a project. Russia has begun construction of the Baltic Pipeline System for the 
export of oil from Timan-Pechora and Western Siberia, which is to be com­
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 28 October and 2 November 1999
The VAT on Ukrainian vodka has been as high as 400% compared to 85% for equivalent 
products of Russian origin. Seaodnva. 3 September 1996, p. 2
Author’s interview at the Institute of Europe (Russian Academy of Sciences), Moscow, 21 
June 1999
Author’s interviews, Moscow, December 1999
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pleted by December 2001 and cost an estimated $460 million.”'®'^  The Suk- 
hodol’naya-Rodionovskaya oil pipeline, leading to the Russian port of Novoros­
siisk, was also built with the purpose of freeing Russian oil exporters from de­
pendence on the Ukrainian route.”*®® A gas pipeline crossing the Black Sea bed 
(‘Blue Stream’ project) is currently under construction.”*®® ‘Gazprom’ has also 
concluded agreements with West European companies for the building of an 
additional Southern section of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, which is to cross 
Belarus, Poland and Slovakia. The readiness of Russian fuel exporters to pro­
ceed with the aforementioned projects, despite the high financial costs and time 
required for their completion, illustrates their frustration with the poor climate in 
relations with Ukraine. The successful materialisation of even some of these 
projects would place Russia in a stronger position to use energy supplies as a 
lever of political influence over Ukraine.^®^ In spring 2000, the Head of Russia’s 
Security Council Sergei Ivanov warned that CIS countries will have to choose 
between pursuing foreign policy objectives opposed by Russia, such as admis­
sion to NATO, and continuing to benefit from Russia’s magnanimous attitude 
towards oil and gas theft.”*®® Even in the long term, however, the relationship of 
interdependence could not be completely dismantled, not merely because Rus­
sia’s intention to increase fuel exports will require the use of existing and new 
Ukrainian pipelines, but also because Ukraine is likely to remain the largest im­
porter of Russian gas.”*®® Ukraine would, thus, preserve adequate bargaining 
power to resist potential Russian pressures in the political and - more arguably
Interfax, Daily CIS News Brief, vol. II, issue 126 (147), 7 July 2000, p. 7 
The pipeline is to become fully operational in autumn 2001, as announced by an executive 
of the Russian oil transportation company Transneft’, which built the pipeline. Strana.ru 
fwww.strana.ru^ news agency, 19 September 2001 
Nezavislmava Gazeta. 26 October 2000, p. 3
The Polish leadership has been refusing to allow a second section of the Yamal-Europe 
pipeline to cross its territory on the grounds that this would harm Ukraine’s interests. However, 
Poland stands to lose an annual income of $1 billion In transit fees, if it does not cooperate. It 
has also come under pressure from the EU (especially France, Germany and Italy, whose gas 
companies are to co-fund the new pipeline), which has announced the intention to increase gas 
imports from Russia. Rossiiskava Gazeta/Biznes v Rossii. 25 October 2000, p. 1
Ivanov quoted in The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, vol. V, no. 8 ,16 May 2000, elec­
tronic version available at www.bu.edu/iscip/news.html
In the first quarter of 2000, Russia exported 24.3 billion cubic metres of gas to Ukraine com­
pared to 12.4 billion exported to Germany and 7.467 billion to Italy, the next-largest importers of 
Russian gas. Interfax CIS Daily News Brief, vol. II, issue 104 (126), 7 June 2000, p. 6
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- economic spheres, especially if it succeeds in rationalising its fuel consump­
tion or in partially diversifying its energy sources. Although improving the effi­
ciency of energy consumption will require huge investment, Ukraine has been 
more successful in diversifying its imports by buying gas from Turkmenistan, 
the only alternative supplier. An agreement for the delivery of 250 billion cubic 
metres between 2002 and 2006 at a price of $42 per 1000 cubic metres (pay­
able 50% in cash and 50% by barter) was concluded in May 2001, following a 
period of prompt payments by Ukraine.Nevertheless, this diversification 
does not necessarily guarantee stable energy supplies. In the past, Turkmeni­
stan has proved much more resolute than Russian suppliers in interrupting de­
liveries to Ukraine in case of arrears. Since Turkmenistan has had the option of 
selling its gas to Gazprom and, subsequently to Itéra, it has repeatedly ceased 
supplies altogether for several months, until arrears were paid in full.”*^ ”* Be­
sides, Turkmen gas may reach Ukraine only through Russian pipelines.
Restraint from coercive policy instruments
Realist theory has long considered coercion in the form of military force or 
credible threats of violence as the fundamental source of state power and ce­
teris paribus the most reliable mechanism for the pursuit of state interests. 
The high political and military risks involved in a direct inter-state confrontation 
have often made the instigation of internal conflicts or intervention in existing 
ones a cost-effective means of pressurising a domestically weak s t a t e . I n  the 
first years after the demise of the Soviet Union, some Western observers 
feared that Russia might employ coercive instruments to establish itself as a 
regional hegemon. Ukraine, with its heavy concentration of ethnic Russian and 
Russophone populations in the Eastern and Southern regions, was seen as
Nezavislmava Gazeta. 17 may 2001, p. 5
Izvestlva. 16 October 2000, p. 3
For the classic statement of this position see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: 
The Struggle for Power and Peace. Second edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956, pp. 110, 
528
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Rela­
tions. Brighton; Wheatsheaf, 1983, pp. 66-69,117-118
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particularly vulnerable to potential Russian attempts at undermining its unity/ 
As Belarus, even before Lukashenko’s coming to power, has never challenged 
Russia’s declared interests, no scenarios of Russia seeking to destabilise Bela­
rus have been envisaged.
The record of Russo-Ukrainian relations has not confirmed such pessimistic 
perspectives, as the Russian leadership has refrained from any measures po­
tentially threatening the authority of the Ukrainian state. The demand that 
Russophone residents of Ukraine be allowed to have dual citizenship (Russian 
alongside Ukrainian), if they so wished, had been quietly abandoned by 1996, 
as it was unacceptable to the Ukrainian leadership.^Ukrainian policy-makers 
feared that dual citizenship could be used in the future as a justification for 
Russian interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs -  at worst, with the purpose 
of igniting pro-Russian separatism. Indeed, Ukrainian law does not allow for 
dual citizenship.^^® Due to the weakness of civil society and lack of identifica­
tion with the Russian state (as opposed to the Soviet Union), the potential for 
mobilising Ukraine’s ethnic Russian or Russophone population in support of an 
alliance, integration or unification with Russia has been estimated to be very 
l im i ted .M oscow itself has shown no interest in subverting political stability in 
Ukraine, either by fostering the necessary conditions for such mobilisation (pro- 
Russian organisations, popular identification with the Russian Federation) or by 
capitalising on manifestations of Russian-speakers’ discontent. The Donbass 
miners’ strikes of September 1993 and June 1996, whose list of demands in­
cluded re-integration with Russia, and the protests in Crimea against the "Sea
For example, see Paul A. Goble, “The Ukrainian Security Trap", The Ukrainian Quarterly.
1994, p. 231; Eugene B. Rumer, “Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?’’, Foreign Pol­
icy. vol. 96, Fall 1994, pp. 131, 136, 143-144
In 1994, a decree by President Kravchuk removed a question on dual citizenship from a ref­
erendum to be held in Crimea. Izvestlva, 17 March 1994, p. 2. Ethnic Russians make up 67% 
of Crimea’s population. The last round of Russo-Ukrainian negotiations on the issue of dual 
citizenship took place in Moscow in November 1995. Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. December
1995, p. 34
On the disputes between the Russian consular authorities in Simferopol and the Ukrainian 
government regarding this issue, see the briefing speech by A.F. Moiochkov (Head of the Con­
sular Group, Embassy of Russia in Ukraine) in Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 1995, pp. 39-41 
Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson, “Rethinking Russia’s Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Poten­
tial for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia", Europe-Asia Studies. 
Vol. 49, No. 5,1997, pp. 854-855, 861; Lieven, Ukraine and Russia, pp. 50-54
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Breeze 97” military exercises indicate a residual potential for mobilisation in a 
future crisis, either within Ukraine, or in Russo-Ukrainian relations/^®
The most remarkable opportunities for Russian involvement on the side of 
Russian-speakers against the Ukrainian authorities arose from a series of dis­
putes between the elected Crimean authorities and the Ukrainian government, 
which culminated in 1995. Then President of Crimea Yury Meshkov, elected in 
January 1994 on a platform of reunification with Russia, attempted to maximise 
the republic's autonomy. To this end, he organised a referendum on sover­
eignty (albeit not secession) and dual (Russian-Ukrainian) citizenship in March 
1994 -  both proposals being endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the 
Crimean e lectorate.Meshkov took an unreservedly pro-Russian line hoping 
to gain the backing of the authorities in Moscow. He went so far as to warn that, 
in the event of a Ukrainian application for NATO membership, Crimea would 
declare independence and hold a referendum on incorporation into the Russian 
Federation.^®® When the Kiev authorities moved to drastically restrict Crimea’s 
autonomy by abolishing the republic’s constitution of 1992 and the office of 
Crimean President in March 1995, the Russian government took no account of 
Crimean leaders’ appeals for support. The Duma did pass a resolution deplor­
ing the Ukrainian authorities’ actions and warning of possible complications in 
negotiations regarding Ukraine’s debt to Russia, the division of the BSF and the 
status of Sevastopol.^®^ No statement of expressing concern came from the 
Russian Foreign Ministry, while Deputy PM Soskovets, heading a delegation of 
Russian negotiators in Kiev, recognised the situation in Crimea as "a domestic 
matter of Ukraine” .^ ®^ The timing of these events, which coincided with the first
On the political demands of the Donbass strikers see Izvestiya, 10 June 1993, pp. 1-2. Mas­
sive strikes took place in Eastern Ukraine also in 1996, but with exclusively economic de­
mands. On the protests against "Sea Breeze 97", see Seaodnva. 27 August 1997, p. 4 
78.4% voted for Crimean sovereignty and 82% voted for dual citizenship.
The Crimean Parliament had declared independence in May 1992, but the declaration was 
overruled by the Ukrainian Parliament.
Kommersant’-Dailv. 23 March 1995, p. 3. The ‘Yabloko’ faction issued a statement against 
the resolution, arguing that such pressure was likely to nudge Ukraine into seeking admission 
to NATO. Instead, Yabloko proposed an economic union (including customs union) with 
Ukraine. Statement of 13 November 1996, “Pozitsia fraktsii ‘Yabloko’ po voprosu o statuse Se- 
vastopolya” published on www.vabloko.ru/Themes/Ukraina/ukr-2.html
Kuchma publicly thanked Soskovets for his “understanding for Ukraine’s domestic prob­
lems”. Nezavislmava Gazeta. 23 March 1995, p. 1
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Chechnyan campaign, was highly inopportune for Russia to appear to be con­
doning separatism in a neighbouring state/®®
Crimea’s pro-Russian leaders, not being able to count on Moscow’s support, 
have since adopted a more conciliatory approach and conflict between Kiev 
and Simferopol has generally subsided. The republic has continued to be 
plagued by governmental instability, culminating in the Crimean Parliament’s 
vote to dismiss the government against President Kuchma’s appeals for mod­
eration.”'®'^  At no point has the Russian government shown any inclination to in­
terfere. Russian policy-makers have no interest in politically destabilising 
Ukraine from a conviction that such a strategy would backfire, driving Ukraine 
to explicitly ally itself to NATO. Dissenters, which include Luzhkov and Zhiri­
novsky but not the CPRF leadership, stand for overt political support for Cri­
mean pro-Russian politicians. Scenarios of violent conflict with Russian in­
volvement on the side of a separatist movement are not, however, treated even 
as remotely possible by any mainstream political force in Russia. From a prag­
matic point of view, the high costs of a negative reaction from the international 
community and of social instability inevitably spreading to Russia (most Cri­
mean residents are said to have relatives in Russia) render such scenarios un­
desirable to Russian decision-makers. More importantly, the idea of armed con­
flict between Russia and Ukraine appears absolutely unacceptable -  if not en­
tirely inconceivable - to most members of the Russian foreign policy community 
because, as it has been explained in the previous chapter, Ukrainians and Bel­
arusians are considered as ‘brothers’, part of a broader ‘Russian nation’. The 
use of military means is categorically ruled out, even in the event of a Ukrainian 
application for NATO membership, which is seen as a worst-case scenario for 
bilateral relations, requiring a firm response from Russia. Threats directed at 
Ukraine would completely lack legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian public.”*®®
Nataliya Belitser and Oleg Bodruk, “Krym kak region potentsial’nogo konflikta”, in Zverev et 
al. (eds.), Etnicheskive i reaional'nve konfliktv v Yevrazii: Rossi va. Ukraina. Beiorusslva. p. 95 
Zerkalo Nedeii. 27 May 2000, p. 1
Author’s interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999.
120
Complex Interdependence, inertia and cautious leadership
For most of the Russian elite and general public, who are highly conscious 
of the historical and ethno-cultural bonds linking Ukraine and Belarus to Russia, 
violent means - including threats are a priori excluded with respect to these two 
countries. The - at least partly - shared historical and cultural background offers 
Russian policy-makers an additional instrument not applicable to Russia's rela­
tions with most states, that of identitive appeals for unity. This is a lever that 
may be used very selectively and with caution or risk proving counterproduc­
tive. Economic instruments, thus, form the most potent means for the ad­
vancement of Russian objectives with regard to Belarus and Ukraine, which 
continue to be bound to their larger neighbour by high levels of transactions es­
sential to the operation of their economies.
The scope for the Russian leadership to translate superior economic re­
sources into desired political outcomes has been significantly constrained by a 
number of domestic and external factors. Despite a considerable degree of 
state influence over the activities of Russian energy exporters, which constitute 
major players in Russo-Ukrainian and Russo-Belarusian economic relations, 
the formulation of issue-linkage strategies to be pursued at intergovernmental 
level requires complex bargaining between Russian business leaders and their 
government. A comparable pattern characterises the federal government's at­
tempts to direct the external economic activities of the Russian regions, whose 
input in the country's overall economic relations with Ukraine and Belarus will 
be discussed in the following chapter. Unlike the Soviet Union, today's Russia 
does not have a rigid hierarchy of interests, in which economic resources are 
infinitely expendable in the pursuit of military and political ends. Economic in­
centives (e.g. subsidised exports, debt pardoning or restructuring) can be af­
forded only when there is a high probability of achieving an objective of cardinal 
importance.
It is also difficult for Russian policy-makers to advance demands contradict­
ing the core priorities of the Belarusian and Ukrainian leaderships by threaten­
ing to alter existing economic relations to the disadvantage of either of the two 
countries. Both Belarus and Ukraine have opportunities to apply counter-
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measures with serious implications for Russia’s interests. The positive climate 
prevailing in Russo-Belarusian relations has prevented disagreements from es­
calating into mutual pressure. In relations with Ukraine, the dispute over the 
maintenance costs of the BSF and the alternation of gas arrears, reduced sup­
plies and intensified interception of Russian gas exports to Europe have ex­
posed the limitations to Russia’s ability to use economic pressure even in con­
nection with relatively narrow economic goals. The above features of Russia's 
relations with Belarus and Ukraine approximate an environment of ‘complex 
interdependence', in which government policy-makers’ scope for matching 
means to ends effectively is restricted by the role of non-state actors and a 
blurred distinction between domestic and foreign policies - particularly in the 
economic sphere.”*®®
Russia’s policy has been essentially reactive - both towards Ukraine and Bel­
arus. The initiative for integration between Russia and Belarus came, as we 
have seen, from the Belarusian side. It was followed up because it offered a 
vehicle for the advancement of several objectives favoured in varying degrees 
by different sections of the Russian elite. Belarus has derived substantial mate­
rial rewards, which most of the Russian elite regards as an investment return­
ing irreplaceable political and military benefits in the short term and with the po­
tential to yield important economic advantages in the medium term. Thus, cur­
rent levels of support for the Belarusian economy are likely to be maintained or 
increased somewhat in the foreseeable future. Bringing the Belarusian political 
and economic systems in line with Russian conditions to allow for the imple­
mentation of the ambitious integration agreements remains an elusive objec­
tive. Its attainment is likely to depend less on pressures from the Russian side 
and more on its resolve to abide by a clearly defined economic programme, 
which the integration process would have to comply with.
Russian foreign policy makers would like Ukraine to voluntarily join the Union 
with Belarus, but are reluctant to antagonise the Ukrainian leadership by urging 
it to do so. They have relied on a strategy of consistent reassurance regarding 
Russia's ‘non-imperialist’ intentions and its respect for the neighbouring states' 
sovereignty. In the medium term, it is hoped that this approach may combine
‘Complex interdependence’ is additionally defined by multipie transnational links and com­
munications as well as by virtually insurmountable barriers to the use of military force among 
states involved in this type of relationship. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 
24-30
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with demonstrable achievements of the Union with Belarus in the economic 
sphere to increase the appeal of integration with Russia in the eyes of a new 
Ukrainian leadership/®^ Economic pressures have been employed rather spar­
ingly and with limited economic objectives, notably recovering payment for fuel 
deliveries -  both from Belarus and Ukraine. Success has been rather modest -  
particularly with regard to the more controversial demand of swapping debt for 
equity in Belarusian and Ukrainian state enterprises. Alternative arrangements 
linking enterprises, which will be examined in the next chapter, have somewhat 
reduced the urgency of Russian companies acquiring shares in Belarusian 
firms. By contrast, equity ownership has formed a major priority for Russian 
business seeking to protect and expand its interests in Ukraine. Canadian aca­
demic James Mace has suggested that, as Russian business conglomerates 
acquire stakes in a growing number of Ukraine’s key enterprises, Russia's in­
fluence may rise to the point of substituting for formal integration arrange­
ments.”*®® However, as will be shown in the next chapter, the sale of some of 
Ukraine's largest oil-processing and metallurgical plants, which had been 
avoided until 1999, began not as a result of any change in Russian policy, but 
due to the mounting debts of these enterprises and a corresponding shift in the 
Ukrainian elite's attitude to this question.”*®®
According to a Ukrainian economist, since the restructuring of Ukraine’s 
debt, Russia has been effectively deprived of economic levers in its relations 
with Ukraine.”*®® So long as Russian gas is necessarily exported to the Balkans, 
Central and Western Europe through Ukraine, supplies cannot be withheld - 
even if Ukraine pays nothing. Advisers to the Ukrainian government and Par­
liament dismissed alleged economic pressures from Russia in connection with 
Ukraine’s relations with NATO as a myth deliberately perpetuated by the Ku­
chma administration to extract financial assistance and political support from
Author’s interview with senior official from the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 2 Decem­
ber 1999.
Den' (Kiev), 1 February 2000, p. 1
Dergachev, "Dolgaya doroga inostranykh investitsii v ukrainskuyu ekonomiku", p. 47. The 
plants in question were unable to remain profitable when buying raw materials on the world 
market. The buyers have the obligation to pay of the plants' debt and to supply fuel and other 
raw materials to guarantee increased output. Predictably, there was insufficient interest on the 
part of Western investors.
Author’s interview, Kiev, 28 October 1999.
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the West/®^ Most Russian interviewees thought a more robust line would have 
to be adopted in the event of a Ukrainian application for admission to NATO 
and preferably before that happened. There is no agreement on what such a 
line might consist of, except for categorically ruling out the use of military 
threats directed at Ukraine. Even for hard-line nationalists, the notion of military 
conflict between Russia and Ukraine is all but inconceivable. The utilisation of 
the Yamal to Europe pipeline (crossing Belarus and Poland), which became 
operational in autumn 1999, is expected to somewhat increase the feasibility of 
reducing gas supplies to Ukraine, but not eliminate Russia’s dependence on 
Ukraine as a transit r o u te .E v e n  the proponents of economic pressure in the 
form of reinforced trade barriers doubt that it would lead to the improvement of 
Russo-Ukrainian relations. It would most probably contribute to a further drop in 
standards of living in Ukraine (and, likely, bordering regions in Russia), which 
Kiev would blame on Russia.”*®®
Despite its economic weakness, most interviewees thought that Russia 
would be in a position to extend to Ukraine the kind of economic support it has 
been providing to Belarus, if there were sufficient incentives to do so. For its 
part, Gazprom is unwilling to show the kind of flexibility it has maintained in the 
case of Belarus so long as its grievances against the Ukrainian authorities are 
not redressed, e.g. by the conclusion of debt-for-equity deals. At the same time, 
most Russian respondents saw no point in offering economic incentives to 
Ukraine. Ukraine’s foreign policy orientation was perceived to be inflexible - es­
pecially after Leonid Kuchma’s re-election to the Presidency in November 
1999. It was seen as dictated by the ruling elite’s aspiration to be free from 
Moscow’s tutelage. Besides, the Kuchma administration has striven to project 
the image of Ukraine as a major European power in its own right. Cash credits 
in hard currency were thought to be the only kind of economic support that ap­
peals to the current Ukrainian leadership, but the cost is deemed far too high 
and the rewards uncertain. The domestic weakening of the Kuchma administra­
tion and a cooling of relations with the US and the EU as of the second half of 
2000 (in connection with the scandal regarding the murder of journalist Gon-
^^ '* Ibid.
Author’s Interview with adviser to the State Duma, 25 November 1999 
’*®^ in 1993, Leonid Kuchma addressing the pro-Russian strikers in the Donbass in his capacity 
as PM had blamed the unpopular increases in foodstuff prices on Russia’s raising oil prices by 
900%. Izvestiva. 17 June 1993, p. 1
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dadze), however, appears to have prompted the Ukrainian leadership to recon­
sider the expediency of closer ties to Russia/®'* This appears to have elicited a 
positive Russian response, indicated by PM Kasyanov’s suggestion that Russia 
would be prepared to offer certain concessions (restructuring of Ukraine’s debt) 
to support Ukraine’s policy of ‘living within its means’/®®
In the view of most Russian experts interviewed by the author, the Yeltsin 
administration lacked a clearly formulated strategy in relations with Belarus and 
Ukraine. Whereas the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Cooperation with 
CIS Countries had reportedly prepared such a strategy by 1996, the absence of 
a firm line of decision-making authority in these matters combined with a high 
turnover of negotiators appointed by the President to impair the consistency 
and credibility of Russia’s positions. This weakness was exposed during the 
five-year-long negotiating process on the division and basing arrangements of 
the BSF and also by the negligible progress made in persuading the Belarusian 
leadership to adopt economic reforms. An analytical report by the prestigious, 
non-governmental Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, which was pub­
lished in June 1998, stressed the need for improved coordination and clearer 
division of competences among government departments involved in the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy.”*®® The abolition of the CIS 
Ministry in April 1998 had been conceived as a measure to assist the 
development of consistent policies by strengthening the authority of the Foreign 
Ministry and to promote efficient policy implementation by reducing the 
duplication of functions among government agencies.”*®^
The CIS Ministry was re-established as soon as August 1998, as the CIS De­
partment within the Foreign Ministry lacked the capacity to absorb the functions 
of the defunct ministry.^®® The CIS Ministry was once again abolished and re­
incorporated as a section of the MFA under Putin’s presidency in May 2000. 
Poor co-ordination with the economic ministries and frequent reshuffles in the
194 More details are given in Chapter Four.
Statement made at the CIS Heads of State summit of December 2000. Diplomaticheskv 
Vestnik. January 2000, p. 49
196 «ji^eses of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy: Strategy for Russia in the 21®^  Cen­
tury", Nezavislmava Gazeta. 18 and 19 June 1998, p. 8 (in both issues)
The relevant Presidential decree appeared in Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. May 1998, pp. 6-8 
Boris Pastukhov, then First Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of relations with CIS coun­
tries, was appointed as Minister for Cooperation with CiS Countries. Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. 
October 1998, pp. 5-7
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latter and the Presidential administration deprived the authors of prospective 
strategies of access to the levers necessary to back up any forward-looking ini­
tiatives. Many expectations were placed on the Putin administration, not so 
much to introduce any spectacular changes to what were generally considered 
fundamentally sound policies, but to provide stability, competent leadership and 
economic growth, which could address the problem of sub-optimal effective­
ness in Russia’s dealings with its two neighbours. Indeed, under Putin, intra- 
governmental divisions have become considerably less prominent than was the 
case of the Yeltsin administrations, allowing the Russian side to speak with one 
voice in negotiations with foreign countries most of the time. This has contrib­
uted to the relatively swift conclusion of the negotiations on Ukraine’s debt and 
the regulation of the problem of illicit gas siphoning in 1999-2000. Likewise, the 
governmental stability and consistency of economic policies, which have differ­
entiated the Putin presidency from the previous administration, have increased 
the credibility of Russian demands, prodding the Belarusian side to adopt some 
long-delayed economic reforms. In general, the Putin administration is reported 
to have brought a more business-like approach,' focused on the prompt resolu­
tion of outstanding issues, to relations with Belarus and Ukraine alike. This has 
been particularly remarkable in the integration process with Belarus, which has 
acquired a more pragmatic, results-oriented character.”*®® The Putin administra­
tion has equally shown a drive to give more substance to relations with 
Ukraine, especially in the economic field, which appeared to have almost stag­
nated since the conclusion of the ‘Big treaty’ in 1997. The appointment of for­
mer PM Viktor Chernomyrdin (also former head of Gazprom) as Ambassador to 
Ukraine in May 2001 indicates an intention to further increase impetus in bilat­
eral relations.
Assessment by Aleksandr Boltovlch, Chairman of the National Assembly (upper house of 
the Belarusian Parliament), quoted In Sovetskava Beiorusslva. 8 May 2001, p. 3
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Chapter Three
Integration and disintegration: the results of Russia’s policies
towards Belarus and Ukraine
As shown in Chapter One, Russia’s objectives with regard to Belarus and 
Ukraine have been shaped by very similar motives. The policy instruments em­
ployed by the Russian leadership in relations with Belarus and Ukraine have, 
however, been somewhat differentiated. The Belarusian and Ukrainian leader­
ships’ varying degrees of readiness to conform with Russian expectations have 
been identified as the principal factor accounting for Russia’s more extensive use 
of material incentives with respect to Belarus. This chapter will examine the effec­
tiveness of this differentiated approach in terms of policy outcomes in a range of 
areas identified in bilateral agreements. A detailed analysis of these agreements 
will illustrate differences in the envisaged scope of cooperation between Russia 
and Belarus, on the one hand, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other. It will, thus, 
provide the basis for a comparison of the progress made in the implementation of 
Russo-Belarusian and Russo-Ukrainian agreements. Defence, foreign policy and 
various aspects of bilateral relations in the social and economic spheres will be 
surveyed in order to discern the factors that have enhanced or hindered the reali­
sation of the aims stated in relevant agreements.
The legal framework
The development of the legal framework of Russia’s interaction with Belarus on 
the one hand and with Ukraine on the other cannot be assumed to accurately re­
flect the actual condition of inter-state relations. Still, it offers an indication of the 
different climate prevailing in current relations and of divergent expectations re­
garding their medium and long-term prospects. A series of agreements heralding a 
special relationship between Russia and Belarus had been concluded before the 
launch of the bilateral integration process. These agreements enabled the quick, 
tension-free resolution of issues such as mutual recognition of borders; Russian
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Armed Forces’ use of military facilities on Belarusian territory; the rights of Rus­
sians permanently living in Belarus and those of Belarusian residents of the Rus­
sian Federation; and the division of Soviet debt and assets. In contrast, such ques­
tions continued to seriously complicate Russo-Ukrainian relations, hindering the 
conclusion of bilateral treaties until 1997, and have not yet been wholly settled.'* In 
addition, Russia has concluded more agreements covering narrow functional (non­
politicised) areas of cooperation (e.g. tourism, science, culture and education) with 
Belarus than with any other state within or outside the CIS. The most significant of 
these earlier agreements concerned military cooperation and will be discussed in 
later sections of this chapter.
The start of Russo-Belarusian integration could be identified either with the 
agreement on a customs union of January 1995 and the treaty of ‘Friendship, 
Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation’ of February 1995 or with the treaty ‘On 
the Formation of a Community’ of April 1996.^ Although the customs union agree­
ment and the Friendship treaty provided for the coordination of policies and envis­
aged the creation of a unified economic space, they did so with reference to the 
objectives of CIS-wide agreements. In particular, the provisions of the Friendship 
treaty, aiming at close cooperation but not joint decision-making (integration) in 
many fields, were very similar to those of the ‘Friendship, Partnership and Coop­
eration’ treaty signed by Russia and Ukraine in May 1997.® The Community treaty, 
however, established institutions separate from those of the CIS and declared the 
two signatories’ intention of advancing towards a significantly higher level of inte­
gration than that endorsed by the rest of CIS member-states. This was in line with 
the growing advocacy of ‘variable geometry’ and ‘variable speed integration’ as
 ^ Ukraine continues to claim from Russia a share of assets owned by the Soviet Union abroad. Ne­
gotiations on the division of the Azov Sea and the Kerchen Strait are continuing.
 ^Agreement on Customs Union, Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. October 1995, pp. S I- 
36; Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation, Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. March 
1995, pp. 38-42; Treaty on the Formation of a Community, Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 1996, pp. 
39-41
 ^ Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. July 1997, pp. 35-41
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solutions to divergent political priorities and heterogeneous socio-economic condi­
tions thwarting CIS-wide integration/
The integration treaties
The Russo-Belarusian integration treaties (the treaty ‘On the Formation of a 
Community’ of April 1996; the treaty ‘On the Union of Belarus and Russia’ of April 
1997 and the attached Charter of the Union of May 1997; the treaty ‘On Equal 
Rights of Citizens’ of December 1998; and the treaty ‘On the Formation of a Union 
state’ of December 1999)® were modelled on the example of the European Com­
munity/Union. Officials from both countries interviewed by the author stressed that 
the recent experience of centuries-long common statehood, membership of a sin­
gle economy and a stronger sense of shared ethno-cultural identity gave Russia 
and Belarus an - at least putative - advantage compared to the more heterogene­
ous EC/EU. This was expected to allow the two countries to unify their economies 
and extend joint policy-making to areas such as defence within a shorter time 
frame. The two countries’ negotiating teams, consisting of government and Presi­
dential administration officials who drafted the Community and Union treaties,® 
have had different notions of what economic unification would entail in practice. 
The more optimistic expectations of the Belarusian side were reflected in the goals 
set in the initial stages of the process.^
For a clarification of these concepts, which were borrowed from EU theorists and advanced with 
reference to the CIS by experts from Russia and other CIS countries alike, see the Introductory 
Chapter.
® Treaty on the Formation of a Community of Russia and Belarus, Diplomaticheskv vestnik. May 
1996, pp. 39-41; Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia, Diplomaticheskv vestnik. April 1997, 
pp. 41-43, and Charter of the Union of Russia and Belarus (part of the Union treaty), Bvulleten’ 
Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. September 1997, pp. 68-79; Treaty on Equal Rights of Citizens, 
Diplomaticheskv vestnik. January 1999, pp. 45-46; Treaty on the Formation of a Union State, Bvul­
leten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 2000, pp. 54-73.
® The original draft of the Union-state treaty was prepared by the Union Parliamentary Assembly 
and subsequently sent to the two Presidential administrations for consideration.
 ^The Action Programmes, which are attached to the integration treaties and identify specific 
measures and deadlines for their implementation, are formulated by the supranational Executive/ 
Permanent Committee.
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Thus, the Customs Union agreement (January 1995) set a four-month time 
limit, not only for the removal of customs controls on the common border and the 
elimination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on bilateral trade, but also for the 
unification of all legislation regulating trade with third countries (Art. 2, Pars. 1.1, 
1.2). The Community treaty (April 1996) required the implementation of the four 
freedoms characteristic of a single market (free movement of goods, services, 
capital and labour) by the end of 1997. The same target-date applied to the syn­
chronisation of economic reforms, the harmonisation of economic - including tax - 
legislation and the unification of monetary-credit systems in preparation for the in­
troduction of a common currency (Arts. 4, 7). The social and economic rights of 
citizens of the two states as well as standards of social security provision were to 
be equalised. The treaty prioritised the sectors of energy, transport and informa­
tion, in which a unified economic space was to have begun to take shape by the 
end of 1996 (Art. 5). These priorities are reaffirmed in the “Programme of Actions” 
for the implementation of the Union-state treaty, but the specified deadlines are 
extended taking into account the difficulties experienced in the execution of the 
tasks set by earlier programmes. Thus, the establishment of a unified energy sys­
tem is scheduled for 2001 and the unification of tax and customs legislation for 
2002 and 2004 respectively. Preparations for monetary union are to be completed 
by the end of 2005.®
Like the EC/EU treaties, the Community treaty did not restrict integration to the 
mere removal of economic and legislative barriers to a unified market (negative 
integration), but provided for common policy formulation (positive integration) both 
in the run-up and after the completion of a single economic space. It specified the 
following policy areas: joint guarding of borders; elaboration of common positions 
on defence and issues of international concern; coordination of policies for the de­
velopment of the two countries' industrial and agricultural sectors. Haas, in his 
seminal study of the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the EEC, 
identified the adoption of such ongoing tasks as the ‘expansionist logic’ of integra­
tion. This was intended to ensure that the jurisdiction of supranational institutions
“Programme of Actions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus for the Realisation 
of the Provisions of the Treaty on the Formation of a Union State”, Bvulleten* Mezhdunarodnvkh 
Doaovorov. March 2000, pp. 73-85
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would not be limited to the establishment and the policing of the single market, but 
would spread to an increasing number of related spheres.® Jean Monnet, Robert 
Schuman and their like-minded authors of the model of integration analysed by 
Haas, expected the sector-by-sector approach to gradually convince sceptical na­
tional elites and mass publics of the merits of integration, weaken their attachment 
to the idea of national sovereignty and - at least partly - refocus their loyalties upon 
supranational institutions. Although these expectations have not fully materialised, 
West European integration has indeed expanded from technical and economic 
sectors (‘low politics’) to the politically sensitive domains of justice, defence and 
foreign policy, which are closely identified with state sovereignty (‘high politics’).
The Russo-Belarusian integration treaties have progressively widened the list of 
policy areas subject to common or coordinated decision-making to include military 
policy, combating crime and terrorism (Union Charter, Art. 11), environmental pro­
tection (Charter, Art. 16), external borrowing and labour legislation (Union state 
treaty, Arts. 26, 31). At the same time, a tendency towards the deepening of inte­
gration has been expressed by the move from ‘common principles’ of military pol­
icy, ‘interaction’ with regard to the border protection in the Community treaty and 
from ‘common approaches’ to employment and social policy (Charter) to ‘coordi­
nated’ military and social policies and a common border policy (Union state treaty). 
The Union-state treaty also refers to the creation of a single currency emission 
centre (Art. 22). This deepening and widening of integration is consistent with the 
objective of forming a community with a higher level of integration than that exist­
ing in the EU, which most Russian and Belarusian policy-makers appear to favour 
as the eventual end-point of the integration process.”*® It does not, however, ad­
vance along the hierarchy of sectors from ‘low politics’ to ‘high politics’, for integra­
tion in defence, instead effacing opposition from nationalists defending state sov­
ereignty, has formed the most popular aspect of the process in both countries.”*”* If 
anything, the West European path is reversed, as economic unification has ad­
vanced more slowly than military integration -  primarily because implementation in
9
10
E. B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958, pp. 297-29 
Author's Interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999; Minsk, November 1999. See 
Chapters One and Four for a more detailed presentation of elite preferences in the two countries.
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the latter field has proved less cumbersome. Indeed, a report by Russia’s Institute 
of Strategic Studies and the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy suggests that 
economic integration need not be a precondition for political and military integra­
tion, citing the example of German reunification as evidence that the two may ad­
vance simultaneously or that the latter may successfully precede the former.”*^  
Russo-Belarusian integration seems to be guided by a combination of the models 
provided by the EU and NATO. The latter comes closer to the decision-making 
pattern of the young Community/Union, which is based on intergovernmental insti­
tutions. The integration treaties reveal no intention of creating powerful suprana­
tional bodies with powers comparable to those of the European Commission.
The Community treaty set up two supranational institutions (whose members do 
not act directly on behalf of their national governments but in the name of the 
Community/ Union), the Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Assembly. 
Their competences were clearly subordinated to those of the Supreme Council, 
which "within the limits of Community jurisdiction, considers and decides the most 
important questions regarding the development of the Community, controls and 
directs the activities of its institutions regarding the implementation of (its) deci­
sions” (Community treaty. Art. 9). The Supreme Council initially comprised the 
heads of state, the heads of government, the chairs of national parliaments (two 
for each member-state, as both Russia and Belarus have bicameral legislatures) 
and the chair of the Executive Committee. The Union-state treaty, however, de­
prived the latter of membership in the Supreme State Council (Art. 34, Par. 2). The 
Presidents of the two member-states rotate in the office of Supreme Council Chair. 
Decisions are made by unanimity on the basis of ‘one state, one vote’ ®^ and they 
are immediately valid without the need for enabling national legislation. The Union 
treaty required that national legislation contradicting Union decisions be amended 
to ensure conformity (Art. 19). The Union-state treaty granted Supreme State 
Council decisions the status of decrees or directives (Art. 35, Par. 3).
** Survey data supporting this point is provided in Chapter One (for Russia) and Chapter Four (for 
Belarus).
Nezavislmava Gazeta-Stsenarli. April 1997, p. 2
The chair of the Executive Committee had a consultative vote (Community treaty, Art. 9; Union 
treaty, Art. 20).
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The Executive Committee (constituted by an equal number of representatives 
appointed by the government of each member-state) lacked the legislative powers 
of the ECSC’s High Authority or the European Commission, its role being confined 
to the implementation of decisions made by the Supreme Council. As the Union- 
state treaty gave formal status to the Council of Ministers, which was designated 
as ‘the executive body of the Union state’, t h e  Permanent Committee (as the Ex­
ecutive Committee was renamed) lost its most significant powers to the new insti­
tution. This was the case of the following competences: advising the Supreme 
Council on the creation of new agencies; proposing draft legislation to the Parlia­
ment of the Union State (as the Parliamentary Assembly was renamed); preparing 
the budget of the Union state; issuing directly applicable decrees and directives. 
As a result, the function of Permanent Committee was reduced to coordinating the 
activities of Union state institutions and their interaction with national government 
agencies (Art. 48). Its composition and mode of appointment acquired a more su­
pranational character. The Permanent Committee was to be appointed by the 
Council of Ministers for a four-year mandate and no more than two thirds of its 
members were to be citizens of any one member-state (Art. 49). Somewhat mis­
leadingly, the Council of Ministers is not an entirely intergovernmental body like its 
West European counterpart. It consists of the heads of government, the foreign 
ministers, the economics and finance ministers, the State Secretary (a new supra­
national post) and the heads of various Union-state agencies (Art. 44, Par. 2). It 
has been the meeting on a regular basis, on average every two months.
The Parliamentary Assembly was originally made up of an equal number of 
deputies delegated by the national legislatures.^® The Union state treaty creates a 
bicameral parliament divided into the Chamber of the Union (upper house) and the 
Chamber of Representatives (lower house). The upper house maintains the com­
position and mode of selection of the former Parliamentary Assembly. The lower 
house is to be directly elected every four years by the citizens of the two member- 
states and to contain 75 deputies from Russia and 28 from Belarus, reflecting the
‘Ispolnitelny organ’ has the meaning of ‘institution with duties of implementation’ rather than ‘de­
cision-making institution’, which the word ‘executive’ might suggest. Its decisions may be invali­
dated by the Supreme State Council (Art, 46, Par. 3).
Each state had 36 representatives (Union treaty, Art. 22).
1 3 3
unequal size of the two countries’ populations (Art. 39). The Community treaty 
granted the Parliamentary Assembly the right to initiate legislation to be adopted 
either by national governments or by the Supreme Council (Art. 10).”*® According to 
the Union treaty, it could pass normative acts with the status of ‘legislative recom­
mendations’ to assist the harmonisation of national legislations and had to be con­
sulted regarding the Union budget and international agreements concluded in the 
name of the Union (Art. 23). Making use of these powers, the Assembly assumed 
the role of a ‘motor of integration’ by working closely with the supranational Execu­
tive Committee to exert pressure on national administrations with a view to the 
faster implementation of agreed measures and the extension of Union compe­
tences and resources.The introduction of Union citizenship (Union treaty), equal 
rights for citizens (treaty of December 1998) and the Union-state treaty itself origi­
nated from Parliamentary Assembly initiatives.”*® The Assembly’s leadership has 
consistently campaigned for faster progress towards further integration and for the 
increase of Union resources.”*® The Union state treaty further strengthened the 
Parliament by enabling it to pass immediately valid legislation, adopt the budget, 
and ratify international agreements on behalf of the Union state (Art. 40). Draft 
laws have to be approved by the lower house before they are considered by the 
Chamber of the Union. A simple majority is required in both houses with the pro­
viso that no more than a quarter of the total number of deputies from both houses 
may vote against a decision, if it is to be valid. Conciliation procedures are fore­
seen in case of disagreement between the two houses or between the Parliament 
and the Chair of the Supreme State Council, who may veto acts passed by the 
Parliament (Art. 43).
The Union state treaty extends this right to the Chamber of the Union and to groups of more than 
20 deputies from the Chamber of Representatives (Art. 43, Par. 1).
The term ‘motor of Integration’ was coined by neofunctlonaiist theorists to describe the contribu­
tion of EC supranational institutions, it was used by President Lukashenko to praise the work of the 
Parliamentary Assembly. Pravda 5. 31 July 1998, p. 1 
Speech by A. Kozyr' (Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly) published in informat- 
sionnv Bvulleten’ Pariamentskoao Sobraniva. vol. 2, July 1999, p. 35 
For example, in his address to the 18^ '’ session of the Parliamentary Assembly (Grodno, June 
2001), its Chairman Gennady Seleznyov accused the Union government (Council of Ministers) of 
"sabotaging the implementation of the Union budget for 2001”, expressing doubts that Union pro-
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The Union state treaty also establishes an Accounts Chamber and a Court. 
Both are supranational bodies whose members are appointed by the Parliament 
(on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers in the case of the former and 
on that of the Supreme State Council in the case of the latter) and are required to 
act independently of national governments In the interests of the Union state (Art. 
52, Par. 3; Art. 55, Par. 5). The Accounts Chamber oversees the implementation 
of the budget and proposes measures for maximising the efficient use of the Union 
state's resources (Art. 56). The creation of a supranational Court is especially sig­
nificant, as hitherto there were no sanctions in case of member-states’ non­
implementation of treaty provisions. National governments and Union state institu­
tions may bring cases to the Court concerning any dispute within the jurisdiction of 
the Union state. The Court’s decisions are to be directly binding (Art. 54). The for­
mation of the Union state Parliament, the Court and the Accounts Chamber (the 
Parliament is to formally appoint the members of the Court and confirm those of 
the Accounts Chamber) has not occurred immediately after the ratification of the 
treaty due to delays in the adoption of the electoral law that is to apply to the elec­
tion to the lower house. Elections to the Union Parliament are to be held in autumn 
2002.
The Union-state treaty does not establish a new state, as its name would sug­
gest. Like its predecessors of April 1996 and 1997, it acknowledges that Russia 
and Belarus remain fully sovereign states preserving their respective constitutions 
and their independent representation in international organisations. Nevertheless, 
it requires that the Parliament of the Union state drafts a Constitutional Act, whose 
approval would be subject to referenda in the two member-states. If the draft is 
approved, the national constitutions of Russia and Belarus would have to be 
amended accordingly (Art. 62). The Union-state treaty -  for the first time -  speci­
fies a list of policy areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of Union state institutions 
and a list of spheres where jurisdiction is shared between Union state bodies and 
national governments (Art. 17-18). The former list comprises measures aimed at 
the creation of a unified legal and economic space, joint military procurement, and 
issues related to regional troops (to be discussed in the following section). In these 
policy areas, Union state institutions may pass immediately valid laws and de­
grammes would be sufficiently financed, izvestiva. 6 June 2001, p. 5
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créés, whereas in the spheres of shared jurisdiction, national legislation is required 
for the implementation of decisions reached at Union-state level (Art.59).
Strategic partnership with Ukraine
The drafting of a comprehensive treaty regulating bilateral relations had been 
discussed in numerous rounds of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian of­
ficials since 1992. These negotiations were primarily consumed with pressing is­
sues such as the fate of the nuclear weapons left on Ukrainian territory, Ukraine’s 
mounting energy debt, and the division of Soviet assets- most notably the Black 
Sea Fleet (BSF).^° The conclusion of the January 1994 Trilateral Agreement^^ and 
Ukraine’s accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state in Oc­
tober 1994 eliminated nuclear weapons as an issue in Russo-Ukrainian relations. 
All the remaining issues, however, needed to be resolved to allow for the conclu­
sion of a comprehensive bilateral treaty. Indeed, the treaty ‘On Friendship, Part­
nership and Cooperation’ was signed three days after the agreements resolving 
the division of the BSF as well as the relevant basing and financial arrangements 
in May 1997.^^ The treaty itself makes no reference to either the BSF or Ukraine’s 
debt, though it could be considered as part of a package also comprising the BSF 
agreements, which will be discussed in a subsequent section.^®
The ‘Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation’ treaty has been commonly re­
ferred to as the ‘Big Treaty’ because its authors presented it as the foundation of a 
qualitatively new stage in bilateral relations, which would be rid of the major dis­
putes and sources of mutual mistrust that had hitherto stifled the development of 
Russo-Ukrainian cooperation. Art. 1 proclaims that bilateral relations are to be
Russia had initially wished to maintain the BSF under CIS command, whereas Ukraine sought to 
incorporate it in its newly established national Armed Forces. The preliminary agreement that the 
Fleet was to be divided between the two states was reached in August 1992.
The Trilateral Agreement signed by Ukraine, Russia and the United States provided that all nu­
clear weapons left in Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union were to be either transferred 
to Russia or dismantled within 10 months.
The agreements were signed on 28^ '’ and the treaty on 31st May 1997.
According to Russian MFA, the conclusion of the treaty "became possible after the regulation of 
the problems relating to the BSF”. Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. July 1997, p. 35
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based on “mutual respect and trust, strategic partnership and cooperation”. Ar­
guably, the most important aspect of the treaty were its confidence-building 
clauses. Art. 2, which was included on the insistence of the Ukrainian side, affirms 
the mutual recognition of existing borders, thereby precluding Russian territorial 
claims to the Crimea or Sevastopol in particular.^'^ As explained In the previous 
chapter, it was this provision that aroused so much controversy in Russia over the 
treaty's ratification. Without the prior or simultaneous formal settlement of the 
BSF's basing rights in Sevastopol, the basic treaty would have been completely 
unacceptable even to moderate nationalists, making its ratification by the Russian 
Parliament all but impossible. Art. 3 contains general commitments to international 
norms and is worded in the same way as Art. 1 of the Russo-Belarusian Friend­
ship treaty of 1995 -  with the notable insertion of the clarification that the “unac­
ceptability offeree or threat of force” includes “economic and other means of pres­
sure”.
In return, Art. 6 is of special significance to the Russian side, which has inter­
preted it as a safeguard against Ukrainian accession to NATO. It states that each 
of the signatory parties is to "refrain from participation in or support of any activities 
directed against the other” and “assumes the obligation not to conclude with third 
countries any treaties directed against the other party”. Also, each of the two 
states undertakes “not to allow its territory to be used to the detriment of the other 
party’s security”.^ ® Compared to the Friendship treaty with Belarus, the Russo- 
Ukrainian treaty contains extended guarantees of equal rights for ethnic and lin­
guistic minorities, forbidding discrimination and attempts at assimilation (Arts. 10- 
12). It does not require Ukraine to introduce legislation allowing for dual citizen­
ship, as the Russian side had demanded during the earlier stages of the negotia­
tions.^® Moreover, it states that possibilities for the learning of the Russian lan-
This article was included in addition to the more general commitments to territorial integrity and 
Inviolability of borders contained in Art. 3.
A very similar clause is contained in Russia’s Friendship treaty with Belarus (Art. 5), which, how­
ever, also provides for the coordination of military policies.
The preparation of a bilateral agreement on dual citizenship was announced in the Communiqué 
issued after the 17 June 1993 meeting of Presidents Kravchuk and Yeltsin in Moscow. The docu­
ment appeared in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations, Rossilsko-Ukrainskiye Otnosheniva 1990-1997 aa.: Sbornik Dokumentov.
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guage are to be equal to those for learning Ukrainian in the Russian Federation 
(Art. 12) -  effectively permitting the reduction of Russophone educational institu­
tions in Ukraine. Russian-language television and radio broadcasting is similarly to 
be guaranteed on an equal basis to Ukrainian-language programmes in Russia 
(Art. 24). The 'Big treaty' is not an integration treaty in the sense that it does not 
establish supranational institutions nor provide for common policy-making. The 
envisaged relations of strategic partnership are to materialise through regular con­
sultations and close cooperation over a wide range of issues. Mikhail Pashkov and 
Valery Chaly of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies propose a 
compelling understanding of strategic partnership:
“Strategic partnership, as a feature of bilateral relations, evidently presumes their spe­
cial, qualitatively higher level compared to that of traditional relations between two 
states. Strategic partnership consists of a higher level of trade and economic coopera­
tion, convergence of geopolitical interests, mutual support in foreign policy, positive 
dynamics and effectiveness of contacts of state-political, financial-industrial, military, 
scientific and cultural elites. It implies the reliability of mechanisms for the resolution of 
disputed issues, and, finally, a spirit of trust and mutual understanding.”^ ^
In line with this multifaceted objective, the treaty covers consultations on foreign 
policy and provides for the coordination of positions ‘where necessary’ (Arts. 5,16) 
-  as opposed to the provision of the Russo-Belarusian Friendship treaty (Art. 2) 
that the parties “will coordinate their foreign policy activities”.^ ® Likewise, Russia 
and Ukraine are to ‘develop their relations’ in the military and military-technical 
spheres, customs issues, export and migration controls (Art. 8), but without going 
as far as Russia’s treaty with Belarus, which referred to the ‘coordination of activi­
ties In the military sphere’ (Art. 5) and an open-border regime (Art. 4). In the eco­
nomic field, Russia and Ukraine recognise ‘the necessity of the gradual formation 
and development of a common economic space by establishing conditions for the 
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour’. To this end, they are to
Moscow, 1998, p. 120 
Zerkalo Nedeli. 15 April 2000, p. 2
Consultations between the two Foreign Ministries have been based on annual plans agreed to­
wards the end of the previous year.
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strive towards the ‘compatibility of economic reform strategies, the deepening of 
economic integration and the harmonisation of economic legislation’. Reflecting 
the preoccupations of the Ukrainian side, the treaty states that the parties are to 
‘refrain from actions that could harm each other economically’ (Art. 13). Russian 
concerns are mirrored in the provisions on the protection of state property and in­
vestments made by enterprises of the each of the parties on the territory of the 
other (Arts. 15, 19).^ ® Other provisions, closely resembling those of the Russo- 
Belarusian Friendship treaty, relate to cooperation in the spheres of energy, trans­
port, environment, health, social security, education and culture.
According to an expert of the Institute of Europe (Russian Academy of Sci­
ences), the ‘Big treaty’ undermines its declared objectives because its provisions 
are imprecise to the point of being virtually impossible to implement.®® Indeed, al­
most half of the provisions on cooperation refer to further agreements to be con­
cluded in the future. The treaty ‘On Economic Cooperation for the years 1998- 
2007’ and the attached Programme, which were signed in February 1998, attempt 
to remedy this problem.®’’ These documents reveal more modest ambitions than 
those pertaining to Russo-Belarusian relations. They reaffirm the intention to 
gradually create a common economic space, but their goals clearly fall short of in­
tegration on the example of the Russo-Belarusian Union or the ‘Customs Union of 
the Five’. A degree of coordination in economic reforms is to be achieved by har­
monising the principles of taxation In bilateral trade and national legislation regulat­
ing transnational financial-industrial groups (FIGs). Convergence is to occur in 
transport rates and in national privatisation programmes, which are to optimise 
conditions for the participation of enterprises from the other party. The Russian 
Central Bank and the National Bank of Ukraine are to exchange Information on a 
regular basis (Section III of the Programme).
The Russo-Belarusian Friendship treaty contains no comparable provisions.
Author’s interview, Moscow, 21 June 1999
Treaty and Programme on Economic Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine 
for the years 1998-2007, Diolomaticheskv Vestnik. April 1998, pp. 37-43. These were based on the 
framework document “Basic Directions of Long-term Economic and Scientific-Technical Coopera­
tion” of 1997. Rossiisko-Ukrainskive Otnosheniya 1990-1997 aa.. pp. 333-335
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The two states are to coordinate their approaches to the long-term restructuring 
of their industrial sectors. They declare the intention to develop joint production 
and establish transnational enterprises to boost investment and competitiveness in 
priority industrial sectors, namely the missile, space and aeronautical industries, 
shipbuilding, agricultural machinery construction, the energy complex, and the light 
and food-processing industries. The reduction of reliance on imports from third 
countries is another stated objective. Joint research is to be undertaken in the 
aforementioned areas as well as other technological sectors such as metallurgy, 
the chemical industry and nuclear power generation. The Programme provides for 
intergovernmental measures to direct investment to these sectors and defend the 
“common market-space against illicit competition” (Section IV). Efforts in the field 
of public health are to be coordinated and national legislation is to be amended to 
resolve problems resulting from diverging provisions on social security and em­
ployment (Section V). Measures for the promotion of bilateral trade include the uni­
fication of customs regulations, the approximation of tariffs and the gradual elimi­
nation of non-tariff barriers. The Programme states that joint controls are to be car­
ried out at border crossings and for the registration of energy supplies. It refers to 
the reduction of transport rates, the convergence of relevant legislation and com­
mon programmes for the modernisation of transport infrastructure (Section VI). Fi­
nally, it creates a Coordination Council, divided in national sections and functional 
working groups, to assist government agencies in the implementation of the treaty 
and propose further agreements to the Joint Russo-Ukrainian Commission on Co­
operation.®^
The Commission, whose function has been to prepare intergovernmental negotiations and over­
see the implementation of bilateral agreements, was originally formed in January. It has been led 
by the two countries’ heads of government and composed by an equal number of appointees of 
each of the two governments. The relevant agreement was published in Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Defence and foreign policy
The Russia-Beiarus Union: more than an alliance
Close cooperation between Russia and Belarus in the military sphere began be­
fore the launch of bilateral integration. Between mid-1992 and 1995, the two coun­
tries concluded a multitude of agreements regarding the transfer of strategic 
weapons and the temporary basing of troops remaining on Belarusian territory af­
ter the dissolution of the USSR,®® the demobilisation of Soviet forces formerly sta­
tioned in Eastern Europe, and the continuation of inter-enterprise deliveries be­
tween their military-industrial complexes (MICs).®"^  In January 1995, the agree­
ments on Russia’s rent- and tax-free use of the Baranovichi missile-warning sta­
tion and the Vileika communications facility for a minimum of 25 years suggested 
the formation of a bilateral alliance with a higher level of integration than that im­
plied by the CIS Collective Security treaty.®® The Baranovichi installation hosts the 
Central CIS air-defence administration and Vileika constitutes the principal radio 
control centre for Russia’s Navy -  including nuclear submarines.®® In 2000, the 
early-warning missile station ‘Volga’ became operational on the Baranovichi site. 
In compliance with the treaty of February 1995 ‘On Joint Efforts in the Guarding of 
the state border of the Republic of Belarus’, since the removal of controls on the 
Russo-Belarusian border in June 1995, the borders of Belarus with Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia have been jointly patrolled by Russian and Belarusian border 
troops. A Border Control Committee was established in April 1997 to organise
of the Russian Federation, Rossiisko-Ukrainskive Otnosheniva 1990-1997 aa.. pp. 114-116
The withdrawal of strategic forces -  including nuclear weapons - from Belarus was completed in 
November 1996.
Deliveries were to be exempted from customs duties and licensing procedures. See agreement 
“On Production and Scientific-Technical Cooperation among industrial Enterprises of the Defence 
Sector” (May 1994) in Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. January 1995, pp. 63-56.
The agreements about the military installations of Vileika and Baranovichi were published in 
Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. November 1996, pp. 48-56. These installations do not 
have the legal status of military bases.
Press service of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia, Soyuz Belarus! 
i Rossi I: 100 voprosov i otvetov. Moscow: Klub “Realisty”, 1999, p. 23
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Border Troops activities and assist the formulation of a Union border policy.®  ^A 
permanent Union Committee for Security Affairs made up of officials from various 
national security services was created in late 1997. It has been responsible for 
preparing proposals and ensuring the implementation of decisions made at inter- 
ministerial level in a broad range of security-related issues such as combating ter­
rorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.®® The Russian Foreign Intelligence 
Service has been assisting the Beiarusian KGB with the intelligence gathering and 
officer training.®®
In April 1996, the two countries’ air-defence forces began joint alert duty cover­
ing the air-space of Belarus as well as that of western Russia. In December 1997, 
the treaty ‘On Military Cooperation’ formalised the military alliance of Russia and 
Belarus.'’® The Russian and Belarusian Ministries of Defence (MoDs) have been 
cooperating on a daily basis to achieve full convergence in operational and doc­
trinal matters alike. Joint collegial sessions began in 1998 with the function of de­
signing a common defence policy, an integrated armed forces structure and 
weapons procurement programme.In addition to multilateral exercises organised 
with the participation of member-states of the CIS Collective Security treaty, 
Russia and Belarus have regularly held bilateral exercises. Large-scale strategic 
exercises have been conducted annually beginning with the ‘Redoubt 96’ exer­
cises. Joint air-force exercises took place in the Tula oblast’ in March 1997 and in 
the Moscow military district a year later.'’® June 1999 saw the most extensive stra-
Supreme Council Decision no. 6 (2 April 1997) and Executive Committee Regulation “On the 
Border Control Committee of the Union of Belarus and Russia” (23 July 1997), in Basic Documents 
of the Union of Belarus and Russia. Moscow: Administration of the Executive Committee of the 
Union of Belarus and Russia, 1998, pp. 221-228 
See relevant Executive Committee Regulations In Basic Documents of the Union of Belarus and 
Russia, pp. 231-239; Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 2000, pp. 46-52 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 11 November 2000, p. 5
See statement by then Belarusian MoD Aleksandr Chumakov in Krasnava Zvezda. 23 December 
1997, p. 1
Basic Documents of the Union of Belarus and Russia, pp. 262-268 
Air-defence exercises within the framework of the Collective Security treaty have been con­
ducted annually since February 1995. The most extensive ones were carried out throughout the 
area covered by the treaty’s members in spring 1999. See Krasnava Zvezda. 24 April 1999, p. 1 
Kommersant’-Dailv. 13 March 1997, p. 4; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 17 April 1998, p. 5
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tegic exercises performed by Russia’s Armed Forces since their establishment in 
1992. The ‘West 99’ exercises, which involved all services from five Russian mili­
tary districts (Leningrad, Moscow, Volga, Urals, North Caucasus) and which were 
jointly planned and directed by Russian and Belarusian officers, took into account 
the experience of NATO air-strikes on Yugoslavia in simulating the repulsion of a 
similar campaign against Belarus and Russia.'’'’ Belarusian air force and air- 
defence units participated in the second phases of the exercises, which were 
partly conducted on the territory of Belarus.'’® Since 1998, Belarusian officers have 
been trained in Russian military academies on the same programmes as their 
Russian colleagues -  a privilege which is not extended to officers from other 
member-states of the CIS Collective Security treaty or from any other foreign 
state.'’® The ‘Concept of the Common Defence Policy of Belarus and Russia’ was 
adopted in 1998, and the ‘Security Concept of the Union of Russia and Belarus’ 
along with the ‘Concept of the Union’s Border Policy’ followed in spring 1999. The 
‘Programme of Actions’ attached to the Union-state treaty also provides for a 
common military doctrine.
Military integration moved forward in 1999, when eleven agreements were 
signed covering the joint use of military facilities, officer training, procurement, ex­
change of intelligence, and planning. A common procurement programme was 
formulated for the first time in spring 2000. In the words of then Belarusian De­
fence Minister Aleksandr Chumakov, “integration has been developing much faster 
in the military sphere than in other fields”.'’  ^ Following President Putin’s visit to 
Minsk In April 2000, it was announced that a regional army group, uniting the 
whole of the Belarusian Armed Forces with the Moscow military district, would be 
created in line with Art. 17 of the Union-state treaty. The formation of the regional 
group has its origins in the agreement of 16 October 1998 “On the Joint Use of 
Military Infrastructure Objects”, which Included all kinds of installations (e.g. com­
mand and communications centres, aerodromes, air-defence facilities, bases and
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 June 1999, p. 2; Krasnava Zvezda. 23 June 1999, p.1 
Krasnava Zvezda. 25 June 1999, p. 1
Pariiamentary Assembly Press Service, Sovuz Belarusi i Rossii. p. 23. 61 Beiarusian officers 
attended Russian military academies In 1998. This figure had risen to 103 by 2000.See The Russia 
Journal. May 3-9 1999, and Nezavisimava Gazeta. 19 April 2000, p. 1 
Rossiiskava Gazeta/Ekonomicheskv Sovuz. 24 October 2000, p. 1
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depots) in the two countries’ border regions. The modernisation of these facilities 
was to be financed in common - from the national budgets and/or from the Union 
budget - on the basis of separate agreements. Russian Armed Forces will not be 
permanently stationed in Belarus, as, according to the November 1999 review of 
the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the republic undertook the obligation 
not to increase existing force levels. The force of 300,000servicemen (from the two 
countries’ armies, border and internal troops) is to be deployed on Belarusian terri­
tory only in the event of an external threat to the country’s security. In the mean­
time, its troops are to remain under national command structures.'’® In accordance 
with the Belarusian constitution, the country’s Armed Forces are not to serve out­
side Its borders nor are nuclear weapons to be returned to its territory. Bilateral 
command-and-staff exercises, which focused on practical questions related to op­
eration of the regional force, were conducted in October 2000.'’®
The Russian and Belarusian Foreign Ministries concluded an agreement ‘On 
Cooperation and Coordination’ in January 1995.®° Since then, they have been ex­
changing information and formulating common positions both on fundamental 
questions relating to the development of the European and global systems of in­
ternational relations and on particular temporary problems. As President Luka­
shenko has said, “the positions of Russia and Belarus coincide completely”.®^ Both 
countries have been advocating the development of a European security architec­
ture centred around the OSCE, firmly opposing the current NATO-centric system 
and any expansion of the Alliance to the East. They have been arguing against a 
world order dominated by a single superpower and the trend towards interference 
in states’ domestic affairs on humanitarian grounds, categorically condemning 
NATO’s use of force against Iraq (in 1998) and Yugoslavia without sanction from 
the UN Security Council as aggression. Russia and Belarus have also agreed to 
closely coordinate their relations with the EU, NATO, the US and other major 
states. Belarusian diplomacy, especially as expressed in Lukashenko’s public 
statements, has had a stronger anti-Western slant than Russian official reactions.
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 18 April 2000, p. 1, and 19 April 2000, p. 1 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta/Ekonomicheskv Sovuz. 24 October 2000, p. 1
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Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Doaovorov. August 1995, pp. 33-35
Interview with Yegveny Kiselyov, programme Itogi’ on the Russian television channel NTV, 28
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Nevertheless, Belarus did not follow Russia’s example In recalling its ambassa­
dors from London and Washington in protest against the bombing of Iraq by British 
and US forces in December 1998. Though Belarus did suspend its participation in 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme at the same time as Russia 
(March 1999) in response to the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia, it re­
turned to the PfP in August 1999 -  half a year before the ‘thawing’ of Russia’s 
relations with NATO.
In addition, Russian and Belarusian delegations have consistently supported 
each other’s initiatives and positions in the UN and the OSCE. The Belarusian 
leadership expressed wholehearted support for Russia’s second Chechnya cam­
paign. In turn, Russian diplomacy has sought to remedy the negative image of the 
Belarusian political system prevailing among Western policy-makers. In autumn 
1999, Russia’s Commissioner for Human Rights Oleg Mironov presented a report, 
which asserted that human rights were adequately protected in Belarus and dis­
puted the objectivity of assessments made by international organisations and 
Western governments. Russian diplomacy has (on the grounds of non-interference 
in Belarusian domestic matters) consistently resisted calls from Western govern­
ments and international institutions (e.g. EU, Council of Europe) to join their efforts 
to pressure the Belarusian authorities to conform to international standards of de­
mocratic governance. The Russian MFA criticised the OSCE’s negative assess­
ment of the October 2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus on the grounds that it 
applied excessively strict standards (the EU observers expressed a more positive 
view of the electoral process) and ignored progress achieved towards démocrati­
sation and compliance with the demands of international organisations.®^ Russian 
officials have sought to convince the EU and the Council of Europe to end the dip­
lomatic isolation of Belarus.®®
November 1999.
Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 18 October 2000
Following the referendum of November 1996, used by President Lukashenko to weaken the par­
iiamentary opposition, increase presidential powers and extend his mandate until July 2001, the 
Council of Europe suspended negotiations on the admission of Belarus as a full member in Janu­
ary 1997. Eight months later, the EU suspended the implementation of the Partnership and Coop­
eration Agreement signed in 1994 as well as all assistance programmes involving the participation 
of the Belarusian state authorities.
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The two countries have been coordinating their efforts in negotiations for acces­
sion to the World Trade Organisation. They have equally been advancing common 
positions within the CIS and the Customs Union of the Five. In 1998 and again in 
2000, the two MFAs adopted a “Programme of Coordinated Actions in the Field of 
Foreign Policy” detailing all aspects of their interaction. The first joint session of 
the two MFAs was held in February 2000. In accordance with the Programme 
documents, Belarusian diplomats receive higher training at the Diplomatic Acad­
emy of the Russian MFA and the Moscow State Institute of International Rela­
tions.®'’ Russian embassies and consulates are to assist Belarusian citizens in 
countries, where Belarus does not have representation, and Belarusian delega­
tions are to be accommodated within Russian embassies in several countries.®®
The problematic Russo-Ukrainian ‘strategic partnership’
Russian and Ukrainian diplomatic positions on major international issues have 
tended to be compatible, but not identical. Joint declarations have highlighted 
common perspectives regarding the need to strengthen the OSCE, recognition of 
the UN Security Council as the only source of legitimacy for the use of military 
force in the resolution of conflicts, or even the desirability of a multipolar world or­
der.®® Such general statements have been rather commonplace in Russian diplo­
matic relations with many states that could barely be described as strategic part­
ners. Moreover, what is omitted from Russo-Ukrainian statements testifies to dis­
agreements on fundamental issues. For example, the "Joint Declaration on the 
Further Development of Equal Partnership and Cooperation within the Framework 
of the CIS” refers to the minimum-common-denominator objective of gradually es­
tablishing a common economic space, but not to broader CIS-wide integration as 
supported by Russia and Belarus.®  ^ Different emphases indicative of divergent
Art. 17 of the agreement “On Cooperation and Coordination” of January 1995, Bvulleten’ 
Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. August 1995, p. 35 
"Programme of Coordinated Actions in the Field of Foreign Policy", Diolomaticheskv Vestnik. 
March 2000, p. 26
See Russo-Ukrainian Declaration of 31 May 1997, Dioiomaticheshv Vestnik. July 1997, p. 42; 
Presidents’ Declaration of 27 February 1998, Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. April 1998, p. 36 
The declaration was issued in February 1998, Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. April 1998, pp. 36-37
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strategic priorities distinguish the respective stances of Russia and Ukraine on the 
key questions of NATO expansion and the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Chechnya. 
Like Russia, Ukraine initially cautioned that NATO enlargement was likely to rein­
force dividing lines in Europe, but did not describe It as a potential threat to its own 
security. Instead, it defended the right of Central European states to make their 
own choices about their security.®® President Kuchma later recognised the Alliance 
as “a guarantor of democracy, the most important pillar of security in the Euro- 
Atlantic area”.®® Ukrainian diplomacy was critical of NATO’s campaign against 
Yugoslavia, advocating the observance of the international legal principle of state 
sovereignty and UN procedures. It did not, however, speak of ‘aggression’ or sus­
pend cooperation with the Alliance. The Ukrainian leadership endorsed the Rus­
sian position of treating Chechnya as a domestic matter. It acknowledged the right 
of the Russian Federation to defend its territorial integrity, but expressed concern 
over the tactics employed by the Russian military and their potential conse­
quences for the civilian population. In some cases, Ukrainian diplomacy has di­
rectly opposed Russian positions, most notably regarding efforts to increase 
strengthen the powers of CIS institutions and continued Russian military presence 
in the form of peacekeeping forces in the CIS.®®
In 1998, Russia and Ukraine agreed to hold "constant consultations concerning 
the two countries’ approaches to relations with NATO”.®^ Formally, Russian and 
Ukrainian relations with NATO, like those with the EU, appear very similar.®  ^Both 
the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the Ukraine-NATO Charter provide for politi-
See interview by Boris Tarasyuk (then First Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine) in Transition. 28 
July 1995, p. 19
Statement by President Kuchma in NATO Vestnik: NATO 1949-1999 (Russian edition of NATO 
Review), Jubilee issue, 1999, p. 49. The NATO-Ukraine Charter, which was signed In Madrid in 
July 1997, notes the Alliance’s “positive role In maintaining peace and stability in Europe and in 
promoting greater confidence and transparency In the Euro-Atlantic area”. It was published In 
NATO Review, vol. 45, no. 4, July-August 1997 www.nato.in1/docu/baslctxt/ukrchrt.htm
Ukraine fully supported Georgia’s demand that Russian forces leave Its territory. Kommersant - 
Dallv. 14 May 1997, p. 5 
Presidents’ Declaration of 27 February 1998, Diolomaticheskv Vestnik. April 1998, p. 36 
Both countries’ relations with the EU are regulated by Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. 
Ukraine’s PCA was concluded In May 1994 and came Into force in March 1998. The EU-Russla 
PCA was signed In July 1995 and entered Into force in December 1997.
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cal and military consultations in the Permanent Joint Council (Russia-NATO) and 
the Ukraine-NATO Commission on issues such as peacekeeping, non-proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction, conversion of defence industries, defence-related 
environmental issues, and civil emergency preparedness.®® The “Charter on a Dis­
tinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine", however, goes further in cover­
ing cooperation in armaments production, military training (with special reference 
to PfP exercises on Ukrainian territory), and defence ties between Ukraine and 
neighbouring NATO member-states -  including NATO support for the Polish- 
U krai ni an peacekeeping battalion.®'’ Ukraine’s apparently flourishing relations with 
NATO in conjunction with its aloofness from CIS military cooperation seem to have 
given rise to considerable scepticism among the Russian political elite regarding 
the sincerity of the Ukrainian leadership’s commitment to the so-called strategic 
partnership. According to a survey of the Russian foreign policy community con­
ducted by the Russian Public Policy Centre Foundation in early 2000, 84% of re­
spondents were highly critical of Ukraine’s policy towards Russia.®® 30% described 
bilateral relations as unstable, 29% as “declarative cooperation", and 26% saw 
stagnation as their main feature. The reasons cited by the members of the Rus­
sian elite were the deepening of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO (84%), the 
problems surrounding the BSF and Sevastopol (84%), Ukraine’s insistence on the 
demarcation of the common border (79%)®®, the situation of Ukraine’s Russo-
The Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed in Paris In May 1997. It appeared In NATO Review, 
vol. 45, no. 4, July-August 1997 and is available at www.nato.Int/docu/basictxt/fndaot-a.htm 
The Polish-Ukrainlan battalion was established following a bilateral agreement concluded In 
Warsaw In November 1997. For a detailed analysis of the Charter, see Olga Alexandrova, “The 
NATO-Ukraine Charter: Kiev’s Euro-Atlantic Integration", Aussenpolltik. no. IV, 1997, pp. 325-334 
The survey was based on a sample of 100 Russian government officials, parliamentarians, re­
gional officials, business people and academic experts. 38% of respondents described Ukrainian 
policy as driven by “a desire to Improve Its situation at Russia’s expense", 36% saw It as “a policy 
of double standards" and 10% as “evidently unfriendly". The full results of the survey were pub­
lished in V. Chaly and M. Pashkov, "Ukraine’s International Image: The View from Russia”, Na­
tional Security and Defence (Kiev), no. 3, March 2000, electronic version at www.uceps.com.ua/ 
ena/pu blications.html
Russia seeks to avoid this on the grounds of cost and also because of concern that it may lead 
to the creation of a rigid border regime. For Ukrainian officials, the demarcation of the border Is a 
matter of state sovereignty and also a means of convincing the EU and their Central European
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phone population (77%), Ukraine’s gas debt (71%), its limited participation in the 
CIS (57%), the Ukrainian leadership’s inconsistent foreign policy course (55%), 
and its negative stance on the issue of membership of the Russia-Beiarus Union 
(50%). A series of elite polls conducted by the Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Con­
version and Conflict Resolution Studies during 1997 and 1998 also showed that 
the Ukraine’s foreign policy community assessed relations with Russia as one of 
the failures of Ukrainian diplomacy.®^
The Russian political and military elite has been watching Ukraine’s active par­
ticipation in the PfP with some anxiety. The mere frequency of Ukraine’s hosting 
NATO forces on its territory caused Russian concern.®® This was amplified by the 
content of the ‘Sea Breeze’ exercises, which took place in Crimea in August- 
September 1997. Russian MoD Igor Sergeyev, in a visit to Ukraine at the time of 
the exercises, expressed disapproval of NATO forces’ presence so close to the 
Russian BSF and Russia’s very borders.®® The initial scenario for these exercises 
involved the suppression of an armed separatist movement supported by a 
neighbouring state, which suggested that NATO and Ukraine had contingency 
plans for military intervention on the part of the Alliance in an uprising of Crimea’s 
Russophone population.^® After a demarche from the Russian MFA, the scenario 
was modified to a rescue operation following a major earthquake. The conduct of
neighbours to adopt a flexible approach to border controls on Ukraine’s western border. Author’s 
interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999; Kiev, October-November 1999
Eight polls, with 39 to 42 respondents each, were conducted In March, June, September and 
December of 1997 and 1998. Respondents were drawn from four elite groups: MFA officials and 
government/presidential advisers; Verkhovna Rada deputies; high-ranking military officers; and 
Journalists specialising in International affairs. The results are available at www.public.ua.net/ 
~potekhl n/ucpccrs/MONITOR/EXPOLL
Major PfP exercises with non-combat content were held on Ukrainian territory in May (‘Peace 
Shield 95) and July 1995, October-November 1998 (‘Sea Breeze 98’ with Russian participation), 
July (‘Peace Shield 2000’ with the presence of Russian observers) and September 2000 (Tran- 
scarpathla 2000’, with Belarusian participation). US naval vessels visited Ukrainian ports on 19 oc­
casions between 1994 and 2000. The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review, vol. V, no. 5, 21 March 
2000
Seaodnva. 28 August 1997, p. 3
The participation of the Turkish Navy In the exercises Indicated that the supposed insurgents 
were not the Crimean Tatars, as the foreign power supporting them would have been Turkey.
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air-defence exercises and of a simulated naval embargo despite the revised sce­
nario, and Ukraine’s subsequent participation in exercises (this time on US terri­
tory) based on a scenario similar to the one originally devised for ‘Sea Breeze’ did 
nothing to appease Russian misgivings/"’ The ethnic conflict scenario also in­
formed the ‘Peace Shield 98’ exercises, which were carried out in Western 
Ukraine in 1998/® In September 2000, the ‘Cossack Steppe’ exercises rehearsed 
such a scenario in Eastern Crimea, though the Russian MFA was most alarmed by 
an article which appeared in the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Navy on the 
eve of the exercises. The article, which was not disavowed by Ukrainian diplomatic 
spokesmen, warned of a threat to the country’s independence emanating from 
Russophones and asserted that Russia would not start a war against Ukraine be­
cause of its awareness that, unlike Chechnya, Ukraine had combat-worthy Armed 
Forces.^® Ukraine's allocation of additional funds from the state budget to the con­
duct of such NATO exercises fuelled accusations that Kiev had violated Art. 6 of 
the Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation treaty.^'’ NATO financial support for 
the modernisation of Ukraine’s Navy and military facilities in order to bring them 
into line with Alliance standards were viewed as further signs of the Ukrainian 
leadership gradually abandoning its ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia.^® The 
agreement granting the Yavorov facility the status of an “international training cen­
tre under the aegis of NATO’’ came as no surprise to Russian observers.^®
Russia’s military presence on Ukrainian territory is much more substantial than 
that of NATO. In March 1997, the Russian military obtained leasing agreements of 
Ukraine’s missile-attack warning installations in Mukachevo and Yevpatoriya as
Seaodnva. 27 August 1997, p. 4; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 22 November 1999, p. 3
72 Nezavisimava Gazeta. 25 September 1998, p. 5
The article appeared in Flot Ukrainv and excerpts were published In Nezavisimava Gazeta. 8 
September 2000, p. 1 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 4 December 1999, pp. 1, 5.
By 1998, NATO had spent $8 million on the modernisation of the Yavorov training ground. The 
US government was reported to have granted Ukraine an additional $1.2 million for the upgrading 
of training facilities and Navy equipment. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 25 September 1998, p. 5; Seaod- 
nya. 28 October 1998, p. 2 
^^ Nezavislmaya Gazeta. 4 March 2000, p. 5
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well as a limited agreement on joint monitoring of air-space/^ In October 1999, 
Russia and Ukraine conducted bilateral air-defence exercises entitled "Duel 99"/® 
As a result of the BSF agreements of May 1997, Russia was authorised to main­
tain 25000 servicemen on Ukrainian territory and have exclusive use of a total of 
170 naval and land basing points, command and communications centres, aero­
dromes, and various auxiliary facilities for at least 20 years/® 137 of these installa­
tions are located in the city of Sevastopol. Russia is to lease the above facilities at 
the annual cost of $97.75 million to be deducted from Ukraine’s debt ($3,074 bil­
lion at the time), with a provision for direct payments after the debt is paid off. 
Payments from the Russian state budget for the maintenance of the BSF (includ­
ing servicemen’s salaries) were to be exempt from Ukrainian taxation, which was 
not to be the case of other economic activities of various agencies belonging to the 
BSF. The Russian MoD assumed the obligation to annually inform Ukraine of the 
numbers of troops and weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory. The Russian 
BSF, which is based in Ukraine, may not be equipped with nuclear weapons. The 
Russian Navy may use Ukraine’s territorial waters in order to enter and exit BSF 
bases -  on condition of prior notification. The agreement of the Ukrainian authori­
ties is required for the conduct of military exercises within the installations avail­
able to the Russian BSF. The authorisation of the Ukrainian authorities is also 
needed for the use of Ukraine’s air-space by Russian military aircraft.®®
Since the conclusion of the BSF agreements, the Russian and Ukrainian sec­
tions of the Fleet have conducted bilateral exercises on several occasions. In No­
vember 1997 (‘Channel of Peace 97’), the exercises were confined to rescue op­
erations and were conducted at sea only, but in April 1998, September 1999 and 
September 2001 (‘Channel of Peace’ 99 and 2001), they contained land opera-
Kommersant’-Dailv. 5 March 1997, p. 3 
Krasnava Zvezda. 14 October 1999, p. 1
The agreements are to be automatically renewed for five years, if neither of the signatory parties 
requests their termination at least one year before the expiry of the 20-year period.
The agreements ‘On the parameters of the division of the BSF’, ‘On the status and conditions of 
the presence of the BSF of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine’ and ‘On mutual fi­
nancial obligations related to the division of the BSF and the presence of BSF of the Russian Fed­
eration on the territory of Ukraine’ were published in Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. Oc­
tober 1999, pp. 34-83
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tions and air defence elements.®’' Russia and Ukraine, alongside Georgia, Roma­
nia, Bulgaria and Turkey, have agreed to set up a cooperative naval force entitled 
‘BlackSeaFor’ for rescue, humanitarian and environmental operations.®® In August 
2000, Ukraine for the first time participated in the CIS air-defence exercises, which 
were conducted in Russia’s Astrakhan’ oblast’. Still, Russia’s military and political 
elite resents the Ukrainian leadership’s willingness to increase budget allocations 
for cooperation with NATO, while reducing participation in bilateral exercises with 
Russia on the grounds of cost.®® The impression of the Ukrainian authorities delib­
erately harassing the BSF and using it as a bargaining chip for extracting conces­
sions from Russia represents a major grievance for the Russian side. The BSF 
faced cuts in water and electricity supplies in February 1999 due to arrears, de­
spite an earlier agreement to offset such payments against Ukraine’s debt to Rus­
sia.®'’ A year later several bank accounts belonging to BSF units were frozen due 
to utilities arrears exceeding 600 million hryvnyas and officers were interrogated 
about alleged tax evasion.®® Some of the problems complicating the activities of 
the BSF were - at least partly - alleviated by nine supplementary agreements regu­
lating the use of radio frequencies, customs procedures for supplies from Russia, 
and various social and legal matters related to the presence of BSF personnel and 
their families in Ukraine.®® Further progress regarding the harmonious co­
existence of the BSF and the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol was reported following 
the meeting of the two countries’ Defence Ministers in June 2001.®^
On ‘Channel of Peace 97’, see Krasnava Zvezda. 4 November 1997, p. 1. During the April 1998 
exercises, the Russian and Ukrainian forces were under national command. Krasnaya Zvezda. 18 
April 1998, p. 1. See also Nezavisimava Gazeta. 20 September 2001, p. 5 for ‘Channel of Peace 
2001’ .
The decision to create such a force was announced in Juiy 2000. Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 
5 July 2000. The agreement on the establishment of the force was signed in Istanbul on 2 April 
2001. Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 2 April 2001 
The Ukrainian side used such an argument with respect to ‘Channel of Peace 2000’. Kommer­
sant’-Dailv. 2 March 2000, p.1 
At that time, the Russian and Ukrainian governments were negotiating the exact level of 
Ukraine’s debt, which had been accumulating since the restructuring agreement of 1995. 
Kommersant’-Dailv. 1 March 2000, p. 1 
Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. April 2000, pp. 25-26
Defence Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Aleksandr Kuz’muk met in Sevestopo! and agreed infer alia
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Restrictions imposed by the Ukrainian authorities on Russian Armed Forces’ 
use of Ukraine’s air space and territorial waters have constituted another source of 
irritation. Such restrictions were introduced in spring 1997 on the grounds of Rus­
sian military aircraft having entered Ukraine’s air space without authorisation, but 
were promptly lifted after the Russian military leadership offered explanations.®® A 
year later, more serious controversy arose from new regulations requiring the BSF 
command to give the Ukrainian MoD three days’ notice in advance of any naval 
vessel or military aircraft crossing the border. The regulations also demanded a 
report detailing all weaponry and other military equipment to be carried on board 
and stated that the Ukrainian authorities could carry out inspections for the pur­
poses of verification. This was particularly disconcerting to the Russian military, as 
it erected an effective barrier to the stealthy, rapid deployment of forces in the 
Mediterranean in connection with the Kosovo conflict.®® According to a Ukrainian 
foreign policy expert interviewed by the author, Ukraine agreed to the transit of 
Russian forces only after Bulgaria (an applicant for admission to NATO) had given 
such permission - presumably with the consent of the Alliance.®® The replacement 
of the BSF’s obsolete SU-17 bombers with SU-24 aircraft encountered opposition 
from the Ukrainian side, which contended that the deployment of aircraft with a 
capability for delivering nuclear weapons on Ukraine’s territory contradicted the 
country’s non-nuclear status. Russia's proposal of removing relevant equipment 
from the bombers in question satisfied the Ukrainian authorities with respect to 18 
of the 22 new aircraft to be deployed, but objections persisted in the cases of the 
remaining four, as they were regarded as reconnaissance aircraft.®^
Such frictions straining the declared strategic partnership between Ukraine and 
Russia are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. A sizeable section of 
Ukraine’s political and military elite, with some influence on the Kuchma admini­
stration, advocates the reconsideration of the leasing agreements with Russia, 
which it sees as the major source of threats to the country’s independence.®^
on the joint use of certain military installations. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 20 June 2001, p. 1 
RFE/RL, Newsline: Central and Eastern Europe. 7 April 1997 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 1 June 1999, p. 5 
Kiev, 20 October 1999 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 29 May 2000, p. 5
These points were contained in a draft resolution “in Connection with the Escalation of Tensions
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Ukrainian officials have dismissed Russian complaints about Ukraine contravening 
the spirit of strategic partnership and the clauses of the ‘Big treaty' by returning the 
latter accusation with regard to the lack of state provision for the cultural needs of 
the Ukrainian minority in Russia/® More significantly, Russian and Ukrainian pol­
icy-makers appear to have divergent interpretations of what ‘strategic partnership' 
entails. Whereas the Russian elite tends to view Ukraine's cordial ties to NATO as 
evidence of a lack of interest in strategic partnership with Russia, Ukrainian offi­
cials have asserted that the two approaches to strengthening the country's secu­
rity and international authority are complementary. They argue that Ukraine need 
not have to choose between a ‘distinctive partnership’ with NATO and a ‘strategic 
partnership’ with Russia.®" This position can be maintained oniy so iong as 
Ukraine does not officially declare an intention to join the Alliance. Indeed, as 
stated in the policy-pianning analysis of Ukraine’s Security and Defence Council, 
the country will have to make a choice between Russia and the CIS, on the one 
hand, and full participation in Euro-Atlantic structures, on the other. Ukraine’s ba­
sic national interests are found to coincide with those of the United States and 
conflict with those of Russia. Strategic partnership with the US and a gradual ap­
proach to NATO membership are suggested as the foremost priorities of Ukrainian 
foreign policy. Tellingly, the term ‘strategic partnership’ is not used to describe the 
envisaged type of relations with Russia.®® President Kuchma, however, reaffirmed 
the primary importance of Russia in Ukraine’s foreign policy soon after dismissing 
Boris Tarasyuk, the Foreign Minister whom the Russian foreign policy community
in Russo-Ukrainian Relations", which was introduced for consideration to the Verkhovna Rada by a 
group of national-minded deputies including former President Leonid Kravchuk. The fuli text of the 
draft resolution was published in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 14 September 2000, pp. 1, 5 
Ibid. and Stepan Gravrish (Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Pariiament), interview to Nezavisi­
mava Gazeta. 13 September 2000, p. 5 
National Institute of Ukrainian Russian Relations, National Security and Defence Council of 
Ukraine, Velikv Doaovir Ukrai ni z Rossievu: Istorichnv Komoromis chi Real’nv Shans na 
Stratiaichne Partnerstvo?. Kiev: ‘Akadempres’, 1999, p. 15 
Ukraine’s Security and Defence Council is an officiai institution comparable to Russia’s Security 
Council. O. Beiov et al. (eds.), Ukraine 2000 and Bevond: Geopolitical Priorities and Scenarios of 
Development. Kyiv: The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, National Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1999, pp. 10-11, 29, 61, 72
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saw as excessively pro-Western ®® Moreover, in January 2001, the Russian and 
Ukrainian Defence Ministers announced an extensive programme of military coop­
eration, which was to include the creation of a joint observation point in Sevastopol 
and Russia’s participation in the planning of all multilateral exercises to take place 
on Ukrainian territory, a provision bound to affect Ukraine’s PfP activities/^
The social and economic spheres
It is possible to distinguish between two kinds of integration in the economic and 
social spheres, one referring to policy coordination or joint decision making in 
these areas, and another denoting density of transactions and economic interpen­
etration. The former typically aspires to the promotion of the latter, which may, 
however, occur in the absence of inter-state policy coordination. The Russo- 
Belarusian integration treaties provide for legal harmonisation, common decision­
making mechanisms and a variety of projects aimed at strengthening social- in­
cluding cultural -  ties between the two countries, creating a unified economic area 
and Increasing economic transactions (trade, investment, joint production lines). 
Similar objectives have also been declared at Russo-Ukrainian diplomatic meet­
ings, but with a view to arresting the trend of rapidly declining social and especially 
economic interaction.®® The following tables display contrasting trends in Russia’s 
economic relations with Belarus and those with Ukraine.
Table 1
Russia’s trade with Belarus (millions of US dollars)
Exports index Imports Index Turnover Index
1994 2998 100 2094 100 5092 100
1995 2940 98 2088 100 5028 99
1996 3522 117 3024 144 6546 129
1997 4673 156 4780 228 9453 186
Urvadovv Kur'er. 4 October 2000, p. 1
97
98
Krasnava Zvezda. 21 January 2001, p. 1
Joint Declaration by Presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin in Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. October 1998, 
p. 33
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1998 . 4670 156 4608 220 9278 182
1999 3761 125 3236 155 6997 137
Table 2
Russia’s trade with Ukraine (millions of US dollars) -  Russian official statistics
Exports Index Imports Index Turnover Index
1994 6885 100 4404 100 11289 100
1995 6980 101 6617 150 13597 120
1996 7552 110 6299 143 13851 123
1997 7243 105 3991 91 11234 100
1998 6024 87 4072 92 10096 89
1999 4889 71 2817 64 7706 68
Source: Rossiva v Tsifrakh. Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000, p. 362 
Table 3
Russia’s trade with Ukraine (millions of US dollars) -  Ukrainian official statistics®
Exports index Imports Index Turnover Index
1996 8548 100 5528 100 14076 100
1997 7838 92 3913 71 11751 83
1998 7064 83 2906 53 9970 71
1999 6195 72 2396 43 8591 61
Source: Natlonal Bank of Ukraine as cited in IMF Country Report no. 01/28. Ukraine: Statistical
Appendix. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, January 2001, pp. 44, 46
After economic integration between Russia and Belarus began in 1995, bilateral 
trade grew spectacularly until 1998. President Lukashenko has credited the inte­
gration process with a 150% rise in bilateral t ra d e ,w h ic h  is not entirely implau­
sible considering that the official figures testify to growth of 87% between 1995 
and 1997. Because barter transactions have constituted the bulk of Russo- 
Belarusian t r a d e , i t  is hardly possible to accurately calculate the value of trade
®® Two separate tables are given for trade between Russia and Ukraine In order to take account of 
the somewhat different figures published by the Russian and Ukrainian official statistics agencies. 
In the case of trade between Russia and Belarus, this problem does not arise, as the relevant 
agencies (Mlnstat in Belarus and Goskomstat In Russia) work in close coordination.
' Rossiiskava Gazeta. 9 December 1999. p. 7
According to calculations of economists of the Belarusian National Bank, barter represented
34% of bilateral trade in 1997 and 41.9% in 1998. A. Tereshchenko and A. Zyuiev, “Monetarnye
Aspekty Integratsii Belarusi i Rossii”, Belarus Monitor. June 2000, p. 33
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volumes. Data on Belarus's foreign trade indicate that the increase in trade with 
Russia has been due to a combination of trade creation and trade redirection.^®^ 
The growth has been most impressive In terms of Belarusian exports to Russia, 
whose volume in 1997 was more than double compared to 1995. As a result, Bela­
rus ranks (ahead of Ukraine) as Russia's second largest trading partner behind the 
EU.^ ®® A downward trend became observable in 1998 and was accelerated in 
1999. This appears to have been a function of the August 1998 financial crisis, 
which produced a drop of 31% in Russia’s foreign trade between 1997 and 1999. 
During the same period, the decline in overall trade with Belarus was 26%.^®" Still, 
turnover remained 38% higher than its 1995 level, A positive trend was reported to 
have returned in 2000 and continued in 2001, as the Russian economy showed 
signs of recovery.^®®
Whereas Russia and Belarus share statistical information, therefore reporting 
identical figures on bilateral trade, this is not the case of statistics regarding trade 
between Russia and Ukraine. According to the information published by the Na­
tional Bank of Ukraine, bilateral trade has displayed linear decline since 1996, with 
Ukrainian exports to Russia dropping by 57% (compared to a turnover decline of 
39% between 1996 and 1999). According to Russian official statistics, trade turn­
over between Russia and Ukraine began to decrease in 1997, with imports being
Beiarusian foreign trade grew by 56% between 1995 and 1997 and trade with the EU Increased 
by 28%. Russia’s overall external trade is not used as an indicator because in 1997 Belarus ac­
counted for 5% of Russian exports and 9% of imports, whereas Russia’s shares in Beiarusian ex­
ports and imports were 66% and 54% respectively. External Economic Activities of the CIS Coun­
tries. Moscow: interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, 1999, pp. 96-97, 274
In 1999, the EU accounted for 36.7% of Russia’s total imports, Belarus represented 10.7% and 
Ukraine was third with 8.3%. According to customs data for 2000, Russia’s trade with Belarus 
stood at $9.3 billion, compared with $8.6 billion of trade with Ukraine). Country Report: Russia. 
London: The Economic intelligence Unit, March 2001, p. 37
Russia’s foreign trade volume declined from $161.9 billion in 1997 to $115.1 billion in 1999. 
Rossiva V Tsifrakh. Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000, p. 356
In the first ten months of 2000, official statistics showed a year-on-year growth of 39% in bilat­
eral trade. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 26 January 2001, p. 5; In May 2001, the Belarusian Foreign Min­
istry announced statistical information for the first quarter of 2001 showing year-on-year growth of 
15% in exports to Russia and a drop of 7% in imports from that country. (Exports to the CIS as a 
whole grew by 17% and imports declined by 11% during the same period). Belarusskava Delovava
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reduced since 1996. By the end of 1999, the positive trend visible between 1994 
and 1997 had been entirely reversed. Trade volumes were down by 32% com­
pared to 1994 and more than halved after 1997. Growth of almost $1.5 billion 
(around 17%) has been claimed for 2000, which could be linked to both countries’ 
improved economic performance.^®®
Migration, a major indicator of inter-state social interaction, shows a linear de­
cline with regard to both Belarus and Ukraine. Nonetheless, Ukraine has been by 
far the largest provider of immigrants from the CIS coming to work in Russia.’*®^ 
Due to the CIS visa-free regime, no statistical data for travel to and from Russia, 
on the one hand, and Ukraine and Belarus on the other is available for the same 
period.''®®
Table 4
Migration flows between Russia and Belarus (number of persons)
To Russia Index From Russia index Total index
1994 43383 100 27751 100 71134 100
1995 35337 81 25229 91 60566 85
1996 23903 55 21542 78 45445 64
1997 17575 41 18928 68 36503 51
1998 13760 32 19035 69 32795 46
1999 11549 27 19151 69 30700 43
Gazeta. 4 May 2001, p. 4
This figure was cited by President Putin in his interview to the Ukrainian press in February 2001 
Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. March 2001, p. 42
In 1994, Ukraine was the country of origin of 77.8% of CIS immigrants to Russia. Belarus was 
second with 8.2%. Rossiiskv Statlsticheskv Ezheaodnik. Moscow: Goskomstat, 1995, p. 518. 
These figures have not been published consistently to allow for year-on-year comparisons.
Russia announced its decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Bishkek agreement of 1992 on 
visa-free travel vwthin the CIS as of January 2001. Belarus was the only country to be a priori ex­
empt from any future visa requirements, while relevant agreements with all remaining states were 
to be negotiated on a bilateral basis. Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 4 September 2000. In late 
November 2000, Russia concluded agreements on visa-free travel with all member-states of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan). Izvestiva. 1 December
2000, p. 2
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Table 5
Migration flows between Russia and Ukraine (number of persons)
To Russia Index From Russia Index Total Index
1994 247351 100 108370 100 355721 100
1995 188443 76 99422 92 287865 81
1996 170928 69 83813 77 254741 72
1997 138231 59 69116 64 207347 58
1998 111934 45 57318 53 169252 48
1999 81297 33 58922 54 140219 39
Source: Rossiya v Tsifrakh, Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000, pp. 72-73
Another measure of cross-border societal links, often mentioned in arguments fa­
vouring the restoration of such Soviet-era ties, is the movement of students in 
higher education. The numbers of students from both Ukraine and Belarus coming 
to the Russian Federation have declined dramatically compared to the period im­
mediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.^°® As of 1997, opposite trends 
have emerged, with numbers of Belarusian students increasing, while the down­
ward trend in the case of students from Ukraine has continued. A similar trend has 
characterised movement from Russia to Belarus, though absolute numbers have 
been lower.
Table 6
Students from Belarus and Ukraine in Russian institutions of higher education
(number of persons)
From Belarus Index From Ukraine Index
1995/96 4355 100 9462 100
1996/97 3121 72 6473 68
1997/98 3314 76 5016 53
1998/99 4203 97 4703 50
Source: Rossiva v Tsifrakh. Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000, p. 123
The number of students from Ukraine was down by 83% between 1992 and 1998, whereas that 
of Beiarusian students decreased by 65%. Rossiiskv Statistlcheskv Ezheaodnik. Moscow: 
Goskomstat, 1999, p. 210
159
Table 7
Students from Russia in Belarusian Institutions of higher education
(number of persons)
Index
1995/96 1161 100
1996/96 881 76
1997/98 955 82
1998/99 1316 113
Source: Be arus’ i Rossiva. Moscow: Ministry of Statistics of Belarus/ State Statistics Committee of
Russia, 1999, p. 64
The following sections will seek to shed some light on the above trends in trade 
and societal links by examining the progress of relevant policies announced in the 
context of Russo-Belarusian integration and Russo-Ukrainian cooperation pro­
grammes.
Russia and Belarus in pursuit of closer sociai and economic integration
Social aspects
The treaty “On Equal Rights of Citizens” of December 1998 has been the least 
controversial and most successful in terms of implementation of all bilateral inte­
gration treaties. All of its provisions were reported to have been realised by mid- 
1999.^^® The treaty requires that citizens of Belarus have the same legal rights as 
those granted by Russian law to citizens of the Russian Federation and vice versa 
(Art. 3). Equal electoral rights apply only in the case of elections to supranational 
bodies (Art. 1). Neither of the two states may impose any restrictions applicable to 
foreigners on the economic activities of citizens of the other party (Art. 2). Russian 
citizens are entitled to acquire property in Belarus -  including by means of free 
transfer of state or municipal property - on the same basis as Belarusian citizens 
and the same applies to Belarusian citizens in Russia (Art. 6). Russian and Bela­
rusian citizens may exchange dwellings in accordance with national legislation and
110 Author’s interviews, Moscow, June and November-December 1999; Minsk, November 1999.
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be registered as permanent residents on that basis (Art. 5). Free movement of la­
bour is guaranteed by equal access to employment, remuneration and full protec­
tion granted by national labour legislation (Art. 7). The recent introduction of these 
changes seems not to have had any impact in terms of halting the decrease of mi­
gration flows in both directions, which continued in 1999. No discrimination is to 
apply concerning access to education at all levels, health care or other social ser­
vices, and no payments are to be made by either state for services rendered to its 
citizens by agencies belonging to the other party (Arts. 4, 9). Therefore, services 
free to Russian citizens are also free to Belarusian citizens and vice versa. Where 
fees are applicable, as is the case of various higher education courses, the same 
amounts are payable by Russians and Belarusians, whereas citizens of third coun­
tries -  including CIS member-states -  are typically charged higher fees. This ap­
pears likely to strengthen the upward trend in the mobility of students in both direc­
tions, which has been observable since 1997.
The unification of labour and social legislation is to occur according to the princi­
ple of maximisation, which requires that common standards be based on those of 
the state with the most extensive guarantees in each aspect of labour and social 
provision.'’’’'' Work in this field has been directed at the equalisation of real wages, 
pensions and social security benefits, beginning with legally guaranteed minimum 
s tandards .The  envisaged harmonisation of living standards, which also covers 
coordination with respect to price regulation, has the double function of encourag­
ing cross-border mobility and contributing to real economic convergence by affect­
ing measures such as labour productivity and unemployment. A maximum degree 
of convergence in such indicators is expected to enhance the prospects of suc­
cessful monetary union. From among various initiatives aimed at promoting socie­
tal and cultural integration, it is worth noting the creation of a Union television and 
radio organisation funded both from the Union budget and national resources. It 
began broadcasting in February 1998.’’'’®
“Programme of Synchronisation and Coordination of Economic Reforms”, Diplomaticheskv 
Vestnik. May 1997, p. 38
“Programme of Actions” attached to the Union-state treaty, Bvulieten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doao­
vorov. Mach 2000, pp. 82-83
See treaty “On the Common Television and Radio Organisation of the Union of Russia and Bei- 
arus” (signed in January 1998 and ratified in Juiy 1999). Bvuileten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov.
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Trade relations and the problematic Customs Union
The spectacular growth In bilateral trade attained between 1995 and 1998 has 
been -  to a very large extent -  the result of the January 1995 Customs Union 
agreement. In June 1995, customs control points on the Russo-Belarusian border 
were removed. At the same time, both countries abolished customs and excise 
duties along with non-tariff restrictions on exports to and imports from each 
o th e r .T h is  boosted the competitiveness of products from Russia and Belarus in 
each other’s markets, especially compared to imports from CIS countries remain­
ing outside the Customs Union of the Five (Eurasian Union). The Customs Union 
agreement made allowances for temporary restrictions on bilateral trade in condi­
tions of extreme budget deficit or shortages of a commodity in the domestic market 
(Art. 5). These measures were understood to be reserved for emergency situa­
tions and were not meant as transitional arrangements on the way to a fully func­
tioning free trade area, as was the case of the early stages in the development of 
the European Community .They were used only In one case, when temporary 
controls were reintroduced on the Belarusian side of the border in the wake of the 
financial crisis that hit Russia in August 1998 to prevent the export of foodstuffs 
subsidised from the Belarusian budget. With this exception, neither side has im­
posed other restrictions or duties of any kind on goods imported from or exported 
to the other party, though such a possibility has been raised with regard to certain 
commodities of disputed origin (e.g. Cuban sugar packed in Belarus). Belarus has
February 2000, pp. 70-72
Customs duties and quantitative restrictions on bilateral trade had been lifted following the free 
trade agreement of November 1992, which, however, excluded raw materials exported to Russia. 
The January 1995 agreement abolished these residual restrictions. Ernest Sh. Sultanov, “Rossiya i 
Beiorusslya: tri postuiata ekonomicheskoi integratsii v ramkakh Tamozhennogo soyuza”, 
Vneshnvava Toraovlva. no. 10-12,1998, p. 23
Free trade in the EC was attained in 1968,17 years after the conclusion of the Paris treaty, 
which established the ECSC and 11 years after the treaty of Rome, which created the EEC.
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also complained about Russia’s making profits by re-exporting goods of Belaru­
sian origin to third countries. '^'®
The modernisation of customs infrastructure on Belarus’s borders with Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia has been one of the first projects Implemented within the 
framework of the Union. The Russian government contributed financial resources 
and technical equipment to the project, whose urgent completion was considered 
essential in order to avert an influx of contraband goods. Nonetheless, the failure 
to harmonise excise taxes and duties on imports from and exports to third coun­
tries has given grounds for unilateral measures, which have provoked friction in 
bilateral relations and negative publicity for the integration process. Tensions 
emerged already in 1996 in connection with the Belarusian administration’s licens­
ing of favoured companies to import certain goods from third countries without 
paying any duties. The Russian government warned of restoring customs controis, 
as the goods in question (notably alcoholic beverages and tobacco, which were 
meant for sale only in Belarus) were found to have been systematically re­
exported to Russia under false documentation presenting the cargo as Belarusian 
p ro d u c ts .A  regulation brought in by the Russian State Customs Committee re­
quired that duties on such commodities be paid into its bank account in Minsk be­
fore the goods reached Russia’s territory.’’’'®
The Belarusian administration subsequently abolished the controversial privi­
leges, but discontent persisted on both sides due to the combination of different 
tariff rates applied by each of the two countries and the provision (Art. 4 of the 
Customs Union agreement) that customs duties contribute to the budget of the 
country of entry or exit. Thanks to the establishment of a Community Customs 
Committee in June 1996, significant progress towards the equalisation of customs 
duties was made in 1997.’’’'® This was undermined in the following year by Rus-
Speech of President Lukashenko to the 18**^  session of the Russia-Belarus Parliamentary As­
sembly (Grodno, 5 June 2001). Nezavisimava Gazeta. 6 June 2001, p. 5
“Lukashenko poluchil novy ul'timatum", Itoai. 10 December 1996, reprinted In Problemv Poli- 
ticheskoao Liderstva i Intearatslva Belarus! I Rossi!. Minsk: Independent Institute of Socio- 
Economic and Political Studies, 1997, p. 106
Regulation N 01-14/1310 of 28 November 1996 published in Tamozhennve Pravila. Moscow: 
“Infoyurservis”, 1998, pp. 44-47
In 1997, excise duties differed with regard to 63 commodities, whereas different customs duties
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sia’s decision to unilaterally amend tariffs on several commodities without prior 
consultation with the competent Belarusian or Union agencies.^^° Russian excise 
duties applied equally to 22 categories of domestic and imported goods, with Bela­
rus levying excise on 22 domestic and 50 imported commodities/^^ In early 1999, 
Belarus adopted legislation bringing most customs duties in line with the new Rus­
sian ra te s /T h is  did not avert a partial restoration of controls on the Russian side 
of the border with Belarus, as Russian officials continued to be dissatisfied with the 
patchy implementation of the new Belarusian customs legislation. A further source 
of Russian discontent was the influx of low-priced Ukrainian goods entering the 
Russian market through the porous border between Belarus and Ukraine, thereby 
avoiding Russian excise and import duties. The latter problem had been exacer­
bated by the entry into force of a free trade agreement between Belarus and 
Ukraine in 1999.^^® In autumn 2000, border controls returned on both sides of the 
Russo-Belarusian border to control the flow of goods smuggled from third coun- 
trhes.124
The Russian State Customs Committee had claimed annual losses of budget 
revenue approximating $500 million as a result of importers’ preference for Bela­
rus as a point of entry to the Russian market due to its lower tariffs on a range of 
commodities such as automobiles, alcohol and tobacco products. Belarusian ex­
port duties on petrochemical products were also set at lower levels than those lev­
ied by Russia, which increased the attractiveness of Belarusian oil-processing 
plants to Russian oil companies.’'^ ® Belarusian officials have resented Russia’s
applied to 460 commodities. Sultanov, “Rossiya i Belorussiya”, p. 24
Anatoly Sirotsky, “Tamozhenny Soyuz: Plany I Realli”, in Belorusskv Zhurnal Mezhdunarodnoao 
Prava i Mezhdunarodnvkh Qtnoshenii. no. 1, 2000, pp. 68-69 
Ibid.
Kommersant’-Vlast’. 13 July 1999, p. 38
The Russian State Customs Committee announced that it had raised $2.5 billion in duties levied 
on imports from third countries arriving through the ‘Belarusian corridor’ in the first half of 1999 
alone. Ibid. and Nezavisimava Gazeta. 24 May 2000, p. 1 
Rossliskava Gazeta/Biznes v Rossi I. 25 October 2000. p. 1
According to bilateral agreements, only 10% of Russian oil processed in Belarusian plants may 
be exported to destinations other than Russia. However this has not been always applied in prac­
tice, to the effect that the Russian Ministry of Finance had calculated annual losses to the federal 
budget as a result of lower Belarusian oil export duties at $100 million. Izvestiya, 2 March 2001, p.
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lower import tariffs on foreign commodities (e.g. electronic equipment) competing 
with Belarusian products. In 1999, common lists of commodities, whose import 
and/or export was to be subject to quantitative restrictions, were formulated, but 
provision was made for residual categories of goods for which national licences 
would still be r e q u i re d . In  March 2000, Russia began to levy VAT on imports 
from third countries entering the Russian market through Belarus. This was 
deemed necessary in view of the agreements concluded by Belarus with Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Moldova in early 1999, according to which VAT on bilateral trade 
is levied in the country of destination. The measure proved highly effective in dis­
torting import routes to Russia’s advantage, thereby prodding the Belarusian au­
thorities to introduce similar regulations six months later.
The ‘Programme of Actions’ attached to the Union-state treaty provides for the 
creation of a new Commission for Tariff and Non-tariff Regulation, the full unifica­
tion of duties, exemptions, and quantitative restrictions by 2002, and of all legisla­
tion regulating foreign trade by 2004. Union-state customs codes are to be 
adopted and supranational bodies with exclusive jurisdiction over external trade 
regulation are to be created by 2005. Negotiations were further complicated by the 
need to take into account the interests of the other three members of the ‘Customs 
Union of the Five’ (or ‘Eurasian Economic Community’, as it was renamed in Oc­
tober 2000) and Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the WTO on terms that had not been 
communicated to other Customs Union member-states in advance.'*^® As of the 
beginning of 2001, Russia has applied a single rate on all commodities subject to 
customs duties.^^® This simplified the negotiation of Union rates, which were finally
4
126Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. June 1999, pp. 51-56
Between February and July 2000, the value of imports from third countries reaching Russia 
through Belarus approximated $95 million, whereas $263 million’s worth of imports entered Belarus 
through Russia. Prior to the introduction of the contested measure, imports averaging $50 million 
per month flowed almost evenly In the two directions. Izvestiva. 26 September 2000, p. 6
By April 1998, identical import tariffs across Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Taji­
kistan applied to 4500 out of 9506 commodity categories. Sirotsky, “Tamozhenny Soyuz’’, pp. 68- 
70
Interfax News Agency, CIS Dailv News Brief. 5 October 2000, p. 7
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set during the January 2001 session of the Council of Ministers/®® As of March 
2001, customs duties on all but 300 commodity categories have finally been equal­
ised/®^ This has been the result of a major compromise, most notably regarding 
the controversial question of export duties on oil and oil products/®^ The two coun­
tries are likely to maintain different lists of products subject to export restrictions in 
the near future/®®
Harmonisation of economic reforms
The agreement “On the Creation of Equai Conditions for Economic Actors" of 
December 1998 provides for the modification of national legislation to eliminate 
any form of discrimination against Russian enterprises operating in Belarus and 
vice versa. Art. 3 states that prices in bilateral trade are to be freely negotiated 
with the exception of monopoly goods and services, where export prices are not to 
exceed the levels fixed for the domestic market. The latter provision is particularly 
pertinent to transport, electricity and gas rates, which are covered by a specific in­
tergovernmental agreement of April 1999. In these cases, prices are to be subject 
to agreements between the relevant ministries or other agencies from the two 
countries and be set at minimum levels allowing for the recuperation of costs and 
essential investment in infrastructure maintenance and modernisation.^®^ It is on 
this basis that the Belarusian leadership has been pushing for gas prices identical 
to those prevailing in Russia's domestic market. Railway transport rates and motor 
transit fees have proved rather controversial. Belarusian enterprises have been
The Belarusian side has expected to offset losses resulting from Its adopting higher export du­
ties on oil and oil products by obtaining a reduction in rail transport tariffs for Belarusian exports. 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 31 January 2001, p. 5
These exemptions (most notably in textiles, foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals) have been agreed 
in order to enable Russia and Belarus to respect their divergent obligations resulting from agree­
ments with third parties.
The Russian export duty on crude oil was reduced from 48 to 22 Euros, while the Belarusian 
rate was raised to this level. I zv estiva. 2 March 2001, p. 4
International Monetary Fund, Republic of Belarus: Recent Economic Developments and Se­
lected Issues. IMF Staff Country Report no. 00/153, Washington DCrlMF, November 2000, p. 41
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complaining about the costs of railway cargo transport being higher than those ap­
plied to Russian exports using the Belarusian railway system, thus inflating the 
prices of exports to remote Russian regions/®® The Russian side’s grievances 
have focused on discriminatory fees payable by Russian lorry drivers using Bela­
rusian motorways. These have given local motor transport firms an advantage im­
permissible by common market standards, which has been converted into a major­
ity share of the Russian export freight market.
Since Belarus reduced the highest rate for private income tax from 50 to 30% in 
line with Russian legislation, the two countries’ rates of direct -  including corporate 
- taxation have not diverged significantly. Belarus plans to replace its system of 
progressive income taxation with a flat rate of 13%, in line with the rate adopted by 
Russia in 2000.''®® Profit tax rates have been similar (25% in Belarus, 30% in Rus­
sia), but economic activity in Belarus has been subject to various other forms of 
taxation, which have exceeded those applicable in Russia.’'®^  Although VAT rates 
are the same in the two countries, distortions in the single economic area have oc­
curred because Belarusian agricultural enterprises are exempt from VAT, while 
exemptions from VAT and customs duties on imported equipment and raw materi­
als apply to all industrial and agricultural exporters.'*®® An agreement on the har­
monisation of tax legislation commits the two countries’ Finance Ministries to the 
formulation of unified principles and rules regarding fiscal obligations and of a sin­
gle list of basic taxes, aiming for the completion of legislative work on a Union 
state Tax Code by July 2002.^ ®® Business conditions in Belarus have differed con­
siderably from Russian ones, with a higher degree of state regulation (e.g. stricter 
controls on banking operations and currency export in particular; local authorities’ 
veto rights over enterprise reorganisation, liquidation or managerial appointments) 
and more complex bureaucratic procedures (e.g. with regard to the registration of
Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. September 1999, pp. 65-66 
Author’s interview with Belarusian official, Minsk, 19 November 1999 
IMF, Republic of Belarus. IMF Staff Country Report no. 00/153 (November 2000), p. 41 
Author’s interviews with Belarusian economic experts, Minsk, 15 and 16 November 1999 
Nezavisimava Gazeta-Stsenarii. April 1997, p. 2; Sirotsky, "Tamozhenny Soyuz", p. 70 
Agreement “On the establishment of unified tax legislation and the conduct of a single fiscal pol­
icy of the Union state’’ (signed 30 August 2000), Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. May 
2001, pp. 31-34
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new companies). Russian firms particularly complain about very limited opportuni­
ties to invest in the Belarusian economy, where privatisation has moved extremely 
slowly and has excluded its otherwise most appealing sectors, namely oil and 
g as /40
The “Programme of Synchronisation and Coordination of Economic Reforms" of 
1996 required Belarus to introduce anti-monopoly legislation in line with Russian 
law and to implement a wide-ranging privatisation programme -  including legal 
provision for the sale of land.’'4'' Light industry, construction and agricultural enter­
prises were to have been sold at market prices by the end of 1997. Legislation 
guaranteeing investors’ rights would also have to be introduced. 4^2 Although the 
Belarusian government has been intent on increasing revenue from the sale of 
shares in state-owned enterprises, it has been reluctant to discard the legal ban on 
sales of majority stakes. 4^3 y^e obligation to surrender 40% of foreign currency 
earnings from exports, banking operations and domestic retail to the Belarusian 
National Bank has constituted another major disincentive for Russian private sec­
tor involvement in the Belarusian economy. According to the “Programme of Ac­
tions" attached to the Union-state treaty, Russia and Belarus are to work towards 
legal convergence regarding the regulation of financial markets. In the first in­
stance, Belarus is to adopt legislation on securities based on the Russian 
model. 4^4 Ip 2000, Belarus moved somewhat closer to Russian economic condi­
tions by phasing out price controls and subsidies to enterprises. Privatisation of 
large enterprises is expected to begin after the September 2001 presidential elec­
tions in Belarus. Many Russian enterprises, among which gas company ‘Itéra’, oil 
company ‘Yukos’ and several food-processing enterprises, are reported to be in­
vestigating investment opportunities in Belarusian industry and conducting talks 
with the Belarusian leadership.^4s
In 1998, the private sector accounted for 20% of Belarusian GDP, compared to 70% for Russia. 
EBRD, Transition Report 1999. pp. 196, 260
The Belarusian Land Code of January 1999 in principle allows for land privatisation, but requires 
Presidential approval in each individual case.
Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 1997, pp. 36, 38.
EBRD, Transition Report 1999. pp. 194-195
Byulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 2000, p. 77
The directors of ‘Itéra’ and ‘Yukos’ met President Lukashenko to discuss investment prospects
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Preparations for monetary union
Agreements between the Russian Central Bank and the Belarusian National 
Bank aiming at the establishment of necessary conditions for monetary union have 
focused on the coordination of exchange-rate policies. The immediate goal has 
been the mutual convertibility of the two currencies based on exchange rates de­
termined by the operation of liquid currency markets.''4® The Belarusian leader­
ship’s regular use of currency emission as a means of financing real sector 
growth, however, resulted in the extreme weakness of the Belarusian rouble. In 
turn, this led the National Bank to maintain rigid controls on currency transac­
tions. ^ 4^  These perpetuated a disorderly situation characterised by the simultane­
ous presence of several exchange rates, one official rate set by the National Bank 
and a multitude of unofficial (e.g. commercial inter-bank transaction rate) and 
black-market rates, some of which exceeded the official rate by as much as four 
times. Actual economic conditions seem to create more potent obstacles standing 
in the way of monetary union. The two central banks, which have formed an Inter­
bank Currency Council, have been working on a list of preconditions, which are 
likely to prove very difficult to attain. They include full mutual convertibility of the 
two national currencies, the elimination of non-monetary transactions from both 
countries’ economies, the completion of market reforms and the rule of law in eco­
nomic activity. In line with the criteria set by the ELI for participation in monetary
in spring 2001. ‘Yukos’ has reportedly made an offerte buy a majority stake in Novopolotsk oil- 
processing plant and invest in the modernisation of oil pipelines crossing Belarus. Belarusskava 
Delovava Gazeta. 4 April 2001, p. 1 ; 7 May 2001, p. 4; Sovetskava Belorussiva. 3 April 2001, p. 1 : 
8 May 2001, p. 3
Agreements of January 1996 and March 1997 published in Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doao­
vorov. December 1996, pp. 34-36, and Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. May 1997, pp. 39-40
The Belarusian rouble was withdrawn (contrary to the provisions of the March 1997 agreement) 
from the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange in March 1998 after suffering catastrophic devalua­
tion, apparently brought about by currency speculators. Rossliskava Gazeta. 24 March 1998, p. 2. 
The official exchange rate of the Belarusian rouble was devalued by 400% between September 
1998 and June 1999 alone. EBRD, Transition Reporti 999. p. 194
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union, Russia and Belarus have been considering limits of 3 and 60% on a per­
missible budget deficit and state debt as a proportion of GDP respectively/4®
In 2000, the Belarusian authorities re-denominated the national currency, tight­
ened emission and achieved a degree of monetary stability, which emboldened 
them to request the Russian Central Bank to support the Belarusian rouble/4® 
wards the end of that year, a single exchange rate for the Belarusian currency was 
finally achieved, while there was progress in the deregulation of the banking sec­
tor, leading to an improved climate in the ongoing negotiations with the Russian 
Central Bank/®® In November 2000, Presidents Putin and Lukashenko signed an 
agreement “On the introduction of a single currency unit and the formation of a 
single emission centre of the Union state”. According to the agreement, the two 
countries are to form common gold, currency and other liquid asset reserves.^®  ^
After years of contestation, the Belarusian side has accepted the Russian rouble 
as the common currency and the presence of a single emission centre -  at least 
until 2008, when a new common currency may be introduced. It is planned that the 
Russian rouble will replace the Belarusian currency as of 2005/®^ The Belarusian 
National Bank has been reluctant to recognise the Russian Central Bank as the 
single currency emission centre and has insisted on a Union Central Bank with 
coordinating functions existing alongside the two national central banks, an option 
unacceptable to the Russian side. A Union Central Bank may be formed in 2008. 
Until then, it is not clear whether (as of January 2005) the Russian Central Bank 
will be solely responsible for currency emission or whether this will be the joint re­
sponsibility of the two central banks under the oversight of the Inter-bank Currency 
Council. In order to assist Belarus in its preparations for monetary union by 2005, 
Russia has agreed to provide a credit of $260 million for the support of the Belaru-
Kommersant’-Vlast’. 13 July 1999, p. 38. At that time, Russia’s budget deficit stood at 5.8% and 
its debt was 120% of GDP.
This request was granted by the Union-state Council of Ministers. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 14 
September 2000, p. 5
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 31 January 2001, p. 5
Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 30 November 2000; Agreement “On the introduction of a single 
currency and on the formation of a single emission centre of the Union-state", Bvulleten’ Mezhdu­
narodnvkh Doaovorov. October 2001, pp. 60-63 
Ibid.; Izvestiya. 15 November 2000, p. 2
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Sian rouble/®® However, the ratification of the agreement by the Belarusian Par­
liament, a precondition for the full disbursement of the funds, has been controver­
sial due to the Belarusian Constitution’s provision that the National Bank be the 
sole currency-emitting authority in the republic. The implementation of monetary 
union will require the prior amendment of the Belarusian Constitution -  probably in 
conjunction with the adoption of a Union Constitutional Act envisaged by the Un­
ion-state treaty/®4 The exchange rate of the Belarusian currency has been pegged 
to the Russian rouble as of the second quarter of 2001 /®®
Problems of economic Integration
It is clear that economic integration has defied the optimistic expectations re­
flected In the targets set by the Community treaty. The example of the European 
Community/Union helps place the progress rate of Russo-Belarusian economic 
integration into perspective. It took longer than four decades and a long series of 
exemptions, unimplemented agreements and regressive developments for West 
European countries to complete the single market.’’®® Leon Lindberg and Stuart 
Scheingold adapted neo-functionalist theory to account for disintegrative phenom­
ena in the evolution of the EC. In their seminal work, Europe’s Would-be Polity, 
they analysed how lack of consensus among member-states stalled the develop­
ment of a common transport policy and described the obstacles (such as tempo­
rary import restrictions and export subsidies) that stood on the way to the customs 
union. They introduced the concept of ‘spill-back’ to describe reductions in the 
sectoral scope of integration and/or in the capacities of supranational bodies, 
which were exemplified by the increasing non-implementation of agreed measures
Ibid.; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 1 December 2000, p. 1. According to EBRD experts, the partial 
disbursement of the credit at the end of 2000 contributed to an improvement of the Belarusian cur­
rent account position. EBRD, Transition Report Update. April 2001, p. 50 
Rossliskava Gazeta/ Ekonomicheskv Sovuz. 3 March 2001, p. 1 
Nezaavisimava Gazeta. 3 April 2001, p. 5
Exemption periods to the unified customs tariffs, the elimination of subsidies for national pro­
ducers, and the protection of ‘sensitive sectors’ were as long as 12 to 15 years. Haas, The Uniting 
of Europe, pp. 307-308
171
and corresponding use of unilateral action in the coal sector/®^ It appears unreal­
istic to expect the negotiation of mutually acceptable regulations and mechanisms 
for compensating disadvantages incurred as a result of economic integration to 
progress rapidly -  even if only two states are involved. The implementation of 
agreed measures equally presents many complications, as it requires government 
institutions to venture into novel tasks and coordinate their activities with foreign 
governmental and supranational agencies with evolving competences. Changes to 
national arrangements necessitated by legal harmonisation may be arduous 
and/or unwelcome to certain domestic constituencies. In the absence of a supra­
national court, the implementation of Russo-Belarusian integration agreements 
has relied on the conscientiousness and efficiency of national bureaucracies. In 
the opinion of several Russian and Belarusian experts interviewed by the author, 
the inadequate administrative capacity of both government apparatuses has been 
the main cause of delayed or partial implementation of measures aimed at eco­
nomic integration.'*®® As a senior analyst from a Russian governmental think-tank 
commented:
“Many laws of the Russian Federation are also not being implemented. Why should 
one expect agreements with Belarus to be handled any more effectively? The imple­
mentation of laws and international agreements is difficult and this is not a problem 
faced by Russia alone.”'*®^
The frequent government reshuffles, characteristic of the second Yeltsin admini­
stration, have also been detrimental to the consistency of the integration course.^ ®® 
To an extent, the failure to meet set targets for economic integration has been 
the product of bureaucratic politics, particularly within the Russian executive, 
which has been characterised by a higher degree of fragmentation than the Bela-
Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polltv: Patterns of Change in the 
European Communltv. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 163-168, 188-189, 198-207 
The Russian bureaucracy, however, attracted more criticism from both Belarusian and Russian 
observers, which may partly be related to a greater readiness on the part of the latter to be outspo­
ken about shortcomings in their own administration.
Author’s interview, Moscow, 29 November 1999
Author’s interview with State Duma official, Moscow, 23 June 1999
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rusian administration. The ministries primarily involved in the negotiation of inte­
gration agreements (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry for CIS Affairs In Rus­
sia; Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belarus) have had limited competences and re­
sources with respect to their implementation. Russia’s economic agencies (Minis­
try of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Central Bank, State Customs Committee) 
have often assigned a secondary priority to the integration process. This has oc­
curred especially during periods of particularly acute financial difficulties and in 
cases where the implementation of agreements with Belarus could have impaired 
short-term economic indicators taken into account by foreign creditors in their as­
sessment of the Russian economy. In 1998, the financial crisis led Russia to dis­
burse funds allocated to the Union budget by only 27% - to the irritation of the Bel­
arusian administration, which contributed 99% of its s h a r e .T h is  caused delays 
in several projects, including the modernisation of border Infrastructure. Likewise, 
due to the urgency of increasing budget revenue, the restoration of partial customs 
controls advocated by the State Customs committee prevailed over opposition 
from the Union Executive Committee, and Russia’s own Foreign and CIS Affairs 
Ministries.'*®  ^ The Belarusian President has used such instances as grounds for 
denouncing anti-integration forces within the Russian administration as responsi­
ble for the unsatisfactory record of implementation in the economic sphere.’*®® 
Such allegations have been contradicted by Belarusian officials who have praised 
the work of consecutive Russian governments -  including the one led by economic 
liberal Sergei Kiriyenko -  in ensuring the realisation of agreements.^®^ The failure 
of Belarus to disburse in full its share of the 2000 Union budget did not prevent 
President Lukashenko from urging the Parliamentary Assembly to increase the 
budget (3 billion roubles in 2001; 2.3 billion roubles in 2000).’*®®
At the same time, the Belarusian authorities have repeatedly failed to sanction
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 23 January 1999, p. 5. The Union-state budget consists of Belarusian 
and Russian contributions to 35% and 65% respectively.
For the relevant arguments among different agencies of the Russian executive, see Seaodnva. 
6 September 1996, p. 2
See for example his speech to the State Duma of 27 October 1999, in Rossliskava Federatsiva 
Seaodnva. no. 22,10  November 1999, pp. 6-11 
Author’s interview, Minsk, 15 November 1999
Belarusskava Delovava Gazeta. 21 March 2001, p. 2; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 6 June 2001, p. 5
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agreements requiring the adoption of reforms contradicting the socio-economic 
model with which President Lukashenko has associated his political reputation. 
Measures such as price liberalisation, large-scale privatisation, and the phasing- 
out of subsidies to major enterprises have been postponed or restricted to a mini­
mum because of their anticipated dire social consequences. Such reforms would 
be particularly painful for pensioners, and workers of agricultural collectives and 
large industrial enterprises, who represent the majority of Lukashenko supporters. 
Therefore, Belarusian observers expect very little progress on that score before 
the Presidential election of 2001. Instead, the Belarusian President proposed that 
Russia itself ought to learn from the experience of Belarus.**®® The Primakov gov­
ernment, which included prominent leftists such as Deputy PM Yury Maslyukov, 
adopted certain measures (e.g. currency and price controls, interruption of privati­
sation, state subsidies to industry) suggesting that Russian economic policy was 
moving closer to the Belarusian model. Although this proved a temporary shift in 
response to the crisis of August 1998, the apparently precarious position of the 
Stepashin and Putin governments encouraged the Belarusian government to delay 
market reforms required by the agreements until a firm leadership with a coherent 
economic policy emerged in Russia. Putin’s accession to the Presidency and the 
subsequent formulation of a coherent programme of economic reform in Russia 
drastically reduced the Belarusian administration’s scope of influencing Russia’s 
course according to the ‘Belarusian model’. Moreover, the functioning of the 
Council of Ministers (as of early 2000) brought Russia’s economic ministers and 
heads of related agencies to the centre of negotiations/ policy-making sessions in 
the context of Union with Belarus. The clear authority of Russian negotiators to en­
force the implementation of agreements has enhanced their credibility and placed 
the integration process on a more realistic footing.
Belarusian emphases in economic integration 
FinanciaNndustrial Groups
In the meantime, the Belarusian leadership was remarkably successful in pursu­
ing aspects of economic integration which presented immediate opportunities for
166 Kommersant’-Dailv. 12 March 1997, p. 4
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the expansion of trade and investment in the country's economy, while keeping 
Russian interference with the Belarusian socio-economic system to a minimum. 
These objectives have been advanced through two types of initiatives: trans­
national financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and joint production and/or trade agree­
ments between Belarus and individual regions of the Russian Federation. A com­
mon policy for industrial restructuring has been one of the most appealing aspects 
of economic integration for the Belarusian side. The agreement of March 1999 “On 
Production Cooperation" heeded the experience of Belarusian industrial policy in 
exempting inter-enterprise supplies of components and raw materials from Russia 
to Belarus and vice versa from VAT and excise d u t ie s .O th e r  measures have 
included joint production and research projects and the formation of transnational 
enterprises and inter-state financial-industrial groups (FIGs).'*®® These have been 
concentrated in sectors that the two sides have identified as the main priorities on 
the basis of potential profitability or contribution to defence capabilities (energy, 
machine-building, chemical, metallurgical and electronic industries). Joint research 
and development projects financed from the Union budget have covered dual-use 
technologies in the chemical, electronics and mechanical sectors with a view to 
raising the export potential and assisting the partial conversion of the two coun­
tries' military industries.’*®®
Transnational FIGs are set up by intergovernmental agreements and unite 
Russian and Belarusian enterprises (including banks) in joint production projects 
at least partly financed from the national and Union budgets. They appear to have 
been most successful in the MIC, where Russian and Belarusian enterprises have 
been particularly interdependent, at the same time as being - for the most part - 
technologically advanced and internationally competitive. Most FIGs established in 
later years have been exactly in this sector. Though FIGs have constituted the 
foremost priority for Union-state budget allocations, these have not always been 
disbursed on time. FIGs have also been intended to increase competitiveness in 
foreign markets and/or attract foreign investment. This consideration has been
Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 2000, pp. 52-54
Agreement "On the Conduct of a Single Structural industrial Policy", Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarod­
nvkh Doaovorov. February 2000, pp. 53-55
Sovuz Belarusi i Rossi I. Moscow: Executive Committee of the Union of Belarus and Russia,
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most pertinent to Belarusian policy-makers who hope that the presence of a Rus­
sian partner would increase the appeal of Belarusian enterprises to foreign inves­
tors weary of venturing into a small market/^® For Russian companies, transna­
tional FIGs have provided a means of involvement in the most promising state- 
controlled sectors of Belarusian industry with certain financial advantages (e.g. tax 
breaks and exemptions from customs duties on imported equipment) granted by 
legislation on FIGs. Investment in FIGs has been limited by lack of resources 
and/or by the Belarusian authorities’ refusal to cede majority ownership to Russian 
investors. Although legislation on FIGs provides for one of the participating enter­
prises to acquire shares in the remaining participants and to exercise control over 
the management of, it does not require that the head enterprise becomes a major­
ity stockholder. Besides, smaller participants may also acquire share packages in 
other enterprises within the FIG -  including the head enterprise.'*^’'
This problem is illustrated by the example of the first Russo-Belarusian FIG, 
‘Slavneft’, which has, nevertheless, been one of the most successful cases. Slav- 
neft was established in autumn 1994 with the special function of supporting the 
unification of the two countries’ energy systems. Russia’s Ministry of State Prop­
erty owns 45% of Slavneft shares, with another 30% belonging to the Russian 
Federal Property Fund. The Belarusian state owns 11%.^^^ Slavneft, now one of 
the major oil companies exploiting Russia’s reserves, has its own bank, ‘Slavneft- 
bank’, and an extensive network of petrol stations in both states.'*^® The Mozyr and
1997, p. 60
Author's interview with senior official from the Belarusian Ministry of Economy, Minsk, 19 No­
vember 1999
Vasily M. Shlyndikov, “Finansovo-Promyshlennye Gruppy kak Forma Razvitiya Integratsionnykh 
Svyazei s Rossiei", in L.K. Zlotnikov and V.M. Shlyndikov (eds.), Ekonomicheskava Politika: Analiz 
i Al’ternativa. Minsk: Association for the Assistance of Economic Development (ASER), 1999, pp. 
312-314
Slavneft was initially established by an Intergovernmental agreement in 1994, according to 
which the Russian and Belarusian states owned 75% and 11% respectively. Russian oil companies 
‘Lukoil’ and ‘Yukos’ received the rest of the shares at the time. Interfax-ANI. 21 September 1999 
and Prime-Tass. 24 May 2000, via rusoil.ru
Apart from ‘Slavneftbank’, there are another two Russo-Belarusian banks,‘Belgazprombank’ and 
‘MinskKompleksbank’, In which the share of Russian capital is 70% and 49% respectively. Alek­
sandr Gordeichik, ‘‘Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Rossi ei i Belarus’yu’’, in Russian
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Novopolotsk oil-processing plants in Belarus also form part of the FIG, though 
Belarus has maintained majority stakes in these enterprises. This peculiarity has 
been a product of divergences in national legislative provisions on FIGs and has 
represented a stumbling block in the planned modernisation of the Mozyr plant, as 
the Belarusian leadership has been reluctant to contribute financially in proportion 
to its controlling s t a k e . The formation of a gas industry FIG to unite ‘Beltrans- 
gaz', the company managing the fuel pipeline system in Belarus, with ‘Gazprom’ 
has not yet materialised also as a result of the Belarusian leadership's reluctance 
to privatise such strategic assets. It is unlikely that Belarus will obtain gas at prices 
applicable to the Russian domestic market before its gas-exporting pipelines come 
under Gazprom ownership as provided by the ‘Programme of Actions’ attached to 
the Union-state t re a ty .T h is  will require the lifting of the legislative ban on the 
privatisation of energy and utilities companies imposed by the Belarusian Parlia­
ment in May 1999.
In the remaining sectors, credits from the national and Union budgets, which 
accompanied the creation of the FIGs, have assisted the modernisation of Soviet- 
era production lines involving enterprises from the two countries and -  in some 
cases -  results in terms of increased competitiveness have began to be discerni­
ble. ‘Belrusavto’, which, as of 1996, has restored disrupted links between comple­
mentary enterprises in the automotive sector, has been praised as an example of 
how transnational FIGs can contribute to the modernisation of the two countries’ 
industry. Apart from governmental and Union resources, it has obtained loans from 
Japanese commercial creditors and developed public transport vehicles conform­
ing to EU standards.Belarusian enterprises have also joined ‘Nizhegorodskye 
avtomobily’, a more recently established FIG in the same sector. ‘Oboronitel’nye 
SIstemy’, originally formed in 1997 under the name ‘Granat’, comprises 17 enter­
prises producing components for air-defence systems and is expected to advance
Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economic and Political Studies, Rossiisko-Belorusskle Otnosh- 
enlva: Problemv I Persoektlw. Moscow: ‘Epikon’, 1998, p. 53
The Belarusian state oil company'Belneftkhim’ holds a 58% stake in the plant. Interview of Slav­
neft Chairman Mikhail Gutseriev in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 12 February 2000, p. 4
Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. March 2000, p. 79
See interview of Anatoly Malofeyev, First Deputy Chairman of the Union Parliamentary Assem­
bly, in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 18 January 2000, p. 5
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the Union’s joint military procurement and export strategies/^^ The FIG is highly 
profitable, having obtained contracts for the export of the S-300PMU air-defence 
missile system to Greece and China and for the modernisation of the earlier sys­
tems that Egypt and India had purchased from the Soviet Union/^® Tochnost” in­
cludes 16 enterprises from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine involved in the develop­
ment and production of guided weapons systems/^® In total, 19 joint production 
programmes exist with the participation of 280 Russian and Belarusian enterprises 
engaged in military technology, employing an estimated 400,000 people/®® 
‘Aerofin’ was established in October 1996 as FIG-cum-holding company with 
shares in airline companies (including ‘Belavia’, the Belarusian national carrier), 
airport management and aircraft repair enterprises/®'* ‘Mezgosmetiz’ unites five 
metallurgical enterprises and ‘Interagroinvest’ is active in the production of fertilis­
ers. ‘Formash’ comprises 44 enterprises and research institutes involved in the 
development and production of chemical fibres.^®  ^ According to Yegor Stroyev 
(Chairman of Russia’s Federation Council), the above three FIGs have enabled 
Russia and Belarus to reduce operating costs by half.'*®® ‘Elektronnye Tekhnologii’ 
brings together research institutes and producers of various electroniccompo- 
nents, most of which have military applications. As part of an effort towards grad­
ual conversion, it has pioneered the programme ‘Soyuzny Televizor’ for the mass 
production of technologically advanced television sets, which are to be available at 
lower prices than imported models and cover a third of the domestic market.''®  ^
Due to delays in the implementation of the Union-state budget, funding for the pro­
ject has been incomplete.^®® Nevertheless, significant increases in output and prof-
Reuters via Russia Todav at vwvw.russiatodav.com/news.php3?ld=133945 
The FIG’S total exports were estimated to have exceeded $1 billion. Interfax, Diplomatic Pano­
rama. 25 April 2000
Gordeichik, "Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo”, p. 45 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 26 January 1999, p. 5 
Ibid., pp. 44-45
The relevant agreements were published in Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. January 
1999, pp. 42-48; March 1999, pp. 81-83; July 1999, pp. 41-46
Speech given at the St Petersburg Economic Forum of June 1999, published in Problems of 
Economic Transition, vol. 43, no. 2, June 2000, p. 8 
Rossliskava Gazeta/ Biznes v Rossii. 11 July 2000, p. 3 
Seaodnva. 20 September 2000, p. 3
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itability were announced in early 2001, bringing the group among the top five tele­
vision set suppliers to the Russian market/®® ‘Optronika’ Is another Russo- 
Belarusian FIG in the electronics sector. ‘Slavyanskaya bumaga’ links firms from 
the two countries’ paper-production industries.'*®  ^ The latest addition to Russo- 
Belarusian FIGs has been ‘Aerokosmicheskoye Oborudovaniye’ (aerospace sec­
tor), which was established in April 2001/®®
Economic links between Beiarus and Russian regions
Direct economic relations based on agreements between Belarus and individual 
units of the Russian Federation have been credited with a significant share of the 
growth in bilateral trade since 1995. Again, their exact value has been subject to 
speculation, as common type of these agreements have involved barter ex­
changes of Belarusian foodstuffs, chemicals or machinery -  especially consumer 
goods - in return for raw materials, energy or industrial products from Russian re­
gions/®® Belarus has concluded economic agreements with more than two thirds 
of Russian federal units, with varying degrees of effectiveness.'*®° Ten Russian re­
gions have accounted for 73% of total trade between the two countries/®'* In 1997, 
trade turnover between Belarus and 15 Russian regions was estimated to have 
increased by more than 150%, while growth of 250% was reported in the cases of 
Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Tver and Orlov oblasts/®^ Diversion of existing trade
186 Belarusskava Delovava Gazeta. 4 May 2001, p. 4
Documents provided by the Belarusian MPA (2000).
168 Sovetskava Belorussiva. 3 April 2001, p. 1
A senior Belarusian official interviewed by the author (Minsk, 19 November 1999) estimated the 
share of agreements with Russian regions to around 15% of Russo-Belarusian trade.
In his address to the Supreme Council of the Russia-Belarus Union in January 1999, Luka­
shenko referred to agreements with 66 regions. Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus 
and Russia, Informatsionnv bvulleten’. January-March 1999, p. 9. In March 2000, Belarus con­
cluded new agreements with Karachaevo-Cherkesiya and the Nenets Autonomous District. Nezav­
isimava Gazeta. 3 March 2000, p. 2, and 14 March 2000, p. 5
These are Moscow, Moscow oblast’, St Petersburg, Ingushetia, and the Tyumen, Smolensk, 
Yaroslavl’, Niznhy-Novogorod, Kaliningrad, and Rostov oblasts. Document provided by the Belaru­
sian Foreign Ministry (2000).
Sultanov, “Rossiya i Beiorusslya’’, p. 23
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appears to have played an important part in generating such figures, with Belaru­
sian enterprises typically replacing Ukrainian suppliers/®® The lower cost of Bela­
rusian goods owing to the free trade regime and the possibility of barter payments 
partly account for this phenomenon.
Another factor has been President Lukashenko's active pursuit of such agree­
ments. As a Russian analyst put it, the Belarusian President “has been acting as a 
salesman for his country's products”.'*®4 Lukashenko has visited most Russian 
federal units and repeatedly hosted Russian governors in Belarus. He has devel­
oped close personal ties with a number of governors such as Lisitsyn of Yaroslavl’ 
and Kondratenko of Krasnodar, which have been accompanied by extensive eco­
nomic relations. Initially, these initiatives met with opposition from the Russian 
federal authorities, which were anxious to preserve control over external relations 
and discourage the formation of a pro-Lukashenko lobby among Russia’s regional 
elite. In 1997, the administrations of Lipetsk and Yaroslavl’ oblasts were instructed 
to cancel Lukashenko’s planned visits on the grounds that visits by foreign heads 
of state had to be arranged at Foreign Ministry level.^ ®® A year later, half of the 
forty. Russian governors invited by Lukashenko to attend a political festival in Bela­
rus avoided making a personal appearance in order not to displease the federal 
authorities.^®® For most regions maintaining particularly extensive economic rela­
tions to Belarus, pragmatic considerations and encouraging results in terms of re­
duced shortages, higher employment and social stability have fostered commit­
ment to the preservation and expansion of these llnks.’*®^ In Yaroslavl’, for exam-
Ibid. Also, author’s interviews, Moscow, 28 June 1999, and Minsk, 19 November 1999 
Author’s interview, Moscow, 28 June 1999 
Author’s Interview, Yaroslavl’, 15 December 1999 
I zv estiva. 30 July 1998, p. 1
This applies relatively less to exceptionally prosperous regions with highly developed foreign 
economic relations (e.g. Moscow, Moscow oblast’, Tatarstan) and more to the regions of the so- 
called ‘red belt’ (e.g. Yaroslavl’, Pskov, Tula, Kostroma, Vladimir, Smolensk). The governors of 
these regions have been campaigning for more rapid progress in the inter-state integration process 
and have been actively participating in Union institutions. For example, Bryansk governor LodWn 
succeeded the former governor of Smolensk as Deputy Chairman of the Union Executive Commit­
tee in March 1999. See also Mikhail Alexseev and Vladimir Vagin, “Russian Regions in Expanding 
Europe: The Pskov Connection", Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51, no. 1, January-February 1999, pp. 
48-49
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pie, approximately 200,000 jobs have been directly connected with trade and joint 
production agreements with Belarus, which the regional administration has cred­
ited with social stability achieved in terms of timely payment of wages/®® Critics of 
such arrangements have contended that apparent growth and social stability could 
not be sustained for long, as they have been due to the recreation of a system al­
lowing inefficient enterprises to survive in ways similar to those provided by the 
command economy/®®
Such arguments are bound to find little resonance among governors of eco­
nomically depressed regions with meagre hopes of attracting foreign investors. In 
some cases, like those of the restored links between the Minsk and Yaroslavl’ 
automotive industries, investment and modernisation of production has begun to 
take place. According to another investment-focused agreement between the Bel­
arus and the Nenets Autonomous District, Belarusian company ‘Belorusneft’ has 
undertaken the extraction of the district’s oil reserves.^®® A joint enterprise set up 
by Belarus and Kalmykia is to perform the same function with respect to Kalmyk 
reserves.^®  ^ Belarus took on the role of the investor in financing shipbuilding and 
the development of port and other transport infrastructure in Kaliningrad.^®^ The 
Russian federal authorities have taken an increasingly positive view of agreements 
between Belarus and individual regions with the proviso that the documents be 
submitted to the Foreign Ministry in order to ensure their compliance with the Rus­
sian constitution and international obligations assumed by the Russian Federation. 
To this end, the Ministry has established a department responsible for directing the 
development of regions’ foreign relations.^®® Nevertheless, the leadership of the
Documents provided by the Yaroslavl' oblast’ administration. The production of four major en­
terprises from the oblast’ has been tied to the ‘Belrusavto’ FIG. A journalist working for the main 
regional paper referred to strikes due to non-payment of wages in ‘Avtodizel’, the largest enterprise 
in the oblast’ and part of ‘Belrusavto’. Author’s interview, Yarosiavl’, 15 December 1999 
Author’s interview with West European diplomat, Minsk, 10 November 1999 
°^°Nezavlslmava Gazeta. 3 March 2000, p. 2
Belarus has already invested in a tractor-assembly plant in the republic. Rossliskava Ga- 
zeta/Ekonomicheskv Sovuz. 24 October 2000, p. 1
The agreement was concluded during Lukashenko’s visit to Kaliningrad in October 1999. The 
text was published in Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnvkh Doaovorov. September 2000, pp. 74-77
Author’s interview with Russian Foreign Ministry official, 2 December 1999. See also E. Kuzmin, 
“Russia: The Center, the Regions, and the Outside World’’, International Affairs (Moscow), vol. 45,
181
Foreign Ministry has felt the need to repeatedly warn governors not to exceed their 
authority by seeking to shape the course of integration with B e l a r u s / ® ^  Minis­
try for CIS Affairs has also become involved in the negotiation of agreements be­
tween Belarus and the Russian regions/®® The Belarusian embassy has ap­
pointed economic missions in five regions outside Moscow.
Russia and Ukraine: erratic cooperation
According to Russian and Ukrainian experts interviewed by the author, there 
has been hardly any progress in implementing the long-term Economic Coopera­
tion Programme signed in February 1998. This appears to be particularly the case 
of provisions referring to policy coordination and legal convergence. For Ukraine, 
approximating EU, not Russian, legislation has been an officially declared priority 
since June 1998. In the assessment of some Russian and Ukrainian economic ex­
perts alike, Ukraine’s declared aspiration to EU membership dictates the reorienta­
tion of production standards and trade away from Russia and the CIS. So long as 
Russia and Ukraine are guided by diverging strategic priorities, the observable 
tendency driving their economies apart is deemed all but irreversible.^®® However, 
bilateral economic relations have not always conformed with this tendency, just as 
two countries’ strategic priorities have not been always been in direct conflict -  es­
pecially since the Ukrainian leadership has sought accommodation with the Putin 
administration.
no. 1,1999, pp. 114-115
Speech by Foreign Minister Ivanov to the Regions’ Council for International and Foreign Eco­
nomic Ties as reported In Kommersant’-Dailv. 31 January 2001, p. 3
For example, the Deputy Minister for CIS Affairs signed the aforementioned agreement on long­
term cooperation between Belarus and Kaliningrad oblast’. East West Institute, Russian Regional 
Report, vol. 4, no. 39, 21 October 1999
Author’s Interviews, Moscow, 21 June and 30 November 1999; Kiev, 28 October and 3 Novem­
ber 1999
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Industrial Cooperation: the Military-Industrial Sector and the Energy industry
The reasoning linking the decline in economic interaction between Russia and 
Ukraine to a divergence in strategic priorities appears to stem from two highly pub­
licised cases of MIC export contracts, which were frustrated due to the combina­
tion of technological interdependence and conflicting political objectives. In August 
1996, Ukraine obtained a contract worth over $600 million for the delivery of T- 
80UD tanks to Pakistan. At the beginning of the following year, Ukraine supplied 
15 tanks, which failed to meet the buyers’ expectations, as they lacked essential 
parts produced only in Russia. Surprised that Ukraine had been able to self- 
sufficiently produce any tanks at all, the Russian Minister of Foreign Economic Re­
lations announced that Russia would not be providing the necessary parts (en­
gines, guided weapons systems, guns, etc). He justified this decision on the 
grounds that Russia had not been consulted when the contract was concluded and 
that the strengthening of Pakistan’s military capabilities posed a threat to Russian 
security interests, which lay with its strategic partnership with India, Pakistan’s 
main adversary.Vladimir Gorbulin, then Chairman of Ukraine’s National Secu­
rity Council, warned that future deliveries of components to the Russian space in­
dustry would be made conditional on Russia’s supply of the parts needed for the 
T-80UD tanks, but to no avail.^°® Ukraine obtained used parts from Eastern Euro­
pean countries in order to salvage the contract and subsequently developed pro­
duction lines of its own supplanting Russian-made parts, as it had done in the 
case of SU-27 aircraft.^®® Russia did likewise with regard to components needed 
for Topol’ M’ missiles, which had been formerly supplied by the Ukrainian enter­
prise ‘Universal’. G o r b u l i n ’s threat materialised a year later, when Ukraine re­
fused to supply turbines for a nuclear power plant Russia had contracted to build 
in Iran. Again, the dispute was a product of conflicting strategic alignments, as
Kommersant-Dailv. 21 February 1997, p. 4
208 Seaodnva. 25 February 1997, p. 4
Kommersant’-Dailv. 18 March 1998, p. 5
Interview of Vladimir Gorbulin (Chairman of Ukraine’s State Commission on MIC Affairs) in 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 6 September 2000, p. 5
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Ukraine reluctantly forsook $45 million it would have gained from the contract un­
der intense pressure from the US Secretary of State
Overall, disintegrative tendencies among the MICs of the two countries have not 
been in line with state priorities in either Russia or Ukraine, since most instances 
of successful implementation of the Economic Cooperation Programme have 
come from this sector. The space and missile industries in particular have raised 
their international competitiveness thanks to special agreements ensuring that 
supply chains would not be disrupted and that joint research and development 
would be enhanced.^’*^  A Ukrainian research unit was incorporated in the Russian 
part of the ‘Mir’ international space station and a joint space research centre has 
been established in the Ukrainian city of Yevpatoriya. '^*® Scientists and industrial 
enterprises from the two countries have been working on joint projects for the ap­
plication of advanced military technologies to highly lucrative civilian purposes. 
These have included the modification of the 88-18, 88-19 and R8-20 ballistic 
missiles for the launch of satellites (bilateral ‘Dnepr’ project and multilateral 'Global 
Star’ project) and the ‘Sea Launch’ project (with the participation of the US and 
Norway as well) involving the launch of satellites from sea platforms using ‘Zenit’
missiles/^4
The aeronautical industry has provided further success stories, beginning with 
the joint development of transport aircraft based on the AN-70 and AN-140 models 
modified according to European standards. '^*® The new aircraft may have failed to 
conquer European markets, but has attracted Chinese interest. The project has 
been followed up with the modernisation of the AN-124-100 ‘Ruslan’ model, whose
Rossliskava Gazeta. 11 March 1998, p. 7
Agreements ‘On cooperation in the field of creation and expioitation of space and missile 
equipment’ (February 1995) and ‘On cooperation in the field of research and use of space for 
peaceful purposes’ (August 1996) in Bvulleten’ Mezhdunarodnykh Doaovorov. October 1995, pp. 
39-42 and February 1999, pp. 38-43
Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. July 1997, p. 44
These projects began before the conclusion of the Economic Cooperation Programme, which 
prioritised their successful development. Rossliskava Gazeta. 25 February 1997, p. 7; Gorbulin’s 
interview in Nezavisimava Gazeta. 6 September 2000, p. 5; interview of Aleksand Kuznetsov of the 
Russian Aviation and Space Agency, Nezavisimava Gazeta. 19 November 1999, p. 5
PMs Putin and Pustovoitenko praised the project as an example of successful bilateral coopera­
tion in technologically sophisticated sectors. Diplomaticheskv Vestnik. November 1999, p. 41
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production had been interrupted for five years. The first orders for the aircraft were 
received from cooperating Russian and Ukrainian airline companies ‘Volga-Dnepr’ 
and ‘Antonov Airlines’.^ '*® An American company has undertaken its promotion in 
the US cargo transport market.^^^ Joint research, development and production has 
not occurred within the framework of a FIG, but of a consortium, which does not 
entail the joint management of the participating enterprises. '^*® In 1998, another 
project for the development of new generation TU-334 aircraft was launched.^^® 
Nuclear power production has been another sector where Soviet-era links have 
been developed. Since 1998, Russia has been participating in the construction of 
new reactors for the Rovno and Khmelnitsky power plants and has provided cred­
its -  mostly in the form of nuclear fuel and other equ ipm en t .An  agreement of 
April 1998, intended to assist bilateral industrial cooperation, exempted services 
and goods exported or imported for this purpose from taxes and customs duties.^^^ 
It is worth noting that none of the aforementioned projects has been carried out 
within the framework of a transnational FIG, though, as has been mentioned ear­
lier, Ukrainian MIC enterprises have been part of the FIG ‘Tochnost". The Russo- 
Ukrainian FIG ‘Mezhdunarodnye Aviamotory' was established in March 1995 to 
preserve research and production ties among enterprises from the two countries' 
aviation industries.^^^ The Programme of Measures attached to the Programme of 
Economic Cooperation (1998-2007) provided for the creation of four transnational 
structures (FIGs) in the automobile sector and specified more than fifty joint re­
search and production projects in the metallurgical, energy, space exploration, the 
military-industrial and other sec to rs .M os t  of these were reported to have made
216 Nezavisimava Gazeta. 30 June 2000, p. 5
Interfax, CiS Dailv News Brief. 17 October 2000, p. 1
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(Samara) and ‘Aviant’ (Kiev). Nezavisimava Gazeta. 12 March 2001, p. 5. A tender for the partici­
pation of other enterprises was announced in 2001 due to the inability of ‘Aviakor’ to implement 
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very slow progress, if any at all/^^ [p, February 2001, a meeting of Presidents Putin 
and Kuchma in Dniepropetrovsk was devoted to economic cooperation, with spe­
cial emphasis on the aviation and aerospace industries. A total of 16 agreements 
were signed, including a ‘Programme on Inter-regional and Border Cooperation’ 
for the period 2001-2007; a ‘Memorandum on a Unified Industrial Policy’ (to be fol­
lowed by an agreement on FIGs); and a ‘Memorandum on the Creation of a Single 
Energy System’, establishing a parallel working regime for the two countries’ elec­
tricity grids with a view to increasing electricity exports to Moldova and Ger- 
many.^^® The latter agreement, in conjunction with the settlement of the gas debt 
question in late 2000, allowed President Putin to speak of the energy sector as 
one of the foremost areas of bilateral cooperation and announce that disputes in 
this sphere had finally been resolved.
Russian investment in Ukraine
Statistical data would suggest that Russia’s contribution to total foreign direct in­
vestment (FDI) in Ukraine has not lived up to the expectations raised by the Eco­
nomic Cooperation Programme. In 1996, Russia with 7.9% featured as the third 
largest source of FDI behind the US (19%) and Germany (16.1%).^^^ As President 
Putin has admitted, legislative restrictions on currency exports have so far repre­
sented a barrier to Russian investment abroad, including in Ukraine. Russia’s 
planned liberalisation of currency exports are expected to bolster such invest­
ment.^^® In many cases, Russian investors have been discouraged by the same 
problems that Western firms have been complaining of (e.g. contradictory and un-
Author’s interviews, Kiev, October-November 1999
Russia agreed to export electricity to Ukraine in exchange for the transit of its exports beyond 
Ukraine’s western borders. Seaodnva. 13 February, pp. 1, 5; Rossliskava Gazeta. 13 February, p.
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predictably changing legislation, excessive bureaucratic regulation and arbitrary 
behaviour on the part of state officials -  especially tax officials).Although such 
impediments have plagued business operations in Russia itself, inadequate pro­
tection of investors rights by the authorities and the tax burden have been blamed 
for rendering the business climate in Ukraine even worse than that prevailing in 
Belarus.^^° Perceptions of discrimination have represented an additional obstacle, 
as Russian business people have often attributed the indifference shown by state 
authorities towards the non-fulfilment of contractual obligations assumed by 
Ukrainian partners to ‘anti-Russian’ attitudes.^^^ During a visit by Ukrainian Foreign 
Minister Boris Tarasyuk to Moscow, many of Russia's business leaders he had in­
vited to a meeting did not participate as an expression of their discontent with the 
Ukrainian authorities’ treatment of their business Interests. As one of the bankers 
invited put it, “there will be no meeting with the Foreign Minister so long as he 
does not solve my problems”.
Regardless of such tensions, Russian and Ukrainian experts alike have esti­
mated the level of actual Russian investment as much higher than that indicated 
by statistical data and as comparable to total Western FDI. Most of this ‘hidden’ 
Russian investment is said to contribute to Ukraine’s allegedly huge ‘grey econ­
omy’, ending up in diffuse sectors and, therefore, hardly being amenable to any 
political control -  from Russia or Ukraine.^^^ Though it is barely possible to verify 
these estimates, several factors lend them plausibility. Switzerland and Cyprus, 
well-known as destinations of capital exported from Russia, have figured quite 
prominently among sources of FDI in the Ukrainian economy, suggesting that 
capital of Russian origin has -  most likely -  formed the bulk of these investments.
Ishaq, “FDI In Ukraine”, 103-105; Foreign Investors have equally reported acute difficulties due 
to changing tax legislation in Russia as well. Rudiger Ahrend, “FDI into Russia: Pain without 
Gain?”, Russian Economic Trends. June 2000, p. 6
Author’s interview with leader of a Russian business association, Moscow, 1 December 1999. 
In Ukraine, the corporate tax rate has been set at 30% (the same as in Russia and Belarus), but 
the total number of taxes enterprises are liable to has been higher and compliance procedures 
more complex. EBRD, Transition Report 1999. p. 279
Author’s interview with leader of a Russian business association, Moscow, 1 December 1999 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 27 May 2000, p. 1
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 2 and 4 November 1999; Moscow, 30 November 1999
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Furthermore, Russian Investors have tended to be interested less in the sectors 
that have attracted most of the Western FDI (trade and other service industries; 
food-processing and light industries) and more in those where foreign investors 
have been barred from majority ownership. In June 1999, Ukrainian Premier Va­
lery Pustovoitenko referred to the simplification of Ukrainian legislation on transna­
tional FIGs and to 250 agreements with Russia on the creation of joint enterprises 
in sectors such as shipbuilding, energy, and heavy machine-building.^^'* Hitherto, 
however, the Ukrainian authorities had not been enthusiastic about FIGs involving 
Russia from concern over ceding control of strategic sectors of the economy and 
projecting the impression that Ukraine might be following the example of Belarus. 
Against this background, Russian industrialists have adopted a different approach 
to acquiring Ukrainian enterprises. Major Russian industrial concerns have estab­
lished Ukrainian subsidiaries, which, in turn, have submitted bids for stocks made 
available In some of Ukraine’s largest plants. Alternatively, they have acquired mi­
nority stakes, which, combined with those of allied minority shareholders, have 
given them de facto control.
Almost all major Ukrainian enterprises in the oil-refining sector seem to have 
come under some form of Russian c o n t ro l . I n  1999, ‘Luk-Syntez Oil’, a Ukrain­
ian-registered subsidiary of Russia’s largest oil company, ‘Lukoil’, acquired 51.9% 
of shares in the Odessa oil-processing plant. Like in most comparable cases, the 
sale was made conditional on the new owner’s annual deliveries of specified 
amounts of crude oil to the plant, which ‘Lukoil’ failed to meet in the first year of 
ownership.^^ Lukoil has, however, invested a reported $1.45 million in the mod­
ernisation of the plant, which is estimated to enable a substantial increase in out- 
put.^^  ^ The Tyumen Oil Company obtained a controlling stake in the Lisichansk
speech given at the St Petersburg Economic Forum of June 1999, published in Problems of 
Economic Transition, vol. 43, no. 2, June 2000, pp. 19-20
Indeed, the sale of Ukrainian enterprises’ stock to Russian oil companies was a provision of the 
Programme of Measures attached to the Economic Cooperation Programme. Rossiisko- 
Ukrainskive Otnosheniva 1990-1997 aa.. p. 85
’Lukoil’ promised to increase deliveries in the following years. Prime TASS. 27 January 2000, 
via www.rusoil.ru
Zerkalo Nedeli. 31 March-7 April 2001, p. 5
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plant (Linos), which is the largest one in Ukraine.^^® ‘UkrTatnafta’, a Tatneft” sub­
sidiary, bought 48.6% of shares in the Kremenchug oil-refining plant, with another 
8.3% belonging to 'Zenit' Bank of Moscow. The Russian concern ‘Gruppa Aryans' 
and ‘Kazakhoil’ (Kazakhstan) have been managing the Kherson plant, in which 
they own 50% plus one share. Another Russian company ‘Al’fa-Nafta’ acquired 
26% of shares in the state-owned ‘Neftekhimik Prikarpat’ya’ (Ivano-Frankovsk 
oblast’).
The Nikolayev Aluminium plant, one the enterprises which had featured most 
prominently in the lists of Russian negotiators advancing debt-for-equity proposals, 
has also come under Russian control by means of a deal arranged between 
President Kuchma and Anatoly Chubais, director of Russia’s electricity grid ‘United 
Energy Systems’. ‘Sibirsky Alyuminy' acquired 36% of shares and a further 30% 
were later bought by its Ukrainian subsidiary ‘Ukrainsky Alyuminy’, which had 
been established exactly for this purpose. According to the conditions of the sale, 
the new owners have undertaken to cover the debts of the enterprise, to construct 
a new plant of an annual capacity exceeding 100,000 tonnes and to raise the out­
put of the existing plant by almost a t h i r d . A  similar arrangement has been nego­
tiated with the Russian concern ‘AvtoVAZ-Invest’, which acquired a 68% stake in 
the Zaporozhiya aluminium plant in early 2001. "^** ‘AvtoVaz’, Russia’s largest pro­
ducer of automobiles, has also acquired the Ukrainian assembly plant LuAZ 
(Volyn’ oblast’), where it has built a new production line. '^*  ^The pending privatisa­
tion of ‘Khartron’, producer of SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, and of ‘Yuzhmash’, 
Ukraine’s largest machine-building plant, which also produces missiles for the 
launch of satellites as well as agricultural machinery, has also been the subject of
Seaodnva. 3 October 2000
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 10 March 2000, p. 4. Ukraine’s State Property Fund, however, declined 
a bid by ‘United Energy Systems’ for the Sevastopol electricity company on the grounds that UES 
was not an electricity generator. Rossiiskava Gazeta/ Ekonomicheskv Sovuz. 16 January 2001, p.
1
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 31 March 2000, p. 4
Although a Ukrainian firm won the initial auction for the plant, the Ukrainian State Property Fund 
re-opened negotiations with ‘AvtoVAZ-invest’ following the winning firm’s failure to produce the re­
quired bank guarantees in support of its bid. Izvestiva. 12 January 2001, p. 5.
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 13 May 2000, p. 2
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Russo-Ukrainian negotiations. Management of agricultural machinery production 
line in ‘Yuzhmash’ has been offered to Russia’s ‘Rostelmash’.^ '*^  Gazprom is keen 
to obtain a major stake in ‘Ukrtransgaz’, to which Ukraine’s gas exporting infra­
structure belongs. '^ '^* There have been some acquisitions in the banking sector, 
with Russia’s ‘Alfa Bank’ having bought the Ukrainian bank ‘Kyivinvest’ and having 
set up a separate Ukrainian subsidiary. ‘Ukrsotsbank’ is also reported to have 
come under Russian ownership.
The recovery of the Russian economy, which began in 1999, enabled Russian 
business concerns to acquire assets abroad, a process that has unfolded in paral­
lel with the consolidation of business groups (most notably, in the metallurgical 
and oil sectors) inside Russia itself. Another essential factor in this wave of acqui­
sitions by Russian capital was the remarkable shift in the position of Ukraine’s po­
litical and business leadership in favour of inviting Russian participation in the pri­
vatisation of ‘strategic enterprises'.^"^^ In December 2000, a group of prominent 
Ukrainian businesspeople came to Moscow precisely for this purpose, while Rus­
sia’s role in Ukrainian privatisation has been repeatedly discussed in a multitude of 
high-level bilateral meetings -  including between the two countries’ Presidents. 
Importantly, this has not been the result of Russian pressures, as President Ku­
chma has taken the initiative in this issue.^ '*® There can be little doubt that the 
aforementioned acquisitions and subsequent outlays on infrastructure modernisa­
tion have formed the most sizeable part of Russian investment in Ukraine, which is 
reported to have risen impressively since 1999.^ *^^  The impact of these enterprise 
acquisitions may not, however, be fully perceptible in statistical data, since the 
buyers have -  in many cases - been enterprises registered in Ukraine. The flow of 
investments has not been completely unidirectional, with Ukrainian investment be-
East West Institute, Russian Regional Investor, vol. 2, no. 32, & September 2000
Hitherto, ‘Ukrtransgaz’ had been part of state-controlled ‘Neftegaz Ukrainy’. Izvestiva. 5 October
2000, p. 6
The reasons for this shift, which relate to Ukraine’s domestic politics and economic situation, wiil 
be looked at in the next chapter.
President Putin’s interview to the Ukrainian media, 6 February 2001. Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. 
March 2001, p. 43
In 2000, Russian FDI stood at $314 million (8.13% of total FDI), while Cyprus appeared as the 
second largest investor in Ukraine.
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ing of notable importance for certain Russian regions such as Belgorod and
Rostov. '^*®
Trade relations
Given Ukraine’s dependence on imports of Russian fuel and the high levels of 
technological interdependence linking most of its heavy industry to Russia, even 
national-minded Ukrainian politicians and experts have recognised that Russia will 
necessarily remain Ukraine’s main trading partner in the foreseeable future. '^*® In 
several industrial sectors, the creation of self-sufficient production lines would en­
tail unaffordable costs in time and resources.^®® Despite the decline in bilateral 
trade, calculations by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
suggest that Ukraine, like Belarus and -  to a lesser extent -  Russia, has continued 
to trade with the CIS to a far higher extent than levels that could have been pre­
dicted based on geographical proximity and the size of a trading partner’s market. 
At the same time, in the cases of all three countries, trade with the EU has grown 
but has lagged behind predicted levels owing to lack of competitiveness of Rus­
sian, Ukrainian and Belarusian exports as well as a variety of restrictions Imposed 
in either di recti on. As of 1998, Ukraine remained the largest importer of Russian 
goods in the world, though it had dropped to third place among the leading export­
ers to the Russian market. In 1997, Russia was the destination of 26% of 
Ukraine’s exports and the source of 46% of its imports.^®  ^Though the Ukrainian 
leadership has had a reasonably successful policy of progressive trade reorienta­
tion towards the EU and Central Europe (trade with the EU rose by 38% between
Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov, in a press interview given during his visit in Khar’kov (February 
2001), referred to Ukrainian investment in more than 500 enterprises in Belgorod obstast', in more 
than 100 in Rostov oblast’, and in around 50 in Voronezh oblast’. Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. March 
2001, p. 49
Belov (ed.), Ukraine 2000 and Beyond, p. 60
For estimates of different industrial sectors’ dependence of Russian-made components, see R. 
Yevzerov, Ukraina: s Rossiei vmeste ill vroz’?. Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2000, pp. 40-43 
EBRD, Transition Report 1999. pp. 91-92
Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, External Economic Activities of the CIS Countries. 
Moscow, 1999, pp. 278, 388
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1995 and 1997), it is clear that most products formerly sold in Russia have not 
made it into the EU market.^ ®® Between 1995 and 1997, Ukrainian exports to Rus­
sia declined by 59%, while those to the EU grew by a mere 25%.^^ At the same 
time, it is deemed expedient to preserve and develop trade with Russia in those 
sectors where the reorientation of trade towards the West has been barred by 
trade restrictions (e.g. agriculture, metallurgy) or the low competitiveness of 
Ukrainian products.^®® This view has been shared even by advocates of maximum 
reorientation of Ukraine’s economic relations away from Russia and the CIS.^ ®®
A series of disputes between Russian and Ukrainian authorities relating to trade 
regulation, in conjunction with mutual inertia with respect to the promotion of bilat­
eral trade, appear to have been largely responsible for the dramatic drop in trade 
between the two countries. In 1992, CIS member-states agreed to levy VAT on 
exports within the Commonwealth in the country of origin. Two years later, how­
ever, Ukraine requested the adoption of the internationally prevalent practice of 
VAT being paid in the country of destination, a position later supported by most 
other CIS countries. Russia objected that, given the permeability of internal CIS 
borders, VAT collection from Inter-state transactions would decrease drastically, 
should the principle favoured by Ukraine be introduced. Russia’s positive trade 
balance with most CIS member-states strongly suggested self-interest in its re­
fusal to yield to the position of the majority in the CIS.^ ®^  In September 1996, Rus­
sia started levying VAT on Ukrainian imports, while continuing to collect VAT on 
goods exported to Ukraine. Russian producers -  particularly those of alcoholic
Between 1994 and 1998, the share of CIS countries In Ukraine’s export trade declined from 
57.5 to 35.1%, while their share in Ukrainian imports was reduced from 74.8 to 56.4%. During the 
same period, the share of the EU in Ukrainian foreign trade rose from 9.2 to 15.6%. Natal’ya Kuk- 
harskaya, “Vneshnekonomlcheskaya Deyatel’nost’ Ukrainv”.Vneshnvava Toraovlva. no. 3, 2000, 
pp. 7-8
Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS, External Economic Activities of the CIS Countries. 
Moscow, 1999, p. 389
Author’s interviews, Kiev, October-November 1999
Belov (ed.), Ukraine 2000 and Bevond. p. 60; Author’s interview with a leader of Ukraine’s So- 
clai Democratic Party, Kiev, 29 October 1999 
Si rotsky, “Tamozhenny Soyuz”, p. 70
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beverages -  had been protesting against the allegedly dumping prices of state- 
subsidised Ukrainian imports.^®®
Ukrainian statesmen have repeatedly affirmed that they regard accession to the 
WTO as the top priority and have no interest in joining Russia-led clubs such as 
the Customs Union of the Five. Instead, they have been advocating the transfor­
mation of the whole of the CIS into a free trade zone.^ ®® Russian policy-makers 
have ruled this out for the medium term, but have been discussing proposals for 
the gradual liberalisation of bilateral trade with Ukraine. As of February 1998, bi­
lateral trade in 750 categories of technical equipment was exempted from VAT. 
The measure had been expected to increase bilateral trade by up to 25%,^®° which 
did not materialise -  at least partly -  due to the devaluation of the rouble following 
the crisis of August 1998.^ ®* In 1999, the Russian government cancelled a 3% duty 
levied on Ukrainian imports and the 20% duty on sugar of Ukrainian origin. Hence­
forth, the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian side has related to remaining restrictions 
on exports of alcohol and tobacco products and to Russian rail transport prices af­
fecting the price of Ukrainian exports.^®  ^As of July 2001, Russia Is to exempt ex­
ports to CIS countries from VAT, though no such exemption will apply to gas and 
oil exports.^®®
Barriers complicating trade between the two countries have persisted with re­
spect to particular commodities. It has been precisely these commodities (tobacco 
and alcohol products, sugar and metals) that have formed the bulk of contraband 
imports reaching the Russian market through ‘the Belarusian corridor'. When Rus­
sia imposed a 25% import duty on refined sugar in April 1997, Ukrainian imports 
were exempted only up to an annual quota of 300 thousand tonnes. During the 
previous year, Ukraine had exported 1100 thousand tonnes of duty-free sugar to
Seaodnva. 28 August 1996, p. 1
For example, see speech by then PM Pustovoitenko from the St Petersburg Economic Forum of 
June 1999, published in Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 43, no. 2, June 2000, p. 19 
Interview of Gennady Seleznyov (State Duma Chairman) in Metaliv Evrazli. no. 1,1998, p. 7 
Peter Westin, “The Domino Effect of the Russian Crisis”, Russian Economic Trends. December 
1999, pp. 4-5
Pustovoitenko (see note 258), p. 18
Maxim Vladimirov and Eugene Kuskov, “Russian VAT Reform: A Move towards the EU Frame­
work?”, Russian Economic Trends. September 2000, p. 5
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the Russian market^®'* In January 1998, the quota was doubled, but was not ful­
filled by the end of the year due to disputes regarding the specific companies’ au­
thorisation to import the duty-free sugar.^ ®® In April 2000, under pressure from do­
mestic producers, the Russian government introduced a special 10% duty on im­
ports of raw sugar, raised to 40% for the period between June and December of 
that year.^ ®® For 2001, a quota of 3.5 million tonnes subject to an import duty of 
5% was set for sugar from developing countries.^®^ This is likely to cover Russia’s 
demand for imported sugar (its own production has typically covered around 35- 
40% of domestic needs), thereby squeezing Ukrainian producers out of the Rus­
sian market, as no bilateral agreement on a duty-free quota has been reached.^®® 
These disputes have arisen because the production of Ukrainian and Russian 
sugar alike has involved much higher costs than those of leading competitors in 
the world market. It can be sold on the domestic market only with the artificial ex­
clusion of more efficient competitors and abroad only at the cost of high export 
subsidies. In these circumstances. It has been cheaper for Russia to buy sugar on 
the world market than to Import it from Ukraine.^ ®® Lack of international competi­
tiveness, combined with the decline of Ukrainian agricultural production, has also 
been a crucial factor in the dramatic decline in the export of Ukrainian foodstuffs to 
Russia.^ ®^
Russia has equally been considering anti-dumping measures against Ukrainian 
steel producers, whose share in the Russian pipeline market has been as high as 
30%, due to appeals from major domestic producers, themselves facing such 
measures imposed by the EU and the US.^ ^  ^ In October 2000, Russia exempted 
30 commodities of Ukrainian origin from the generally valid free-trade regime, to
Yevzerov, Ukraina: s Rossi ei vmeste III vroz’?. pp. 55-56 
Author's interviews, Moscow, 24 June 1999; Kiev, 29 October 1999 
Interfax, CIS Daily News Brief. 25 May 2000, p. 6 
Interfax, CIS Dailv News Brief. 20 March 2000, p. 6 
Rossiiskava Gazeta/Biznes v Rossii. 25 October 2000, p. 1 
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 29 October and 2 November 1999 
270 Yevzerov, Ukraina: s Rossi ei vmeste ill vroz’?. pp. 50-51
Izv estiva. 8 September 2000, p. 5; Talks on a durable quota system of import quotas have so 
far been fruitless, though Russia has agreed not to impose any tariffs In exchange for Ukraine’s 
reducing its supplies from 800,000 tonnes in 2000 to 423,000 tonnes In 2001. The Russia Journal.
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which Ukraine responded with equivalent restrictions on Russian imports.^^^ Sev­
eral branches of the Russian food industry have called for the exemption of addi­
tional Ukrainian products.^^® With 2000 having been the first year of growth in bi­
lateral trade since 1996, restrained optimism appears to have returned, which has 
been reflected in the recent activism of the Russian and Ukrainian leaderships in 
reinvlgorating economic ties between the two countries.^^'*
Cross-border relations among regions
Mechanisms compensating for mutual lack of competitiveness (most notably, 
barter arrangements) have not been as consequential in Russia’s trade with 
Ukraine as they have been in trade with Belarus. Unlike Belarus, the governments 
of Russia and Ukraine have been actively seeking to reduce the use of non­
monetary transactions in the domestic market and in foreign trade alike. Besides, 
Ukrainian regions have lacked the autonomy to directly negotiate far-reaching 
economic agreements in the way that their Russian counterparts have done with 
the keen Belarusian leadership. Border regions, like Lugansk and Donetsk, which 
suffered particularly from the disruption of economic relations with Russia, have 
been lobbying Kiev to assist their revival .Special  events have been organised 
for the promotion of cross-border ties among r e g i o n s . T h e  governors of the 
Russian regions of Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kursk and Rostov, the heads of 
administration of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Suma, Khar’kov and
16 April 2001
Rossiiskava Gazeta. BIzness v Rossi I. 25 October 2000, p. 1
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 10 November 2000, p. 4
See joint press conference of Presidents Putin and Kuchma (Dniepropetrovsk, 12 February 
2001), Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. March 2001, pp. 44-45. In early 2001, the two Presidents’ meeting 
in Dniepropetrovsk, that of the two countries’ Foreign Ministers In Khar’kov (16 February 2001), 
and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yushchenko’s visit to Mosvow (12 April 2001) were primarily con­
cerned with expanding economic relations, including trade.
Author’s interviews, Moscow, 28 June 1999; Kiev, 5 November 1999
For example, the Committee for CIS Affairs of the Russian Duma organised special hearings in 
Belgorod with the participation parliamentarians and members of regional executives from Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine on the development of economic cooperation among border regions. Nezav­
isimava Gazeta. 26 May 2000, p. 5
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Chernigov, and, since 1996, representatives of Belarusian regions, repeatedly met 
to discuss ways of boosting economic interaction and appealed to the national 
leaderships to assist them In their endeavours.^^^ By the beginning of 1999, 
around 280 agreements had been concluded among Ukrainian regions and Rus­
sian federal units, while five of the latter maintained trade missions in Ukraine.^^® 
Even in the case of Russian regions supplying fuel in exchange for foodstuffs and 
other products from Ukraine, the overall tendency of declining trade does not ap­
pear to have been arrested. Yaroslavl’, for example, supplies oil and petroleum 
products to Nikolayev, Kirovgrad, and Gherkassk oblasts, receiving grain in return. 
Nevertheless, the regional administration reported a drop in trade with Ukraine for 
1999.^^® In late 2000, President Kuchma proposed the creation of an ‘energy is­
land’ made up of three border regions (Khar’kov, Poltava, and Suma oblasti), 
whose principal enterprises would export their products to Russia in exchange for 
fuel supplies.^®® Representatives of border regions for the first time participated in 
a meeting between Foreign Ministers Ivanov and ZIenko, which was devoted to 
issues of regional, economic and technical cooperation (Khar’kov, February 2001). 
A “Programme on Interregional and Border Cooperation for 2001-2007” as well as 
an agreement on the rights of migrants were concluded. Ivanov spoke of an 80% 
growth in trade between Russian and Ukrainian border regions during 2000 and 
praised the work of the Council of Heads of Border Regions of Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus. He made special reference to an ongoing project for the environ­
mental protection of the Northern section of the river Don valley, which he de­
scribed as the most important of a series of successful regional cooperation pro­
jects launched by the Council.^®*
Conditions of cross-border travel have equally been a prime concern to border 
regions, where most the population have relatives across the border. According to
A Council of Heads of Border Regions of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus has been formed. See 
Rossllsko-Ukrainskive Otnosheniva 1990-1997 aa.. pp. 594-608 
Yevzerov, Ukraina: s Rossi ei vmeste ill vroz’?. p. 60
Documents provided by the Yaroslavl’ obslast’ administration, December 1999 
This proposal was made during Kuchma’s meeting with President Putin in Sochi. Nezavisimava 
Gazeta. 1 November 2000, p. 5
Speech by Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov (16 February 2001) in Dipiomaticheskv Vestnik. 
March 2001, p. 49
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a survey by the Ukrainian centre ‘Democratic Initiatives’, 33% of Ukrainian citizens 
have relatives in Russia, which rises to 70% in Eastern and Southern regions. Of 
those, 42% reported they had repeatedly travelled to Russia.^ ®® Despite Russia’s 
withdrawal from the CIS visa-free regime, both Russia and Ukraine have con­
firmed that travel between the two countries will remain free from visa require­
ments. The planned introduction of a requirement that internationally valid pass­
ports be used instead of domestically valid identification documents, as it has been 
the case so far, is expected to reduce cross-border mobility. In 2000, only 7-8% of 
adults in the Khar’kov oblast’ held internationally valid passports, which may be 
obtained promptly at considerable financial expense.^®® The measure has been 
proposed by the Ukrainian side, which has been seeking to reduce the permeabil­
ity of its CIS borders in an effort to minimise the negative consequences of its 
Western neighbours’ forthcoming accession to the EU’s Schengen agreement on 
border controls. An agreement of October 1999 requiring that Russian citizens 
travelling to Ukraine and vice versa be covered by medical insurance, whose costs 
they are to bear themselves, is also likely to affect cross-border travel. In the 
meantime, Ukrainian citizens living in Russia and vice versa have had to pay 
higher fees than those applicable to local citizens for access to higher education 
and health care (albeit CIS rates have been lower than those applicable to for­
eigners from non-CIS countries).
Conclusion: Mixed results
The record of realising intentions declared in treaties and diplomatic meetings 
between Russia on the one hand and Belarus and Ukraine on the other has been 
rather uneven. Agreement on fundamental objectives, in conjunction with relatively 
low demands on financial resources and administrative capacities, has enabled 
Russia and Belarus to proceed with common policy-making in defence and exter­
nal relations quite smoothly. The same may be said of the liberalisation of bilateral
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 1 September 2000, p. 5 
Ibid. The procedures for the issuing of internatic 
bar ordinary citizens from visiting relatives living in Russia in case of an emergency.
ionaily valid passports were thought to effectively
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trade and of the initial stage in the effort to equalise citizens’ rights. Positive results 
have been immediately discernible in trade volumes and an upward trend may be 
expected in terms of cross-border migration. The harmonisation of wages, pen­
sions and social security benefits is likely to be complicated by the persisting un­
evenness of economic conditions in the two countries.
Core aspects of the integration process such as monetary convergence and the 
unification of external trade regulation and economic legislation have advanced in 
an irregular manner and encountered setbacks due to a range of factors, some of 
which have been beyond policy-makers’ control (e.g. the crash of the Belarusian 
rouble in March 1998; the crisis of August 1998). In each of these policy areas, the 
implementation of agreed measures has required coordinated action on the part of 
several national and supranational agencies. This has not always been achieved 
as a result of inadequate administrative capacities and/or disagreements over 
measures entailing disproportionate costs -  in terms of revenue or decision­
making authority -  for one of the two parties. Though the experience of economic 
integration in Western Europe suggests that such difficulties are inevitable, in the 
case of Russia and Belarus, they appear to have been exacerbated by the two 
leaderships’ divergent approaches to economic reform. It remains to be seen 
whether Russia’s attainment of political stability and consistency in economic pol­
icy since Putin’s accession to the Presidency will nudge the Belarusian leadership 
into reconsidering its economic course. Meanwhile, innovative strategies for the 
integration of the two countries’ real economic sectors (e.g. inter-regional and in­
ter-enterprise links) have accounted for tangible advancements in this respect.
Conflicting strategic priorities have repeatedly hindered the fulfilment of the 
comparatively modest objectives set by Russia and Ukraine for cooperation in the 
diplomatic and military spheres. They have affected even the economic and social 
spheres in the cases of the disputed defence contracts and the pending introduc­
tion of new formalities in cross-border travel. At the same time, serious disputes 
such as those over the recognition of Ukraine’s current borders and over the divi­
sion and basing arrangements of the BSF have effectively ceased to burden bilat­
eral relations, allowing negotiations to focus on the development of economic co­
operation. Bilateral trade has been an eloquent indicator of the trend towards the 
separation of the two countries’ economies, which has been driven in equal meas­
198
ure by political choices and factors related to economic expediency. The Russian 
side has shown some intransigence in prioritising the economic interests of do­
mestic producers over improving relations with Ukraine by liberalising bilateral 
trade. As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, Russian policy-makers’ 
readiness to make concessions in this regard has been limited by their persisting 
aspirations to attract Ukraine to the Customs Union of the Five or even the union 
with Belarus by means of exclusive economic privileges attached to membership.
Although the decline in bilateral trade has been relatively costlier for Ukraine 
than for Russia, the Ukrainian leadership has not been diverted from the effort to 
reorient the country's economic relations in line with its political priorities. Selected 
cooperative projects in technologically advanced sectors, where the two countries’ 
international competitiveness has been subject to the preservation and enhance­
ment of Soviet-era links, have given rise to moderate optimism about the pros­
pects of bilateral economic relations. Since the re-election of President Kuchma in 
November 1999 and the change in the leadership of the Ukrainian parliament in 
February 2000, a more pragmatic line has prevailed in economic negotiations with 
Russia, allowing for growing Russian involvement in the Ukrainian economy. A se­
ries of acquisitions of major industrial enterprises in Ukraine by Russian strategic 
investors has promptly produced results in terms of investment in infrastructure 
and increased willingness on the part of Russian business leaders to venture into 
Ukraine’s economy, thereby contributing to the integration of the two countries’ 
real economic sectors. Gazprom’s possible acquisition of a stake in a privatised 
company controlling Ukraine’s gas-exporting pipeline system would be likely to re­
lieve inter-state relations of the remaining perennial disputes related to gas theft 
and Ukraine’s arrears for gas supplies. An increased emphasis given by the two 
countries’ political leaderships and business communities to economic relations, 
which has been reflected in extensive high-level contacts devoted to these ques­
tions during 2000-2001, may assist a continuation in recent positive trends (includ­
ing in bilateral trade).
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Chapter Four
Understanding the divergent approaches of Belarus and 
Ukraine towards Russia
The approaches of the Belarusian and Ukrainian leaderships to relations with 
Russia have differed significantly. While Belarus has been actively pursuing the 
acceleration of the integration process, Ukraine has rejected integration with 
Russia along the path trodden by its northern neighbour, opting for an external 
orientation geared towards accession to the European Union. As has been ar­
gued in previous chapters, these divergent strategic objectives have largely ac­
counted both for the differentiation in Russia’s policies towards the two coun­
tries and for the contrasting outcomes obtained in corresponding aspects of 
their relations with Russia. It is, therefore, important to examine the factors that 
have underlain the Belarusian and Ukrainian leaderships’ preferences as to the 
envisaged type of relations with Russia, on the one hand, and their positions on 
particular issues that have arisen in bilateral (Russo-Belarusian and Russo- 
Ukrainian) relations, on the other.
The external orientations of Ukraine under the Kravchuk administration 
(1991-1994) and of Belarus before Aleksandr Lukashenko’s election to the 
Presidency in spring 1994 will be outlined in order to establish the starting posi­
tions of the Kuchma and Lukashenko administrations in connection with Rus­
sia’s prioritisation of its relations with these two countries during 1995-1996. 
Special attention will be devoted to Ukraine’s ideological cleavages along re­
gional and ethno-linguistic lines as a constraint on the leadership’s latitude in 
foreign policy. In comparing the strategies of the Kuchma and Lukashenko ad­
ministrations, the range of policy options available to them will be analysed with 
reference to the following factors: conceptions of national identity as under­
stood by the Belarusian and Ukrainian elites and mass publics; corresponding 
(elite and mass) perceptions of the international environment and definitions of 
strategic interests; economic considerations; and external factors, most notably 
Russia’s actual and putative use of incentives and pressures as well as oppor­
tunities presented by the policies of other actors such as NATO, the EU, and 
the United States.
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Defining one’s place in the world: Russia’s position in Belarusian and
Ukrainian role conceptions
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise, the political leaderships of both 
Belarus and Ukraine favoured neutrality - in the sense of non-participation in 
military alliances -  as the defining principle of their countries’ role in the interna­
tional field. Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty, which was passed by the 
Verkhovna Rada in July 1990, proclaimed neutral status as well as a commit­
ment to the attainment of nuclear-free status.* The Belarusian declaration of 
sovereignty, which was adopted by the republic’s Supreme Soviet a few days 
later, asserted the same principles.^ Consequently, the two countries were not 
among the founding members of the CIS Collective Security treaty, which was 
concluded in Tashkent in May 1992.® At that time, neither NATO nor the Euro­
pean Union had indicated any consideration -  let alone Intention -  of eastward 
enlargement. While Russia’s relations with Western Europe and the United 
States appeared to be flourishing, various ideas for regional economic and/or 
security groupings, which were to unite neutral Central and/or East European 
countries, were being considered. Neutrality, combined with active participation 
in inclusive international fora like the United Nations and Conference for Secu­
rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, renamed OSCE as of 1995), emerged 
as the guiding principle of Belarusian and Ukrainian foreign policies in the im­
mediate post-independence period. In an effort to establish an international 
profile and assist their integration into the world economy, both countries ap­
plied for admission to the Council of Europe and opened relations with the EU, 
NATO (initially through participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council)
 ^ Commitment to neutral and nuclear-free status was reiterated In the first foreign policy frame­
work document adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament and the country’s first Military Doctrine. 
“Pro Osnovni Napryami Zovnishnoi Politiki Ukraini” (On the Basic Directions of the Foreign Pol­
icy of Ukraine), resolution no. 3360-XII, 2 July 1993, Vidomosti Verkhovnol Radi, no. 37,1993, 
pp. 944-945; “Q Voennoi Doktrine Ukrainy”, Verkhovna Rada resolution no. 3529-XII, 19 Octo­
ber 1993, Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Radi, no. 43, 1993, p. 409 
 ^ Izvestiva. 29 July 1990, p. 1
 ^The original signatory states were Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, later joined by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. In 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Uzbekistan did not renew their membership in the Collective Security treaty.
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and international financial institutions such as the OECD, the IMF and the 
EBRD.'*
Ukraine distances itself from Russia: the Kravchuk Presidency
Whereas both Belarus and Ukraine have formally maintained their commit­
ment to neutral status, signs of their divergent choices of strategic orientation 
became observable soon after independence. Albeit a signatory to the Decem­
ber 1991 Belovezh agreements, which effectively dissolved the Soviet Union, 
Ukraine did not subsequently ratify the original text of the agreements. The 
Verkhovna Rada inserted a series of amendments which negated the provi­
sions relating to the preservation of a common foreign policy, a single eco­
nomic space and a unified military command structure for all the successor 
states of Soviet Union. In March 1992, when the CIS Inter-Parliamentary As­
sembly was created, Ukraine restricted its participation to observer status, 
which it upgraded to full membership only seven years later. In January 1993, 
Ukraine (along with Moldova and Turkmenistan) refrained from signing the CIS 
Charter, which aimed to strengthen the authority of CIS institutions with a view 
to improving member-states’ records of implementing agreements concluded 
within the CIS framework.
Under the Presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine firmly resisted proposals 
with a potential to bolster CIS structures and advocated the organisation’s re­
duction to an informal forum for inter-state consultations and negotiations with 
an emphasis on bilateral interaction. The Kravchuk administration saw the CIS 
as a convenient framework for the resolution of bilateral disputes resulting from 
the demise of the USSR (most notably, the recognition of borders and the divi­
sion of Soviet debt and assets -  including the Black Sea Fleet). According to a 
framework document containing guidelines for Ukrainian diplomacy, which was 
adopted by the Ukrainian parliament in July 1993, relations with Russia form 
the dominant aspect of Ukraine’s bilateral relations with bordering states. Rela­
tions with Russia are described as
 ^ Ukraine became a full member of the Council of Europe in November 1995. Belarus obtained 
'guest status’ in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in late 1992. This form of 
participation, along with the Belarusian application for membership, was suspended in 1997 in 
condemnation of the situation in Belarusian domestic politics.
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“a ’special partnership’, insofar as the fate of the progressive democratic develop­
ment of Ukraine and of the Russian Federation, stability in Europe and the whole 
world will depend on their character to a significant extent.”®
Nevertheless, during the Kravchuk presidency, the resolution of major issues in 
relations with Russia did not make much headway, as both countries concen­
trated their diplomatic efforts on relations with the US, Western and -  especially 
Ukraine -  Central Europe. Highly suspicious of Russian motives, Ukraine 
emerged as the champion of the view of the CIS primarily as a mechanism for 
a ‘civilised divorce’ among the successor states of the Soviet Union, implying 
an understanding of the CIS as a transitional structure. The Verkhovna Rada’s 
resolution “On the Basic Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine” stated that 
Ukraine would not participate in the formalisation of multilateral cooperation 
within the CIS, which could “transform the CIS into a supranational structure of 
a federal or confederal character.” Instead, the resolution emphasised 
Ukraine’s Central European identity and contained the first formal declaration of 
a Ukrainian intention to become a full member of the EU.® Insisting on its self- 
proclaimed associate member status, Ukraine opted out of most multilateral 
agreements signed by CIS member-states, having (alongside Turkmenistan) 
the highest rate of abstention from basic CIS agreements.^ Ukrainian represen­
tatives were especially adamant in their opposition to the CIS assuming any 
functions in the military sphere -  including peacekeeping operations.®
Ukraine’s obstructive CIS policy during the first three years of independence 
was primarily a function of the Kravchuk administration’s reliance on national- 
minded factions, which held the majority in the country’s parliament until March 
1994. The leadership of the ‘Rukh’ (then Ukraine’s largest nationalist party)
® "Pro Osnovni Napryami Zovnishnoi Politiki Ukraini”, p. 939 
® "Pro Osnovni Napryami Zovnishnoi Politiki Ukraini”, p. 942
 ^ Neither the treaty of December 1991 establishing the CIS nor the organisation’s Charter con­
tains any provisions for associate membership. The Ukrainian leadership based its assertions 
to associate membership status on its abstention from the CIS Charter. Ukraine signed only
three out of twelve basic CIS documents, concluded between February 1992 and March 1996
and surveyed by Helga Welsh and John Wlllerton, “Regional Cooperation and the CIS: West 
European Lessons and Post-Soviet Experience", International Politics, vol. 34, no. 1, March 
1997, p. 43. None of the three documents was signed under Kravchuk.
® Nevertheless, predominantly Russian peacekeeping troops have been deployed in Abkhazia 
and Tajikistan under the aegis of the CIS.
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contended that, in order to buttress its independent statehood, Ukraine ought to 
exit the CIS, which was seen as an instrument of Russian plans to undermine 
the sovereignty of other post-Soviet states.® Nationalists perceived a necessity 
for Ukraine to maximally distance itself from Russia and the rest of the CIS -  in 
the political, cultural and economic fields alike. They promoted an image of 
Ukraine as an absolutely European state and associate it with Central Europe 
rather than with the Eurasian region (i.e. Russia and the CIS). The Kravchuk 
administration prioritised relations with Poland and other Central European 
states.*® It sought admission to the Visegrad group and the Central European 
Initiative (CEI), and advanced proposals for a regional security grouping and 
economic cooperation forum, intended to bring together countries from the Bal­
tic to the Black Seas- excluding Russia.** The United States and Canada (by 
virtue of its politically active ethnic Ukrainian community) were expected to take 
a leading role in assisting Ukraine’s integration In the international community 
and world economy. However, the aspirations of the national-minded elite to 
Ukraine’s emergence as a major European power in its own right led to fric­
tions, not only with Russia, but with the US as well, over the issue of nuclear 
disarmament. Under intense pressure from Russia and the US alike, the 
Ukrainian leadership agreed (in January 1994) to the dismantling or transfer to
® John Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After: The Russian-Ukralnian Relationship", International Af­
fairs. vol. 69, no. 4, 1993, p. 689 
Ukraine concluded military cooperation agreements with Hungary and Poland in March 1992 
and February 1993 respectively. In cooperation with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, it partici­
pated (through Zakarpatskaya oblast’) In the creation of the EU-sponsored ‘East Carpathian 
Euroregion’. Romania joined this project in 1997. For a more detailed coverage of Ukraine’s 
early relations with Central Europe, see Sherman W. Garnett, Kevstone in the Arch: Ukraine in 
the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern Europe. Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1997, pp. 83-94; Stephen R. Burant, “Ukraine and East 
Central Europe’’, in Lubomyr A. Hajda (ed.), Ukraine in the World. Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian 
Research Institute, Harvard University, 1996, pp. 45-75
"  On Kravchuk’s proposal for a Central and East European ‘zone of stability and security’, 
which was to include Belarus and Moldova but not Russia, see Golos Ukrainv. 10 July 1993, p. 
1. The Visegrad group was initially founded by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia as a re­
gional integration forum to assist their "return to Europe’. As its members began to focus on 
their individual applications for admission to the EU and NATO, the group lost Its salience and 
was superseded by the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). Ukraine became 
an associate member of the CEI (a forum for political dialogue and economic cooperation) In 
1994 and a full member in 1996.
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Russia of all its nuclear weapons, though not without robust opposition from the 
nationalist-dominated Rada, which contradicted the country’s international obli­
gations by asserting Ukraine’s right to ownership of nuclear weapons on its ter­
ritory.*^
In the view of the national-minded political elites, who held sway both In the 
Rada and in the Presidential administration under Kravchuk, the consolidation 
of Ukrainian statehood was the foremost priority, not just in foreign policy, but 
equally in the domestic realm. The adoption of Ukrainian as the language of 
public administration at all levels of government as of instruction in schools and 
higher education establishments was perceived as an imminent need in order 
to instil in the population a strong sense of national identity and a firm commit­
ment to Ukraine’s independent statehood. As Iver Neumann has suggested, 
identity formation implies the highlighting of differences from ‘others', repre­
sented -  in the case of a ‘European’ identity -  by ‘the East’ (Russia and Tur­
key).*® The Kravchuk administration’s language policy graphically illustrated the 
political elite’s definition of Ukrainian national identity in terms of a distinction 
from - or even opposition to -  Russian language, culture and identity. Accord­
ing to the last Soviet census (1989), ethnic Ukrainians represented 73% of the 
population of the Ukrainian SSR, with ethnic Russians constituting 22%. 
Whereas 12% of ethnic Ukrainians considered Russian as their mother tongue, 
with a further 60% declaring themselves bilingual, less than 2% of ethnic Rus­
sians had Ukraine as their first language, with 33% asserting a fluent knowl­
edge of Ukrainian as a second language.*"*
In view of these figures, even moderate nationalists regarded a deliberate 
distancing from Russia (in political, cultural-linguistic and even economic terms) 
as an essential component of a policy aimed at the promotion of Ukrainian na-
*^  This Verkhovna Rada resolution was published in Golos Ukrainv. 20 November 1993, p. 3. In 
1992, Ukraine (along with Belarus and Kazakhstan) had signed the Lisbon Protocol, which 
committed It to the attainment of nuclear-free status in the shortest possible timeframe.
*® Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. London: Routledge, 1996; Uses of the 
other: “the East" In European identity formation. Manchester: MUR, 1999, pp. 207, 228 
*'' The census classification of nationalities followed the designation In citizens’ Internal pass­
ports and, therefore, did not contain a special category for Individuals of mixed Russian- 
Ukralnian parentage. Goskomstat SSSR, Natsional’nv Sostav Naseleniva SSSR. Moscow: “Fi- 
nansy I Statistlka’’, 1989, pp. 78-79. Ethnic Russians and Russlan-speakers (of Russian, 
Ukrainian and mixed ethnic origin) were heavily concentrated In the Eastern and Southern 
oblasti.
205
tional identity - at least during the initial period of ‘state-building’. The Ukrainian 
ruling elite chose to take advantage of the window of opportunity presented by 
the referendum of December 1991, in which over 90% of the electorate en­
dorsed the Rada’s declaration of independence, in order to mould public atti­
tudes in support of its favoured role conception of Ukraine as a free-standing 
Central European power. It needs to be stressed that, despite the overwhelm­
ing electoral support in the referendum on independence, the political elite’s 
decision to politically and economically distance Ukraine from Russia and the 
CIS could hardly be described as corresponding with public opinion at that 
time. As late as March 1991, over two thirds of Ukrainian voters had expressed 
their support for the preservation of the Soviet Union.*®
Later survey and interview evidence appears to corroborate the hypothesis 
that perceptions of Ukraine as a self-reliant, economically powerful entity, 
whose prosperity would increase in the absence of tutelage from Moscow, 
largely contributed to the impressive rates of support for independence even in 
the predominantly Russophone Eastern and Southern regions.*® The Kravchuk 
environment had fostered popular expectations of Increased material well-being 
in good faith, as the administration’s subsequent economic policy choices 
demonstrated.*^ Emboldened by foreign financial institutions’ optimistic as­
sessments of Ukraine’s economic prospects, the country’s leadership withdrew 
from the rouble zone voluntarily in November 1992.*® Expectations of generous 
economic assistance and investment from the West prompted Ukrainian deci­
sion-makers to anticipate a relatively painless transition to hard currency trans­
actions and world market prices. They reportedly had considerably overesti­
mated the length of this transition period, leading to resentment at Russia’s in-
15 70.2% of votes in Ukraine were cast in favour of preserving the Soviet Union - compared to 
71.3% in the RSFSR and 82.7% in Belarus. Georgia and the Baltic republics did not participate 
in the referendum. Izvestiva. 27 March 1991, pp. 1, 3 
Anatol Lieven, Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry. Washington DC: United States Insti­
tute of Peace Press, 1999, pp. 68-70; Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A 
Minority Faith. Cambridge: CUP, 1997, pp. 128, 201 
Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 169-170; Hermann Clement, “Economic Aspects of 
Ukrainian-Russian Relations”, in Kurt R. Spillmann, Andreas Wenger and Derek Müller (eds.). 
Between Russia and the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine. Bern: Pe­
ter Lang, 1999, pp. 282-283 
Morrison, “Pereyaslav and After", pp. 685-686
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troduction of higher prices for fuel exports.*® Similarly optimistic estimates per­
tained to the re-orientation of exports to Central European and Western mar­
kets, encouraging the Kravchuk administration not to show particular concern 
over the steep decline of Russo-Ukrainian trade.^®
By 1993, a determined move away from Russia had begun to appear unten­
able for economic and political reasons alike. As foreign investment and trade 
re-orientation under the Kravchuk Presidency fell far short of expectations, calls 
surfaced for the revitalisation of economic ties to Russia, on which most of 
Ukraine's industrial enterprises used to depend for supplies and/or sales. In 
June 1993, the leaders of a massive miners' strike in the Donbass included 
among their demands full and active participation in the CIS, which resulted in 
the resignation of PM Leonid Kuchma. A Russophone industrialist from Eastern 
Ukraine, Kuchma, who was appointed PM in October 1992, had been more 
concerned with economic recovery than with state-building and took some 
steps to arrest the deterioration of Ukraine's economic relations with Russia 
and the CIS. In May 1993, Ukraine signed the CIS declaration on economic un­
ion, though, four months later, it acceded to the treaty ‘On Economic Union' 
only as an associate member. In June 1993, Kuchma put his signature to an ill- 
fated trilateral agreement with Belarus and Russia on a customs union.
In the run-up to the parliamentary elections of March-April 1994, the Commu­
nists and their left-wing allies (Socialist and Peasant parties) advocated official 
status for the Russian language, a federal state and closer relations with Rus­
sia and the CIS -  issues which public opinion surveys revealed to closely follow 
economic concerns in the list of the electorate's priorities.^* The left-wing par­
ties obtained 68% of their seats in the Eastern and Southern oblasti. They won 
no seats in the seven oblasti of historical Western Ukraine, which accounted for 
the overwhelming majority of extreme nationalist parties’ votes and, together 
with Kiev, for 88% of the seats won by the moderate nationalist ‘Rukh’.^  ^As a
Despite gradual price increases since 1993, Russia began selilng fuel to Ukraine at worid 
market prices as late as 1996.
Paul J. D’ Anieri, Economic Interdependence In Ukrainian-Russian Relations. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 83
*^ Sarah Birch, T h e  Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994", Electoral 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 1995, p. 95
^  The nine oblasti of the South and the East returned no deputies for the extreme nationalist 
'Ukrainian National Assembly' and 'Conservative Republican Party’. Marko Bojcun, “The
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candidate in the Presidential election of July 1994, Kuchma campaigned on a 
platform of a more balanced external orientation and renewed emphasis on 
partnership with Russia. The election results reiterated the pattern of marked 
regional variation along the lines of ethno-linguistic divisions, which had been 
displayed in all Ukrainian elections between 1990 and 1994.^® In the second 
round, Kravchuk, campaigning on a nationalist platform (state promotion of the 
Ukrainian language; opposition to closer ties with the CIS), won in all bar one 
oblast’ to the west of the Dniepr (Kirovograd oblast’), polling almost 90% in the 
three oblasti of Galicia. Kuchma’s vote in this region fell short of 4%, whereas 
his average on the Left bank was 66% (with close to 90% in the Crimea and the 
Donbass) - compared to 31 % for Kravchuk.^"*
Extensive survey evidence has revealed marked divergences in the mass 
public’s ideological leanings and policy preferences across Ukraine’s regions -  
particularly with regard to the nation-building agenda (strengthening Ukrainian 
language and culture within Ukraine; the question of the Russian language’s 
status) and to the country’s external orientation. Ethnicity, ethno-cultural identi­
fication, language and regional political cultures all strongly correlate with re­
spondents’ positions in a continuum whose poles are represented by the na­
tionalist stronghold of Galicia in the West, on the one hand, and the Donbass 
region in the East and Crimea in the South, on the other. Statistical data show 
that Western regions, with their predominantly ethnic Ukrainian population, as 
having well above average rates of preference for the Ukrainian language 
(even among ethnic Russians) and of religious attachment - especially to the 
Ukrainian denominations historically linked with Ukrainian cultural and national 
identity.^® In the Eastern and Southern oblasti, the share of ethnic Russians in
Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994", Eurooe-Asia Studies, vol. 47, no. 2, 
1995, p. 242
On the divide between Ukraine’s national-minded West and the Russia-oriented East and 
South as manifested in electoral contests between 1990 and 1994, see Wilson, Ukrainian Na­
tionalism in the 1990s. pp. 118-146
Ibid., pp. 143-145; Birch, “The Ukrainian Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1994”, 
pp. 98-99
Ethnic Ukrainians represented 79% of the population in L’viv, 72% in Kiev, and 22% (com­
pared to 72% of Russians) in Simferopol. 45% of ethnic Ukrainians in L’viv declared an affilia­
tion with the Ukrainian Uniate Church (as opposed to a mere 1% of L’viv ethnic Russians), with 
another 27% belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Autocephalous Orthodox (Kiev) 
Church. 61% of L’viv Russians, compared to 6% of ethnic Ukrainians belonged to the Russian
208
the population and the use of the Russian language -  also among ethnic 
Ukrainians - are above the national averages, while religious affiliation is lower 
and concentrated on the Russian Orthodox Church.^®
In a comparison of L’viv, Kiev and Simferopol survey data, Ian Bremmer 
found that that language preference and religious affiliation correlated very 
closely with ethnicity, which in turn displayed strong correlations with political 
attitudes and party support.^^ This also revealed high levels of negative atti­
tudes among L’viv and -  to a lesser extent -  Kiev ethnic Ukrainians towards 
Russian people, whereas such attitudes were not observed among Ukrainians 
in Crimea or among Russians (in their attitudes towards Ukrainians) in any of 
the cities surveyed. To the contrary, Ukrainians in Crimea held negative views 
regarding the nationalist Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and the US.^ ® The eth­
nic and regional factors combined to produce polar positions with regard to 
questions such as Ukraine leaving the CIS (supported by 69% of L’viv Ukraini­
ans, but only by 12% of Simferopol Russians) and attitudes towards the demise 
of the Soviet Union (83% of L’viv Ukrainians would not prefer that the Soviet 
Union still existed, while 42% of Ukrainians and 75% of Russians in Simferopol 
would).^® Bremmer’s findings are corroborated by the research of Stephen 
Shulman, who found considerable anti-Russian sentiment among Galician local 
elites, which was reflected in their foreign policy preferences. Elite interviewees 
from Eastern Ukraine, who tended to favour a Russia- and CIS-focused exter­
nal orientation, perceived themselves as having more in common with Rus-
Orthodox Church. Ibid., pp. 266, 270-273. On the role of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church In 
West Ukrainian Identity, see Paul Robert Magosci, A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996, pp. 649-651 
For complete oblast’-level data on ethnic composition, language use, religious affiliation and 
voting behaviour, see Elia Zadorozhnyuk and Dmitry Furman, “Ukrainskye Regiony i Ukrain- 
skaya Poiitika", in D. Furman (ed.), Ukraina i Rossi va: Obshchestva i Gosudarstva. Mos­
cow:'Prava Cheloveka’, 1997, pp. 88-129 
ian Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine", Eurooe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 46, no. 2, 1994, pp. 268-269, 277 
66% of L’viv Ukrainians expressed negative views of Russian people and 49% did so In Kiev, 
ibid., pp. 274-275. Paul S. Pirie, “National identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern 
Ukraine”, Eurooe-Asia Studies, vol. 48, no. 7, p. 1087 
Ibid., p. 277
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sians in bordering regions of the Russian Federation than with their co-ethnics 
from Western Ukraine.®®
Surveys giving respondents the option of selecting a dual (Russian-Ukrainian 
or Ukrainian-Russian) ethno-cultural identification reveal a more complex pat­
tern, with the political attitudes (particularly those related to foreign policy and 
nation-building) of the predominantly Russophone dual-identity group occupy­
ing an intermediate position between those of ethnic Ukrainians and Rus­
sians.®* In this spectrum of opinion, the views of the dual-identity group are 
closer to those of Russians.®^
Table 8
Readiness to vote for parties advancing the following objectives, according to national 
self-ldentlflcation:
Ukrainians Dual iden­
tity
Russians Other identifica­
tion
Total
Strengthening the 
independence of the 
Ukrainian state
70,1% 48.6% 36.8% 43.2% 59.6%
Rebirth of the 
Ukrainian nation
67.0% 37.5% 26.3% 32.2% 53.4%
Unification with 
Russia and Belarus
32.5% 50.5% 61.6% 51.9% 41.1%
Resurrection of the 
USSR
25.3% 41.1% 51.9% 41.4% 32.8%
The study was based in 60 interviews with members of regional elites, half of which were 
conducted in L’viv and half in Donetsk. Stephen Shulman, international and National integration 
in Multi-ethnic States: The Sources of Ukrainian (Dislunitv. PhD thesis. University of Michigan, 
1996
The survey, which was conducted by the Kiev Centre for Political Research and the Kiev In­
ternational Institute of Sociology in November-December 1997, used a sample of 10, 211, with 
an average of 400 respondents from each of 26 regions (Kiev, Crimea and the remaining 24 
oblasti). Because the overall sample does not reflect the different population sizes of the re­
gions, the results accurately reveal regional differences, but cannot be considered representa­
tive of Ukraine as a whole, in this survey, 71% of respondents expressing identification with 
both the Russian and Ukrainian nations and cultures declared a preference for the Russian 
language. M.l. Beletsky and A.K. Tolpygo, "Natsional’no-kul’turnye 1 ideologicheskiye orientatsii 
naseleniya Ukrainy", Polls, vol. 46, no. 4, 1998, pp. 74-76 
The most marked distance between ethnic-identification groups, occupying ideological posi­
tions adjacent in the continuum, was that separating ethnic Ukrainians from the dual-identity 
group (2:1). Ibid., p. 85
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Source: M.l. Beletsky and A.K. Tolpygo, "Natsional'no-kurturnye i ideologicheskiye orientatsii 
naseleniya Ukrainy”, Polis, vol. 46, no. 4, 1998, p. 8
Table 9
Notions of preferred relations with Russia, according to national self-ldentlflcation:
Ukrainians Dual Iden­
tity
Russians Other identifica­
tion
The same as those with other 
states
16.1% 2.8% 1.3% 5.8%
Independent but friendly states 54.8% 51.7% 40.7% 50.2%
Unification in a single state 22.9% 42.4% 55.5% 39.5%
Source: Beletsky and Tolpygo, “Natsional’no-kul’turnye i ideologicheskiye orientatsii”, p. 86
When language preference is factored Into the analysis, Russophone ethnic 
Ukrainians (those who declare Russian as their language of choice) also ap­
pear to be closer to the political positions of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine 
than to those of their Ukrainian-speaking co-ethnics.®® However, region of resi­
dence seems to prevail over ethnic identification or language preference as the 
most significant factor underlying differences of political opinion on such ‘na­
tional’ issues.®"*
Table 10
West Centre-West South Centre-East East Total
Strengthening the 
independence of the 
Ukrainian state
80.7% 72.3% 43.2% 57.4% 39.0% 59.6%
Rebirth of the 
Ukrainian nation
75.6% 65.6% 33.4% 56.7% 30.8% 53.4%
Unification with 
Russia and Belarus
16.7% 39.0% 51.2% 46.9% 54.9% 41.1%
Resurrection of the USSR 10.7% 30.1% 41.4% 36.2% 48.0% 32.8%
Source: Beletsky and Tolpygo, "Natsional'no-kul'turnye i Ideologicheskye Orientatsii”, p. 86 
Table 11
West Centre-
West
South Centre-
East
East Total
The same as those with 
other states 32.1% 10.4% 2.7% 6.3% 1.6% 10.3%
Independent but friendly 
states 53.6% 57.1% 49.8% 55.6% 44.8% 52.1%
Unification in a single state
7.2% 26.1% 44.7% 34.7% 49.8% 32.9%
Source: Beletsky and Tolpygo, “Natsional’no-kul’turnye i Ideologicheskye Orientatsii”, p. 86
33 Pirie, “National Identity and Politics”, pp. 1088, 1093 
Beletsky and Tolpygo, “Natsional’no-kul’turnye i Ideologicheskye Orientatsii”, p. 86
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This is a function of the concentration of Russophone, ethnic Russian and dual­
identity populations in the Eastern and Southern parts of Uk ra ine, i n  conjunc­
tion with diverse political cultures/ ideological systems shaped by the Ukrainian 
regions' different historical legacies. Western Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovyna and 
Transcarpathia), which had not belonged to Russia or the Soviet Union for 
most of their history until the end of WWII, has traditionally been characterised 
by a stronger sense of national identity, leading to an “almost obsessive desire 
for sel f - rule". In Eastern Ukraine, however, the mentality of ‘Little Russianism’, 
which views the Ukrainian people (Little Russians) -  along with Belarusians 
and ‘Great Russians' as one of the branches of a wider Russian nation, had 
become widespread already in the 19^ century.^^ The salience of regional po­
litical cultures is indicated by survey evidence showing the views of ethnic Rus­
sians in Western Ukraine as well as those of ethnic Ukrainians in the East to 
occupy intermediate positions in the spectrum of political op in ion . In  a survey 
conducted in October 1996 by SOCIS-Gallup in five of Ukraine’s main regions, 
rates of support for the unification of Russia and Ukraine in a single state were 
highest in the South and East. More importantly, they were almost identical for 
Russian and Ukrainian respondents within each of the two regions.^® In Kiev 
and Western Ukraine, overall support for unification was significantly lower, but
The highest concentrations of mixed Russian-Ukralnian families are found in the Eastern 
oblasti, especially Donetsk, where 41.7% belong to mixed families, and the Crimea, where 
36.4% of the families are mixed. Pirie, "National Identity and Politics”, p. 1086-1087 
In Western Ukraine, the Soviet Army faced armed struggle against the Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists from 1944 until the early 1950s. Orest 
Subtelny, Ukraine: A History. Second edition, Toronto: Toronto University Press/ Canadian In­
stitute of Ukrainian Studies, 1994, pp. 425, 478-479, 488-491 
Magosci, A History of Ukraine, p. 368; Subteiny, Ukraine: A History, pp. 203, 206 
Beletsky and Tolpygo, "Natsional'no-kul'turnye i ideologicheskiye orientatsii”, p. 87 
In the South, support for a single Russo-Ukrainian state was 51% among Russian and 51.4% 
among Ukrainian respondents. The respective rates in the East were 35.6 and 33.9%.
In the Kiev region, 21.6% of Russians and 9.7% of Ukrainians were in favour. The difference 
was even wider In the West: 18.6% of Russians as opposed to a mere 2.8% of Ukrainians.
The survey used a sample of 1465 (869 Russians and 569 Ukrainians) and was intended to 
test for differences in attitudes between Russian and Ukrainian respondents. The resuits were 
published by Sergei Savoskul, “Russkie v Nezavisimoi Ukraine: Status, Identichnost’, Perspek- 
tivy", in Furman (ed.), Ukraine i Rossi va. pp. 279, 288
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Russian respondents were more than twice as likely to be in favour than were 
Ukrainians from their region.
Table 12
Readiness to vote for parties advancing the following objectives, according to national 
self-identification and region:
Ukrainians Russians
West East West East
Strengthening the 
Independence of the 
Ukrainian state
84.2% 39.5% 51.7% 34.3%
Rebirth of the 
Ukrainian nation
80.4% 42.8% 37.1% 21.0%
Unification with 
Russia and Belarus
14.0% 45.0% 49.1% 58.4%
Resurrection of the USSR 8.4% 39.8% 34.0% 51.9%
Source: Beletsky and Tolpygo, "Natsional'no-kul'turnye i Ideo ogicheskye Orientatsii", p. 87
Survey research has shown that the population Eastern and Southern Ukraine 
tends to be characterised by a strong antipathy to nationalism and the nation- 
building agenda, while the Soviet Union has remained an important focus of 
identification long after its demise.Th is  has combined with economic motiva­
tions to produce high rates of support for closer ties or integration with Russia 
and the CIS, contributing to the electoral success of left-wing political forces 
standing for a Russia/CIS-oriented foreign policy. On certain occasions, the in­
tegration 1st agenda has surfaced as an autonomous issue for political mobilisa­
tion, as was the case of the referendum held -  on the initiative of the regional 
administrations -  in the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasti on the question of 
Ukraine's full membership in the CIS economic union.
As East-West differences on socio-economic issues have been far less 
sharp than those relating to foreign policy, the deep-seated nationalism- 
integrationism divide, which appears unlikely to lose its electoral significance at
According to the survey conducted by the Kiev Centre for Political Research and the Kiev 
International Institute of Sociology in November-December 1997 (note 25), 12.5% of respon­
dents from the regions lying to the East of the Dniepr identified with the ‘Soviet people’ and 
26.4% saw themselves primarily as citizens of Ukraine (compared to 41.7% in the Western re­
gions). Ibid., p. 81; See also Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 114-115 
The referendum was held simultaneously with the parliamentary elections of March 1994. 
89% of votes in Donetsk and 91% in Lugansk were cast in favour of Ukraine’s full membership.
213
least in the medium term, represents the foremost political cleavage in 
Ukraine/^ Considering that, according to public opinion surveys, advocates of 
economic reform were roughly equally divided among the supporters of Ku­
chma and Kravchuk, academic observer Paul Pirie identified the nationalist and 
occasionally anti-Russian slant in Kravchuk’s policies and discourse as the 
principal factor explaining the outcome of the 1994 presidential election. He 
concluded that because the more populous East and South were bound to 
carry more electoral weight in Ukraine’s presidential contests, “no candidate 
opposed to closer ties to Russia could hope to win power in Ukraine for the 
foreseeable future"."^ The numerical advantage of the Eastern and Southern 
oblasti may be somewhat counterbalanced by the higher levels of voting and 
political activism characterising Western Ukraine.' '^^ Nevertheless, the regional 
divisions regarding the country’s external orientation would effectively compel 
any Ukrainian President to - at least as far as public discourse is concerned -  
adopt a ‘balanced’ approach to relations with Russia. This constraint still allows 
the leadership considerable room for manoeuvre, as it is compatible with a 
wide range of policy options lying between the extremes constituted by maxi­
mal dissociation from Russia, as pursued by Kravchuk, and full integration on 
the model favoured by the Belarusian leadership.
Belarus turns to Russia
While Ukraine’s leadership strove to thwart centripetal tendencies within the 
CIS and to bring the country’s economy and international position closer to
According to the survey referred to in notes 25 and 37, market reforms were more strongly 
endorsed in the Western than in the Eastern regions, but differences regarding such questions 
were well below ten percentage points, while those regarding relations with Russia and the 
adoption of the Ukrainian language throughout the country exceeded twenty percentage points. 
Likewise, Western and Eastern respondents’ perceptions of their own economic conditions 
were very closely balanced. Beletsky and Tolpygo, “Natsionarno-kul’turnye i ideologicheskiye 
orientatsii”, pp. 79, 81 
Pirie, "National Identity and Politics”, p. 1100
Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity", p. 273. Likewise, a set of surveys conducted by the 
Ukrainian Institute for Social Research and the Social Monitoring Centre (Kiev) in December 
1998 and March 1999 found that supporters of national-democratic ideas were far more in­
clined to political activism than left-leaning respondents. Details of the surveys are published by 
Oleksandr Yaremenko and Mykhailo Mishchenko, “The Political Preferences of Ukrainians as a 
Factor Influencing the Political Process", Politichna Dumka. no. 1-2, 2000, pp. 81, 89
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Central and Western Europe as opposed to Russia, Its Belarusian counterpart 
opted for a very different strategy. Since the establishment of the CIS, Belarus 
has consistently taken a pro-integrationist line and signed up to all major 
agreements -  especially after neutrality was interpreted as compatible with 
membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty. By mid-1993, as CIS-wide 
integration appeared to be undermined by member-states’ conflicting political 
priorities, the government of Vyacheslav Kebich began to consider the possibil­
ity of bilateral integration with Russia -  primarily due to economic considera­
tions. The collapse of the rouble zone in July 1993 prompted Kebich to ap­
proach the Russian leadership with a proposal for a bilateral monetary union in 
the hope that the Belarusian economy might still be able to benefit from Rus­
sian support.
Joseph Nye, in his classic theoretical analysis of regional integration, 
stressed the importance of perceptual -  alongside material -  determinants, 
identifying the following preconditions: perceived equity in the distribution of 
benefits; perceived external cogency (i.e. perception of economic dependence); 
and low visible costs. The second factor becomes particularly significant in 
cases when actual economic dependences “pull in different directions''.^^ The 
Belarusian ruling elite perceived the country’s economic dependence on other 
CIS states and Russia in particular as absolutely overwhelming. Belarusian of­
ficials interviewed by the author in late 1999 supported this assessment, point­
ing out that Belarusian industry depended on Russian energy resources and 
raw materials by up to 90%. The country’s industrial capacity, which exceeded 
the needs of its population several times over, required a vast export market 
traditionally represented by Russia and -  to a lesser extent -  other CIS coun­
tries. In the eyes of Belarusian policy-makers, the substantial diversification of 
energy and raw materials suppliers, the restructuring of industry without Rus­
sian assistance and the redirection of exports towards non-CIS markets ap­
peared extremely daunting, if not completely hopeless. The structure of the 
Belarusian economy was thought to simply dictate a policy of maximum efforts 
to strengthen economic integration - either within the CIS framework or on a 
Russo-Belarusian basis. At that time, even successive Parliamentary Speakers 
Stanislav Shushkevich and Myacheslav Gryb, who were later to oppose Presi-
J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict In Regional Organization. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 83-86
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dent Lukashenko’s course of political integration with Russia, openly admitted 
that economic dependence on Russia would necessarily be the major determi­
nant of Belarus’s external orientation."^®
In the Belarusian case, actual economic dependence and especially policy­
makers’ perceptions thereof were significantly higher than in Ukraine -  at least 
in the immediate post-independence p e r i o d . I n  the absence of a politically 
significant constituency of determined opponents of integration, comparable to 
the Ukrainian region of Galicia, the Belarusian leadership could expect negligi­
ble opposition to and overwhelming popular support for its pursuit of integration 
with Russia. In this regard, the visible costs of integration were rather low. In 
the late Soviet period, the Belarusian public had shown barely any inclination to 
back a pro-independence movement. Efforts by the nationalist Belarusian 
Popular Front (BPF) to revive the Belarusian language, culture and national 
consciousness largely failed to appeal to the mass public, which remained sus­
picious of the national-minded intelligentsia."^® In the referendum of March 1991 
on the preservation of the Soviet Union, Belarusian voters had shown the high­
est degree of allegiance to the Soviet state among the participating republics. 
Though an agreement of September 1993 regarding the re-introduction of the 
Russian rouble in Belarus did not materialise, economic integration with Russia 
was the most prominent feature in the campaign platforms of Vyacheslav Ke­
bich and Aleksandr Lukashenko, his main rival in the 1994 presidential election. 
Former Supreme Soviet Speaker Stanislav Shushkevich and BPF leader 
Zyanon Poznyak were the two candidates standing for market reforms and for 
reducing economic dependence on Russia through close relations with the 
West. They jointly gathered less than a quarter of the total vote in the first 
round, indicating that most of the Belarusian public was not enthusiastic about 
market reforms nor had any particular wish to strengthen national independ­
ence at the cost of close relations with Russia.®®
Burant, “Foreign Policy and National identity", pp. 1133-1136
in 1994, Ukraine’s energy dependence on fuel imports from Russia was estimated at around 
40% of its total energy consumption (90% of oil and 77% of gas). D’ Anieri, Economic Interde­
pendence. p. 73
David R. Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Pub­
lishers, 1999, p. 75
See note 15 for the results.
Shushkevich polled 10% and Poznyak 13%. Lukashenko gathered 45% of the votes cast in 
the first round, with Kebich coming second with 17%. Seaodnva. 25 June 1994, p. 1
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According to a member of the BPF leadership, this undeveloped national 
consciousness, characterising most of the Belarusian public and elite alike, has 
been the primary reason for the leadership’s failure to see any realistic alterna­
tives to integration with Russia.®”* As he remarked, at the time when the Soviet 
Union was dissolved, economic conditions for market reforms were almost as 
favourable in Belarus as in the Baltic states, but the ruling elite shied away from 
the painful consequences involved in radical economic transformation. In the 
Baltics, emancipation from Russia and the “return to Europe’’ were embraced 
by the publics and the elites alike as national causes worthy of temporary mate­
rial sacrifices. This was not the case in Belarus, which used to be the Soviet 
Union’s most successfully Russified non-Russian republic. Among titular na­
tionalities of Soviet republics, Belarusians had the lowest level of knowledge of 
their native language (80%), followed by Ukrainians with 88%. Belarusians also 
had the highest rate of knowledge of Russian as a second language (60%), 
with Ukrainians close behind at 59%.®  ^Throughout the country, Russian pre­
dominates as the language of choice both at work and in citizens’ private 
lives.®® In the Western regions of Belarus (Brest’ and Grodno oblasti), which 
had formerly been part of Poland and where Catholics represent a sizeable 
section of the population, levels of support for independence-enhancing policy 
options (presented in public opinion surveys) have exceeded the country-wide 
average. Minsk, with its highly educated population, stands out in terms of sup­
port for independence-enhancing positions, while the Eastern regions (Vitebsk, 
Mogilev and Gomel’ oblasti) have had the highest rates of support for integra­
tion with Russia.®"* However, regional differences in Belarus have been far less
51 Author’s interview, Minsk, 20 November 1999
The data refers to ethnic Belarusians and ethnic Ukrainians, who (according to the census of 
1989) represented 78 and 73% in the Belarusian and Ukrainians 8 8 Rs respectively. 8tate Sta­
tistics Committee of the USSR, Natsional’nv Sostav Naseleniva SSSR. Moscow: ‘Finansy i Sta- 
tistika’, 1989, pp. 78, 88.
A survey conducted in July 2000 (Commissioned by the US State Department and conducted 
by the Belarusian firm ‘Social and Ecological Surveys’, using a sample of 1081) found that 12% 
of respondents usually spoke Belarusian at home and only 7% did so at work. The respective 
rates for the use of Russian were 53% and 63%, while the rest (31% and 26%) used both lan­
guages. US State Department Office of Research, Opinion Analysis. M-175-00,11 October 
2000, p. 3
These conclusions are based on surveys of around 1500 respondents conducted by the 
Minsk-based Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (NiSEPl). Oleg
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pronounced than in Ukraine and their impact on electoral outcomes appears 
rather limited.
For the Belarusian ruling elite, whose composition was characterised by re­
markable continuity with the one of the most loyal-to-Moscow republican Com­
munist Party elites, the value of sovereignty was clearly outweighed by the 
threat of total economic collapse.®® The steep economic decline experienced by 
Ukraine reassured the Belarusian leadership as to the soundness of its own 
choice to strengthen its economic ties to Russia, even at the cost of reduced 
sovereignty implied by participation in a monetary union. National identity, per­
ceived in terms of distinctiveness from Russia, did not represent a motivation 
powerful enough to persuade Belarusian decision-makers to forsake the option 
of using Russian props to ease the course of economic transition. Finally, 
unlike the Ukrainian leadership, which sought to project an image of Ukraine as 
a free-standing European power, Belarusian policy-makers had no aspirations 
to a prominent role in international affairs.
The Lukashenko Presidency:
Belarus defines itself as Russia’s closest ally
President Lukashenko has continued the policies of his predecessors in 
minimising potentially unpopular economic reforms and in relying on integration 
with Russia in order to maintain relative economic and social stability. Indeed, 
the Lukashenko administration has taken significant steps towards the realisa­
tion of the Kebich government’s objectives (customs and monetary union) re­
garding relations with Russia. At the same time, Lukashenko has given the 
pursuit of integration a much stronger ideological underpinning by presenting 
himself as a champion of Soviet nostalgia and Slavic-Orthodox solidarity. He 
drew political capital from the fact that as a member of the Supreme Soviet he 
was the only Belarusian deputy to have voted against the Belovezh agree­
ments, which dissolved the Soviet Union. Praise for the achievements of the
Manayev, "Na Vostok ill na Zapad? Sotsiologichesky Portret Protlvnikov I Storonnikov Nezav- 
isimosti Belarusi", Novosti NISEPl. December 1999, pp. 6-7 
Valery Karbalevlch, “Problemy Polltlcheskoy Bezopasnosti”, in Leonid Zaiko (ed.), 
Natsionai’no-aosudarstvennve Interesv RespublikI Beiarus’. Minsk: Analytichesky Tsentr 
‘Strategiya’, 1999, p. 90
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Soviet state and with references to the fraternal ties uniting the peoples, not 
just of Russia and Belarus, but of Ukraine as well have been commonplace in 
the Belarusian President’s speeches.®® Soon after his coming to office, Luka­
shenko also reversed policies aimed at the wider use of the Belarusian lan­
guage in education and public administration, which the Kebich government 
had introduced under pressure from the vocal national-minded minority in the 
parliament (Shushkevich and the BPF).®  ^ A referendum held in May 1995 
showed that the President’s pro-Soviet rhetoric and Russia-friendly gestures 
had struck a chord in the public mood: 83% of voters supported the restoration 
of Russian as an official state language alongside Belarusian, 76% favoured 
the adoption of Soviet symbols, and 82% endorsed the President's policy of 
economic integration with Russia.®®
Belarusian public opinion
The conclusion of integration treaties with Russia has been accompanied by 
street demonstrations, mainly in the Belarusian capital, organised by the BPF 
and other national-minded political forces in order to alert domestic and interna­
tional opinion to what they perceived as the erosion of Belarusian independ­
ence. The magnitude of these public protests is rather difficult to estimate, as 
official and opposition media have reported widely divergent numbers of par­
ticipants. Survey evidence suggests that integration with Russia has not devel­
oped into a divisive issue for Belarusian society and that Lukashenko has suc­
cessfully converted it into a major source of political support.®® Public opinion
See for example Lukashenko’s replies to readers’ letters In Pravda 5 . 31 July-7 August 1998,
p. 2
Valery Karbalevlch, “Natslonal’no-gosudarstvennye Interesy RespublikI Belarus ”, In Zalko 
(ed.), Natslonal’no-aosudarstvennve Interesv. pp. 80-81 
Nezavlslmava Gazeta. 16 May 1995, p. 1. A survey commissioned by the US State Depart­
ment (note 53) Indicated that most of the public (62%) did not consider it important that Belaru­
sian be the language of Instruction at schools and universities. US State Department Office of 
Research, Opinion Analysis. M-175-00, 11 October 2000, p. 4 
A survey commissioned by the US State Department found that 52% of the Belarusian elec­
torate credited the President with successfully advancing the Interests of Belarus. The survey 
was conducted In July 2000 by the Belarusian firm ‘Social and Ecological Surveys’, using a 
sample of 1081. US State Department Office of Research, Opinion Analysis. M-162-00, 13 
September 2000, p. 4
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surveys have revealed temporary fluctuations in the size of a consistent major­
ity in favour of the Union with Russia.®® Positive views of the Soviet Union and 
ethno-cultural affinity between Russia and Belarus appear as important factors 
in public support for integration. In a survey carried out by the Moscow-based 
Centre for Sociological Research (Foundation for National and International 
Security) in May-June 1999, 77% of Belarusian respondents regarded the fol­
lowing argument as a valid reason to integrate with Russia: “Russians and Bel­
arusians are historically one people, they are spiritually close, and have similar 
languages, cultures and traditions".®^ A public opinion poll commissioned by the 
US State Department found that, as late as mid-2000, 69% of the Belarusian 
public regarded the demise of the Soviet Union as "a great misfortune".®^ A 
survey conducted by Minsk-based ‘Novak’ in March 2000 suggested that only 
50% of the public considered Belarusians as “a separate independent nation", 
while 43% endorsed the statement that “Belarusians are one of the branches of 
the triune Russian nation” (ostensibly consisting of Russians, Belarusians and 
Ukrainians). Family ties may also motivate the desire for closer-than-ordinary 
relations with Russia. Another survey carried out by Novak in April 2000 (com­
missioned by the ‘Outsiders’ project of Stephen White et al.) indicated that 62% 
of Belarusians had at least one close relative living in Russia. Only 9% were in 
favour of relations with Russia being on the same basis as with other countries, 
involving border, visa and customs controls.®®
In another poll commissioned by the US State Department (see note 53), 75% of respon­
dents said that they supported the Union with Russia (19% opposed it). US State Department 
Office of Research, Opinion Analysis. M-175-00, 11 October 2000, p. 2. in a survey conducted 
by Minsk-based institute ‘Novak’ in November-December 1999, using a sample of 1058, 55% of 
respondents thought that the Integration process should be intensified (29% thought otherwise). 
Novak, Public Opinion Monitoring: Republic of Belarus. Minsk: December 1999. A ‘Novak’ sur­
vey conducted in September 2000 showed 57% of the Belarusian public to be In favour of con­
tinuing the integration process (27% disagreed with this view). Nezavlslmava Gazeta. 6 Octo­
ber 2000, p. 5
This Is an unpublished survey, which covered both Russia and Belarus. The Belarusian 
sample consisted of 837 respondents.
US State Department Office of Research, Opinion Analysis. M-175-00, 11 October 2000, p. 1
This survey (based on a country-wide sample of 1390) was organised within the framework 
of the project The Outsiders: Russia. Ukraine. Beiarus. Moldova, and the New Europe by 
Stephen White et al. within the ESRC “One Europe or Several?” research programme. The re­
sults are published in Stephen White and Richard Rose, Nationality and Public Opinion in Bela-
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According to the Novak survey of March 2000, most of the public thought that 
Russia exercised significant influence over the President, the government and 
the economy of Belarus, but only a small minority evaluated this influence 
negatively.®"* Despite some apprehensions related to the possibility of unwel­
come aspects of the Russian economic system (asset-stripping privatisation, 
widespread corruption and criminality) being ‘exported’ to Belarus,®® the inte­
gration process has elicited expectations of increased welfare from the Belaru­
sian mass public.®® The ‘Outsiders’ project survey (conducted by Novak in April 
2000), indicated that the vast majority of the Belarusian public (69%) thought 
that existing relations with Russia had a positive impact on conditions in Bela­
rus.®  ^ In the context of these perceptions, it is hardly surprising that a common 
defence with Russia has gathered larger popular backing compared to alterna­
tive strategies of advancing the security of Belarus.®® In the aforementioned
rus and Ukraine. Studies in Public Policy no. 346, Glasgow, Centre for the Study of Public Pol­
icy, University of Strathciyde, 2001, pp. 18, 45 
The survey used a sample of 1608. In a general question on the nature of Russia's influence 
on Belarus, 77% of respondents characterised it as positive and 8% as negative. 57% believed 
that Russia exercised a iot of influence over the President and government of Belarus, while 
66% thought so with regard to the country’s economy. 42% described Russia’s influence on the 
Belarusian President and government as positive, 33% as neutral, and 9% as harmful. The 
percentages concerning Russia’s influence on the Belarusian economy were 50%, 23% and 
12% respectively. ‘Novak’, Beiarus and the world. Minsk: March 2000 
In the survey carried out by the Centre for Socioiogicai Research (see note 61), 34% of re­
spondents expressed concern over potential negative consequences of political instability in 
Russia and widespread corruption in the Russian government apparatus, 29% feared the intro­
duction of privatisation on the Russian model, and 28% were worried about the spreading of 
criminality from Russia. The plurality (37%), however, expected no adverse consequences from 
the formation of a Russo-Belarusian Union-state.
ibid. In this survey, 68% of respondents expected that “unification would enable a significant 
improvement in the economic performance of both countries, reduced unemployment, and 
higher standards of living ”. The November-December 1999 ’Novak’ survey (see note 60), a 
quarter of ail respondents suggested “strengthening economic ties to Russia’’ as the best strat­
egy for Belarus to exit the economic crisis. 21% suggested ties to Western Europe and an 
equal percentage favoured market reforms.
White and Rose, Nationalitv and Public Opinion in Beiarus and Ukraine, p. 45 
Ibid. A common defence with Russia was supported by 46% of respondents, with 37% ex­
pressing a preference for neutral status. Only 8% were in favour of joining NATO. In the April 
survey by Novak (for the ‘Outsiders’ project, see note 63), 38% of respondents favoured an 
alliance with CIS countries, with 12% opting for NATO membership. White and Rose, National­
ity and Public Opinion in Beiarus and Ukraine, p. 18
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survey by the Centre for Sociological Research, 82% of Belarusian respon­
dents agreed with the argument that the unification with Russia “will strengthen 
the common defence capabilities (of Russia and Belarus) and enable them to 
jointly countenance a potential military threat emanating from NATO”.®®
At the same time, Belarusian citizens have expressed a considerable degree 
of appreciation for independent statehood. In surveys, where respondents have 
been given a choice between alternative forms of integration, overwhelming 
majorities have rejected the option of Belarus becoming the 90**^  unit of the 
Russian Federation.^® Most of the public has favoured some form of political 
integration with Russia, with survey evidence forecasting a 'yes' vote in the 
event of a referendum on a Union-state.^^ A series of surveys conducted by the 
Minsk-based Independent Institute of Social, Economic and Political Studies 
(NiSEPl), produced the following results:
Table 13
Vote in a hypothetical referendum on the unification of Belarus and Russia
MAR 99 JUN 99 NOV 99 APR 00 AUG 00 NOV 00
In favour of 
unification
41.8% 54.9% 47.0% 55.7% 52.9% 54.4%
Against
unification
40.4% 31.1% 34.1% 27.6% 29.4% 28.9%
Would not 
vote
14.7% 13.1% 15.6% 15.6% 16.4% 15.9%
Source: Novosti NiSEPl. December 2000, p. 82
This section of public opinion has been divided between proponents of a new 
federal structure (in which Belarus and the Russian Federation would have 
equal status) and those of a confederation (understood as a looser version of 
the aforementioned federal model). The Survey by the Institute for Sociological 
Research indicated that 48% of the Belarusian public preferred a federation 
and 19% a confederation. According to the ‘Novak’ survey of March 2000, 29%
^^See note 61.
In the ‘Novak’ surveys of November-December 1999 (note 60) and March 2000 (note 63), 
only 5% of respondents approved of Belarus becoming a Russian federal unit.
The survey by the Institute for Sociological Research (May-June 1999, note 61) suggested 
that almost two thirds of the Belarusian electorate (62%) were prepared to vote in favour of the 
Union state. The Novak’ poll of November-December 1999 (note 60) indicated that 47% in­
tended to cast a ‘yes’ vote, with 28% voting against the Union state.
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of public opinion favoured a federation and 25% a supranational union (confed­
eration). Repeat NiSEPl surveys reveal relatively stable public attitudes:
Table 14
Preferred type of relations NOV 97 SEP 98 MAR 99 NOV 99 NOV 00
Good-neighbourly relations 34.5% 50.8% 43.2% 42.4% 40.6%
Union of two states (confederation) 26.2% 28.1% 30.5% 33.4% 29.2%
Union in a single state (federation) 27.5% 20.1% 24.1% 21.8% 15.9%
Sources: Oleg Manayev, "Na Vosto < ill Na Zapad?". Analvticheskv Bvuileten’ N SERI. no. 7
1999, p. 5; Source: Novosti NiSEPl. December 2000, p. 82
As the above table indicates, a plurality of Belarusians would prefer Russia and 
Belarus to remain separate states. This is corroborated by the ‘Novak’ surveys 
of November-December 1999 and March 2000, in which 48 and 38% of re­
spondents respectively supported such an option.
“Together with Russia in Europe!”
Elite conceptions of Belarusian economic and strategic interests
Aware of the link between the material rewards of integration and its popular­
ity among the electorate, the Lukashenko administration has sought to maxi­
mise, not only trade with Russia, but equally various forms of subsidies from 
the Russian to the Belarusian economy. An increased dependence on Russia 
has not been a concern for the Belarusian leadership, which has had no inten­
tion of antagonising Russia's priorities (e.g. in the strategic sphere) and, there­
fore, no fear of Russia exploiting the Belarusian economy’s vulnerability. Bela­
rusian economist and opposition politician Leonid Zlotnikov has estimated that 
uneven customs legislation diverted around $400 million in customs duties from 
the Russian to the Belarusian budget, with another $200-300 million gained 
annually from barter exports at prices above those prevailing on the world mar­
ket.^ ® Taking into account the reduced prices paid for Russian gas and oil, he
The higher rate produced in the earlier survey might have been affected by the fact that the 
option of separate statehood was expressed as follows: "sovereign states cooperating more 
closely In the economic and defence fields".
In 1997, for example, Russia Imported Belarusian sugar at $513 per tonne compared to a 
world market price of $307-324. Leonid Zlotnikov, "Vyzhivaniye ill Integratsiya?", Pro et Contra. 
vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1998, p. 85
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calculated the annual amount of Russian subsidies at a total of $1-1,3 billion/"* 
As a result of its loyalty to Russia, Belarus was preferred as the route for the 
Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, from which it stands to gain a permanent source of 
substantial revenue (in transit fees) and/or guaranteed fuel supplies/® Accord­
ing to President Lukashenko, the integration process, particularly the abolition 
of customs barriers and the adoption of a “common energy resources balance”, 
has had a “most positive impact” on the Belarusian economy/® Lukashenko 
has partly credited integration with the achievement of “stable economic 
growth” in Belarus, which has allegedly resulted in “a more effective tackling of 
social problems”/^  The position of Belarus as the highest-ranked CIS country 
in the United Nations’ index of living standards has served as evidence of the 
ostensible success of the Belarusian socio-economic model/®
Market-oriented Belarusian politicians and economic experts have recog­
nised Russian subsidies as a major prop for the Belarusian economy.^® Zlot­
nikov has suggested that the economic growth, which began in mid-1996, 
would not be sustainable. He has attributed this growth to the increase of im­
port tariffs (in line with Russian ones), which provided a boost to the competi­
tiveness of Belarusian products in the domestic market. Apart from reducing 
the purchasing power of Belarusian consumers, increased protectionism could 
lessen the incentives of inefficient Belarusian enterprises to restructure.®® In a 
broader sense, critics of the Lukashenko administration’s economic policies 
have argued that Russian support has acted as a counter-incentive to conduct 
economic reforms, thereby making little contribution to the long-term economic
Ibid.
Valery Karbalevlch, “Kurs na Integratsiyu s Rossiei; Istoki, Tendentsil, Posledstviya”, in Bela­
rus Monitor. Special Issue "Belarus’-Rossiya: Strategiya Partnerstva”, January 1999, p. 8 
Aleksandr Lukashenko, Beiarus and the CIS: A Path towards a Common Vision. Geneva: 
East European Development Association, 1998, p. 6 
Lukashenko, Beiarus and the CIS, p. 6. Belarus attained growth of 2.8,10.4 and 8.3% in 
1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively, which declined to 1.5% in 1999 due to the impact of the 
Russian economic crisis. In the same period, Russia showed positive growth only in 1997 
(0.8%). EBRD, Transition Report 1999. p. 73 
In 1998, Beiarus was ranked 60^ *^  in the world, whereas Russia and Ukraine occupied the 71®' 
and 108^ *^  positions respectively.
Author’s interviews, Minsk, November 1999 
Zlotnikov, "Vyzhivaniye iii integratsiya?’’, pp. 84-85
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recovery of Belarus.®  ^ The ‘Belarusian model’ has comprised several policy in­
struments contradicting the prescriptions of liberal economists (e.g. price con­
trols on food staples, inflationary currency emission, subsidies to unprofitable 
enterprises), which may undermine the prospects of the Belarusian economy.
Public opinion surveys suggest that Lukashenko’s relatively high approval 
rates have been connected with the integration process and the socio­
economic policies that Russian subsidies have made possible. Most Belaru­
sians appear to credit the President with ensuring adequate food supplies, pay­
ing wages and pensions on time, and providing for education and defence.®^ As 
has been shown in the previous chapter, the instruments used to sustain the 
above social and economic policies have formed one of the major barriers to 
the implementation of agreements relating to economic integration with Russia. 
Perhaps paradoxically, the integration process has also begun to provide the 
most potent pressures on the Belarusian authorities to proceed with economic 
reform. Meeting the requirements of the Russian side (notably the conditions of 
the Russian Central Bank with respect to monetary union) would imply some 
domestically unpopular measures. The harmonisation of economic policies and 
monetary union have been delayed also due to the Belarusian governing elite’s 
insistence (despite the lack of an ideological commitment to the value of state 
sovereignty) on preserving substantial policy-making autonomy as well as on 
maximising its weight in Union decision-making processes. Concern over the 
possible erosion of their competences may account for the high rates of opposi­
tion to formal integration among Belarusian officials.®® Still, the level of Russian 
support and the flexibility of economic conditions attached to it render the op­
tion of switching to creditors like the IMF rather unattractive to the Belarusian
Author’s interviews, Minsk, November 1999
Majorities ranged from 63 to 73%. This data comes from a survey commissioned by the US 
State Department, which was conducted in July 2000 (see note 58). According to this poll, 60% 
of respondents had a positive opinion of Lukashenko, with 29% expressing an unfavourable 
view. 58% thought that he had performed well enough to deserve re-election.
In a series of elite polls (of 50 respondents each) conducted by NiSEPl on a monthly basis 
between June and October 2000, found that 68% of state officials would cast a negative vote in 
the event of a referendum on unification with Russia (the rates for elites from non-governmental 
structures and for the mass public were 97% and 23% respectively). Aleksandr Sosnov, “Poli- 
ticheskie predpochteniya Belorusskoi elity: daleka II ona ot naroda?’’, in Leonid Zaiko (ed.), 
Belarus’: na puti v tret’e tvsvachiletive. Minsk: FilServ Plyus, Belarusian Think Tanks, 2001, p. 
64
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leadership. Regardless of Lukashenko’s alleged aspirations to the presidency 
of a Russo-Belarusian state,®"* economic gain represents more than sufficient 
motivation for any non-nationalist Belarusian leader to persist with the Russia- 
centred orientation.
Market-oriented economists and politicians consider that the current leader­
ship had initially overestimated Russia’s ability to assist the long-term recovery 
of the Belarusian economy and had, therefore, been misguided in delaying the 
country’s integration In the wider European and global economy.®® In their view, 
the integration process (most notably, through the formation of FIGs) has at 
best led to rather modest increases in investment and productivity, which could 
not realistically be expected to change in the foreseeable future. Russia simply 
lacks the surplus capital and the advanced technology needed for the moderni­
sation of Belarusian (as well as Russian) enterprises. The Belarusian govern­
ment has recognised that, if the country’s economy is to overcome its techno­
logical backwardness and improve its competitiveness in international markets, 
it will have to attract Western assistance and investment. The creation of 
Russo-Belarusian FIGs Is hoped to increase the attractiveness of Belarus in the 
eyes of Western investors interested in expanding into the much larger Russian 
market.®®
The realisation that Belarusian economic dependence was not exclusive to 
relations with Russia was one of the motives underlying a reconsideration of 
Belarusian foreign policy, which led to the proclamation of a ‘multi-vector’ for­
eign policy. This was not conceived as the ‘Ukrainisation’ of Belarusian policy, 
implying a shift towards Western states and reliance on national-minded forces 
within the country.®^ The principal aim has been, not to reverse the ‘Russia-first’ 
orientation, but to give Belarus its own profile in international affairs, enabling it 
to become directly involved in European political and economic processes. The 
first priority in this respect has been to redress the international isolation of Bel­
arus, primarily by improving relations with the West and with the ELI in particu-
^  Fora sophisticated example of this common allegation, see Galina Dragokhrust, "Rossi isky 
Faktor v Belorusskoi Politlke", in Problemv Politlcheskoao Liderstva I Intearatslva Belarusi i 
Rossii. Minsk: Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, 1997, p. 16 
Author’s interviews, Minsk, November 1999
Author’s interview with a member of the Belarusian cabinet, Minsk, 19 November 1999 
Anatoly Rozanov, “Vneshnyaya Politika Belarusi: Novye Ochertanlya?’’, Belarus’ v Mire, no. 
2,1999, p. 7
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lar.®® Belarus had formalised its relations with the EU by concluding an Interim 
agreement and a Partnership and Cooperation agreement (PGA) in 1994. 
These agreements, alongside EU assistance through the TACIS programme, 
were suspended in 1997 in condemnation of President Lukashenko’s excessive 
concentration of power In his own hands at the expense of the Parliament and 
the Constitutional Court and his use of repressive tactics towards the opposi­
tion and the media.®®
The BPF and some other members of the anti-Lukashenko elite would -  in 
principle - prefer Belarus to strive for EU (or even NATO) membership, which 
they see as a theoretically more promising path for the country’s political and 
economic development. Most, however, seem to believe that this is no longer 
a realistic prospect, as too much time has been lost due to the delay in eco­
nomic and political reforms, making the distance separating Belarus from 
credible candidates for accession to the EU almost impossible to cover.®® With 
the notable exception of the BPF, which opposes a Russia-centred orientation 
as detrimental to Belarusian national identity and state sovereignty, most critics 
of the course of integration pursued by Lukashenko have had less fundamental 
objections. Vladimir Goncharik, the main opposition candidate in the 2001 
presidential elections, has argued for a balanced foreign policy and for coop­
erative relations with the West, including NATO, but has described the Russia- 
Belarus Union and the Russian nuclear umbrella as the most effective guaran­
tees of Belarusian security.®^ The Social Democratic Party ‘Gromada’ of Nikolai 
Statkevich and Myacheslav Gryb and the United Civic Party of Anatoly Le-
Oleg Laptyonok (Director of the international Organisations Department, Belarusian Foreign 
Ministry), “Plurality of Foreign Policy Vectors of Belarus in New International Setting", Belarus in 
the World, vol. 4, no. 4, 1999, p. 45
The result of the referendum of November 1996, which enabled the President to increase his 
competences and extend his mandate by two years, was not recognised by international or­
ganisations because the procedures required by Belarusian legislation had not been followed. 
Elections conducted subsequently (notably the 2000 parliamentary election and the 2001 
presidential election) were also considered not to have met international standards. Belarus 
has, however, continued to receive humanitarian aid from the EU and Belarusian NGOs have 
benefited from TACIS funding through its Civil Society programme.
Author’s interviews with opposition politicians, journalists and economic experts, Minsk, No­
vember 1999
Interview published in The Viewer. Weekly Analytical Bulletin, Beiapan News Agency, no. 32, 
8-14 August 2001, p. 6
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bedko have advocated close relations and economic cooperation with Russia, 
but have disputed the need for bilateral supranational institutions and for a mili­
tary alliance.®^ They have also been rather sceptical regarding the prospects of 
monetary union and have argued for a more balanced foreign policy and for the 
expansion of economic interaction with Western Europe. As anti-Lukashenko 
forces have had almost no representation in the Belarusian parliament since 
1995 and hardly any access to the official media, they have had no direct 
channels of influence over official policy.®®
Nevertheless, their views have found considerable resonance among parts 
of the state administration and the broader foreign policy community (e.g. lead­
ing academic specialists), resulting in the re-evaluation of the conspicuous im­
balance in the external relations of Belarus. What appears to have been an in­
fluential section of Belarusian Foreign Ministry officials has increasingly felt that 
the Lukashenko administration’s intransigence towards the EU’s demands un­
necessarily restricted the country’s opportunities for advancing its economic 
and political interests to the bilateral relationship with Russia.®"* Despite some 
efforts to rebuild relations with Western European states and organisations,®® 
neither the Lukashenko administration and the pro-Presidential forces in Par-
A series of elite polls conducted by NiSEPl in 2000 (see note 81) 86% of elite members from 
non-governmental structures preferred Belaurs and Russia to have “good-neighbourly relations 
as two independent states”, with 10% supporting a Union of independent states. The rates for 
state officiais were 64 and 28%. No member of the elite favoured a merger into a single state, 
an opinion supported by 33% of the mass public. Sosnov, “Politicheskie predpochteniya”, p. 64 
^  Following the referendum of November 1996 on the extension of Presidential powers, the 
Belarusian Parliament became bicameral, with the lower chamber being formed by 110 out of 
198 deputies returned In the 1995 elections, thereby excluding anti-Lukashenko forces. In the 
Parliamentary elections of October-November 2000, whose conduct was criticised by interna­
tional organisations, only two deputies from the opposition were elected (Ol'ga Abramova of 
‘Yabloko’ and Vladimir Novosyad of ‘Civic Forum’).
Author’s interviews with Belarusian officials, Minsk, November 1999 
Modest steps forward were made in 1999-2000 (e.g. conclusion of an agreement raising the 
Belarusian quota for the duty-free export of textiles to the EU market; the EU revoked visa re­
strictions for Belarusian officials and increased funds allocated to Belarus), which were linked to 
the opening of negotiations between the Belarusian President and the opposition. In early 
2001, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly began negotiations with the Belarusian 
Parliament on the reinstatement of its ‘guest status’. In a press conference during the campaign 
for the September 2001 presidential elections, Lukashenko promised that, if he was re-elected, 
“diplomatic and political relations with the West would be normalised literally within a few 
months”. Sovetskava Belorussiva. 9 August 2001, p. 1
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liament nor most of the extra-parliamentary opposition see a workable alterna­
tive to the special relationship with Russia. A course of integration with the EU 
does not form part of the possibilities contemplated by the Belarusian foreign 
policy community. In the short to medium term, it is hoped that that Belarus 
may be able to develop relations with an enlarged EU with a view to some rela­
tively modest objectives such as the widening of its producers’ access to the 
EU’s export market; the expansion of EU assistance and investment in the Bel­
arusian economy; and participation in various EU-sponsored regional projects 
in fields such as environmental protection and transport infrastructure.
At any rate, the optimal form of relations envisaged by the Belarusian admini­
stration does not extend beyond the bounds of the PCA. This type of agree­
ment, which has also been signed by Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries, 
differs from Association (‘Europe’) agreements, which have constituted the le­
gal framework of relations between the EU and individual Central and East 
European (non-CIS) states, in containing no reference to the possibility of ac­
cession to the EU. President Lukashenko may have defined Belarus “as a pro­
foundly European country”, but, in the view of Belarusian foreign policy plan­
ners, a strategy of accession to the EU is not a viable option for Belarus.®® As 
an analysis by the Belarusian Foreign Ministry points out,
“unfortunately, it is evident that the European Union, which represents a uni­
versally recognised pole of attraction in the European region, cannot realisti­
cally constitute ‘a common home’ for all European peoples in the medium 
term.”®^
Therefore, they share the conclusion of their Russian counterparts that CIS 
countries need to emulate the experience of the EU in developing integrative 
processes among themselves. Perhaps even more enthusiastically than the 
Russian side, Belarusian officials view the Eurasian Economic Community 
(formerly Customs Union of the Five) and especially the Russo-Belarusian Un­
ion as the integrative core of the CIS. They expect that the success of these 
two formations in creating a common economic space, generating trade and 
increasing the prosperity of member-states, will encourage other CIS countries
See Lukashenko’s interview in Sovetskava Belorussiva. 27 July 1999, p. 2 
Documents provided by the Belarusian Foreign Ministry (spring 2000). This point is made 
also in an article by Laptyonok, “Plurality of Foreign Policy Vectors”, p. 44
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to join.®® In the long term, an integrated post-Soviet region could come to mirror 
ED structures and constitute an Eastern pillar, eventually merging with the EU 
into a Europe-wide community.®®
It is this end-game, involving the growing interaction and gradual conver­
gence between an enlarged EU and a Eurasian integrated community, that is 
denoted by the slogan "together with Russia in Europe”. This notion is founded 
on the consideration that Russia has proved far more successful than Belarus 
in developing its relations with West European states and the EU. Besides, 
Belarusian foreign policy experts believe that the strategy symbolised by the 
above slogan reflects the expectations of the Belarusian mass public.^®® This 
strategy is supported also by moderate opposition forces like the United Civic 
Party of former National Bank Chairman Stanislav Bogdankevich, on condition 
that pro-market forces with a positive attitude towards the West retain power in 
R u s s ia . U n i t e d  opposition candidate for the September 2001 presidential 
elections Vladimir Goncharik has, likewise, criticised the current integration 
process with Russia as ‘unrealistic’ due to the failure of Belarus to adopt market 
reforms that would ensure the compatibility of the two countries’ economic sys­
tems. He has also argued for a more balanced orientation between Russia and 
Western Europe, while pledging not to terminate the integration agreements.^®^ 
Survey evidence suggests that Belarusian public opinion is attracted by the 
higher living standards associated with accession to the EU,”*®® but does not 
wish to see the ‘special relationship’ with Russia dismantled. In the view of a 
leading Belarusian analyst, the BPF alienated most of the electorate, not due to
Author’s interviews, Minsk, 15 and 19 November 1999 
Laptyonok, “Pluraiity of Foreign Poiicy Vectors”, p. 44
A.V. Sharapo, "Rossiisko-Belorusskaya integratsiya I Obshchestvennoye Mneniye”, Belo- 
russkv Zhurnal Mezhdunarodnogo Prava I Mezhdunarodnvkh Otnoshenii. no. 1, 2000, p. 65 
Author’s interview with one of the party’s ieadership, Minsk, 16 November 1999; See aiso 
speech by Bogdankevich in the public hearings on issues related to Russo-Beiarusian integra­
tion held in March 1999 (Moscow), published in Bvuileten’ Belarus’ Seaodnva. May 1999, p. 11
Beiapan news agency, 7 August 2001, from www.belapan.com
The March 2000 survey by ‘Novak’ (note 64) asked Belarusians whether they thought that 
iiving standards in Central and East European countries applying for EU membership would 
improve after accession. 55% said that they would. In the same survey, 40% of respondents 
assessed the EU’s influence on Beiarus positively. The ‘Outsiders’ survey (Novak, April 2000) 
found that 55% of the Belarusian public would welcome accession to the EU. White and Rose,
Nationalitv and Public Opinion in Beiarus and Ukraine, p. 49
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its advocacy of integration with Western Europe, but due to its anti-Russian 
rhetoric/®"* The Belarusian President, convinced that no CIS country could join 
Western structures, has repeatedly invited Ukraine to become the third member 
of the Russia-Belarus Union, dismissing the Ukrainian leadership's ‘European 
choice’(strategy aimed at accession to the EU) as unfeasible: “As if it was not 
understood that nobody in the West is waiting for Ukraine, Belarus, Russia or 
the others (CIS countries).” ®^®
Belarusian foreign policy makers equally consider that the Union with Russia 
strengthens their negotiating positions in international fora and vis-à-vis organi­
sations like the WTO/®® As far as the country's security is concerned, the BPF 
appears to be an exception - even among anti-Lukashenko forces - in regard­
ing Russia as a threat to the security of Belarus. Some moderate opposition 
leaders have questioned the credibility of current assurances by the Belarusian 
leadership and the Russian side that the military aspect of integration will con­
tinue to respect the Belarusian constitutional commitment to nuclear-free status 
and the ban on the deployment of Belarusian Armed Forces outside the coun­
try’s territory. They also dispute the Lukashenko administration’s assessment of 
NATO expansion as detrimental to Belarusian security.^®^ Minsk responded to 
the expansion of NATO even more adversely than Russian diplomacy, using 
essentially identical arguments. This has been due both to a genuine conver­
gence in perceptions of NATO and to the coordination of the two countries’ dip­
lomatic positions as part of the integration process. The Belarusian side has 
been especially concerned by the fact that the accession of Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech republic to NATO would end any pretensions to a balance be­
tween the military capabilities of NATO and those of its present-day aspiring 
counterweight, the CIS Collective Security Treaty. This consideration aggra­
vated the Belarusian leadership’s resentment of the heavy financial costs en­
tailed by the country’s CFE obligations, prodding it to temporarily halt (during
Rozanov, “Vneshnyaya Politika Belarusi”, p. 6; Karbalevlch, “Natsional’no-gosudarstvennye 
interesy”, pp. 71, 87
Lukashenko’s interview with Yevgeny Revenko, programme "Vest!”, Russian television net­
work RTR, 24 May 2000, transcript provided by the Belarusian Foreign Ministry
Author’s interviews, Minsk, 13,15 and 19 November 1999
Author’s interviewswith leaders of the extra-parliamentary opposition, Minsk, 16-18 Novem­
ber 1999
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the latter part of 1995 and the beginning of 1996) the destruction of weapons 
inherited from the Soviet Union.
The Belarusian President surpassed even Russia’s ‘red-browns’ in the feroc­
ity of his anti-NATO discourse, describing the Alliance as "a scary monster star­
ing at Belarus”. His most controversial statements have included an expression 
of regret that Belarus gave up its nuclear weapons and a call for the formation 
of a Minsk-Moscow-Beijing axis.^°® The exploitation of Cold-War stereotypes 
complemented President Lukashenko’s image as a staunch defender of Slavic- 
Orthodox unity, ostensibly threatened by the West in the form of NATO.'*®® 
Since the expansion of NATO emerged as an inevitable prospect, the Belaru­
sian side has enthusiastically supported the enhancement of the military aspect 
of integration with Russia (which will be discussed in the following section). 
During a visit by Russian Defence Minister Igor’ Sergeyev to Minsk in October 
1998, his Belarusian opposite number reportedly assured him that Russia could 
-  to all intents and purposes - regard Belarus as a Russian military district.'* 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo crisis alarmed the Belarusian leadership, 
which drew a parallel between Western condemnation of Yugoslavia’s human 
rights record and quasi-dictatorial regime, on the one hand, and charges of au­
thoritarianism and civil liberties’ violations levelled at Belarus, on the other. Lu­
kashenko saw himself in the position of Slobodan Milosevic, as the target of a 
US-driven ‘démonisation’ campaign, presumably intended to justify in the eyes 
of Western public opinion a future intervention to forcibly remove him from 
power.'*^  ^ As a leading Belarusian parliamentarian said to the author, in view of
Kommersant’-Dallv. 25 September 1998, p. 2
The “Clash of Civilisations” thesis has attracted immense publicity in the press and among 
academic circles in Belarus, as has been the case in Russia. According to the ‘Novak’ poll of 
March 2000 (note 64), just under a quarter (24%) of the Belarusian public considered Western 
civilisation as hostile to Orthodox peoples. For the original argument, see Samuel P. Hunting­
ton, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, NY: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996
Kommersant’-Dailv. 17 October 1998, p. 3
Allegations of a CIS plot to overthrow Lukashenko had surfaced as early as 1997: Nezav- 
Isimava Gazeta. 27 July 1997, p. 1. See also Lukashenko’s interview in Rossiiskava Federat- 
siva. 9 August 1999, p. 14. In early 2001, the Belarusian President appeared on national televi­
sion and accused the OSCE Consultative-Monitoring Group in Minsk of smuggling weapons 
into the country intended for an armed group to be disguised as election monitors during the 
summer Presidential elections. Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 29 January 2001
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NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which provides for operations beyond the terri­
tories of member-states, “there are no guarantees that Belarus, too, may not 
become the object of a ‘humanitarian intervention”’.” ^
As the Belarusian President himself has pointed out, Belarus has not experi­
enced ethnic tensions (nor is there a realistic prospect of this),” ® which renders 
comparisons with the case of Kosovo inappropriate. Nevertheless, for pro- 
Lukashenko elite, Russia’s role as a guarantor of Belarusian security has come 
to rival its significance as a welfare provider. An emphasis has been placed on 
the Russo-Belarusian Union’s reflecting NATO functions, most notably firm col­
lective defence guarantees including protection by Russia’s ‘nuclear umbrella’. 
In Lukashenko’s own words: “Russians understand perfectly that an attack on 
Belarus would be primarily an attack on Russia, as was the case in World War 
I, in World War II, in all wars, at all times”.” "* In return, the Belarusian President 
has stressed that Belarus has been “defending both its own interests and those 
of Russia. And it will keep doing so. Because we [Belarus] have always been a 
reliable ally for the Russian person and have never in history betrayed him.”” ® 
In response to criticisms by Russian liberals relating to the costs of integration 
with Belarus to the Russian economy, he has contended that the contribution of 
Belarus to Russia’s security (by means of the Russia’s lease-free use of the 
Baranovichi air-defence facility and the Vileika communications installation) is 
worth more than any economic support Belarus has received from Russia.” ® 
Apart from viewing the Union with Russia as an alternative to the EU and as 
the epicentre of economic integration in the post-Soviet region, Belarusian di­
plomacy has portrayed the bilateral Union as the nucleus of the Tashkent Col­
lective Security Treaty and as a putative pole of resistance to a NATO-centric 
security environment.”  ^This corresponds to the joint endeavour of the Russian 
and Belarusian foreign-policy makers to accelerate the emergence of a multipo­
lar world order, with a Russia-led CIS as one of the regional ‘poles’.” ® The Bel-
Minsk, 19 November 1999
Lukashenko’s address to the Russian State Duma, 27 October 1999, published in Rossils- 
kava Federatsiva Seaodnva. 10 November 1999, p. 9
From Lukashenko’s aforementioned Interview (note 105), broadcast on RTR (24 May 2000) 
Ibid.
Lukashenko’s address to the Russian State Duma, 27 October 1999, p. 11 
Documents provided by the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, spring 2000.
China and the EU are also regarded as prospective regional centres in a multipolar world 
order.
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arusian leadership has recognised that Georgia and Azerbaijan, having an­
nounced their intention to apply for admission to NATO, could not be attracted 
to the Russian/CIS pole. Still, it has expressed the view (more optimistic than 
Russian forecasts) that Uzbekistan and Ukraine, which have also established 
cordial relations with NATO, might reconsider their strategic orientation in the 
face of security challenges that Western structures could be unwilling to get in­
volved in.” ®
At the same time, the Belarusian stance on NATO has become more prag­
matic than Lukashenko’s rhetoric would suggest. Indeed, as public concern 
over NATO has subsided with the end of the campaign against Yugoslavia,^^® 
the Belarusian administration has adopted a markedly conciliatory tone. Bela­
rus has expressed reserved satisfaction with its participation in the Euro- 
Atlantic Partnership Council (a forum uniting members of NATO and states that 
have joined its Partnership for Peace programme) and a wish to develop ‘nor­
mal relations’ with the Alliance. Again, this change of attitude seems to have 
been driven by moderate criticism, originating even within official circles. Critics 
contended that it was counterproductive for a small country like Belarus to be 
aggravating tensions with an all-powerful alliance like NATO, alienating its 
prosperous member-states, which could provide investment vital to the Belaru­
sian economy.Be la rus  has tended to be rather unenthusiastic about and 
even somewhat suspicious of the PfP, with its participation in the programme 
being as limited as that of Russia. It has, nonetheless, taken part in some PfP 
activities (e.g. environmental and other civil emergency exercises) without Rus-
From Lukashenko’s interview to RTR (24 May 2000). The Belarusian President referred to 
Uzbekistan’s recent -  at least partial -  rapprochement with Russia, which was prompted by the 
advancement of Taliban forces closer to the Uzbek border. He did not, however, specify the 
kind of security threat that Ukraine might face.
According to a survey commissioned by the US State Department and conducted by the firm 
‘Social and Ecological Surveys’ In May 1999 and again In July 2000, the section of the public 
concerned about the possibility of an external attack on Belarus had declined from 55 to 33%. 
The share identifying the US as the most likely aggressor dropped from 26 to 13%. US State 
Department Office of Research, Opinion Analysis. M-168-00, 20 September 2000, p. 1. Like­
wise, in November 1999 NiSEPl (using a sample of 1508) found that the share of respondents 
who considered NATO expansion as a threat to Belarus had been reduced to 44%, compared 
to 48% In June 1999. Novosti NiSEPl. November 1999, pp. 19-20
Author’s interviews with Belarusian officials, Minsk, November 1999. See also Rozanov, 
“Vneshnyaya Politika Belarusi", pp. 6-7
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Sian involvement. Russia’s continued quest for compromise and dialogue with 
NATO has motivated the Belarusian leadership to renew its efforts to also con­
clude a framework agreement formalising its interaction with the Alliance.'*^^ In 
no sense, however, have these efforts at rapprochement with NATO been in­
tended to extend beyond the level of Russia-NATO relations, let alone shift the 
strategic orientation of Belarus towards the West.
Ukraine under Kuchma: the ‘European choice’ and perspectives on Rus­
sia
Whereas President Lukashenko turned integration with Russia into one of the 
pillars of his popular appeal, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma partly back­
tracked on his emphasis on relations with Russia and the CIS, which appeared 
to have played an important part in his electoral victory of 1994. His administra­
tion did prioritise the normalisation of relations with Russia, leading to the set­
tlement of the major issues left unresolved by the previous administration (nu­
clear disarmament; division of the BSF; Friendship treaty -  including mutual 
recognition of borders). Still, it has by no means pursued a Russia-first foreign 
policy, as had been expected by foreign observers and -  presumably -  his 
electorate in 1994. Tellingly, the results of the 1999 presidential elections 
showed that Kuchma’s pattern of support had shifted from the East to the West 
(Kuchma’s Eastern and Southern electorate having largely switched its prefer­
ences in favour of Communist leader Simonenko), while perceptions of eco­
nomic conditions remained balanced across the East-West divide."*^®
As Taras Kuzio has noted, Kuchma has achieved a lot more than Kravchuk in 
terms of bringing Ukraine closer to (Western and Central) Europe and, thereby.
Laptyonok, “Plurality of Foreign Policy Vectors", p. 46.
A survey conducted by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research and the Social Monitoring 
Centre (Kiev) in March 1999 showed that 70% of voters characterised by an adherence to na­
tional-democratic (rather than social democratic) ideas were inclined to support Kuchma. 
Among those who intended to vote for Kuchma, only 14% would like to see the President work 
towards the unification of Ukraine and Russia in a single state, as opposed to 42% among Si­
monenko supporters. Details of the poll are given by Oleksandr Yaremenko and Mykhailo 
Mishchenko, “The Political Preferences of Ukrainians”, pp. 92, 95
235
removing it from Russia’s orbit/^"* Ukraine’s so-called ‘European choice’ be­
came official in June 1998 by means of the Presidential decree “On the Ap­
proval of the Strategy for Ukraine’s Integration in the European Union”. The 
Strategy states that “the main priority of Ukraine’s foreign policy in the medium 
term is the attainment of associate member status in the EU” and envisages 
the approximation of Ukrainian economic, social and environmental legislation 
to the standards required of countries applying for admission to the EU.^ ^® At 
the same time, relations with the US and NATO have reached such cordiality 
that Ukraine has become one of the largest recipients of American aid, while 
military cooperation (both bilateral and within the PfP) has arguably developed 
to the maximum extent compatible with Ukraine’s formal non-bloc status/^® 
Unlike its predecessor, the Kuchma administration has repeatedly argued in 
favour of raising the effectiveness of the CIS (especially in the economic field) 
and has been actively involved in the debates and negotiations regarding the 
reform of CIS institutions. Nonetheless, it has not only continued to categori­
cally oppose the evolution of the CIS on the supranational model, but it has 
also taken the lead in uniting like-minded CIS member-states in a separate 
grouping known as GUAM (from the initials of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova) and, since the addition of Uzbekistan, as GUUAM."*^^ The organisa­
tion's main task has been to reduce its members’ economic dependence on 
Russia (primarily through the advocacy of energy transport routes from Central 
Asia to Europe bypassing Russia). Military cooperation has been added to its 
activities with the purposes of minimising Russia’s potential leverage in con-
Taras Kuzio, "Slavophiles versus Westernizers: Foreign Policy Orientations of Ukraine”, in in 
Spilimann et al (eds.), Between Russia and the West, pp. 57-58
Presidential decree no. 615/98, 11 June 1998
For the year 2000, Ukraine was the fourth largest recipient of US foreign aid behind Israel, 
Egypt and Colombia. Lt. Coi. Frank Morgese, US-Ukrainian Bilateral Securitv Links. Paper Pre­
sented at the conference “European Security and Post-Soviet Space: Integration or Isolation?”, 
Scottish Centre for international Security/ University of Aberdeen, 26 November 2000. For de­
tails on the content of Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO, see Zerkalo Nedeii. 4 March 2000, p.
1
GUAM was formed as an unofficial grouping in October 1997 at a meeting of the four coun­
tries’ Presidents during the Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg. It became a formal organi­
sation during such a meeting on the occasion of the NATO 50‘  ^anniversary summit (Washing­
ton, April 1999). Uzbekistan became a member a month later. The organisation does not have 
an Integration agenda or any supranational bodies.
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flicts within GUAM states (notably the conflicts in Transdniestr and Abkhazia) 
and of assisting member-states' integration into Western structures."'^® Finally, 
although Leonid Kuchma has occasionally capitalised on the theme of East 
Slavic unity, he has firmly rejected any suggestions that Ukraine might consider 
becoming the third member of the Union formed by Russia and Belarus."'^®
Ukrainian public opinion
The Kuchma administration’s professed quest for a balance in the develop­
ment of relations with Russia and with the West appears to be the only foreign 
policy path with significant support and little opposition among the Ukrainian 
mass public. A set of surveys carried out in early 1998 by SOCIS-Gallup found 
that 42% of the Ukrainian electorate would be inclined to vote for a party or 
candidate standing for a balanced external orientation, with only 4% of respon­
dents saying that they would not vote for a party or candidate with such a pro­
gramme."'®® A close economic and political union with Russia was the second 
most popular foreign-policy programme, with 38% of respondents saying that it 
would have a positive influence on their voting decisions (10% viewed it nega­
tively), while the ‘European choice’ lagged behind with 28% of voters seeing it 
as a positive factor."'®  ^ A poll organised by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Re-
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, the GUUAM member-states that were also parties to 
the CIS Collective Security Treaty, did not renew their membership in the treaty in 1999. In­
stead, the leaderships of Georgia and Azerbaijan have deciared an intention to join NATO. 
Moldova has been increasingly reluctant to engage in military cooperation within GUUAM and 
has raised the possibility of leaving the organisation. See Aleksandr Levchenko, “Ukraine in the 
Black Sea and Caspian Regions”, in Spilimann et al (eds.), Between Russia and the West, p. 
227; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 26 January 2001, p. 5
In May 2000, Kuchma, together with Putin and Lukashenko and the Orthodox Church lead­
ership of the three countries, visited the WWiI battle site ‘Prokhorovskoye pole’ (Belgorod 
oblast’) to participate in the religious service in commemoration of the 55**^  anniversary of the 
Soviet victory. The Presidents revealed a memorial to the unity of the three East Slavic nations 
and Kuchma referred to the “common memory, common history and common destiny" of Bela­
rus, Ukraine and Russia. Nezavisimava Gazeta. 4 May 2000, p. 11
The surveys were conducted in January and February 1998, using samples of 1200 drawn 
from all of Ukraine’s regions. The results are available at www.public.ua.net/~DOtekhin/ 
ucpccrs/MONITOR/OCCAS
10% said that they would not be incilned to vote for a party or candidate speaking for “com­
prehensive economic integration with the West”, ibid.
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search and the Social Monitoring Centre (Kiev) in March 1999 indicated that 
considerable confusion exists among Ukraine’s public opinion as to the com­
patibility between a pro-Western orientation and unification with Russia and 
Belarus, as absolute majorities of respondents (59 and 53% respectively) ex­
pressed approval for both o p t i o n s . T h e  supporters of unification with Russia 
and Belarus were not confined to the political left, but included a substantial 
pro-market constituency, apparently considering that “it is precisely through in­
tegration with Russia that Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West European 
states becomes possible”."'®® The SOCIS-Gallup survey showed that the most 
controversial options were “accession to a renewed Soviet state” (supported by 
23% and opposed by 19%) and prompt accession to NATO, which was the only 
programme with an overall negative influence on voting decisions (15% saw it 
as a positive factor and 19% as a negative one). Overall, rates of indifference 
to foreign policy programmes were rather low, ranging from 5 to 10% - with the 
exception of relations with Poland (16%), which seemed to be of lesser concern 
to the Ukrainian electorate.
Later surveys have indicated an increase in the public’s endorsement of the 
governing elite’s EU- and NATO- centred interpretation of a 'balanced foreign 
policy’, despite the continued prevalence of Russia as the foreign partner of 
choice. According to a survey conducted in February 2000 by the Kiev Interna­
tional Institute of Sociology (KIIS), 58% of Ukrainian public opinion favoured 
membership in the EU (only 11% opposed it)."'®"' Attitudes to Ukraine’s joining 
NATO were very closely balanced, though determined opponents were more
At the same time, the unification of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus was the focus of signifi­
cantly more opposition (29%) than was an "orientation towards rapprochement with the West" 
(18%), though the phrasing of the questions (‘unification’ implies a much stronger commitment 
than ‘rapprochement’) may -  at least party -  account for this. See Yeremenko and Mishchenko, 
“The Political Preferences of Ukrainians", pp. 81-82
This Russia-oriented pro-market constituency was also characterised by an adherence to 
liberal (rather than ethnic and traditional) values. A perception of Russia as being more ad­
vanced in the path of Westernisation than Ukraine itself appeared to have contributed to the 
appeal of integration among this group. Ibid., pp. 84-85
Just over a quarter of ail respondents (25.8%) were not able to express an opinion on this 
issue. This survey (based on a country-wide sample of 1390) was organised within the frame­
work of the project The Outsiders (S. White et al.) and the results are published in White and 
Rose, Nationality and Public Opinion in Belarus and Ukraine, p. 49 (see note 63)
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numerous than enthusiastic supportersJ®® A poll conducted during the same 
period by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies found that 
accession to NATO was of primary concern to a mere 2% of respondentsJ®® A 
survey of Donetsk oblast’, which took place in autumn 1999, indicated that anti- 
NATO sentiment was significantly stronger in the predominantly Russophone 
EastJ®^ The KIIS poll found that, contrary to the leadership’s position, a military 
alliance with other successor states of the Soviet Union formed the most popu­
lar option (30%) for enhancing Ukraine’s security. Cooperation with NATO was 
preferred by 23%, while NATO membership was the choice of 16%.^ ®® Unlike 
the populations of Russia and Belarus, Ukrainian public opinion did not see 
NATO expansion as a threat to the country’s security, even if this would extend 
to former Soviet republics."'®® Ukrainian public opinion appeared to agree with 
that of Russia and Belarus in considering the US as the most significant threat 
to global security, whereas the majority thought that Russia represented no 
threat at all.^ "'® A series of focus group studies commissioned by the US State 
Department and conducted in late 1999 revealed a high degree of cynicism re­
garding American intentions and policy in the international sphere (including 
towards Ukraine) in all five Ukrainian regions examined. Most participants
Positive attitudes prevailed (36.1%) over negative ones (35.9%) with a negligible margin. 
Strong opponents of membership represented 14.7%, compared to 11.4% of enthusiastic sup­
porters. A quarter of all respondents, however, had no opinion on the matter. Ibid., p. 53 
The survey took place in January and February 2000,using a sample of 2010. The results 
were published by Andriy Bychenko and Igor Zhdanov, “UCEPS Opinion Poll: Nation, Power, 
Referendum”, National Security and Defence (Kiev), no. 2, February 2000; electronic version at 
www.uceps.com.ua/ena/Dublicatlons.html
51% of respondents disagreed with the suggestion that Ukraine should strive for admission 
to NATO, whereas 20% agreed. Sociological Service, Donetsk Centre of Political Studies, 
Provekt: “Izuchenive Obshchestvennogo Mnenlva kak Sotsial’noao Faktora Razvitlva Donet- 
skoi OblastI”. Donetsk: 1999, p. 3. The survey was conducted In September 1999 in 20 popula­
tion centres in the oblast’ with a total sample of 850.
Neutrality to the point of non-cooperation with any military bloc was favoured by 14%. White 
and Rose, Nationality and Public Opinion in Belarus and Ukraine, p. 18 
139 Qf respondents said that the first wave of NATO expansion was not harmful to 
Ukraine’s security, while 62% thought so In case of a second wave reaching Into the former 
Soviet Union. Ibid., pp. 52-53
35% saw the US as a potentially big or considerable threat to world security. 22% thought 
so about Russia, while 52% thought It posed no threat at all (compared to for the EU and Ger­
many). Ibid., pp. 51-52
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(even in ostensibly pro-Western L'viv) also regarded “NATO’s motives as sus­
pect and the organization itself as an aggressive puppet of the United 
States
In a January 1999 survey carried out by the Institute for Social and Political 
Psychology (Kiev), 39% of respondents said they did not support President Ku­
chma’s programme of close relations with NATO (24% endorsed it). Instead, 
50% agreed with the statement that Russia and Ukraine should have a com­
mon defence doctrine (23% were opposed to it), 47% supported a united 
Russo-Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet (32% were against it) and 41% were in favour 
of a single cur rency.According to the aforementioned KIIS survey, most of 
the Ukrainian public (57%) wanted Russia and Ukraine to have friendly rela­
tions, at a higher level than those with other states, while a quarter would like to 
see the two countries united in a single state."'"'® 72% of respondents consid­
ered good relations with Russia as Very important’, while rates of prioritisation 
of relations with the EU and with United States were only 38% and 36% 
respectively. Closer ties with Russia were supported by 92% of respondents, 
with Belarus (with 87%) and Moldova (with 84%) in second and third position 
respectively among former Soviet republics. Belarus (with 72%) and Moldova 
(with 68%) were also favoured as economic partners to a higher extent than the 
more prosperous Central European countries."'"*"'According to the same survey, 
most Ukrainian citizens viewed relations with Russia as beneficial to economic 
conditions in Ukraine."'"'® The ‘human dimension’ may partly account for the 
Ukrainian public’s choice of foreign partners, as half of all respondents had 
close relatives living in Russia and a quarter had family in other CIS coun-
Thomas Klobucar with Steven A. Grant, Ukraine and the World: Focus Groups in 5 Cities. 
Research Report R-3-00, Washington DC: Office of Research, US Department of State, April 
2000, pp. 7-11. Two focus groups of eight to ten participants, one of ‘elites’ and one of ‘ordinary 
citizens’, were organised In December 1999 in the following cities: Kiev, L’viv, Simferopol, 
Kherson and Donetsk.
The survey used a sample of 2016 from all of Ukraine’s 27 regions. Anatoiii Grytsenko, 
“Ukraine’s Defense Sector in Transition: Impacts on Foreign and Security Policy”, in Spilimann 
et al (eds.), Between Russia and the West, p. 117
15% said that Ukraine’s relations with Russia should be the same as with other states. 
White and Richard Rose, Nationality and Public Opinion in Belarus and Ukraine, p. 18 
Ibid., pp. 43-44
28% thought the effect of relations with Russia to be of great benefit, 36% of some benefit, 
while 11% gave a negative assessment. Ibid., p. 45
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tries/"*® The US State Department focus group studies found strong support for 
integration with Russia among participants in Crimea and considerable support 
in Kherson -primarily with reference to a common East Slavic identity. In other 
parts of the country, there was widespread recognition of the need for eco­
nomic integration and some endorsement of a military union with Russia, but a 
cautious attitude towards political unification prevailed.^"*^
Another KIIS survey conducted in October 2000 indicated that three quarters 
of the Ukrainian public had a positive opinion of Russia. 61% of respondents 
were in favour of Ukraine joining a confederation with Russia and Belarus (32% 
were opposed to this) and as many as 40% thought that the merger of Russia 
and Ukraine into a single state would be a positive development (49% thought 
otherwise).^"*® 79% were opposed to any restrictions (including a requirement 
for international passports) on travel to and from Russia. Only 41% thought that 
Russian military bases should remain on Ukraine’s territory. The CIS had the 
confidence of 55% of the Ukrainian public (second behind the United Nations 
with 57%), while the EU and NATO lagged far behind with 37 and 31% respec­
tively. This survey confirmed the regional differences in foreign policy prefer­
ences, as the rates of respondents.favouring integration with Russia and dis­
trusting NATO were highest in the Southern, Eastern, and East-Central regions 
(70, 68 and 58% respectively), somewhat lower in the West-Central ones 
(48%) and very low in the West (15%).
Survey evidence suggests that foreign policy issues, albeit of secondary pri­
ority compared to socio-economic concerns, remain a considerable determi­
nant of voting behaviour in Ukraine."*"*® The Ukrainian leadership has been cau­
tious not to offend any sizeable section of the electorate by steering clear of the
Only 16% agreed that relations with Russia should be on the same basis as with other 
states, with border, visa and customs controls. Ibid., pp. 18, 45-46.
Klobucar, Ukraine and the World, pp. 11-12
KIIS conducted the poll on behalf of the US State Department, using a sample of 1198 from 
all Ukrainian regions. The results are published in US State Department Office of Research, 
Opinion Analysis. M-212-00, 18 December 2000
In a SOCIS-Gallup poll conducted in February 1999 (sample of 1200 from all regions of 
Ukraine), 40% of respondents said that candidates’ foreign policy programmes would have a 
strong influence on their voting in the autumn Presidential elections. 28% said that foreign pol­
icy issues would not affect their voting decision. The survey results are cited by Oleksandr Po- 
tekhin, “The NATO-Ukraine Partnership: Problems, Achievements and Perspectives’’, in Spili­
mann et al (eds.), Between Russia and the West, pp. 160-161
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most controversial alternatives, i.e. accession to NATO or to the Russia- 
Belarus Union. These could be described as the outer limits of the Ukrainian 
leadership’s spectrum of foreign policy choices that could hope to gather broad- 
based public support. According to Ukrainian government advisers interviewed 
by the author, public opinion precludes an official line in pursuit of accession to 
NATO as an option for the country’s leadership -  at least in the medium term. If 
NATO membership was adopted by the leadership as a priority objective, a 
long and resourceful media campaign to alter the public’s perceptions of the 
Alliance would be required.^®® Even in that case, it could prove difficult to allevi­
ate the concern that accession to NATO would gravely impair Ukraine’s rela­
tions with Russia, which appears to be a major consideration underlying the 
mass public’s hesitant or negative attitudes to NATO membership.^®^ This con­
cern does not seem to be relevant in the case of Ukraine’s officially declared 
aspiration to EU membership, which may account for the broad endorsement of 
the leadership's choice on the part of the mass public. The rather low priority 
assigned by Ukrainian public opinion to relations with the EU compared to 
those with Russia, however suggests that the mass public’s stance on the Ku­
chma administration’s choice of external orientation could best be defined as a 
‘permissive consensus’."*®^
A pro-Western elite?
A marked divergence between the foreign policy preferences of Ukraine’s po­
litical, military and economic elites, on the one hand, and the mass public, on
Kiev, October-November 1999. See also International Centre for Policy Studies (Kiev), 
Ukraine’s Role and Place in the Role and Place in the Euro-Atlantic Security System. Back­
ground Paper prepared for the conference “Ukraine, Great Europe and Euro-Atlantic Security 
System: Challenges of the XXI Century, Paris, 1-2 March 1999
According to a SOCIS-Gallup survey, which took place in March 1998 using a sample of 
1200 from all regions of Ukraine, 51% of respondents said that Kuchma’s pro-NATO orientation 
undermined the stability of relations with Russia. Only 10% thought that closer ties with NATO 
would not affect relations with Russia. Potekhin, “The NATO-Ukraine Partnership”, p. 160 
The term ‘permissive consensus’ was coined by Lind berg and Scheingold to describe popu­
lar attitudes to the legitimacy of the supranational integration in Western Europe in the early 
stages of the process. Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe’s Would-Be Politv: 
Patterns of Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 
121
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the other, has been repeatedly noted/®® A series of elite polls conducted by the 
Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies 
(UCPCCRS) during 1997 and 1998 revealed high levels of support for 
Ukraine’s accession to NATO. Ukraine’s membership in a “military alliance of 
CIS countries” was endorsed by a small minority of respondents, while neutral­
ity (non-bloc status) remained the choice of a sizeable section of the elite."*®"* 
Rightist-nationalist and -  to a lesser extent -  centrist Verkhovna Rada depu­
ties, finance and banking business leaders, and the leadership of the MoD 
were identified as the main elite groups lobbying for a pro-Western orientation 
aimed at integration with NATO and the EU. Leftist parliamentarians, industrial­
ists from Russian-Ukrainian groups and -  to a lesser degree -  from the MIC, 
and regional leaders from the East and the South were seen as the most 
important Russia-oriented groups in the Ukrainian elite."*®® Broadly speaking, 
the above pro-Western groups have constituted the pro-Kuchma elite, while the 
Russia-oriented ones (the representatives of Russo-Ukrainian business inter­
ests being a notable exception) have tended to side with the leftist opposition. 
A higher degree of influence exercised by the former groups over the Kuchma 
administration partly accounts for Ukraine’s ‘European choice’.
Despite the dominance of pro-Western groups in the Kuchma administration. 
Russia-oriented elites have imposed certain limits on the leadership’s pursuit of 
full integration with Western structures. Kiev’s firm grip over the regional ad­
ministrations (In line with the constitutional definition of Ukraine as a unitary 
state) has not allowed regional leaders from the South and the East to have 
considerable direct input into official foreign policy. Leftist factions, which held 
the leading posts in the Verkhovna Rada between spring 1994 and early 2000,
For example, see Winfrled Schneider-Deters, “Ukraine's European Perspective: Full Mem­
ber or Good Neighbor?”, Polltlchna Dumka. no. 1-2, 2000, pp. 70-71; Grytsenko, “Ukraine’s 
Defense Sector In Transition”, p. 117
Support for NATO membership ranged from 44% in March 1998 to 69% in December 1998. 
A military alliance with CIS countries gathered 7-9.5% of preferences in 1997 and 2.5-5% in 
1998. Support for neutrality fluctuated between 29 to 42% in 1997 and between 26 to 44% in 
1998. Eight polls, with 39 to 42 respondents each, were conducted in March, June, September 
and December of 1997 and 1998. Respondents were drawn from four elite groups: MFA offi­
cials and government/presidential advisers; VerkhovnaRada deputies; high-ranking military 
officers; and journalists specialising in international affairs. The results are available at 
www.public.ua.net/~D0tekhin/ucpccrs/MONITOR/EXPOLL 
Ibid.
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firmly opposed Ukraine's close relations with NATO and campaigned for full 
participation in the CIS and even for joining the Russo-Belarusian Union/®® 
These factions took the lead in the Verkhovna Rada’s vote to join the CIS Par­
liamentary Assembly in March 1999 as well as in the resolution demanding that 
the Ukrainian leadership condemned NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia and sub­
mitted the “State Programme for Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO for 
the years 1999-2001” for parliamentary approval/®^ Leftist parliamentarians 
have typically advocated a course of integration with Russia and Belarus on the 
basis of economic and -  most commonly - arguments related to a common So­
viet/East Slavic identity, which seem to reflect the attitudes of a very substantial 
share of the Ukrainian electorate/®®
In addition, a Russia-centred foreign policy is favoured by a centrist (moder­
ate reform-oriented) section of the political elite, which has had some presence 
in Ukrainian government structures. Though some representatives of this group 
converge with the political left in being sceptical of NATO and US intentions, 
they purport to support integration with Russia for primarily pragmatic reasons. 
They are very critical of the disruption in economic interaction (trade and pro­
duction lines) with Russia and the CIS. They have increasingly become con­
vinced that the limited investment and assistance that has (and appears likely 
to) come from the West would not be sufficient to make the Ukrainian economy 
internationally competitive and compensate for the costs of abstaining from 
economic integration with Russia.^®® They question the expediency of a Ukrain­
ian strategy antagonistic to Russia’s declared interests and tend to be rather 
pessimistic about Ukraine’s prospects of becoming a member of either the EU - 
or NATO for that matter. Apart from an awareness of EU member-states’ 
unwillingness to consider Ukraine as a potential member, this pessimism stems 
principally from a sober view of Ukraine’s economic situation. As a prominent 
independent foreign policy analyst wondered in an interview with the author:
See statements by Communist Party leader P. Simonenko and then Verkhovna Rada 
Chairman O. Tkachenko (Peasants’ Party) in Den’ (Kiev), 1 October 1998, p. 1
The ’State Programme’ was adopted by Presidential decree no. 1209/98, 4 November 1998. 
The major parties within this category are the Communist Party of Ukraine (P. Simonenko), 
the Peasants’ Party (O. Tkachenko), the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (N. Vitrenko) 
and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (O. Moroz). For details of party programmes see Aleksandr 
Parfionov, “Foreign and Security Policy Views of Relevant Ukrainian Political Forces”, in Spili­
mann et al (eds.). Between Russia and the West, pp. 82-92 
Author’s interviews, Kiev, October-November 1999
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“What is the point of Ukraine gaining associate member status [in the EU]? Its 
economy is not ready for it. It cannot withstand Western competition. Agricultural 
products cannot be sold on the EU market because of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The only market is the CIS. Ukrainian industry can only export metals to the 
West for very low prices. What would happen to Ukrainian industry, if Ukraine were 
to integrate with the EU?” ®^°
Some members of this elite group also perceive an incompatibility between 
Ukrainian culture and Western values (e.g. individualism) and advocate a Rus­
sia-centred orientation on that basis as well.^ ®^  In the long term, this section of 
the elite wishes to see Ukraine integrate with ‘Europe’, but advocates a policy 
of partnership with (within the limits of the PC A) rather than one of accession to 
the EU -  at least for the medium term. A strategy of gradual integration “with 
Europe through Russia” is proposed: "Ukraine and Russia need to work to­
gether to come out of the crisis, develop their economies and be ready to inte­
grate with the West” .^ ®^
Likewise, support for a pro-Western orientation has not been confined to the 
national-minded elite alone. The ‘national-democrats’ in the Parliament, who 
had rallied behind the Kravchuk administration’s policies of ‘nation-building’ and 
distancing from Russia, have also formed the most determined proponents of 
the Kuchma administration’s ‘European choice’."'®® Deeply suspicious of the 
Russian elite’s intentions towards Ukraine and opposed to any form of integra­
tion with Russia as harmful to the consolidation of Ukrainian independence, 
they have seen membership of the EU and NATO as a firm guarantee of 
Ukraine’s remaining outside a Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, they re­
gard the admission criteria set by the EU and NATO as a positive factor in
160 Kiev, 2 November 1999
A Verkhovna Rada official interviewed by the author compared the cultural closeness be­
tween Russia and Ukraine to that linking Germany and Austria or Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Kiev, 26 October 1999
Author’s interview, Kiev, 2 November 1999
In the campaign for the parliamentary elections of 1998, the Rukh-led electoral alliance was 
characteristically named 'European choice bloc’. The ‘national democratic’ bloc (consisting of 
the parties “Ukrainian Popular Rukh”, “Popular Rukh of Ukraine”, “Reforms and Order” and 
“Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists”) will participate in the March 2002 parliamentary elections 
under the leadership of former PM Viktor Yushchenko.
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Ukraine’s economic and political development, supportive of Ukraine’s own os­
tensibly ‘purely European’ identity (as opposed to Russia’s ‘Eurasian’ cul­
ture)/®"* Sympathisers of this group (e.g. former Foreign Minister Tarasyuk) 
have had some influence over certain branches of the administration - espe­
cially those working on Ukraine’s EU accession strategy. Still, they have been 
increasingly frustrated by the leadership’s inadequate resolve in implementing 
the reforms required to establish the credibility of Ukraine’s professed ‘Euro­
pean choice’ in the eyes of existing EU and NATO members.
The political and economic elites, which have formed the core of the Kuchma 
administration, have had a considerably more flexible, pragmatic approach.^®® 
At a minimum, they have been united by an aspiration to maximise their own 
decision-making autonomy and have rejected any kind of formal integration 
with Russia (extending beyond the establishment of a free trade area) primarily 
for this reason. Also, they have rejected any kind of formal integration with 
Russia or within the CIS framework on the grounds that it may impair Ukraine’s 
prospects of integration with ‘Europe’."*®® It has been common for the represen­
tatives of this group to complain of what they perceive as the arrogant attitude 
of the Russian elites towards their Ukrainian counterparts, often described as 
the “eider-to-younger brother" mentaiity.^®^ Besides, they have noted that, apart 
from free trade and the subsidies received by Belarus, “nothing beneficial has 
come out of the duet of Russia and Belarus’’."*®® Although most members of the 
pro-Kuchma elite seem convinced that Russia would be able to extend to 
Ukraine the type of economic support currently rendered to Belarus, they deem 
the political concessions that would be required on the part of Ukraine as too 
high a price to pay. A leader of a pro-Kuchma party offered the following as­
sessment of the Belarusian economy’s gain from Russian support: “It helps al­
leviate the symptoms, but does not provide a cure. It is like a narcotic drug. In
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 26-27 October 1999
The political forces associated with this section of the elite are the main pro-Kuchma fac­
tions in the Parliament, i.e. the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine and the blocs “Trudovaya 
Ukraina” and "Democratic Union”.
V.M. Chumak, E.E. Kamlns’ky, V.A.. Chumak, Ukraina-Rosiva: Mizh Strateaichnim Part- 
nerstvom I Konfliktnistvu. Kiev: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997, p. 21
See interviews by Verkhovna Rada Chairman Ivan Plyushch (Popular-Democratic Party) 
and by Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council Yevgeny Marchuk in 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 13 July 2000, p. 5, and 14 November 2000, p. 1 
Statement by then PM Valery Pustovoitenko in Den’. 1 October 1998, p. 1
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Ukraine, we do something similar. We rely on IMF loans, but this has not con­
tributed to the country’s development.” ®^® Indeed, in the minds of Ukraine’s 
governing elite, concern over losing economic assistance from the West repre­
sents a considerable disincentive to deepen rapprochement with Russia. Rep­
resentatives of this elite group have readily admitted that Russian support (re­
structured debts; tolerance of late payments for fuel deliveries) may exceed 
that received from the West. At the same time, they have been keen to stress 
that Russia would not be in a position to provide the kind of support most useful 
to the Ukrainian authorities, i.e. large cash credits.
Rather than being motivated by an ideological commitment to Ukraine’s ‘re­
turn to Europe’, as has been the case of the ‘national-democrats’, most mem­
bers of the pro-Kuchma elite have taken an instrumental view of the ‘European 
choice’. Apart from being a more promising welfare provider, the West has pre­
vailed over Russia as the Ukrainian governing elite's integration partner of 
choice also because its influence has been perceived as more diffuse and less 
antagonistic of politically powerful economic interests within Ukraine."* "^* The 
prevalent attitude to cooperation with NATO has been similarly pragmatically 
motivated. In view of acute under-funding from the state budget, the leadership 
of the MoD and the broader defence-policy community have been very appre­
ciative of NATO’s contribution to the upkeep and modernisation of the country’s 
Armed Forces and military equipment.'*^^ While Ukraine’s full membership in 
the so-called Euro-Atlantic structures has been associated with a high interna­
tional standing and the overcoming of economic crisis and technological back­
wardness, it has been accession to the EU, not to NATO, that has gathered 
almost unanimous support among the pro-Presidential circles. For the most 
part, the Ukrainian ruling elite has been reluctant to reverse the progress 
achieved in relations with Russia under Kuchma by declaring an intention to 
join NATO, especially as the Alliance’s eagerness to eventually admit Ukraine 
appears questionable. The course of accession to the European Union pre­
sents exactly this crucial advantage, that, in the words of Verkhovna Rada 
Deputy Chairman Stepan Gavrish, “Ukraine’s European strategic choice has
Author’s interview, Kiev, 29 October 1999
170 Author’s interviews with government advisers, Kiev, 2-3 November 1999
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 2-3 November 1999
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 27 October and 3 November 1999
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received understanding from Putin” (and the Russian elite in general)/^® As he 
added,
"Russia itself is striving to get into Europe, albeit, possibly, under different condi­
tions. However, for Ukraine the prospect of EU membership is very distant. And the 
process of the development of relations with Russia is inevitable also because we 
have inter-penetrating economic systems and interdependent economic 
spheres.”'*^"*
For the Kuchma administration and its allies, the European orientation appears 
feasible precisely because it is not conceived in terms of a choice between two 
mutually exclusive possibilities (integration with 'Europe'; close cooperation 
with Russia), which are deemed equally indispensable to Ukraine.
An important section of the administration (particularly departments working 
closely with US and Canadian advisers or NATO officials) has sought to direct 
the official definition of Ukraine’s strategic interests towards a firm commitment 
to NATO membership and an alliance with the US aimed at rivalling Russia 
over leadership in the post-Soviet r e g i o n . T h is  rationale has been expressed 
in certain official documents - most explicitly, in a strategic analysis published 
by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. According to it, "stra­
tegic partnership with the US has to become priority number one of Ukrainian 
foreign policy” due to the coincidence or compatibility of American and Ukrain­
ian national interests in the European region -  in opposition to those of Rus- 
sia."*^ ® However, this thinking has not formed the basis of any consensus even 
within the National Security and Defence Council."'^^Former Foreign Minister 
Boris Tarasyuk, an enthusiastic advocate of the ‘European choice’, was alleg­
edly sympathetic to this viewpoint, but what was perceived as his excessively
Gavrish belongs to the pro-Presldential faction “Rebirth of the Regions”. Interview with 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 13 September 2000, p. 5 
Ibid.
O. Belov et al. (eds.), Ukraine 2000 and Bevond: Geopolitical Priorities and Scenarios of 
Development. Kyiv: The National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. National Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 1999, pp. 62, 69, 71-72 
Ibid., pp. 10-11, 72-73
Author’s interviews with senior advisers from the Council’s National Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Kiev, October 1999
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pro-Western line apparently gave rise to resentment within official circles/^® 
President Kuchma and most high-standing officials have been considerably 
more cautious in their public statements, taking care to remind that Ukraine’s 
cooperation with NATO should not be interpreted as an intention to apply for 
membership or allow the relationship with Russia to decline in importance/^® 
The discontent that led to Tarasyuk’s replacement by the less controversial 
Anatoly ZIenko was neither as overt nor of a magnitude comparable to that 
which had brought about the replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by the consensual 
figure of Primakov/®® It has, nevertheless, lent credibility to several experts’ in­
terpretation that the ‘European choice’ has remained a policy under trial as far 
as Presidential circles are concerned/®^ Observers of Ukraine’s relations with 
the EU have noted the Ukrainian ruling elite’s growing dissatisfaction with the 
discrepancy between the political and material support expected from the West 
(and from the EU in particular) and that actually received/®^ The Ukrainian ad­
ministration has began to realise that most existing EU members have been 
reluctant to consider Ukraine as a potential candidate for accession and that 
compliance with EU conditionality (e.g. transparency and free competition in 
the energy sector) would challenge established political and economic prac­
tices.^ ®® In turn, this appears to have prompted a shift of emphasis in Ukraine’s 
external relations. As Foreign Minister Anatoly ZIenko stated shortly after his 
appointment, “for a number of years, the Russian vector (sic) of Ukrainian for­
eign policy did not receive worthy development and support by ministries and 
departments in our country.”"*®"* In the wake of Tarasyuk’s dismissal. President 
Kuchma characteristically told his officials that they “need[ed] to go to Europe
Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council Yevgeny Marchuk made alle­
gations to that effect in an interview with Nezavisimava Gazeta. 14 November 2000, p. 1 
See statements by Defence Minister Aieksandr Kuz’muk and President Kuchma in Interfax, 
Diplomatic Panorama. 10 May 2000, and 17 November 2000
For a detailed investigation of the circumstances surrounding Tarasyuk’s replacement, see 
James Sherr, The Dismissal of Borvs Tarasvuk.Occasional Brief no. 79, Camberiey, Surrey: 
Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, October 2000 
Author’s Interviews, Kiev, October-November 1999
Jennifer Moroney, EU-Ukrainian Relations: Prospects and Possibilities. Paper Presented at 
the conference “European Security and Post-Soviet Space: Integration or Isolation?”, Scottish 
Centre for International Security/ University of Aberdeen, 26 November 2000 
Zerkaio Nedeli. 11-18 November 2000, p. 2 
Interfax, Diplomatic Panorama. 23 October 2000
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and America less often, and to cooperate more with the countries of the CIS, 
which are [were] waiting for Ukraine and are [were] ready to work with it"/®® 
This was an implicit reference to Ukrainian officials’ supposed preference for 
working visits to the glamorous Western capitals (as opposed to Moscow and 
other CIS capitals), which has been often suggested as an important reason for 
the stagnation of relations with Russia since the conclusion of the ‘Big 
treaty’/®®
Likewise, the leadership’s stance on reducing economic dependence on 
Russia appears to have been rather ambivalent. Alleging to Russia’s exploita­
tion of economic interdependence for the purposes of political pressure, the 
aforementioned strategic analysis by the National Security and Defence Coun­
cil concludes that
“Ukraine should develop a comprehensive program of a multi-sided lessening of 
economic dependence on the Russian Federation. Our country should take into 
account the experience of Estonia, which successfully conducted its program of 
overcoming dependence on the Russian Federation, having cut essential Russian 
imports from 80 to 20 percent.”''®^
The view that the dismantlement of the uneven relationship of economic inter­
dependence with Russia would be both feasible and desirable appears to have 
been a matter of contestation within the Kuchma administration.^®® The diversi­
fication of gas and oil imports has persisted as a strategic objective for succes­
sive Ukrainian governments under Kuchma."*®® Ukraine has indeed concluded 
agreements with Turkmenistan (the only alternative source of affordable sup­
plies) for the delivery of approximately half of Ukraine’s gas imports at lower 
prices than those demanded by Russian exporters.^®® Still, it is clear that such
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 1 November 2000, p. 5 
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 28 October and 2-3 November 1999 
Belov et al. (eds.), Ukraine 2000 and Bevond. pp. 52, 55 
Author’s interviews, Kiev, 2-3 November 1999
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Research Update, vol. 6, no. 194, 6 
November 2000
For the year 2001, Ukraine has replaced the 30 billion cubic metres of gas formerly supplied 
by Gazprom with Turkmen imports. The price has ranged from $38-40 per thousand cubic me­
tres (the Russian price of $80, however, includes transportation costs), 50% payable in hard 
currency and 50% in product deliveries. Izvestlva. 13 November 2000, p. 2
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agreements do not guarantee the long-term security of Ukraine’s requirements 
in energy imports. One reason for this is that the gas can reach Ukraine only 
through a pipeline crossing Russian territory, ‘itéra’, an alleged Gazprom sub­
sidiary, may retain $12-14 out of $30 billion cubic metres of the total amount 
provided in Ukrainian-Turkmen contracts (for 2000-2001) in payment of transit 
fees.'*®'* Besides, Turkmenistan, like all other potential fuel suppliers previously 
approached by Ukraine, has had little motivation to tolerate partial and late 
payments.^®^ The option of selling gas to Russia, whose domestic market has 
been facing shortages as a result of increased exports to hard-currency mar­
kets, has been expected to reduce the Turkmen leadership’s willingness to ne­
gotiate in case Ukraine has difficulty meeting its obligations.'*®® Turkmen gas 
provides an alternative to Russian imports only as long as Ukraine is able to 
pay in full, as Turkmen President Niyazov made clear during the negotiations of 
a deal (concluded in May 2001 ) for the provision of 250 billion cubic metres un- 
til 2007/^"
The cost of alternative oil or gas supplies remains prohibitive due to the high 
transportation costs through existing routes (e.g. carriage of Gulf oil by sea) 
and due to the massive investment required for the development of new pipe­
lines and/or oil terminals. The construction of a new oil terminal near Odessa, 
which began in 1995, and that of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline, which started 
in 1996, had initially made very limited progress due to a severe shortfall in 
funding, but is expected to be completed by the end of 2001.'*®® The Ukrainian 
government has sought to enlist international support for Odessa-Brody for the 
transport of Caspian Sea oil, but neither Western fuel companies nor other 
GUUAM states have so far expressed a preference for the route proposed by 
Ukraine."*®® The EU’s prioritisation of the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, which 
crosses Belarus, has further disappointed the Ukrainian side, though the EU,
Zerkaio Nedeli. 3-9 February 2001, p. 1
For details on the Kravchuk administration’s abortive attempts at the diversification of en­
ergy imports, see D’ Anieri, Economic Interdependence, pp. 83-85 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 18 November 2000, p. 5 
Nezavisimava Gazeta. 17 May 2001, p. 5
Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Research Update, vol. 6, no. 194, 6 
November 2000; Zerkaio Nedeli. 9-15 June 2001, p. 1
Ibid. and Levchenko, “Ukraine in the Black Sea and Caspian Regions", p. 222. instead, the 
Baku-Ceyhan (Turkey) route appears to have been favoured.
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France and the EBRD have promised financial assistance towards the comple­
tion of the new reactors at the Rovno and Khmel’nitsky nuclear power plants/®^ 
Increasing the efficiency of energy consumption represents an alternative 
means of reducing Ukraine’s reliance on Russian fuel. Its attainment appears 
similarly complicated due to the high levels of investment that would be neces­
sary for the modernisation of the energy-intensive Ukrainian industry -  most 
notably the metallurgical and chemical sectors. If implemented, the abolition of 
state subsidies to domestic fuel consumers, which has formed a condition for 
the release of IMF credits, would reduce energy consumption and, thereby, the 
need for imports. A former government adviser interviewed by the author 
pointed out that Ukraine’s energy consumption has - intriguingly - failed to di­
minish in line with the decline in industrial output observed throughout the 
1990s.^ ®® Although subsidies have been progressively reduced and even major 
enterprises have been cut off due to arrears,^®® the prevalence of market fac­
tors in the distribution and pricing of energy within Ukraine remains an elusive 
objective. The reform of the energy sector has been the subject of acute, pro­
tracted and highly publicised intra-governmental divisions.^®® At any rate, it is 
understood that Ukraine’s dependence on Russian fuel will continue for a very 
long time and, therefore, the main question has become how to make it more 
manageable. The regulation of the intertwined problems of unsanctioned gas 
siphoning and debt by means of the intergovernmental agreements reached in 
December 2000 represents such an attempt. The agreements effectively legal­
ised gas siphoning according to Ukraine’s needs and provided for conversion of 
the resulting state debt into long-term liabilities, thus easing the pressure previ­
ously faced by the Ukrainian authorities every winter. They have, however.
Izvestiva. 13 November 2000, p. 4; Nezavisimava Gazeta. 20 September 2000, p. 5 
He, moreover, described Ukraine’s dependence on Russian fuel as ‘artificial’, suggesting 
that substantial amounts of the Imported fuel were not actually consumed in Ukraine. Kiev, 3 
November 1999
Subsidies, which stood at $78 per thousand cubic metres of gas In early 1995, have been 
gradually reduced since mld-1995. In winter 2000-2001, all debtors were cut off with the excep­
tion of electricity generation plants. Zerkaio Nedeli. 3-9 February 2001, p. 1
For the dispute between the State Taxation Administration and the National Security and 
Defence Council, on one hand, and PM Yushchenko and then Deputy PM Timoshenko, on the 
other, regarding the state of the energy sector, see Den’. 3 November 2000, p. 1
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given Russia the option of acquiring equity in major Ukrainian enterprises to be 
privatised.^®^
In the past, the sale of so-called strategic enterprises to Russian concerns 
had been opposed, not only by national-minded politicians, but equally by 
Ukrainian business leaders concerned that they might be displaced by Russian 
capital.^®^ A change in attitudes has become observable due to the prolonged 
inability of Ukraine’s hard-currency earning enterprises to obtain raw materials, 
cover their debts, invest in infrastructure, and retain profitable export markets. 
For Ukraine’s metallurgical, oil-processing and broader chemical sectors, Rus­
sia has formed the principal (if not single) source of raw materials, potential in­
vestment and export destination. The sale of several of these sectors’ largest 
enterprises, which had previously been a matter of acute controversy, has pro­
ceeded with remarkably little opposition as of mid-1999. As former Presidential 
adviser Dmitry Vydrin explained:
“We have begun to understand that property and independence are different 
things. Even strongly nationally-oriented politicians have realised that money does 
not smell, that there is no difference between a dollar coming from the USA and a 
dollar from Russia, and that the sale of large and important enterprises does not 
mean automatic loss of independence and sovereignty.’’^ ®^
Similar circumstances pertain to Ukraine’s fuel export pipelines, which have 
been found to be in urgent need of massive investment unavailable in Ukraine 
itself.^ ®"* Because these pipelines are considered as the most strategic of all as­
sets in question, the draft legislation introduced by the government to enable 
the sale of major equity packages to foreign concerns has -  once again -  given 
rise to prolonged contestation.^®® The Ukrainian administration has been di­
vided on whether a concession contract or equity sale would be the optimal 
means of attracting foreign investors and/or managers. Still, high-standing offi-
The text of the agreements is excerpted in Zerkaio Nedeli.3-9 February 2001, p. 1 
This was reported to have been particularly the case of the banking sector. Author’s Inter­
views, Kiev, October-November 1999
Dmitry Vydrin, Interview with Nezavisimava Gazeta. 16 November 2000, p. 5 
Petra Opitz and Christian von Hirschhausen, Ukraine as the Gas Bridge to Europe? Eco­
nomic and Geopolitical Considerations. Working Paper no. 3, Kiev: Institute for Economic Re­
search and Policy Consulting, August 2000, pp. 2-6
The bill for the sale of 49% of ‘Ukrtransgaz’ stock was introduced In September 2000.
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dais (induding PM at the time Viktor Yushchenko) have spoken out in favour of 
the latter option, which, would have been regarded as all but treasonous as re­
cently as 1995.^ ®® Chairman of the National Security and Defence Council Yev­
geny Marchuk expressed this argument as follows;
“Even today I am trying to convince many people here in Kiev. What are we waiting 
for? Until the time when we will be dancing and singing patriotic songs on the 
empty, whining gas pipeline. And today I am even more convinced that it is neces­
sary to encourage Russia’s participation in the privatisation of the gas pipeline in 
any acceptable and mutually profitable form.” ®^^
Adverse economic realities at home, the return of economic growth in Russia, 
in conjunction with the admission that Western economic support is unlikely to 
rise significantly in the foreseeable future, have, thus, prodded the Ukrainian 
ruling elite to reconsider relations with Russia in general and the permissible 
role of Russian concerns in Ukraine's economy in particular. Though Russian 
enterprises seeking to acquire Ukrainian firms have typically sought the assis­
tance of the Russian government rather than the other way around, the possi­
bility of them being occasionally called upon to serve Russian state priorities 
may not be excluded.^®® A more likely effect may be an erosion of the govern­
ing Ukrainian elite’s economic sources of power, since the enterprises acquired 
by Russian concerns have been concentrated in Ukraine’s energy and metal­
lurgical industries, hitherto the domain of powerful Ukrainian ‘oligarchic’ inter­
ests.^ ®® As Ukrainian analysts note, however, those interests (represented po­
litically by the core pro-Kuchma factions) have reconfigured their role as ‘mid- 
dle-men’ for Russian business concerns, in order to safeguard their position in 
the face of their industries’ decline. This has led them to largely support the
On the national-minded deputies’ fierce denunciation of the Massandra agreements of 
March 1995, whereby the Ukrainian government accepted the conversion of energy debt to 
equity to be acquired by Gazprom, and the subsequent backtracking of the Ukrainian side, see 
D’ Anieri, Economic Interdependence, pp. 81-82 
®^^ Interview with Nezavisimava Gazeta. 14 November 2000, p. 1 
®^® This occurred in the case of the Russian government’s temporary ban on oil supplies to 
Ukrainian plants(even those owned by Russian companies), which was linked to Ukraine’s gas 
arrears in late 1999.
Voiodymyr Sidenko, “Current Ukrainian Economic Policy: Taking Account of National Inter­
ests or Those of Entrepreneurial Clans?”, Politichna Dumka. no, 1-2, 2000, p. 26
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sale of enterprises to Russian conglomerates (effectively a U-turn from their 
earlier position), as opposed to the drive by the government of reformist PM 
Yushchenko to introduce transparency in the economy and Implement condi­
tions necessary for Ukraine’s integration into the EU.^ ^® The Ukrainian elite has 
been fully aware that Ukraine's autonomy in foreign policy and -  more argua­
b ly- its security may be compromised as a result of the country’s economic 
weakness,^^^ Still, the view that Ukraine would be politically and economically 
better off by not fundamentally antagonising Russian priorities appears to have 
been gaining wider acceptance. Russian leadership’s strict adherence to non­
intervention in Ukraine’s domestic matters, as opposed to strong Western criti­
cism in connection with the Gongadze scan da l , se em s  to have been appre­
ciated by the Kuchma administration, leading to a further improvement of the 
climate in Russo-Ukrainian relations.
Conclusion: differences between Belarus and Ukraine
The Russia policies pursued by the leaderships of Belarus and Ukraine have 
diverged already since the immediate post-independence period. For Belarus, 
actual and perceived economic dependence on Russia (both as an export mar­
ket and as a supplier of fuel and raw materials) was considerably higher than in 
the case of Ukraine. As national feeling dictating a course of dissociation from 
Russia was weak both among the political elite and the general population, 
mass and elite attitudes alike reinforced the economic rationale in favour of in-
Zerkaio Nedeli. 14-20 April 2001, p. 1
In a series of elite polls organised by the UCPCCRS during 1997 and1998, overwhelming 
majorities of respondents (the rate ranged from 70 to 75%) deemed economic factors as the 
principal threat to Ukraine’s security. For more details on these polls, see note 154.
In November 2000, opposition leader Alekrandr Moroz presented to the Rada audio tapes 
allegedly implicating President Kuchma in the murder of independent journalist Georgy Gon­
gadze. The scandal seriously damaged Ukraine’s democratic credentials in Western capitals, 
especially long delays in the opening of judicial investigations cast doubt as to the willingness 
of the Ukrainian leadership to meet international expectations. Unlike the US and the EU, Rus­
sia has consistently avoided to make any statements on the issue. Equally, it took care not to 
express any preferences as to the composition of the Ukrainian government during the Ukrain­
ian Parliament’s vote of no confidence in PM Yushchenko (April 2001), whose staying in office 
had been explicitly supported by the US.
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tegration with Russia. In Ukraine, the presence of a vocal nationalist section of 
the elite and the electorate ruled out a foreign policy course similar to that of 
Belarus. More importantly, the ruling elite has aspired to Ukraine’s international 
recognition as a major European power, which was seen as incompatible with a 
Russia-centred orientation. Belarusian policy-makers have not had a similar 
motivation to forego the immediate economic advantages of integration with 
Russia.
Though Ukrainian public opinion has tended to assign greater priority to closer 
relations with Russia than to any other potential foreign partner, the Kuchma 
administration has adopted integration with the EU as the foremost objective of 
its foreign policy. The Belarusian political elite has also largely regarded inte­
gration with ‘Europe’ as desirable in principle, but has assessed the prospects 
of EU expansion beyond the Baltics far more pessimistically. The Lukashenko 
administration, primarily for domestic political reasons, has differed from the 
Ukrainian leadership in considering NATO expansion as a potential security 
threat and has, therefore, deemed military integration with Russia as the most 
effective security-enhancing strategy. Economic conditions have, however, 
compelled both countries’ leaderships’ to adopt more flexible approaches in an 
effort to combine the equally essential benefits of close relations with Russia 
(supplies of fuel and raw materials; export markets) and with ‘Europe’ (cash 
credits; potential for investment in advanced technologies). The scope for Rus­
sian policy to influence the priorities of Belarus has been more significant than 
in the case of Ukraine, as a willingness and ability to meet -  in large part - Bel­
arusian expectations in the economic field appears likely to ensure the contin­
ued loyalty of any non-nationalist Belarusian leadership. External factors have 
been far more salient in Russia’s relations with Ukraine. Following the formal 
recognition of Ukraine’s present borders in 1997, additional actual and putative 
-  primarily economic -incentives offered by Russia have been of limited appeal 
to the Ukrainian side, which has focused its expectations on the EU. The fulfil­
ment of Russian aspirations with regard to Ukraine is, thus, likely to depend 
largely on the barriers or on the successes which are to mark the path of 
Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ in the medium term.
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Conclusion
The latter half of the 1990s and the beginning of the following decade have 
seen Belarus and Ukraine steadily rise in significance among the foreign policy 
priorities of the Russian Federation. This trend has not only been manifested at 
the symbolic level of diplomatic statements and political leaders’ rhetoric, but 
has also been reflected in the growing intensity of interaction between Russia 
and its two neighbours - in the diplomatic, economic and military fields. During 
this period, the relevant legal framework developed impressively to resolve ma­
jor outstanding issues (e.g. division of the Black Sea Fleet; mutual recognition 
of borders; Belarusian debt) and to lay the foundations for extensive coopera­
tion (with Ukraine) and integration (with Belarus). It is clear that bilateral rela­
tions have acquired a lot more substance compared to the first few years after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, although the implementation of the relevant 
treaties and agreements has -  more often than not -  been partial and fraught 
with delays.
Despite the continued presence of several divisive issues, especially be­
tween Russia and Ukraine (e.g. trade disputes; debt repayment), progress in 
other areas is no longer blocked nor is the overall climate of bilateral relations 
defined by these tensions, as was -  to a large extent -  the case in the immedi­
ate post-independence period. As all three states under consideration have un­
dergone a process of re-assessing their external environment, priority objec­
tives and longer-term options, Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine have 
become less politicised and acquired a higher degree of stability. Many impor­
tant questions remain open, not least the longer-term feasibility of Ukraine’s ef­
forts to maintain an equal distance from Russia and its Western partners or the 
viability of economic integration between Russia and Belarus as the two coun­
tries draw increasingly close to the broader European economic space. Never­
theless, as will be argued in the sections that follow, the period covered by this 
study could be regarded as a formative stage setting the main directions likely 
to shape relations on Russia’s western border -  at least in the medium term.
This concluding chapter will bring together a number of the most substanitve 
observations made in earlier chapters. These will be viewed in the context of 
competing theoretical perspectives in an effort to offer some insights into the 
character of inter-state relations in this regional context. Finally, tendencies in
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this region will be related to the broader international environment with a view 
to making some policy-relevant remarks.
Principal findings
Perhaps the most noteworthy development in Russia's relations with Belarus 
and Ukraine over the period examined in this work is the emergence of more 
clearly defined objectives and the identification of workable paths to their at­
tainment. A plethora of previously considered options and scenarios (e.g. 
Russo-Ukrainian armed conflict over Crimea; merger of Russia and Belarus) 
have been brushed aside. The re-orientation of Russian foreign policy under 
Primakov’s term In charge of the Foreign Ministry has been accompanied by a 
higher degree of predictability, which has been consolidated since the stabilisa­
tion of Russia’s domestic politics following Vladimir Putin’s election to the 
presidency. Russian foreign policy has had to adapt to the crystallisation of 
trends in the wider international environment, particularly the progressive 
enlargement of NATO and the EU and the continued fragmentation of the CIS. 
Against this background, Russian policy makers have continued to see realistic 
prospects for Russia to play a leading role in its immediate vicinity. This aspira­
tion, which has been repeatedly articulated in official documents and public 
statements by high-ranking officials, has been instrumental to the achievement 
of a wide array of particular goals: from increased prestige and influence in in­
ternational affairs to advantageous terms for Russian economic actors and -  
not least -  enhanced popular legitimacy.
In all these respects, Ukraine and Belarus stand out among the countries of 
the former Soviet Union - as a function of their status as European states lo­
cated between Russia and the expanding political, economic and defence 
community represented by the existing and projected membership of the EU 
and NATO; due to their close linkage to many key sectors of the Russian econ­
omy; and also by virtue of the historical, societal and ethno-cultural ties that 
give them an uppermost position when it comes to the Russian electorate’s in­
terest in foreign affairs. In addition to public opinion at large, the aforemen­
tioned factors correspond to the concerns and sectional interests of elite 
groups, with varying degrees of influence over public policy. For example, Rus­
sia’s fuel-exporting companies require reliable transit routes, the defence- 
related and other industries seek the creation of vertically integrated production
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lines, while the military leadership has been keen to maintain control over im­
portant installations beyond Russia’s borders. Such influential groups' objec­
tives are served by policies aimed at ensuring the Ukrainian and Belarusian au­
thorities’ enduring responsiveness to Russian concerns. Integration, implying 
inter alia a high element of commonality between Russian and Belarusian eco­
nomic and defence policies and open access to the Belarusian economy for 
Russian economic actors, offers good prospects of the principal Russian inter­
ests being heeded in the longer term. The Union with Belarus has, thus, found 
firm sponsors among important sections of the Russian elite. This has been 
crucial to the continuing salience of the issue and also to Russian decision­
makers' readiness to move beyond public statements in support of the Union 
by taking concrete steps, albeit not always successful, in this direction. External 
developments (such as NATO enlargement and its bombing campaign against 
Yugoslavia) have added to the perceived urgency to take such steps, contribut­
ing to occasional accelerations of impetus in the Russia-Belarus integration 
process.
The present study found that all material and identity-related considerations 
underlying elite and mass public support for integration with Belarus, not only 
extended to Ukraine, but could - in some cases - be said to apply with even 
greater force (e.g. given Ukraine’s greater economic weight and strategic ca­
pabilities). Were the Russia-Belarus Union to enlarge, Ukraine would be the 
most welcome third member from the point of view of both Russian and Belaru­
sian policy-makers. Such a prospect is, however, contemplated only as a rather 
remote possibility due to the Ukrainian leadership’s unambiguous dismissal of 
such suggestions made by domestic Russia-oriented constituencies.
As a result, Russian policy towards Ukraine has been guided by more modest 
expectations than those concerning Belarus. Although Ukraine’s ‘European 
choice’ has not raised serious concern among the Russian foreign policy com­
munity, a strategy of increasing material rewards (e.g. free access to the Rus­
sian market for Ukrainian producers; debt cancellation) with a view to ‘buying’ 
Ukraine’s loyalty is not considered realistic, either. At the same time, the Rus­
sian leadership, under both Yeltsin and Putin, has cautiously avoided antago­
nising the Ukrainian authorities. Official Russian policy as expressed by the 
Presidential administration and the government has consistently remained aloof 
from calls for the use of heavy-handed tactics, which have come from high- 
profile Russian experts, parliamentarians and governors. To be sure, such calls
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have caused significant resentment of a Russian ‘elder brother’ or even ‘neo- 
imperialist’ mentality among the Ukrainian elite. On the other hand, representa­
tives of the Russian executive have consistently refrained from questioning 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity, from supporting separatism in Crimea and even 
from interfering on the side of Russophone local authorities in their disputes 
with Kiev over the language issue. In conjunction with internal developments in 
Ukrainian politics, which weakened the position of national-minded forces in the 
second Kuchma administration, this non-interventionist approach has contrib­
uted to the increased mutual confidence and improved climate that came to 
characterise bilateral relations towards the end of the period under considera­
tion.
In terms of effectiveness in obtaining concrete results, however, Russian di­
plomacy has failed to take full advantage of Russia’s superior economic weight 
and of Ukraine’s corresponding vulnerabilities. It has, therefore, been strongly 
criticised by Russian experts for inertia, complacency, insufficient persistence 
in the pursuit of its demands (e.g. debt-for-equity proposals) and even Incoher­
ence and lack of professionalism. In view of apparent Ukrainian indifference, 
the Russian government devoted little effort to reversing the marked downward 
trend in bilateral economic relations, which continued throughout the second 
half of the 1990s. Such criticism has subsided under Putin, as a series of long­
standing Russian mid-range objectives (e.g. acquisition of Ukrainian so-called 
‘strategic’ enterprises; understanding on military exercises involving NATO 
forces) began to materialise. The Putin administration has sought to push rela­
tions with Ukraine out of the relative stagnation that followed the conclusion of 
the ‘Big Treaty’. In this endeavour, the Putin leadership has been assisted by 
the recovery of the Russian economy, which has encouraged the Ukrainian 
administration’s renewed interest in improving relations with Russia and giving 
more substance to their economic element.
Indeed, the impetus for expanding the scope or raising the level of bilateral 
cooperation has in most cases come, not from Russia, but from the Belarusian 
or Ukrainian administrations, for reasons primarily connected with domestic po­
litical and economic developments or with their re-evaluation of opportunities 
presented by the international environment. For the most part, Russian policy 
has been reactive, leaving very considerable scope for manoeuvre (e.g. selec­
tive implementation of existing agreements) for Ukrainian and Belarusian pol­
icy-makers. Faced with a pro-active Belarusian administration, Russian officials
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have typically found themselves trying to respond to maximalist demands for 
further integration (e.g. Union citizenship; monetary union). The Russian ad­
ministration has sought to make economic integration conditional on Belarusian 
approximation of Russian norms and indicators rather than vice versa. This has 
at times made Russia’s commitment to integration with Belarus appear erratic, 
especially in view of highly publicised intra-administration disputes on the mer­
its of the process. Nevertheless, despite the scarce material resources avail­
able to the Russian state, Belarus and also Ukraine have benefited from sub­
stantial levels of subsidy, not comparable to the resources allocated to any 
other foreign countries -  including within the CIS.
It could be argued that, in the case of Ukraine in particular, Russian policy 
makers have had little choice but to restructure Ukraine’s debt on favourable 
terms and continue fuel supplies in spite of payment arrears. The case of Bela­
rus, which has kept receiving Russian fuel for significantly discounted prices 
long after the rest of the CIS countries, demonstrates Russian fuel exporting 
companies’ pliability to state policy priorities. Still, the strategic interests of 
these companies, most notably their intention to acquire important assets both 
in Belarus and in Ukraine, has been a factor in the aforementioned preferential 
terms. Moreover, Russian exporters cannot promptly replace the revenue from 
the Ukrainian market nor can they contemplate completely bypassing Ukraine 
as a transit country. Likewise, the Russian state had very limited options for re­
covering the outstanding debt. Exchanging it for equity and setting it off against 
fees to be charged for Russia's military presence have constituted the main 
possibilities, of which Ukrainian decision-makers chose the latter, not least as 
the economically most rewarding option. In political terms, either side's refusal 
to compromise could have entailed a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations, 
which both sides have been keen to avoid.^
Russia and Ukraine have thus reached a modus vivendi W\ih the potential to 
develop into a long-term, multifaceted cooperative relationship, once mutually
 ^ Russia’s relations with Georgia provide a negative example: mutual accusations of support for 
separatist regions; imposition of a visa regime; debt disputes ieading to repeated disruptions of 
energy supplies; proionged tensions over the presence of Russian military forces in Georgian 
bases. Apart from the higher strategic and economic risks, such a level of deterioration in 
Russo-Ukrainian relations would have had domestically unacceptable political costs for both 
countries’ leaderships (see the analysis of elite and public opinion surveys in Chapters One and 
Four).
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acceptable terms have been negotiated. In the meantime, although Ukrainian 
diplomacy could by no means be described as loyal to Russia, the Kuchma 
administration has been cautious not to openly challenge Russian positions. 
The Russian foreign policy community and the military leadership in particular 
have maintained serious misgivings over Ukraine's close military cooperation 
with NATO and the United States. Still, relations between the Russian and 
Ukrainian military sectors (armed forces and defence-related industries) have 
developed to an almost comparable level, especially since mid-2000 as part of 
a broader shift of the Ukrainian administration away from nationalist positions.
As far as Belarus is concerned, there may well be some merit in relating the 
proportionally higher level of Russian economic support^ to the much firmer 
and more consistent alignment of Belarusian diplomacy to Russian positions 
and the smooth and rapid development of military integration, both before and 
after the establishment of the Union. Indeed, the type of economic support from 
which Belarus has benefited (e.g. debt cancellation; additional credits; dis­
counted energy prices) resembles that enjoyed by some of the less prosperous 
Russian regions. The Russian political elite's growing acceptance of this type 
and level of support to the Belarusian economy has been in large part moti­
vated by the fact that Belarus has enthusiastically assumed the role of Russia's 
most loyal ally. This alignment has also been a function of the close identitive 
affinity, which renders most of the Belarusian foreign policy elite sympathetic to 
Russian perspectives, as well as of the Belarusian President's authoritarian 
rule, which has alienated the Western community, thereby limiting the foreign 
policy options open to Belarus.
At the same time, Russian support for the Belarusian economy has proved 
counterproductive in terms of encouraging harmonisation with Russian reforms, 
as required by the integration treaties. The Belarusian leadership has used 
Russian economic support to sustain policies containing many elements of the 
Soviet socio-economic system, thereby contradicting treaty provisions on eco­
nomic integration. Tellingly, the aspects of integration that did not require the
 ^Annual levels of Russian subsidisation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian economies have been 
comparable ($1.5 billion for Ukraine according to Krasnov and Brada, and $1.5-$2 billion esti­
mated for Belarus by Russian and Belarusian economists -  see Chapters Two and Four), im­
plying a much high impact in the case of Belarus given the smaller size of its economy. Gregory 
Krasnov and Josef Brada, “Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade”, Eurooe-Asia 
Studies. VO. 49, no. 5, 1997, pp. 827-829
262
Belarusian leadership to modify its core socio-economic policies or make other 
economic concessions (e.g. give up customs revenue) have been the ones to 
advance most rapidly and with the least controversy: military integration; im­
plementation of equal social and economic rights for Union citizens; and, for the 
most part, elimination of restrictions on bilateral trade. This rationale has also 
underpinned the Belarusian authorities’ keenness on the establishment of 
egalitarian financial-industrial groups and on direct trade, investment and joint 
production agreements with the Russian regions, which have boosted Russo- 
Belarusian trade and Belarusian exports in particular.
Weak conditionality has been a marked failure of Russian policy -  in part 
due to insufficient coordination between the economic ministries and agencies, 
on the one hand, and the Foreign Ministry and the now defunct Ministry for CIS 
Affairs, on the other. The Putin administration has strengthened conditionality, 
requiring the Belarusian side to implement the necessary reforms (most nota­
bly, monetary discipline; privatisation; deregulation of business activity; price 
and labour market liberalisation) before issuing additional credits or proceeding 
with new treaty commitments -  including monetary union. Under the added 
pressure of declining economic growth, the Belarusian government began to 
heed Russian demands as of 2000, initially in monetary policy and, subse­
quently, in terms of -  albeit gradual -  liberalisation. Russia’s adoption of a long­
term reformist agenda has also been a major factor, as the Belarusian leader­
ship has had to give up its hopes that Russia might decide to emulate the Bela­
rusian socio-economic model.
The divergence between the economic courses favoured by the two coun­
tries’ leaderships has been one among several factors accounting for the sub- 
optimal effectiveness in attaining the objectives specified in the integration trea­
ties. The rather poor intra-governmental coordination (especially between dip­
lomats in charge of inter-governmental negotiations and the economic minis­
tries, primarily responsible for implementation) and low overall administrative 
capacity characterising both integration partners have also had a detrimental 
effect. Russian and Belarusian officials’ rather formalistic approach to problem­
solving, concentrating on the conclusion of agreements and giving insufficient 
attention to their implementation, has been another weakness of the integration 
process. There are signs that the operation of the Union-state Council of Minis­
ters as of 2000, which has given economic ministries a direct role in Union pol­
icy formulation, has reduced national agencies’ scope for diverse implementa-
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tion of agreed measures. In addition, insufficient financial resources have fre­
quently delayed the implementation of ambitious joint projects. Similar short­
comings have affected the Russo-Ukrainian agreements on economic coopera­
tion, whose objectives have been more modest than those of Russo-Belarusian 
integration treaties. The recovery of Russo-Ukrainian economic interaction as 
of mid-1999 has been a function, not only of increased inter-governmental ac­
tivity, but also of heightened involvement of business interests, itself enabled by 
the return of economic growth.
In seeking closer relations with Russia and inviting Russian capital into 
Ukraine's industrial sector, the Kuchma administration has made a marked de­
parture from its earlier positions. It represents a shift of emphasis within the 
bounds of the Kuchma leadership’s dual policy of integration with the European 
Union (and possibly NATO), on the one hand, and of maintaining close rela­
tions with Russia, on the other. The dual policy has helped the Kuchma admini­
stration accommodate pressures from political forces with opposing foreign pol­
icy agendas, i.e. Western-oriented national-democrats and the Russia/CIS- 
oriented left. Shifts in the relative influence of these forces and sectional groups 
allied to them within presidential circles have been reflected in discernible ad­
justments in foreign policy, such as the one that followed the replacement of 
Boris Tarasyuk by Anatoly ZIenko. The centrist core of the pro-Kuchma elite, 
characterised by a lack of a firm identity-inspired commitment to either the so- 
called European choice or a Russia-centred path, has had a pivotal role. It has 
sought to extract concessions from both Russia (e.g. debt restructuring) and its 
Western partners (e.g. NATO assistance with modernising the Armed Forces; 
EU funds to cover energy payments). At the same time, it has been aware (to a 
much higher extent than the Kravchuk administration) of the limitations im­
posed by Ukraine’s structural dependence on the Russian export market and 
fuel supplies and by the long distance separating Ukrainian political and eco­
nomic conditions from Central Europe and EU accession criteria.
The higher (overwhelming even) degree of the Belarusian economy’s de­
pendence on Russia was a fundamental consideration in the Belarusian elite’s 
lack of ambivalence about seeking reintegration with Russia on a bilateral basis 
without waiting for consensus among the whole of the CIS membership. How­
ever, the disinclination to consider alternative external orientations (a rather 
weakly defined neutrality having been the only other possibility considered) has 
been closely linked to the much more limited appeal of nationalist ideas -
264
among both the policy-making elite and the mass public. A strong sense of a 
common ethno-cultural identity traditionally linking Belarusians and Russians 
has meant that the Belarusian political elite has lacked an identity-based moti­
vation to seek dissociation from Russia, especially at the risk of economic 
hardship. Overwhelmingly positive public perceptions of Russia and its contri­
bution to the welfare and security of Belarus have turned integration into a po­
litical asset, of which President Lukashenko has taken full advantage. The Un­
ion’s desirability has been practically uncontested, not only within the Luka­
shenko administration, but also in mainstream opposition circles. On the other 
hand, President Lukashenko’s use of Russian economic support to avoid the 
implementation of market reforms has been much criticised, not only by the op­
position, but also by sections of his own administration as well as his Russian 
integration partners. This has also been the case of the Belarusian leadership’s 
failure to improve relations with international organisations (the EU, NATO, the 
OSCE), the prosperous West European countries and the US.
Theoretical consideration of principal findings
An overview of Russia’ s relations with Belarus and Ukraine since the mid- 
1990s would suggest that distinct dynamics operate within this regional context, 
which may be described as a regional subsystem. Russia’s overwhelming eco­
nomic and political weight is a key feature of this subsystem, reducing not only 
the relative significance of Belarus and Ukraine to each other, but also the 
scope for external actors to influence outcomes within the subsystem. Several 
conceptual and material factors (e.g. uneven interdependence; notions of 
common identity) affecting interaction within this subsystem differentiate it from 
the wider international context, pointing to a given theory’s different degrees of 
applicability within and outside the subsystem.
Realist perspectives (or rather perspectives focused on geopolitical factors, 
consistent with the Realist tradition) have dominated Russian interpretations of 
the broader international environment, privileging zero-sum perceptions of 
changes in the European institutional architecture. Russian policy-makers’ con­
cern with strengthening their country’s position in European security following 
the eastward enlargement of NATO has been an important element in their re­
consideration of relations with Belarus and Ukraine. However, security issues
have far from monopolised the Russian list of priorities with regard to Belarus
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and Ukraine, with so-called strategic economic interests (such as fuel transit 
arrangements) rising to the top of the agenda. Due to the dense economic and 
societal links between Russia and its two immediate neighbours, a multitude of 
government agencies, economic interests, political forces and civil society or­
ganisations motivated by different considerations have sought to influence pol­
icy towards Belarus and Ukraine. Public opinion has equally been a far more 
salient factor in this aspect of Russia's external relations than in foreign policy 
as a whole. As a result, the formulation of policy towards Belarus and Ukraine 
has been more pluralistic and fragmented than Realist models presenting 
states as unitary actors would suggest. Notions of a common identity based on 
close historical, ethnic and cultural ties also have to be taken into consideration 
in order to understand the prevalence of integration as the preferred type of re­
lations with Belarus and -  at least in principle -  also with Ukraine. Therefore, 
power projection does not represent an adequate account of the rationale in­
forming Russia's policy towards these countries.
The combination of factors that have shaped Russian policy towards Bela­
rus and Ukraine may not be comprehensively accounted for within the frame­
work of any single theory. Nevertheless, complex interdependence and Amitai 
Etzioni’s theory of leadership provide insights which are particularly pertinent to 
Russia’s conduct towards Belarus and Ukraine. Asymmetric interdependence 
quite accurately describes Russia’s economic relations with its two smaller 
neighbours. It anticipates that Russia’s superiority of resources may not be 
convertible into a proportionate degree of control over outcomes because of 
structural vulnerabilities (e.g. difficulty of obtaining alternative transportation 
routes for its exports). It thus suggests that the use of economic blackmail tac­
tics (e.g. threats to suspend fuel supplies) to extract political or economic con­
cessions would entail prohibitive costs for the Russian economy, albeit less 
than those for Belarus or Ukraine. Rather, the presence of a wide array of non- 
hierarchically ordered issues in the agenda of bilateral relations presents link­
age opportunities, which may - on different occasions -  be used to Russia’s 
advantage or to maximise the bargaining strengths of Belarus or Ukraine.^ The 
interests of domestic constituencies (e.g. regions and economic sectors relying 
on reliable transactions with Belarus or Ukraine) represent further constraints
 ^ Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, second edition, Lon­
don: Harper-Coliins, 1989, pp. 16-18, 32-34
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on the options considered by Russian policy makers. Interdependence theory 
incorporates this factor by linking the inter-connectedness of economies and 
societies with a reduction in the autonomy of the foreign policy domain from 
that of domestic politics. The framework of complex interdependence refers to 
regional contexts within which resort to military force is not only economically 
inexpedient but is effectively absent from policy makers considerations."^ Ac­
cording to the evidence gathered by this study, the Russian foreign policy 
community has been highly aware of the economic constraints imposed by in­
terdependence and regards the use of force against Belarus or Ukraine as 
practically unthinkable. Etzioni’s leadership theory closely corresponds to the 
rationale of Russia’s overall restraint from coercive policy instruments and use 
of positive incentives as a means of establishing alignment or integration as a 
security-enhancing and economically rewarding foreign policy orientation for 
neighbouring states.
Paul D’Anieri has argued that interdependence theory is not the most appro­
priate framework for looking at the Russia-Ukraine inter-relationship.® He sug­
gests that, in the context of the former Soviet Union, policy-makers’ preoccupa­
tion with state sovereignty and security considerations (key parameters in Real­
ist analysis) overshadows their concern for economic welfare and even -  in 
some cases -  decision-making autonomy. In such a context, the salience, 
however indisputable, of economic interdependence would be reduced to a 
secondary role. A Realist perspective would, therefore, be better suited to 
understanding the dynamics of Russia’s relations with its immediate 
neighbours. Even if a preoccupation with sovereignty and fears over security 
dominated Ukrainian foreign policy makers’ thinking during the period on which 
D’Anieri's analysis focuses, the findings of the present study suggest that this 
has not been the case after the conclusion of 'the Big Treaty’ of 1997.
Some sections of the Ukrainian elite continue to see Russia as a potential 
source of threats to national security, especially if the latter term is defined 
rather broadly to include non-interference in domestic issues and policy-making 
processes. Despite residual caution regarding Russian intentions, Ukrainian 
foreign policy under Kuchma has not been premised on an antagonistic rela­
tionship with Russia. Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ and military cooperation with
Ibid., pp. 25-29
® Paul J. D’ Anieri, Economic Interdependence In Ukrainlan-Russian Relations. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999
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NATO have been the product of diverse considerations advanced by a multi­
tude of constituencies. Many of these groups do not view this orientation as an 
alternative to close relations with Russia, let alone as a means of defending 
Ukrainian independence from what is perceived to be a hostile neighbour. The 
Ukrainian leadership’s active encouragement of Russian investment in the pri­
vatisation of so-called strategic enterprises shows that a strategy of reducing 
economic interaction with Russia in the interests of national security and sover­
eignty has been discredited. Officials from elite sections representing the core 
of the pro-Kuchma forces, who were interviewed by the author, expressed dis­
satisfaction with what they perceived as Russian arrogance. They were, how­
ever, entirely dismissive of suggestions that Ukraine was being subjected to 
Russian coercive diplomacy -  including economic pressure. They appeared 
convinced that the current pattern of relations (especially in the economic field) 
was more beneficial to Ukraine than to Russia and perceived no security threat 
emanating from Russia.®
The presence of several conceptions of national identity, corresponding to 
the political cleavages along regional, ethnic and linguistic lines, is of particular 
relevance to understanding the prominence of foreign policy programmes in 
Ukraine's domestic politics and the constraints on the policy options available 
to the country’s leadership. Broader-than-national notions of identity (East 
Slavic/Soviet; ‘greater Russian’ identity) form a crucial component of the endur­
ing appeal of integration with Russia among the Belarusian elite and mass pub­
lic. They equally underlie the legitimacy of the integration process in Russia, 
where the Union has been surrounded by an aura of ideological ‘correctness’, 
sheltering it from frontal attacks that could question its very desirability and con­
test any immediate material losses incurred in its course.^ The strong legiti­
macy of integration has enabled the Russia-Belarus Union to depart from the 
path suggested by the theory of neo-functionalism, formulated to account for 
the development of the European Community. Instead of a step-by-step ap­
proach starting from relatively narrow technical policy areas within the eco­
nomic domain, Russo-Belarusian integration began from the identity-charged
Author’s interviews, October-November 1999; Chapter Four.
 ^Nye assigns this iegitimising function, protecting an integration process from attacks on the 
grounds of short-term losses, to the presence of a sense of a common regional identity. J.S. 
Nye, Peace In Parts: Integration and Confiict in Reaionai Organization. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1971, p. 73
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sectors of defence and foreign policy. Although positive perceptions of the 
European Union as a successful example of regional integration led to the 
adoption of an institutional structure inspired by the EU model, the Russia- 
Belarus Union has lacked a powerful supranational authority.® Policy making at 
Union level has taken the form of inter-governmental negotiations.
In the absence of a firm step with far-reaching policy ramifications of a more 
or less compelling character such as monetary union, the integration process 
cannot be said to have acquired what neo-functionalist theory describes as a 
self-propelling dynamic making integration rather hard to reverse (‘spill-over’). If 
the two countries’ leaderships lose the motivation to persevere with the imple­
mentation of existing agreements, popular apathy and the quiet abandonment 
of the process may be likely outcomes, in the opposite case, the comprehen­
sive objectives established at the outset of the integration process limit the op­
portunity to probe for functional spill-over effects. In the Russo-Belarusian case, 
the decision to proceed with monetary union has preceded the completion of 
the custom union (an earlier stage according to the neo-functionalist hierarchy 
of policy sectors). Therefore, an expansion in the scope and level of Union ac­
tivity may not be fully attributed to a wish to maximise the material rewards re­
sulting from the successful integration of ‘take-off sectors’. The record of 
Russo-Belarusian integration confirms the fundamental importance of a con­
vergence in national leaderships’ policy agendas, emphasised by neo­
functionalists and other theorists of regional integration. The shared anxiety 
over NATO’s eastward expansion and over its strategic concept sanctioning 
military intervention without UN Security Council (and therefore Russian) ap­
proval has given impetus to integration between Russia and Belarus in the field 
of defence. By contrast, the divergence between the Russian leadership’s -  al­
beit at times wavering -  commitment to the establishment of a functioning mar­
ket economy and the Belarusian effort to preserve elements of the Soviet eco­
nomic system has adversely affected movement towards a unified economic 
space. The measures taken by the Belarusian government to approximate 
monetary union conditions have provided some evidence in favour of Etzioni’s 
insight that a leading state shouldering most of the initial costs may induce 
smaller integration partners to adopt the integration agenda.
® In this respect, it resembles other regional groupings inspired from the European Union such 
as the Latin American Mercosur.
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Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in the European context
In considering the question whether disintegrative or centripetal tendencies 
have prevailed in Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus over the period 
covered by the study, it may be said that the region has become overall more 
cohesive. This refers to the régularisation of political contacts, the shift of focus 
in inter-governmental negotiations from dispute resolution to the upgrading of 
existing relations and also to the arrest (and partial reversal) of the decline in 
economic interaction that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, with the marked exception of Belarus, the region has become more 
integrated in the wider European area by developing political dialogue, func­
tional cooperation and more extensive economic and societal interaction with 
Western and (especially in the case of Ukraine) Central Europe.
The international isolation of Belarus might appear to confirm the suggestion 
that the economic and identity-related pull of Russia drives Belarus in an east­
ern direction, away from the rest of Europe. Ukraine would then seem to be 
moving in the opposite direction, the objective of accession to the EU pointing 
westwards, away from Russia. There are, however, important limitations to this 
intuitively appealing model. The first pertains to the domestic origins of the Bel­
arusian authorities’ neglect of relations with countries to the west of the border. 
Neither the alignment of Belarus with Russian diplomatic positions nor military 
integration with Russia have pushed the Belarusian leadership to turn its back 
on the western dimension of the country’s external relations. None of these fac­
tors has prompted the rest of Europe to isolate Belarus, defence-related con­
cerns raised in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania notwithstanding. Russia’s own re­
lations with the EU, NATO and their member-states have been much more ex­
tensive and on the whole congenial. It has been the authoritarian behaviour of 
the Lukashenko administration towards its political opponents and the media 
that has alienated most European leaders.
In addition, the socio-economic model favoured by the Belarusian admini­
stration has come to represent a major impediment to further integration with 
Russia. While the Belarusian economy has been supported by high levels of 
Russian direct and indirect subsidies, the lag in economic reform appears to 
have restricted the extent to which Belarus has been able to benefit from the
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Russian economic recovery since 1999.® To a certain degree, the same could 
be said of Ukraine, where the first positive growth rates (in 2000) since inde­
pendence have been connected to the improved climate in the Russian mar­
ket.''® Despite the Belarusian commitment to economic integration with Russia, 
Ukraine has been more open to Russian investment. The economic aspect of 
Russo-Belarusian integration is not, nevertheless, reducible to Russian eco­
nomic support and the revival of Soviet-era trade and production links. Follow­
ing the speedy removal of bilateral trade restrictions, the integration process 
has entailed continuous inter-governmental negotiation over the precise terms 
of economic unification (e.g. external trade regulation; monetary union condi­
tions; tax standardisation; privatisation in Belarus). With the clarification of Rus­
sia’s economic course after Putin’s election to the presidency, it has become 
clear that the Belarusian leadership will have little choice but to follow in Rus­
sia’s tracks or risk economic isolation. Since the launching of the integration 
process, Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia (especially as an export 
destination) has increased. As a result of the Russian leadership’s intention to 
further approximate European economic and legal norms in order to attract for­
eign investment and improve its position in the EU market, Belarus is likely to 
be brought into what is set to become a common European economic space. 
This is the expectation reflected in the Belarusian foreign policy community’s 
favoured notion of integration into Europe with Russia.
These dynamics are to some extent pertinent also to the case of Ukraine, 
where Russian investors’ complaints have closely resembled those of their 
Western counterparts. The Ukrainian leadership’s declared intention to seek 
EU membership has so far not been matched by a determined effort to meet 
accession criteria, the pace of reform having been overall slower than in Rus-
Since Russia’s return to economic growth in 1999, Belarusian growth rates have increasingiy 
iagged behind. In 1999, the Russian economy grew by 3.5% as opposed to 3% for Belarus. In 
2000 the gap widened, as Russia posted growth of 7.7% as compared to the Beiarusian econ­
omy’s 5.8%. Growth rates in 2001 are predicted at 3.4% and 2% respectively. European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update. London: EBRD, April 2001, p. 
15
ibid., p. 95. In 2000, the Ukrainian economy showed growth (of 6%; 12.9% in industrial out­
put) for the firs time since the country’s emergence as an independent state. The projected rate 
for 2001 is 3.5%.
This term was introduced during the European Union-Russia summit of May 2001 and refers 
to progressive approximation of economic legislation and trade liberalisation.
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sia.''^ For both Belarus and Ukraine, a far more resolute approach to economic 
reform will be necessary in order to draw closer to Western and Central Europe 
or/and Russia. At the same time, the feasibility of external orientations almost 
exclusively focused on either Russia or ‘the West’ appears increasingly prob­
lematic, as indicated by the Ukrainian leadership’s reassessment of relations 
with Russia, especially in the economic field. Both Belarusian and Ukrainian 
foreign policy-makers have had some success in taking advantage of their 
counties’ strategic positions to extract political support and economic rewards 
from Russia or Euro-Atlantic organisations and their member-states. Neither 
Belarus nor Ukraine could, however, hope to base their longer-term economic 
prospects on geopolitical rivalry between Russia and ‘the West’. The very pres­
ence of such a rivalry is rather precarious and limited to certain aspects of in­
ternational affairs (e.g. military intervention in conflicts). The Kuchma 
administration’s record of alternatively favouring competing Russian and 
Western preferences (e.g. with regard to NATO military activity on Ukrainian 
territory) has impaired its perceived reliability as a partner particularly in the 
eyes of Russian policy-makers. Besides, economic dividends of political loyalty 
(e.g. debt rescheduling or other credits; subsidies in trade or direct assistance) 
could not be expected to provide long-term solutions.
The Belarusian and Ukrainian authorities have been increasingly faced with 
the need to increase their economies’ international competitiveness as export­
ers and investment destinations. While the reform prescriptions of Russia and 
Western creditors have presented considerable overlap, Russian expectations 
have often been accompanied by less demanding conditions (e.g. with regard 
to the repayment of credits). As far as political conditions are concerned, rather 
conveniently for the Kuchma and Lukashenko administrations, the Russian 
leadership (itself not free from international criticism) has not followed the ex­
ample of the European Union, NATO and their member-states in demanding 
stricter observance of democratic norms and human rights. To Belarus and 
Ukraine alike, Russia will continue to be essential as an export market and 
equally as an investor in sectors (notably heavy industry) occupying central po­
sitions in their national economies, which Western companies would not be in­
clined to invest in. Indeed, the future economic prospects of both countries will
This is not to overlook that Ukraine showed marked progress in economic reform (balanced 
budget; low inflation; reduction of barter transactions; real GDP growth) in 2000 and, in some 
aspects (e.g. land privatisation), the reform process has been more advanced than in Russia.
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depend on their ability to convert functional complementarity, geographical 
proximity and structural interdependence with Russia into advantages for im­
proving their position in the wider European economy. The current globalised 
economic order favours closely integrated regions, fully connected to their 
broader environment. To the extent that the Russia-Belarus Union may eventu­
ally succeed in establishing a unified economic space at the same time as -  
primarily through Russian efforts -  becoming increasingly linked to Western 
Europe, it could evolve into a sub-region of a wider European economic space. 
This would add to its appeal to other ‘outsiders’ of the EU integration process. 
Such a prospect has been reflected in the Moldovan leadership’s declared in­
terest in the possibility of accession to the Russia-Belarus Union in parallel with 
the country’s pursuit of EU membership. Although the latter objective has been 
considered - in principle - more rewarding, it is also deemed very hard to attain, 
particularly in view of Moldovan economic conditions.^®
Should the process of integration with Russia disappoint Belarusian hopes, it 
might be extremely difficult for the country’s leadership to aim for membership 
of the EU instead. In the case of Ukraine, a protracted period of exclusion from 
EU accession negotiations may further moderate the elite’s reluctance to con­
template economic integration with Russia. The early stages of West European 
integration provide a potentially meaningful analogy. In his examination of the 
British debate on relations with the EEC during the 1950s, Ernst Haas ob­
served a shift from all parties’ original unwillingness to consider membership of 
any supranational organisation to a general eagerness for association, initially 
through membership of the free trade area.^"' To this he offered the following 
explanation: “Fear of isolation became a potent catalyst to the spill-over proc­
ess.”''® The relatively inflexible cleavage structure of Ukrainian domestic politics 
and elite aspirations to a prominent international role effectively preclude join-
in a statement to Moldovan news agency ‘Infotag’, the Moldovan President said of his ad­
ministration’s external orientation: "We are not against integration into the European Union. But 
this is a long perspective, as a multitude of conditions need to be met for this. We seek to de­
velop cooperation with all countries. Why not our integrating (sic) into the European community 
together with Russia and Belarus?" Infotaa. 23 April 2001 (www.mldnet.com/infotaay See also 
Nezavisimava Qazeta. 3 March 2001, p. 5 
E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958, pp. 159- 
161, 314-317
Ibid., p. 315. In this case, the concept of spill-over (i.e. self-propelling logic of integration) re­
fers to the expansion of EEC membership.
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ing the Russo-Belarusian Union in its current highly Institutionalised and milita­
rised form. A more informal arrangement (e.g. a free-trade area) may be politi­
cally more acceptable and, therefore, provide a more realistic alternative. Such 
an option could be compatible with the possible inclusion of Ukraine in a later 
stage of the EU enlargement process. Though the Russian leadership has not 
been enthusiastic about its neighbours participating in institutional arrange­
ments of which Russia is not a member (most notably in the case of NATO), it 
has not opposed Ukraine’s ‘European choice’. This has been partly due to 
Russian scepticism regarding Ukraine’s ‘European prospects’. It has also been 
a function of Ukraine’s ‘European choice’ largely running parallel with Russia’s 
own approach to the European Union, though the latter does not envisage 
membership.
Russian policy is, therefore, very unlikely to become a barrier to Ukraine’s 
pursuit of EU candidate status, whose attainment will, nevertheless, presup­
pose a remarkable acceleration of Ukraine’s movement towards EU criteria as 
well as a redefinition of the feasible limits of the process from the part of the 
EU. Still, Russia has shown little propensity for taking the initiative in upgrading 
relations with its neighbours, typically waiting for specific proposals from the 
Belarusian and Ukrainian administrations. Ukrainian policy-makers have in­
creasingly suggested that more harmonious political relations, more extensive 
economic ties and even closer security cooperation with Russia could help their 
country draw closer to ‘Europe’. Both the Russian and Ukrainian foreign policy 
communities are becoming more aware of the international dimension of bilat­
eral relations, viewing strengthened bilateral ties as an important mechanism 
for approximating EU socio-economic conditions and enhancing their contribu­
tion to Europe-wide security.'"® Thus, a new thinking may be said to be emerg­
ing, predicated on a conception of convergence with an enlarging European 
Union and of Russo-Ukrainian bilateral rapprochement (in the political, eco­
nomic and security spheres alike) not as antithetical but as parallel, mutually 
reinforcing processes. The coming years will test this new thinking and present 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine with the challenge of further reducing residual 
tensions and suspicions in order to draw closer to one another and to the rest 
of Europe at the same time.
Confidential statements (under Chatham House rules and in private discussions with the au­
thor) by senior Russian and Ukrainian officials. Belgium, spring 2001 ; United Kingdom, autumn 
2001.
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Appendix: 
List of elite interviews 
United Kingdom
December 1998;
• Senior diplomat, Consulate-general of the Russian Federation in 
Edinburgh
• Senior diplomat, Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the U.K.
Kiev
October 1999;
• Ihor Kyrylchuk, adviser to the Verkhovna Rada Environmental
Committee adviser 
® Senior diplomat, Ukrainian representation in the UN
© Igor Pilyaev, adviser to the Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee
© Retro Pavlichenko, director of the Regional Environmental Centre
(Western and state- sponsored, formally independent
organisation)
© Colonel Alexander Mananchinsky and
Andrei Solovyev, National Institute of Strategic Studies 
© Dr Aleksy Plotnikov and
Dr Valery Novitsky, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
© Yaroslav Pilinsky, Deputy director of the Institute for Democracy;
representative of Carnegie Endowment in Ukraine 
® Andrei Nosenko, Social Democratic Party (pro-Kuchma) Headquarters
© Colonel-general working in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence
November 1999;
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• Alexander Levchenko,
Alexander Parfionov, and
Alexander Medved, Ukrainian Centre for International Security Studies
• Ivanna Klympush, East-West Institute
• Vladimir Granovsky, Director of the “Agency for Humanitarian 
Technologies” (economic consultancy firm working for the Ukrainian 
government)
• Dmitry Vydrin, Director of the European Institute of Integration and 
Development; adviser to the Ukrainian government
• Aleksei Tolpygo, Kiev Centre of Political Research and Conflict Studies
• Hrihory Nemirya, Director of European and International Studies,
Institute of International Relations, Kiev Taras Shevchenko
University
• Vasil Boiko, Director of Secretariat, Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
(the most right-wing party in the Verkhovna Rada)
• Anatoly Gutsal, First Deputy Director, and
Valery Kuzmenko, Head of the Regional relations Section, National Institute
of Russian- Ukrainian relations (part of the Council for National
Security and Defence)
Minsk
November 1999:
Senior diplomat. Embassy of the UK 
Eva Sotiropoulou-Gropa, Cultural Attaché, Greek Embassy 
Retired General; adviser to President Lukashenko 
Professor Anatoly Rozanov, Faculty of International Relations, 
Belarusian State University
Senior official. Press section, Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Official, Europe Department of the Belarusian MFA 
Panayotis Goumas, Ambassador of Greece with ministerial rank 
Yury Drakokhrust, journalist for “Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta” and 
Radio Liberty/RFE
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Senior official, Department of Union between Belarus and the Russian 
Federation, Belarusian MFA
Senior official, TACIS office, Minsk branch of the EU Delegation to 
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova
Alexander Mikheishin, Assistant Rector, European Humanities 
University
Official, Planning and Strategy Department, Belarusian MFA 
Senior official, Representation in Belarus of the Executive Committee of 
the Union of the Russian Federation and Belarus
Oleg Manaev, Director of the Independent Institute of Socio-economic 
and Political Studies; Professor of Sociology,
Belarusian State University
Leonid Zaiko, President of the analytical centre “Strategy” (formerly 
East-West Institute)
Leonid Zlotnikov, Executive Secretary, United Civic Party; Doctor of 
Economics
Vladimir Radivonchik, Deputy chairman of the United Civil Party of 
Belarus
Myacheslav Gryb, Deputy chairman of the “Gromada” party; former 
Speaker of the Belarusian Parliament
Member of Cabinet of Ministers and Professor at Belarusian State 
University
Aleksandr Kozyr, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs 
and Relations with CIS countries of the Belarusian
Parliament; Deputy chairman of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Union of the Russian Federation and Belarus 
Pavel Daneiko, Director of the “Institute of Management and 
Privatisation” (NGO)
Yury Khadyko, Belarusian Popular Front HQs
Moscow
June 1999;
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• Diplomat, Political Section, Embassy of the Netherlands in the 
Russian Federation
• Arkady Moshes, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences
• Yevgeny Baranovsky, Professor of International Relations, Diplomatic 
Academy of the Russian MFA
• Ivan Mikhailyuk, Press Secretary to the Committee on CIS Affairs, 
Russian State Duma (two interviews were conducted)
• Anatoly Shutov, Director of the CIS Centre, Institute for Current
International Studies, Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA
• Dmitry Trenin, Deputy Director of Moscow Carnegie Centre
• Diplomat, Embassy of Belarus in the Russian Federation
• Irina Selivanova, Institute for International Economic and Political
Research, Russian Academy of Sciences
• Mikhail Savelyev, adviser to the Committee on CIS Affairs, Russian 
State Duma
• Georgy Tikhonov, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS
Affairs and of the All- Russia movement "Soyuz"
• Sergei Bolshakov, Professor of International Relations, Diplomatic 
Academy of the Russian MFA
November 1999:
® Colonel of the Ministry of Interior
• Tamara Guzenkova,
Yury Puzanov, and
Arkady Murashev, Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies
December 1999:
• Igor Goloshapov, leader of the League of Security Enterprises
• Professor Sergei Lizhnev, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian 
Academy of Sciences
@ Senior official, Second CIS Desk (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova), MFA
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• Professor Oleg Ivanov, Diplomatic Academy, Russian MFA
• Vyacheslav Igrunov, Deputy chairman of State Duma Committee on CIS
Affairs; Deputy chairman of Yabloko
• Executive, Department of Operations in CIS countries, Gazprom
o Theodoros Bizakis, Second Secretary, Political Section, Greek Embassy
o Mark Urnov, Director of the Analytical Centre by the government of the
Russian Federation
Yaroslavl
December 1999
• Oleg Posnenov, Press office, Yaroslavl regional administration
• Elena Batuyeva, journalist for the regional newspaper “Karavan Rus”
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